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 During my research on this dissertation, I visited a number of repositories and 
benefitted from the generosity of many individuals.  Specifically, I would like to thank 
Richard Fusik and Mary Francis Morrow of the National Archives who know RG 75 like 
the backs of their hands.  I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the staff at the National 
Archives II in College Park, Maryland, and the staff at the National Archives Regional 
Branch, San Bruno California, who proved invaluable assistance, and went out of their 
way to aid me in my work.  The staff at the Bancroft Library and the California Water 
Resources Library at the University of California, Berkeley tracked down obscure mining 
and water-related materials.  Also, the staff at the Shields Library, University of 
California, Davis, the California Historical Society and the Wells Fargo Museum in San 
Francisco. The staff at the Humboldt Room, Humboldt State University, Arcata, provided 
access to one-of-a-kind documents on the history of northwest California.  United States 
Forest Service personnel in Eureka and Weaverville generously allowed me to consult 
reports and land-use documents produced by their agency.  Finally, thanks to the staff and 
volunteers of the Trinity County Historical Society, Weaverville, California who 
enthusiastically provided access to their impressive collection of documents relating to 
Trinity County.  Among the most enthusiastic people who assisted my work there was 
Patricia Hicks - special thanks to you Patricia, and good luck in your retirement.  
 This dissertation grew out of a contract with the Hoopa Valley Tribal Council for 
a study of the historic navigability of the Trinity River.  I wish to thank the Council and 
tribal attorneys for the opportunity to work with them in their continuing effort to 
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mitigate the long-abused Trinity River, and for allowing me to use the research I 
compiled for them in writing this dissertation.  The Hupa people maintain their strong 
sense of place and still view the Trinity River as central to their world and ensure balance 
for all of us through their continued vigilance, dances and ceremonies.  I would also like 
to thank Dr. Albert Hurtado for his patient guidance as my mentor and friend, and as the 
person without whom I would not have been introduced to the tribal attorney for the 
Hoopa Valley Tribe, nor would I have had the opportunity to research this topic and gain 
invaluable research experience.  Of the numerous people who assisted me in countless 
ways during the writing of this dissertation, I wish to offer thanks.  For their assistant and 
encouragement through dark days and bright, I wish to thank Dr. Eric Henderson for his 
comments, and for helping me see the humor in the writing process; Dr. Joel Shrock for 
comments, great memories fishing for bass at the Ruby Marshes, and for showing me that 
it can get done no matter where you find yourself writing; to Mandi Laughter, friend, 
editor and bright example of how to conduct oneself in the face of unexpected adversity; 
to Dr. Amy Williamsen who graciously read and re-read my drafts, offered advice, and 
provided warm meals and a comfortable working environment; and finally, to the 
numerous people I have forgotten to name specifically who assisted me in researching 
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 This study began as a contract for the Hoopa Valley Tribe of the Hoopa Valley 
Indian Reservation in far northwestern California.  Counsel for the Hupa (the spelling of 
the name of the people is Hupa, as opposed to the name of their valley - Hoopa Valley, 
and tribe, Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe) wanted to answer questions about the history of the 
Trinity River which bisects Hoopa Valley running from south to north until it merges 
with the Klamath River at Wietchpec.  The Klamath then flows northwest to the Pacific 
Ocean.  Today, the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation encompasses not only the 
aboriginal home of the Hupa People (Hoopa Valley, also known as “the Square”) but also 
includes an area running from Wietchpec to the Pacific Ocean reaching 1 mile on either 
side of the Klamath River for a distance of 40 miles.1  Executive Orders issued in the late 
nineteenth century added this additional territory in two sections commonly referred to as 
the “Extension” and the “Connecting Strip.”  Tribal counsel asked that an historian 
research topics on the history of the Trinity River that might reveal the natural state of the 
river before the Bureau of Reclamation dammed and diverted it in the early 1960s by 
building the Trinity River Project, also known as the Trinity River Division (TRD) of the 
Central Valley Project (CVP).  The confidential report for the Hupa Tribe was completed 
in October 2000, and was submitted to the Tribal Attorneys. The conclusions of that 
report are not discussed herein.  However, while researching the issues that concerned 
tribal attorneys, data gathered revealed that the Trinity River and Basin overall underwent 
                                                
 1The Klamath River from Wietchpec to the Pacific is the aboriginal territory of the Yurok Indians. 
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changes of surprising rapidity, with far-reaching consequences for the natural health of 
the Basin, and the people living there, both Indian and non-Indian.  It is that history that 
is addressed in this study. 
 Because of the nature of the question posed by Tribal Counsel, I had to conduct 
research on a wide range of topics and cast my net far enough to catch information that 
might somehow be useful.  This approach became necessary after I began the initial 
reading of published secondary sources.  Soon after I started work on the project, I 
discovered that there is a paucity of published material on the Trinity River Basin, and for 
that matter, all of northwestern California.  The few monographs available are often 
dated, some are inaccurate, and most did not contain the information needed for my 
work.  Local histories were usually written by non-professional history enthusiasts, and 
while long on anecdote and often entertaining, they tend to usually fall short on thorough 
research and analysis.  Because of the lack of published sources, I had to visit numerous 
repositories to gather data for the report for the Tribe, and subsequently conduct 
additional archival research to allow me to write this dissertation.  I worked at National 
Archives I, Washington, D.C., and at the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, 
I conducted research on obscure land records at the Suitland Reference Branch of the 
National Archives in Suitland, Virginia, and at National Archives Regional Branches at 
San Bruno and Laguna Niguel, California (Pacific Region), and Seattle, Washington 
(Pacific-Alaska Region). I also investigated records at the Bancroft Library and the 
California Water Resources Library at the University of California, Berkeley, and at the 
California Room of the California State Library, the California State Archives and the 
California State Water Library in Sacramento.  The Shields Library, University of 
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California, Davis, provided access to materials on irrigation in California.  The California 
Historical Society and the Wells Fargo Museum in San Francisco gave me access to their 
unique collections, and I worked at Humboldt State University, Arcata California as well 
as the Eureka County Historical Society Museum, Eureka, California. The cultural and 
natural resources staff at the Six Rivers National Forest in Eureka and the Forest Service 
Archaeologist in Weaverville, California allowed me to consult reports and land-use 
documents produced by that agency, and the Trinity County Historical Society, 
Weaverville, California, gave me access to manuscript collections and newspaper files 
that are a treasure of data on the region.  Finally, Counsel for the Hoopa Valley provided 
access to their historic data housed at their home office in Seattle, Washington. 
 This is a study of the change over time in the Trinity River Basin. The Trinity 
River Basin in northwestern California is approximately 2,860 square miles.   The 
topography of the Basin is rugged and mountainous, there are few valleys in the Basin, 
and little arable land.  The Basin is in the region that receives the highest yearly rainfall 
totals in all of California, and some of the numerous streams and rivers in the area have 
among the highest discharge levels ever recorded in the State.  In fact, the largest river in 
the Basin, the Trinity River, has a record discharge of 231,000 cubic feet per second 
(cfs), recorded on December 22, 1964. The 170 mile long Trinity River plays a central 
role in this study.2 The Trinity River is one of fourteen major rivers draining 
northwestern California and it is the major tributary of the Klamath River, another river 
                                                
 2This information is synthesized in Jeffrey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams: The Conflict 
Between Fluvial Process and Land Use (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 179.  Mount 




that will play a role herein. 
 Several indigenous groups with varying cultural and land-use practices populated 
northwestern California and the Trinity River Basin prior to white contact in the late 
1840s.  For the Indians living in the Basin and nearby, subsistence was gained by 
exploiting nearby natural resources.  Anadromous fishes, acorns, plant foods and game 
sustained the Indian people of the Basin. In fact, the area was so biologically rich and 
diverse that the Indian people living there never traveled far from their homes in search 
of food.3  They usually only left their home territories to secure trade goods, for war, or 
participate in religious ceremonies.  This small, intimate, pre-contact world was shattered 
by the arrival of non-native peoples after the discovery of gold on the Trinity River in 
1848. The non-Indian people who moved into the Trinity River brought with them a 
wholly different conception of how natural resources were to be used, what made these 
resources “valuable” and a different idea of how resource ownership functioned.  Gold 
was the attraction for non-Indians who ventured to northwestern California, but its 
importance dwindled over time.  By the twentieth century, other resources such as 
anadromous fish, timber and water rose in value and were exploited for profit.  Thus, the 
transformation of the Trinity River Basin that began with the arrival of gold seekers, 
continued in different ways as the types of resources exploited changed and the scale of 
the exploitation increased.  
                                                
 3For an overview of the subsistence practices of the California Indians see, Robert F. Heizer and 
Albert B. Elsasser, The Natural World of the California Indians (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1980).  For specific data on the peoples inhabiting the Trinity and Klamath river region, consult Arnold R. 
Pilling, “Yurok”, in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., 
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 137-154; William J. Wallace, “Hupa, Chilula, and 
Whilkut,” Ibid, 164-179; and William Bright, “Karok,” Ibid.,180-189. 
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 For the pre-contact population living in the Trinity River Basin, especially the 
Hupa Indians, the Trinity River held significance unimaginable to those who arrived after 
the beginning of the Gold Rush. The river was a key source of sustenance for the Basin’s 
indigenous peoples.  Twice a year runs of salmon and other anadromous fishes were 
taken, and Indian fisherman filled food storage baskets that assured survival of their 
families through the lean winter.  As did many peoples of northwestern California, the 
Hupa on the Trinity River, and the Yurok and Karok on the Klamath, assured a return of 
the fish by practicing the proper ceremonial observances and acted to balance the world 
thus ensuring the fish would return again. The success or failure of the river to provide 
could be the difference between life and death.  The river provided life, but the people 
ensured that the river would do so by observing proper ceremonial/religious behavior. 4   
 Rivers physically connected the native people of the region to one another, 
oriented them towards one another, and helped them identify each other.  For practical 
reasons, rivers were avenues of communication for native peoples who used redwood 
canoes, or walked along the trails near the river to meet and trade and celebrate.  But 
rivers also oriented the people in their world.  The terms “upriver” and “down-river” 
defined a person’s place along the river.  In fact, the names for two large tribes along the 
Klamath River below and above the confluence of that river with the Trinity, are the 
Karok and the Yurok.  These names roughly translate as “upriver people” and “down-
                                                
 4Virginia Egan-McKenna, “Persistence with Change: The Significance of Fishing to the Indians of 
the Hoopa Valley Reservation in Northwestern California”, Thesis: University of Colorado, Department of 
Anthropology, 1983., 50. 
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river people” respectively, and were the terms used by their neighbors to describe them.5  
A person gained personal identity from where they lived along regional rivers, but also 
identified others living elsewhere.  Interestingly, today the pre-contact practice of using 
the terms “up-river” and “down-river” to place a person geographically has been adopted 
by the non-indigenous population along the Trinity and Klamath rivers.  The author, 
while sitting in a café in Weaverville, California during research for this dissertation was 
asked by a food server, “I’ve not seen you here before, are you up-river or down-river?” 
 Methods of gold recovery changed over time and became highly industrialized 
and greatly destructive.  Logging and commercial fishing on the coast, combined with 
mining in the Basin to transform the health of the anadromous fishery.  The rivers and 
streams of the Basin became a convenient waste disposal system for mining and logging 
debris, while commercial fishing at the mouth of the Klamath prevented many salmon 
from returning to the Trinity River Basin to spawn.  By the twentieth century, the Hupas 
responded to the changes by mining, logging and irrigation farming in Hoopa Valley.  As 
the twentieth century moved forward and hydroelectric technology advanced, the waters 
of the Trinity River Basin became an important resource to power companies, but as 
agriculture in the Central Valley expanded, the Basin’s water was also seen as a possible 
source of additional cheap irrigation water that from the farmers’ perspective was just 
being wasted.6 
                                                
 5This information has been gathered from many sources. The best single synthesis to consult is 
Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, ed. Robert F. Heizer, Washington, D.C., 
Smithsonian Institution, 1978., 137-154, 180-189, 164-176. 
 6Although water rights and litigation are not addressed in this dissertation, it is important to note 
that one of the earliest water rights cases heard in California involved the rights to water in the Trinity 
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 The participation of the federal government in the construction of massive water-
conveyance systems and hydroelectric projects combined with the rise of agribusiness in 
the Central Valley.  The desire to expand the supply of inexpensive water for growers in 
the Central Valley led the Bureau of Reclamation to build the Trinity River Division 
(TRD) of the Central Valley Project (CVP).  The bureau constructed two large earthen 
dams on the Trinity, impounding the river and diverting more than 80% of the Trinity 
River at the point of diversion.7  The project also included hydroelectric generation 
facilities.  After the completion of the project in the early 1960s the Basin had become 
transformed into a much different place than the one encountered by white miners in the 
early 1850s. 
 Given the significance of this dramatic process of transformation, this study 
focuses upon resource exploitation by humans, and the tensions and competition between 
different interest groups on the federal, State and local levels.  It becomes clear that there 
really was no central decision making process.  All groups played some role, whether 
active or reactive, in moving the history of the Trinity River Basin in the direction it has 
gone. The physical transformation of the Trinity River Basin can best be understood by 
keeping in mind that the Trinity River serves as a barometer of change. It is essential to 
remember that the Trinity River was not static and unchanging before whites invaded the 
region.  Yet the difference between pre and post-contact change along the Trinity River is 
one of time and scale.  While discussing physical alterations in the Basin, changes in the 
                                                                                                                                            
River Basin and the concept of Prior Appropriation.  See Donald J. Pisani, Water, Land, and Law in the 
West: The Limits of Public Policy, 1850-1920 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 24-37. 
 7Jeffrey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams, 328. 
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Trinity River will be noted and will help reveal the magnitude of change that swept the 
Basin and forever altered the lives of the Indian people who lived there.  In fact, the 
experiences of the Indians in the Trinity River Basin–the changes imposed upon them 
and their responses to these changes–serve as a compelling analogy of the dynamic 
process of “modernization.”   Their history embodies the transformation that took place 
within the Basin because of the interplay among various competing interest groups. 
 It is important, however, to have a basic understanding of river behavior in order 
to understand and “read” the Trinity River as a barometer of the larger changes in the 
Basin.  First, it is imperative to note that all rivers seek equilibrium:  a balance between 
the discharge (water flowing down a river) and sediment (sediment and organic material) 
received, combined with the work (energy) that moves discharge and matter along the 
channel.  Put simplistically, the profile of a river is determined by how much matter and 
discharge it receives, the work it does in moving it, and the geological material over 
which it passes.  This process determines a river’s channel characteristics.  As Jeffrey 
Mount, a California-based Geomorphologist succinctly states:  
The concave-up longitudinal profiles of rivers and their alluvial flood 
plains with the meandering channels and associated riffles and pools are 
all the product of the rivers’ attempt to spread that work out as evenly as 
possible.  In this manner rivers are self-regulating, evolving just the right 
pattern and profile to handle the amount of discharge and sediment 
delivered to them.  This balance is termed grade (not to be confused with 
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slope or gradient) and records a state of equilibrium within a river system.8 
Rivers, therefore, are continually adjusting to changes in discharge and matter provided 
to it by its watershed.  
 It may appear to the casual observer that a river changes drastically in its channel 
characteristics within short periods of time, say ten to a hundred years.  But when looked 
at over a much longer period of time, hundreds, or even thousands of years, 
geomorphologists theorize that rivers actually change relatively slowly around a mean 
condition.  “ Short- and medium-term variations will continue to take place, but they will 
shift around some slowly changing mean condition.”9  It takes a significant disruption in 
the system, such as geologic uplift, climate change, or highly disruptive land-use 
practices, to alter the long-term mean condition of a river system.  The abrupt, seemingly 
obvious changes to a river channel noticed by a person in a single lifetime are usually 
only short-term river channel adjustments related to discharge, matter and energy, and 
these occur around the long-term mean condition of the system.  Therefore, for a river 
where there have been no major tectonic events, climatic changes, or extreme permanent 
alterations of the river system (for example, by erecting a dam), the river will overcome 
the observable changes it experiences because of floods, drought, or even the deposition 
of large amounts of debris.10 
                                                
 8Jeffrey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams, 10. 
 9Jeffrey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams, 11. 
 10Jeffrey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams, 11-15. The theory upon which this discussion 
is based, dynamic metastable equilibrium, was conceived by Stanley Schumm and synthesized by Mount.  
The theory suggests that significant change in a river system takes place in two ways: extreme, or dramatic 
shifts over short periods of time, with gradual shifts over a long period of time in between.  This process 
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 The Trinity River, like any river, experienced slow change over a long period of 
time. Abrupt disruptions occasionally occurred, such as floods, droughts, and landslides, 
but these events were overcome by the system that continued seeking equilibrium.  Taken 
together over a long period of time, these changes would have altered the river’s flow 
regime, sediment load, chemistry and morphological characteristics. The rapid, short-
term changes would have been obvious to the pre-contact inhabitants along the Trinity 
River.  The Indians of the Trinity River Basin witnessed floods, droughts, and other 
events that caused obvious short-term changes in the river system such as extreme 
deposition or erosion.  These events may have been severe enough to interfere with the 
runs of anadromous fishes, but the fish eventually returned to the Trinity.  The long 
periods of slow change, on the other hand, would have been imperceptible to the Native 
peoples along the river. The Trinity continued to doing its “work” by moving water and 
depositing or moving sediment because of the energy that propels any river system.  
Once disturbed by a disruptive event, the forces that created the river’s characteristics 
continued operating, moving the river back toward a “balance” around a long-term mean 
condition.  The river, we know, never achieved a perfectly balanced, unchanging state, 
but it did not change drastically within the lifetime of the average human being.11  All 
that began changing with the arrival of non-indigenous peoples in the late 1840s. 
                                                                                                                                            
eventually changes the long-term mean condition of the system. 
 11While this study relies heavily upon the work of Jeffrey Mount, for additional information about 
river dynamics, see California Rivers: A Public Trust Report (Sacramento: California State Lands 
Commission, 1993); Geoffrey E. Petts, Impounded Rivers: Perspectives for Ecological Management, (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1984); Natural and Anthropogenic Influences in Fluvial Geomorphology : the 
Wolman Volume, John E. Costa, et al, eds. (Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union, 1995); G.P. 
Williams and M.G. Wolman, Downstream Effects of Dams on Alluvial Rivers, U.S. Geological Survey 
Professional Paper Number 1286. (Washington, D.C.: 1984). 
 
11 
 The fact that long-term change in rivers usually occurs slowly is significant to this 
study for three reasons.  Among the most important relates to the wildlife that evolved 
within the river system.  The aquatic fauna that evolved in the Trinity River, most notably 
the anadromous fishes and the organisms they fed upon could–and did– adapt to the long-
term changes in the system.  Moreover, these animals could recover from short term 
dramatic events that periodically impacted the river.  The fauna within the river adapted 
to the system over many centuries and became dependent upon certain river conditions 
for survival.  Because these animals became dependent upon the system as it operated, 
they became part of the system itself.  If a cataclysmic event occurred that quickly altered 
the river and permanently altered the factors that controlled the system to which they 
were adapted (such as permanent reduction in the discharge or permanent increase of the 
sediment load), the impact upon wildlife could be devastating.12 
 The second reason that the way a river experiences change over time is important 
to this study is because long-term change had significant implications for people too - 
especially the people that depended upon a functioning, relatively predictable system.  
For indigenous peoples who relied heavily upon the anadromous fishes of a river system 
for their subsistence, any catastrophic change to that system resulting in a major decline 
or elimination of anadromous fishes could have deadly consequences.  This simple 
example tells us that many northwest California Indian groups were intimately tied to the 
rivers where they lived.  While they could overcome short term events and long term 
                                                
 12Every river is unique because of the rock (geology) over which it flows, its altitude, the climate, 
temperature, flow regime, chemistry, gradient, and plant communities on its banks.  These characteristics 
determine which species will live in a river.  Because a river is a negative feedback system, disruption of a 
rivers characteristics can have catastrophic consequences for the river’s aquatic fauna. 
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change over time, if something altered the river drastically, and permanently, these 
people could find themselves in a precarious situation.  Obviously, this was the state of 
things for the Native peoples living along the Trinity River once the area was penetrated 
by non-indigenous peoples whose culture included a wholly different land-use ethic. 
 The final reason that the rate at which a river changes is significant relates to the 
arrival in the Trinity River watershed of large numbers of non-Indian peoples, mostly 
Euro-Americans, beginning with the gold rush.  Beginning around 1850 and continuing 
thereafter, Euro-American land use activities continually disrupted the Trinity River 
system in ways comparable to the short-term, cataclysmic natural events.  Deposition of 
mining debris is the most obvious, but there were water diversions, semi permanent dams 
and severe erosion that accompanied logging.  These activities increased the sediment 
load of the river, fouled the water, killed fish and destroyed the habitat upon which the 
fish relied making it difficult for fish populations to recover.  The reduction of fish 
populations is the most important reason the indigenous peoples of the Basin began 
resisting the invasion of the region by outsiders.  
 By the mid-1860s, the United States Army and State militia succeeded in 
subduing the indigenous population of northwestern California.  Warfare, a severe 
reduction in population, and confinement to reservations removed the Indians as an 
obstacle to the process of Euro-American settlement. The way was opened for the 
unbridled development of the resources of northwestern California and the Trinity River 
watershed.  The Euro-American world view held that the natural resources in the region 
were commodities available for exploitation within a free market system.  By the 1850s, 
this non-indigenous world view had reached every corner of California and the West.  
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While opening of the Trinity River Basin was an environmentally destructive process, the 
events that impacted the Trinity River were not unique, and should be understood as part 
of the process that Thomas Berry had described as, “the globalization of destruction;” the 
process whereby the Trinity River was linked to the outside world and its commodity-
driven western European inspired economic system.13 
  By the 1950-1960s, the most significant non-Indian impact upon the Trinity 
River Basin came about with the permanent alteration of the long term mean condition of 
the Basin river system.  This occurred because of the construction of the massive Trinity 
River Division (TRD) of the Central Valley Project.  The TRD diverted 80% of the 
Trinity River out of the Basin at the point of diversion and significantly reduced the 
overall discharge received by the Trinity River and the work it could do moving 
sediment. The drastic decline in the amount of water in the river, combined with the 
inflow of a large amount of sediment from mining and logging operations in the Trinity 
Basin, transformed the river.14  The diversion almost completely eliminated the seasonal 
high flows and flooding that were so critical to the functioning of the Trinity River and 
the health of the aquatic communities dependent upon them.15  With a drastically reduced 
flow and an increase in sediment, the river could no longer scour itself, nor could it 
maintain the riffle-pool habitat necessary to maintain an healthy anadromous fishery.  For 
the Indian peoples of the Trinity River Basin, the construction of the TRD was most 
                                                
 13The phrase “globalization of destruction” is from Thomas Berry, interviewed on New 
Dimensions Broadcasting Network, Program #2611. www.newdimensions.org. 
 14The sediment load was augmented by the presence of historic mining debris. 
 15Jeffrey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams., 328-29. 
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significant change wrought upon the river system and those changes are still being felt 
today.  Non-indigenous resource exploitation within the Trinity River watershed altered 
the river on the scale of a major tectonic event in a very brief period of time.  “In the 
geologic blink of an eye, a billion years of California river processes were 
transformed.”16  
 The goal of this study is to understand the changes imposed on the Trinity River 
Basin by outsiders, and how various interest groups fueled that change.  First, it will 
address the history of the activities of Euro-Americans seeking to use the resources of the 
Trinity River Basin, and how these activities altered the river.  Gold, fish, timber and 
water were the resources that brought Euro-Americans to the region, and the exploitation 
of each resource had an important impact on the river.  Second, this study will examine 
how some Native peoples adapted to the exploitation of the resources and changes 
wrought by Euro-Americans.  To understand these changes, it is necessary to examine 
specific resource-related activities.  The changes brought to the Trinity River watershed 
permanently altered the river’s morphology, and also impacted the lives of Native 
peoples living along its course and their close relationship to the Trinity.  Within this 
context, many federal and state policies and decisions are interpreted as attempts to 
satisfy Euro-Americans desire to exploit the region’s natural resources for their own 
benefit within the larger context of the expanding western European type economic 
system.  Also, the polices and decisions regarding the Native peoples of the region are 
interpreted as an effort to reconcile the presence of Native peoples closely tied to the 
                                                
 16Jeffrey F. Mount, California Rivers and Streams, 190. 
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region's natural resources with the desire of Euro-Americans to exploit those resources. 
Decisions seemingly unrelated to the lives of Native peoples nevertheless had unintended 
consequences for them and the river itself, while the policies and decisions aimed directly 
at them often failed to fully achieve their stated goals.  The indigenous inhabitants, once 
subdued, were to be decoupled from their pre-contact land use practices, and reconnected 
to the land in such a way as to mirror Euro-American land use practices as well as 
economic and environmental values.  The shift in the Basin from a wholly indigenous to 
a mostly European way of using and perceiving the river and the resources associated 
with it did not wipe away the region’s Indigenous peoples, many still hold a distinctly 
non-European world view of the Trinity River. 
 Before contact, several distinct Native cultures thrived throughout the Trinity 
River Basin.  When it is necessary to discuss the Native peoples of the region in this 
study, I focus most heavily upon the Hupa Indians.  At contact the Hupa were well 
established in Hoopa Valley which is one of the few areas suitable for agriculture along 
the Trinity River, although the Hupas did not farm.  They had a productive relationship 
with their surroundings, with the Trinity River and its resources, and with their neighbors.  
These relationships were not only social, political and economic, but spiritual as well.  
Spiritual belief permeated their daily experiences giving meaning to their lives, 
relationships and actions, and particularly their relation with natural resources.  The Hupa 
were a significant presence in the region, and were numerous and powerful enough to 
maintain their presence in their traditional home to this very day.  Unlike most of the 
regions’ indigenous population, the Hupa managed to hold fast in their clash with white 
invaders.  Eventually they were assigned a reservation, but rather than being removed, the 
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federal government merely drew a line around their valley and left them where they were 
first encountered by whites: Hoopa Valley. 
 The time frame examined herein is from the arrival of the first non-Indians early 
in the nineteenth century, through the completion of the Trinity River Division of the 
Central Valley Project in 1964.  Throughout this period the health of the Trinity River has 
been a barometer of change wrought by the activities of non-Natives along its course.  
The world view held by the Hupa and their neighbors was incompatible with that of those 
who invaded the region in the nineteenth century.  The experiences of the Hupa Indians 
and the changes to which they have adapted are better understood through an 
examination of the changes wrought upon the Trinity River and its Basin.  These events 
began when Euro-Americans discovered gold on the river in 1848, and continued long 
thereafter.  The Hupa remained in Hoopa Valley, but they adapted to many changes and 
chose to, or were forced to, considerably alter their lives.  The manipulations of the 
Trinity River since the mid-nineteenth century, whether for private or public use, are 
overtly displayed, and because of the competition between, and the activities of private, 
state and federal interests, the controversy over how to use the Trinity River still 
continues.17  
 This dissertation will not address the evolution of water rights, nor the conflicts 
related to water rights.  I am well aware that water rights play a crucial role in the overall 
history of the region and look forward to addressing these issues fully in a later study.  It 
is also important to remember that activities affecting the lives of the Hupa and other 
                                                




indigenous peoples did not always take place in Hoopa Valley or along the Trinity River.  
Often, events upriver, down river, and well outside the region had as much significance 
as events occurring within the watershed. The completion of the Trinity River Division of 
the Central Valley Project marked a new era in the history of the river brought about by 
rising environmental consciousness and a divergence of state-federal policy in the 
management and use of California's rivers.  The Trinity River Division, officially 
completed in 1964, irreversibly linked the Trinity River with the waters of the Central 
Valley Project creating new bureaucratic federal and state involvement in the 
management of the river.  After 1964 the Trinity River was inextricably tied to intrastate 
and inter-basin water management issues and controversies that are well beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
 The present study begins by addressing the pre-contact peoples of the Trinity 
River  Basin and their subsistence practices, life ways and religions in relation to their 
environment.   In Chapter Two, I look at the arrival in the Basin of the first non-Indian 
peoples, their interaction with the native inhabitants and the ensuing struggles over 
resource use and control.  Chapter Three explores the efforts of the Federal Government 
and local non-Indian attempts to remove Indians from the region or confine them to 
reservations in order to clear the way for their exploitation of natural resources.  Chapter 
Four examines the rise of industrialized gold mining, logging and the impact of these 
activities on the anadromous fishery of the Trinity River Basin.  Chapter Five focuses on 
the changing life ways of the Hupa people after the dawn of the twentieth century and 
explores their efforts to direct their own economic future within the Trinity River Basin.   
They attempted to adapt gold mining, logging and irrigation as viable responses to the 
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changes imposed upon them and their land by others.  The final chapter analyzes how 
interests from outside the Trinity River Basin sought to exploit the major remaining 
resource of the region–water–by diverting the Trinity River, taking 80% of its flow from 
the Basin,  for their own purposes without regard for the region’s inhabitants.   At the end 
of this period, the Trinity River and the Basin become linked to the larger irrigation and 
electrical power systems of the Central Valley with outside forces determining how the 
Basin’s water is managed. 
 This study was influenced by numerous articles, essays and monographs 
addressing a number of topics.  While there are many monographs on the west, water, 
gold, timber, American Indians, Indian-White relations, changes along rivers, and 
changes within river basins. The Basin has a unique history that does not fit nicely into 
previous approaches to similar topics.  Three historic monographs did inform my 
approach to the Basin as the scene of change over time brought about by competing 
interest groups.  The studies are Robert Kelly Schneiders’ Unruly River: Two Centuries 
of Change Along the Missouri (1999); Karl Jacoby’s Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, 
Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation (2001); and James 
C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (1998).  Schneiders’ Unruly River addresses the topic of change along the 
Missouri River by looking at the changes caused not only by bureaucracies such as the 
Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, but also changes caused by the 
actions of local peoples living near the river in towns and communities suffering from 
floods and ice floes.  The river was also modified to help steamship companies that 
persuaded the federal government to alter the river to improve navigation for commerce.  
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Finally, Schneider addresses the changes made to the Missouri River brought about by 
the river’s unruly behavior itself.  Attempts at flood control, channelization, and 
damming the river to control its unruly behavior altered the Missouri, but with unforeseen 
consequences.  Throughout the study, it is the competition between interest groups that 
drove changes along the Missouri. 
 Jacoby’s Crimes Against Nature looks at the rise of the American conservation 
movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Essentially, Jacoby states that 
the historic myth of the conservation movement is that it arose with the likes of Marsh, 
Fernow and Pinchot, and other early adherents to conservation, and that prior to the 
conservation movement, “rural” folk, within the myth of American rugged individualism, 
did as they pleased in the natural world and exploited nature and her bounty with no 
regard for others, the future of the resource, or the natural landscape.  Yet Jacoby shatters 
that myth by showing that rural people, from white settlers in the Adirondacks to 
Havasupai Indians in the Grand Canyon, exercised “local, extra-legal” systems of control 
over their resources that worked well for them within their particular circumstances. 
Jacoby cautions us not to sentimentalize or romanticize the pre-contact and rural systems 
of local control because their success depended just as much upon exclusion of non-tribal 
and community members as it did upon the inclusion of those who had to participate 
within the system to make it work.   Jacoby states that these extra-legal systems broke 
down with the arrival of outsiders who imposed new forms of resource control upon the 
rural people and Indians living in areas where they already had an intimate understanding 
of their surroundings, and the impact they had upon the local landscape.  With the arrival 
of outsiders unfamiliar with the local system of controls and the local and regional 
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ecosystems, new rules (codified laws) were imposed from the top - down upon people 
who had successfully managed their resources prior to the arrival of strangers in their 
lands.   
 Finally, Scott’s Seeing Like A State, is a history of governments around the world 
and their attempts to impose various science-based land-use projects upon local 
landscapes to “improve” the lives of local populations, and how from the planning stage 
to the actual end product, numerous forces came into play to ultimately foil the original 
intent of project developers and planners.  In the United States, Scott looks at several 
projects designed to promote industrialized, “orderly” agriculture, modern irrigation 
farming, and scientific forestry.  Within this context, Indigenous peoples are targets of 
programs imposed by the bureaucracy from the top-down in an effort “modernize” them 
and rationalized their land use practices.  Forests, fields and irrigation works must be 
orderly, aesthetically pleasing, and efficient.  This “scientific scorn for practical 
knowledge” lead inevitably to the failure of these schemes because the original planners 
did not take into account the local circumstances - whether economic, ecological, 
religious or cultural.  Thus, top-down schemes experience “push-back” from local 
interests and the end result of the program tends to be wholly different from the original 
intent of its planners. 
 The interpretations put forth by Schneider, Jacoby and Scott apply to the Trinity 
River Basin and have informed this study.  Schneider’s assertion that interest group 
competition and the physical characteristics of the Missouri River drove change along 
that river, also played out in the Trinity Basin.  Jacoby’s study applies to the history of 
the region.  The Indian people of the Basin carefully managed and understood their own 
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impact upon natural resources, but outside interests imposed a new resource management 
order upon local resources and disrupted the lives of people who once managed them.  
Finally, Scott’s analysis is born out within the Basin as well.  The unintended 
consequences of government-imposed resource programs are seen not only in the 
attempts to re-direct Indian people away from traditional subsistence practices, but also in 
the unexpected impacts of mining, logging, commercial fishing, water diversion.  
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 Chapter 1  
 Pre-Contact Indian Peoples and the Trinity River Basin to 1848 
 
 Prior to the arrival of non-indigenous peoples in the 1840s, the Trinity River 
Basin was Indian Country.  The Indian peoples of the Basin controlled how they 
interacted with their surroundings, and over centuries developed complex social, 
political, and subsistence systems that allowed them to interact successfully with the 
surrounding environment.  Numerous Native American tribes inhabited the region, each 
speaking diverse languages, living in scattered village communities, and practicing varied 
subsistence patterns, social and religious customs.  The indigenous people of the Trinity 
River Basin exploited the richness of resources found nearby.  The basin provided a wide 
variety of plant and animal foods as well as materials for building homes, weaving 
baskets, and making all of the tools necessary to support thriving populations.  A brief list 
of the pre-contact tribes living within or bordering the Trinity Basin helps one grasp the 
diversity and complexity of indigenous peoples living in the area. Occupying the Trinity 
River Basin from the mouth of the Trinity to its headwaters were the Hupas, South Fork 
Hupas, the Chimarikos, and the Wintus.  Northwest, north, and northeast of the Hupas 
lived the Yurok and Karok on the Klamath River, and Shasta on New River and Shasta 
River.  West and southwest of the Hupas lived the Chilula, Whilkut and Nongatl, mostly 
centered on Redwood Creek.   The tribes specifically living within the Trinity River 
Basin addressed on this chapter are the are the Hupa, Chimariko, Wintu; and because of 
their residence down river from these tribes, mention will also be made in this study of 






Key to Tribal Territories of California Indian Tribes.  The richness of California’s natural resources 
allowed native peoples in the region to achieve some of the highest population densities in pre-contact 
North America.  In northwestern California, the setting for this study, note the close proximity of native 
peoples of diverse languages and cultures.  Source: Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, 





 The Indian tribes living in or bordering on the Trinity River Basin were not large 
in terms of population, nor did they claim huge swaths of land. The rich diversity of 
resources meant that the native peoples of the Trinity River Basin did not need to claim 
large resource areas compared with such tribes as the Navajo in the Southwest or the 
numerous tribes of the Great Plains who practiced mobile subsistence patterns to wrench 
a living form the scattered resources upon which they relied.  In northwest California, 
there was a superabundance of plant and animal foods such as acorns, pine nuts, deer, and 
elk, and anadromous fishes such as salmon, steelhead, eel and sturgeon.  The richness of 
their surroundings made it unnecessary for the inhabitants of the Trinity River Basin to 
venture far from their homes in search of food.  In fact, while the tribes of the Basin did 
not have large populations, they did have the highest pre-contact population densities of 
any Indian groups on the north American continent.   
 The noted anthropologist Alfred Kroeber classified the Hupa, Karok, Yurok and 
Chimariko as the most southerly people clearly demonstrating cultural traits known as the 
Northwest Culture Type.  People exhibiting the traits of the Northwest Culture Type 
could be found from coastal Alaska to the extreme corner of northwest California.  These 
culturally sophisticated people, according to Kroeber, relied heavily upon salmon and 
other anadromous fishes as a staple food source, and also used acorns as a significant 
protein source.  Dentalium shell money (imported from British Columbia) was an 
important medium of exchange and a sign of wealth. In fact, wealth in the form of 
material and ceremonial goods determined a person’s status within the community.  A 
formal governmental structure and code of law was lacking, yet persons of wealth were 
esteemed within the village community and were looked to for resolving conflicts and 
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meting out justice. Women played a significant role not only in food gathering and 
processing, but also in the spiritual and social life of the communities.  Women often 
acted as shamans, and in the process, acquired wealth and property.  Unlike the classic 
expression of the Northwest Cultures Type among the native peoples of Alaska, coastal 
Canada and the Pacific Northwest, the people of the Trinity River Basin did not practice 
the potlatch.  However, ceremonies such as the Jump Dance and White Deerskin Dance 
(discussed later in this chapter) were religiously and socially significant events that, 
among other things, helped to re-affirmed the status of individuals through a display of 
dance regalia (wealth) and feasts of salmon, game and acorn soup. 
 Topography, for the most part, determined settlement patterns and locations of 
villages within the Trinity River Basin.  The majority of the region’s indigenous people 
settled along  the Trinity and other rivers because the topography of the Basin is so 
rugged.  In the rare places where the land opened into broad valleys, such as at Hoopa 
Valley on the Trinity River, native peoples established village communities located on 
the on the valley floor.  Yet, they still remained river-oriented and mostly depended on 
the riverine environment for subsistence.  Places like Hoopa Valley, however, are scarce 
in the Trinity watershed.  Most native peoples inhabited villages located on river terraces 
or at places convenient for fishing and communication.   Prior to the disruptions in their 
settlement and subsistence patterns caused by the arrival of thousands of non-indigenous 
peoples in the 1840s, the native people of the Trinity River Basin relied upon rivers, 
streams, and the surrounding hillsides for subsistence. Thus, topography and a rich 
anadromous fishery explains why the native cultures of the pre-contact Trinity River 
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Basin reflected their riparian orientation.18 
 If one were to begin a journey in Yurok territory at the mouth of the Klamath 
River at the Pacific Ocean near Requa and travel inland, the reason for the riparian 
orientation of the regions’ first inhabitants would become clear.  The observer is first 
struck by the steep canyon through which the Klamath finds its way to the sea.  The river 
flows through this canyon for much of its length forcing the people using its resources to 
settle and live close on its banks.  Traveling upriver, one notices that the banks are dotted 
with small communities.  At present, these places are inhabited by Native peoples and 
non-natives alike, but that was not always the case.  Many once bustling Indian villages 
are today only archeological sites invisible to passing casual observers.  Finally, others 
are non-native communities built on the sites of pre-contact native villages.  It is 
significant that many are communities that have been continually occupied by native 
peoples prior to contact down to the present day, now including many non-native 
inhabitants among their residents.19     
 The Yurok claimed territory from the mouth of the Klamath River to the 
confluence of the Klamath and Trinity rivers at Weitchpec.20  Like the inhabitants of the 
                                                
 18For a discussion of the tribes dependent upon and oriented towards the Klamath and Trinity 
rivers, see  Arnold R. Pilling, “Yurok”, in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 137-154; William J. Wallace, 
“Hupa, Chilula, and Whilkut,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. 
Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987.,164-179; and William Bright, “Karok,” in 
Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution, 1987.,180-189. 
 19Arnold R. Pilling, “Yurok”, in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987.,139. 
 20The Costal Yurok claimed land along the coast north and south of the mouth of the Klamath, but 
are not addressed in this study. 
 
27 
Trinity River Basin, the Yurok, whose spoken language is a part of the Algic language 
stock, relied upon the resources in the Klamath River and the surrounding countryside for 
their subsistence.21  They harvested salmon, steelhead, lamprey eels and, on occasion, 
sturgeon for a majority of their protein.  They also traded goods from the interior with 
their coastal neighbors for seaweed, redwood canoes and other items not readily available 
inland.  The Yurok hunted the surrounding hills for game such as deer and elk, and 
gathered acorns and other food, as well as grasses and shoots for basket weaving.  The 
majority of Yurok lived in small village communities along the Klamath River, but there 
were also larger “clusters” of communities that were significant ceremonial and political 
centers, or strategic spots where the river could be forded and trade conducted within a 
wide trading network that connected various native peoples throughout the region.22 
 If one were to continue up the Klamath from Weitchpec, one enters the aboriginal 
territory of the Karok Indians.  The Karuk language has been classified a Hokan 
language, but the evidence is uncertain.  Today most scholars classify Karok as an 
“isolate” that might possibly be connected to Hokan.  Because the Karok lived within the 
Klamath Basin along the Klamath River above Weitchpec, the point where the Trinity 
Basin meets the Klamath River.  They are not addressed at length in this study.  
However, their proximity to the Yurok on the lower Klamath and to the Hupa on the 
                                                
 21The Yuroks also inhabited the coast south of the mouth of the Klamath River.  The coastal 
Yuroks were not oriented towards the rivers, but rather towards the Pacific Ocean. As such, the coast 
Yurok do not figure prominently in this study.  They were an important source of trade items for inland 
riverine peoples, however. See Arnold R. Pilling, “Yurok”, in Handbook of North American Indians: 
Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987.,137-154. 
 22Arnold R. Pilling, “Yurok”, in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 144-5. Today Requa, Johnson’s, 
Weitchpec and Pearson’s are communities that hold historic significance for the Yurok people. 
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Trinity River, as well as shared cultural traits, requires a brief description.  Like the 
 
 
Pre and post-contact Yurok villages and camps from Weitchpec to the mouth of the Klamath River and 
south along the Pacific Coast.  Source: Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
Robert Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 139. 
 
Yurok, the Karok depended upon the resources of the Klamath for much of their 
subsistence; they clustered in small communities on the middle reach of the Klamath near 
the river, and in their eastern territory were settled away from the river where the 




occupied the middle course of the Klamath River...[where there were 
numerous] villages....located on the river or on tributary streams; the 
mountain country on each side was visited for hunting, gathering, and 
ceremonial activities.  Those elements of the natural environment that 
were most important to the Karok were the river, up which the salmon 
swam each year; the fir forests on the mountain slopes, in which game 
could be hunted; and the oak groves visited annually for the acorn 
harvest.23 
Bright’s description of Karok settlement patterns and subsistence practices is applicable 
to many of the indigenous pre-contact peoples of the region.  Aboriginal Karok territory 
ended upstream on the Klamath at Seiad Valley where the boundary between the Karoks 
and the Shasta people to the east meet.24  The Shasta do not figure prominently in this 
study, nevertheless, it must be noted that the Shasta traded extensively with their 
neighbors the Karok, Yurok and Hupa to the northwest, west, and southwest, and the  
                                                
 23For a discussion of the Karok language, see Marianne Mithun, The Languages of Native North 
America, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)., 435.; William Bright, “Karok,” in Handbook of 
North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1987., 180. 
 24William Bright, “Karok,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 





Pre and post-contact Karok villages and camps from Weitchpec up-river to the Seiad Valley.  Source: 
Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: 




Wintu and Chimariko to the south and southeast.25   
 Retracing one’s footsteps back down river to Weitchpec at the confluence of the 
Trinity and Klamath Rivers, one arrives at socially, spiritually and politically significant 
place within the Indian world of northwestern California.  While standing at the 
confluence of the two rivers, what grabs ones attention is the color of the water.  The 
Klamath River carries a high sediment yield and is muddy in color.  The Trinity River, on 
the other hand, appears somewhat green from algae, but its waters are clearer than the 
Klamath.  Here at Weitchpec the two river mingle and flow to the sea.  This color 
variation is caused by the type of rocks through which each river flows.  Highly erodible 
soils underlie much of the Klamath River while, for the most part, the Trinity flows 
through soils that are generally slow to erode making its water relatively clear.26  While 
the color of the rivers speak to the geologic history of region, it fails to reveal the 
significance of Weitchpec.  The site of Weitchpec is the territorial meeting place of the 
Yurok, Karok and Hupa Indians, three riparian peoples sharing what Kroeber classified 
as the Northwest Culture Type.  These three tribes shared similar social, material and 
political cultures, yet they all spoke different languages.27  Because the pre-contact 
                                                
 25Shirley Silver, “Shastan Peoples,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, 
California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 213. 
 26The Trinity River today is dammed by the TRD which has increased temperatures in the river 
allowing algae to grow.  The ruggedness of the region is a testimony to the fact the area is undergoing rapid 
uplift in geological terms.  This tectonic phenomenon helps explain the topography of the region and 
influences the behavior of the regions’ rivers, particularly the Trinity River and its tributaries. The Grass 
Valley drainage system which feeds the Trinity River is underlain by granitic, erodible soils.  Logging of 
the region in the 1950s and 1960s created an sedimentation problem that on the Trinity River that still 
disrupts salmon habitat.  Therefore, there are highly erosive soils in the Trinity River Basin, but these soils 
have been exposed by industrial logging and were undisturbed prior to contact. 
 27The Hupas speak a language that is classified as Na-Dene Stock, which is part of the Athapaskan 
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territorial boundaries of the these three peoples met at Weitchpec, it was an important 
location within the social, political and religious system of pre-contact northwestern 
California.  Because the Trinity River flows into the Klamath River, any disruptions of 
the Klamath River fishery below Weitchpec impacted the rivers and streams of the 
Trinity River Basin, and therefore, the people living there.   All of the people depending 
upon the resources obtained from the rivers next to which they lived were equally 
vulnerable to any failure of those resources.28  This is significant because while the 
material culture, subsistence practices, and even the spiritual beliefs of the Yurok, Karok 
and Hupa bound them together, they were equally bound by their dependence upon a 
resource that they all shared and understood, and that, through their religious 
observances, they nurtured and maintained.  
 At Weitchpec one has to turn southeast and enter the Trinity River Basin to reach 
the territory of the Hupa Indians.  Heading southeast along the Trinity River, one 
encounters the rugged lower reaches of the Trinity River Canyon and the outlet of the 
Trinity River Basin.  On a map, the Trinity River is shaped like a great U with the left tip 
of the U marking Weitchpec.  From Weitchpec one travels through several miles of 
winding, rugged canyon along the Trinity River before reaching Hoopa Valley.  Here the 
canyon opens into a broad valley averaging a mile in width and six miles in length.  
Surrounded by high, rugged mountains, Hoopa Valley is the home of the Hupa Indians.  
Prior to contact, the Hupa lived in several villages dotting the valley floor separated from 
                                                                                                                                            
language family. The Karok speak a Hokan- based language which is considered to be one of the oldest 
language families in California.  The Yurok speak a language that is part of the Algic or Algonquian Stock. 
See William F. Shipley, “Native Languages of California,” in Handbook of North American Indians: 
Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 89-90. 
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one another by the meandering Trinity River.  The two most important villages in the 
Hoopa Valley were Te’k′imitding and Me’dilding, where the Hupas conducted  important 
ceremonies.29   Like the Yurok and Karok who were dependent upon the Klamath for 
salmon and the hills for game and acorns,  the Hupa relied upon the resources of the 
Trinity River and the surrounding country for subsistence.  The Trinity provided the 
majority of the protein in the diet of the Hupa Indians in the form of salmon, steelhead, 
lamprey and on rare occasions, sturgeon, while the hills provided acorns, nuts, berries 
and deer and elk.    The Hupa shared many of the same cultural traits, subsistence patters, 
and religious practices as their downstream neighbors, and interacted with them through 
trade and on important ceremonial occasions.  The Hupas were (and are) located on the 
lowest reaches of the Trinity River, and thus commanded an influential position within 
the Trinity River Basin.  Any salmon entering the trinity River from the Klamath while 
making a journey upstream had to run the gauntlet of Hupa fish traps, weirs, spears and 
nets before making their way up river to other native peoples living above Hoopa Valley.   
 Continuing through Hoopa Valley following the Trinity River in a southeasterly 
direction, the Trinity River is again confined to a canyon for a short distance.  Shortly 
thereafter, a small valley locally known as the “Sugar Bowl” is reached.  Passing through 
the Sugar Bowl, again the canyon narrows and steep walls rise sharply on both sides of 
the Trinity forcing the traveler to hug the banks of the river, or if need be, traverse the 
                                                                                                                                            
 28California’s Rivers: A Public Trust Report, 3. 
 29For a description of the pre-contact Hupa communities in Hoopa Valley, see William J. Wallace, 
“Hupa, Chilula, and Whilkut,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. 
Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 168-70. See also, Byron Nelson, Jr., Our 





Pre-contact Hupa, Chilula and Whilkut territory.  Note the 1864 boundary of the “Square” of the Hoopa 
Valley Indian Reservation.  Source: Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert 
Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 164. 
 
 
high ridges well above it.  At a point several miles south of the Sugar Bowl a large 
tributary enters the Trinity River from the south.  This tributary is the South Fork of the 
Trinity River and it is at this point that the pre-contact territory of the South Fork Hupa 
begins.  The South Fork Hupa were linguistically and culturally related to the Hupa of 
Hoopa Valley, but the Hupas saw them as a distinct people.  Kroeber classified the 
Southfork Hupa as Northwest Culture types, and in fact, the ties that bound the Hupa to 
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their downstream Yurok and Karok neighbors were shared with the South Fork Hupas, 
and, to some extent, the Chimariko peoples living upstream in the Trinity River Basin.30  
Along the main stem of the Trinity River the South Fork Hupa did not claim much 
territory, rather, they were concentrated mostly in the canyon of the South Fork of the 
Trinity River.  Prior to contact and for a short time thereafter, the South Fork Hupa had 
extensive contact with the Hupa proper, and traded with the Chimariko and Wintu living 
upriver along the main stem of the Trinity, and their western and southern neighbors as 
well.31  
 If one continues up the main stem of the Trinity River in a southeasterly and 
easterly direction, the territory of the South Fork Hupa is left behind as the pre-contact 
territory of the Chimariko Indians begins.  The Chimariko were, like their down river 
neighbors, a riverine people of the Northwest Culture Type, but with less reliance upon 
the river than the Hupa, Karok and Yurok.  Like the people down river from them, the 
Chimariko harvested salmon, steelhead, and eel, and ventured into the surrounding hills 
for acorns, nuts, berries and game.  The anadromous fishes reaching the Chimariko were 
less valuable for their caloric content because they were somewhat spent due to the 
distance they traveled to that point from the ocean.  Before contact in the 1840s the 
Chimariko occupied about twenty miles along the Trinity River east of the Hupa, from 
the confluence of the South Fork and the Trinity Rivers to what is today known as Big 
                                                
 30William J. Wallace, “Hupa, Chilula, and Whilkut,” in Handbook of North American Indians: 
Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 176-77.  
The South Fork Hupas were quickly absorbed into the Hupa Tribe after the creation of the Hoopa Valley 
Reservation. 
 31William J. Wallace, “Hupa, Chilula, and Whilkut,” in Handbook of North American Indians: 
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Bar.  Their territory included the lower reaches of New River, an important tributary to 
the Trinity River.  During the nineteenth century, non-native miners made significant 
gold discoveries in Chimariko country.  The Chimariko tribe probably never had a 
population of more than a few hundred people prior to contact.  Thus, when they found 
themselves at ground zero during the gold rush to the Trinity River Basin, the social, 
racial and environmental chaos spawned by the gold rush hit them particularly hard.  As a 
Hokan speaking people, the Chimariko were linguistically isolated from the Athapaskan 
speaking Hupas to the northwest, and the Penutian speaking Wintu to the east.  They 
were a small, relatively isolated group that were, unbeknownst to them, ill situated for 
survival after the gold rush began.32   
 Up-river to the east and northeast of the Chimariko lived the Trinity River Wintu.  
The Wintu occupied the headwaters of the Trinity River Basin, as well as, the region 
south and east of the Trinity River, including the Hayfork Valley.  Wintu territory also 
spilled over into the upper Sacramento Valley where Wintu occupied the headwater 
region of the Sacramento and McCloud Rivers.33  The Wintu were a large group divided 
into nine distinct subgroups recognized linguistically by distinct dialects.  Those Wintu 
living along the upper reaches of the Trinity River have been labeled Trinity River Wintu 
by anthropologists.  They spoke a Penutian language like all Wintu, but had a dialect that 
was distinct from the Wintu of the upper Central Valley.  The Wintu were not dependent 
                                                                                                                                            
Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 176-77.  
 32Shirley Silver, “Chimariko,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 205-10. 
 33Frank R. LaPena, “Wintu,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 324-5. 
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upon the Trinity River or bound to its resources, and are not considered as part of the 
Northwest Culture group.34  Although the Wintu were not bound to the Trinity River they 
are significant because they occupied the upper reaches of the Basin and were among the 
first native people to have extensive contact with the Anglo miners who moved into the 
Trinity River region during the gold rush.  Because the anadromous fishes that reached 
the Wintu in the upper-Trinity River Basin were so spent, they were of poor quality.  
Therefore, the Wintu relied less upon the river’s anadromous fishes than their 
downstream neighbors.  Rather, the Wintu, who are not classified as a riverine people, 
exploited other resources located in the region where they lived. 
 Of all the native groups residing in the Trinity River Basin, the Hupa have 
received the most attention by anthropologists, ethnographers and historians studying 
pre-contact northwestern California.  The reason for this focus on the Hupas is simple: 
throughout the terribly disruptive and often tragic era of Indian-white relations during the 
Gold Rush, the Hupa managed to maintain possession of their traditional homeland:  
Hoopa Valley.  Moreover, the federal government set aside Hoopa Valley as a treaty 
reservation in 1864, and in 1876, President U.S. Grant issued an Executive Order 
confirming Hoopa Valley as an Indian Reservation.35  Because the Hupa resided upon a 
reservation under the control of the federal government, there are simply more records 
                                                
 34William F. Shipley, “Native Languages of California,” in Handbook of North American Indians: 
Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 89. 
 3513 Stat., 39.  I do know that there was a reservation established at the mouth of the Klamath 
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relating to the Hupa than their upstream neighbors.  The reservation allowed the Hupa to 
preserve much of their pre-contact world view and knowledge, and they maintained (and 
still do) their identity as a distinct people. 
 The Wintu, and to an even greater extent, the Chimariko, were devastated by the 
influx of miners during the Gold Rush. Without the relative protection of reservations and 
under constant pressure from invading whites, the Chimariko and Wintu were violently 
dispersed by the invaders who seized their lands.  Thus, the majority of data available on 
Indians of the Trinity River Basin relates to the Hupa, therefore, looking at how the 
Hupas interacted with their environment can help us understand the general pre-contact 
relationship between the indigenous peoples of the region and the Trinity River Basin. 
 Hoopa Valley is the physical and spiritual home of the Hupa people.  The valley 
is bisected by the Trinity River which, for most of its length, is a fast-flowing stream 
cutting through deep canyons.  However, when the Trinity enters the Hoopa Valley it 
slackens, and becomes relatively placid.  Before contact with non-indigenous people, the 
Hupa relied heavily upon salmon, steelhead, eels, and sturgeon from the river for a major 
portion of their diet.36 The hills and mountains surrounding Hoopa Valley also contained 
important resources – for example, acorns were second only to salmon as a staple food 
for the Hupa people – but it was the Trinity River that provided the most important 
subsistence resource exploited by the Hupa, and so the Trinity held a central place in 
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University of California Anthropological Records (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 
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Hupa society.37  The Hupa chose to make their homes along the river banks in villages 
scattered throughout Hoopa Valley, and they structured much of their lives, and their 
relationship with their neighbors, around the seasonal cycles of the river – the spring and 
fall runs of salmon and periods of high and low water.38  Besides providing the fish to 
sustain life, the river had (and still has) an important role within Hupa religion which 
anthropologists call "World Renewal."39  Hupa uses of the river and other resources can 
not be readily separated from their world view and religious practices because the daily 
activities of the Hupa – including the act of fishing – were suffused with religious 
significance.   
 Before the rush of gold miners into the Trinity and Klamath River basins during 
the 1840s and 1850s, the Trinity River supported several types of anadromous fishes.  Of 
the various species of Pacific Salmon (Oncorhynchus), the two most commonly found in 
the Trinity were the King or Chinook Salmon (O. tschawytscha) and the Coho or Silver 
Salmon (O.Kisutch).  The Sockeye or Red Salmon (O.Nerka) also ran in the Trinity and 
                                                
 37William J. Wallace, "Hupa, Chilula, and Whilkut," in Handbook of North American Indians: 
Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 164-165. A 
general discussion of various food resources used by California Indians is: Robert F. Heizer and Albert B. 
Elsasser, The Natural World of the California Indians (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). 
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Baumhoff, "Ecological Determinants of Aboriginal California Populations," University of California 
Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 
49(2):155-236. 
 38The Hupa people have a strong attachment to their homeland that can not be readily conveyed 
through pen and paper.  Two sympathetic sources which somewhat demonstrate the Hupas strong 
attachment to Hoopa Valley and the Trinity River are: Byron Nelson, Jr., Our Home Forever: The Hupa 
Indians of Northern California (Salt Lake City: Howe Brothers, 1988), and Lee Davis, "On This Earth." 
Davis' discussion of the Trinity River and its significance to the Hupa people (pp. 147-225) is the most 
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 39Alfred L. Kroeber and Edward W. Gifford, "World Renewal: A Cult System of Native 
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its tributaries, but not in large numbers.40  Runs of salmon occurred twice a year.  King or 
Chinook ascended the Trinity River in both the spring and the fall, and Coho or Silver 
salmon, which is smaller than the King, possibly ran twice a year as well.41  Currently the 
salmon run does not reflect the behavior of pre-contact salmon because of the severe 
disruption of the Trinity River ecosystem during the post-contact period.  Today, salmon 
run in large numbers only during the fall.42 Steelhead Trout (Salmonidae), an anadromous 
rainbow trout Salmogairdnerii (Irideus), and an important food resource for the Hupa 
Indians, also run the river twice yearly; once in summer and once  in winter.43 
 The Hupa Indians harvested other aquatic species from the Trinity River that were 
significant parts of their diet as well.  The Pacific Eel, commonly called Lamprey 
(Entosphenus tridentatus), ascended the river in the early spring and was harvested by 
hand, spear and net.  Two species of Sturgeon, the large White Sturgeon (Acipenser 
Transmontabus), and the smaller Green Sturgeon A.medirostris (Acutirostris) were also 
taken as food.  However, sturgeon are dangerous and difficult to catch, and only 
occasionally ascended the Trinity River as far as Hoopa Valley, as such they were not a 
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“Fishing Among the Indians of Northwest California,”, 5.  Davis suggests that both species ran twice a 
year, while Kroeber and Barrett state that only the King ran twice yearly and the smaller Coho in the fall.  
A good source on California fish, their behavior, distribution and status as native or introduced species is: 
Peter B. Moyle, Inland Fishes of California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976). 
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 43Lee Davis, “On This Earth,” 150. 
 
41 
major source of food but when caught provided a large amount of edible flesh and 
material for making glue for the manufacture of weapons.44 These sustainable fish 
populations assured a predictable food supply for the Hupa and their neighbors, and so it 
is easy to understand why their culture was interwoven with the river and its fish 
resources. 
 The Karok and Yurok down river on the Klamath River relied upon the same 
species of aquatic life as the Hupa.  The Hupas’ upstream neighbors, however, relied less 
upon the river as a food resource.  The Chimariko fished the Trinity for salmon, steelhead 
and eels, but also traded with the South Fork Hupa and Hupa proper for salmon that was 
higher in caloric content and protein because they were harvested lower on the river.  It is 
important to remember that the farther an anadromous fish travels to spawn, the more 
calories it burns moving upstream and at the same time it does not take in any new 
calories.  The farther from the ocean a fish swims, in other words, more and more of its 
food value is lost until it becomes almost useless for consumption.  The Chimariko had 
access to salmon, but the fish were not as good as those caught earlier on the river by the 
Hupa.  The Trinity Wintu did not rely upon salmon in the Trinity and its tributaries 
because they lived so high up in the Trinity River Basin that the salmon reaching them 
were spent.  In fact, the Trinity River Wintu could obtain better salmon through trade 
with their Wintu neighbors living east of them on the headwaters of the Sacramento and 
McCloud Rivers where the quality of salmon was still high.  But the Trinity Wintu did 
exploit the steelhead trout that spawned high up in the headwaters of the Trinity River 
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and other fishes when available.45 
 Methods of harvesting fish varied greatly.  By looking at the Hupas, we can gain a 
better understanding of the fishing methods employed by many Indian people in the 
Trinity River Basin.  One important way the Hupa fished was by building fish weirs, or 
“fish dams,” to efficiently extract the food resources of the Trinity River.  The most 
important of these structures was the Hupas' large ceremonial weir.  To build the large 
weir across a river required a communal effort and great skill.  The preferred site for weir 
construction was along a stretch of river with an even, gravelly bottom, a current of 
moderate strength, and shallow water.  The Hupa built their ceremonial weir during the 
late summer and early fall, just before the rainy season began while the river was at its 
lowest level.  There is some evidence to suggest that before the arrival of Europeans the 
Hupa also built a communal weir during the spring salmon run, but changes in the 
ecosystem and pressures from non-Indians since that time may have forced the Hupa to 
abandon the Spring weir or perhaps they never built one considering that the river ran 
high in the Spring.46  
 Traditionally, the Hupa built their ceremonial weirs at one of two important sites 
– at the two largest Hupa villages on the Trinity.  The locations were alternated each year 
between Te’k′imitding, the spiritual center for the Hupa people and the sacred village of 
the northern district of Hoopa Valley, and Me’dilding, the largest village of the southern 
                                                
 45 Shirley Silver, “Chimariko,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
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 46Lee Davis, “On This Earth,” 160, 171-172.  The Hupa no longer build a communal fish weir. 
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district. Each was the site of many important religious ceremonies.47  Sources suggest 
that before and during the early historic period the Hupa may have built a ceremonial 
weir at another location.  Although this information is scanty, if it is accurate, it appears 
that physical changes in the river caused by mining and water diversion after contact may 
have caused the discontinuance of the ceremonial weir elsewhere.48   
 After ceremonial leaders chose the communal weir site, they performed the 
appropriate ritual as part of their World Renewal religion.49  After observing the proper 
rituals, the Hupas began construction of the weir.  Only males contributed to the physical 
construction of the communal fish weir because women were under many restrictions 
concerning the weir and fishing in general.50  During the early twentieth century, Pliny 
Earle Goddard, an astute observer of the Hupa people, described in simple detail the 
method of constructing the ceremonial weir:   
 
The fall salmon begin to run after the first rains in September and October.  
During the summer preparation is made for catching them. A dam or weir 
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is built across the river. . . .  Stout peeled stakes are driven in the river 
bottom in pairs, crossing near the top and firmly withed together.  Heavy 
logs are laid into the crotches thus made, end to end, forming a continuous 
stringer across the river.  Stakes about four inches in diameter are driven 
on the upper side, about four feet apart, at an angle of forty-five degrees.  
These are bound to the stringer by withes.  A lattice work is then made on 
the upper side of the dam, consisting of small saplings bound together by 
chains of withes.  This is made close enough to stop the upward migration 
of the salmon while impeding the flow of water but a little.  Small 
platforms, to stand on while fishing, are made by driving a stake a little 
below the dam and running poles from the dam to the top of the stake.51 
 
Fishermen stood on platforms built on the downstream side of the weir and harvested fish 
with A-frame dip-nets, plunge nets, and other tools.  Fishing usually took place by 
torchlight at night or when the sun was low in the sky which helped the fisherman spot 
his prey.  The communal weir on the Trinity River remained in place until the high 
waters of the fall rainy season washed it away.52 
 The large ceremonial weir was the Hupas’ most productive method of harvesting 
fish.  The weir allowed Hupa fisherman to catch tons of salmon in a short period of time.  
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Some of the catch was eaten fresh, but most of it was cured and stored for food during the 
long rainy season.  Because the ceremonial weir was a communal effort, all Hupa 
families could rightfully claim part of the catch because theoretically, each participated in 
the dams’ construction.  The system of communal fishing and distribution meant food 
was distributed among every household regardless of wealth, and all people were insured 
of a food supply during the difficult winter that lay ahead. 
 While the communal weir was the largest and most elaborate method of fishing, 
the Hupa also employed other methods to catch fish.  The Hupas built small weirs and 
fish dams on streams feeding into the Trinity, often at privately-owned fishing locations. 
Unlike the large communal weir, these small dams did not have the potential to obstruct 
the entire stream, but they did provide ample fish for the needs of a family.53 The Hupa 
employed several types of fish traps depending on time of year, location on a river or 
stream, and clarity of the water.  Triangular dip-nets wielded from a "crib" or fishing 
platform built over a riffle or eddy were very effective.  Hupas created eddies in the 
Trinity River and other streams by introducing obstructions such as rocks and logs into 
the water to create a slack in the current favorable for catching salmon.  The slack water 
attracted exhausted salmon needing a place to rest and provided an opportunity for Hupa 
fisherman standing on the platform over the eddy to scoop them from the water.54 
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 The Hupa also used seine and other types of nets.  Net size and design varied 
depending on the type of fish sought or the place selected for fishing.  Weighted with 
stones and buoyed by wooden floats, a seine net could be used as a set net.  Seine nets 
were as long as sixty feet, and once set, the Hupas manned dugout canoes to drive fish 
into the nets for harvest.55  The canoe itself was an important fishing tool on the Trinity 
River.  For example, when water conditions were unfavorable, such as when the river 
was muddy from runoff, the fish could not be seen from platforms for spearing or netting.  
In that instance, men and women in canoes floated the murky river wielded drifting bag 
nets to capture the occasional salmon.56  When the Trinity flowed clear, the Hupas also 
used spears equipped with detachable toggle-head points to harvest fish.  The arrival of 
thousands of Anglo miners during the gold rush prevented the Hupas and other Indian 
fishermen from harvesting fish using traditional methods because mining polluted with 
mining debris.  Pliny Earle Goddard observed in the early twentieth century: "Salmon 
were sometimes speared before the Trinity was made foul by mining." 57  
 Places for fishing varied according to religious obligation, environmental 
conditions, and site ownership.  The Hupa fished at many locations along the Trinity 
River.  The selection of a site for the large ceremonial fish weir was determined by the 
characteristics of the river, and by the site's proximity to important Hupa spiritual centers.  
But the Hupa fished (and still fish) many places along the Trinity River within Hoopa 
                                                
 55Pliny Earle Goddard, “Life and Culture of the Hupa,” 24-26. 
 56Alfred Kroeber and Samuel Barrett, “Fishing Among the Indians of Northwest California,” 40-
41. 
 57Pliny Earle Goddard, "Life and Culture of the Hupa,” 25. 
 
47 
Valley that are not central religious centers – though many had religious significance.  
Community fishing sites open to all were located near villages. Other sites along the 
river, usually the best sites, were not open to everyone.  Unlike the communal weirs and 
village fishing areas, families and individuals (including women) owned these prime 
fishing spots.  Pliny Earl Goddard, one of the earliest non-Indian observers of Hupa 
subsistence patters, stated: "Varying lengths of river shore were held as private fishing 
rights by heads of families.  These included one or more riffles suitable for the 
construction of a fishing crib.  These rights passed from father to son and were always 
respected."58  At these places, members of the family who owned the site could fish, and 
sometimes the owner temporarily "sold" or permitted the right to fish the site to others for 
a certain period of time each season.  Both men and women could own a fishing site, but 
usually only men fished from the shore.  People who fished at these places treated their 
catch according to religious obligation so as not to offend the fish and therefore assured 
the yearly return of salmon.59  The seasonal communal weirs at Te’k′imitding and 
Me’dilding provided an abundance of fish in a very short time, and was the most 
important method employed by the Hupa for harvesting fish for winter food.  Fishing at 
privately owned sites along the Trinity River year-round provided most of the fresh fish 
eaten by the Hupa on a daily basis.60   
 The scant data available on the Chimariko and Wintu within the Trinity River 
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Basin suggest that they too employed similar methods of harvesting fish from the Trinity 
River and its tributaries, but they did not build large ceremonial weirs.  The Chimariko, 
like the Hupa, used nets and fish traps, and also used toggle-head harpoons or spears.  
While the anthropological literature states that the Chimarikos were not known to build 
large weirs, they did use scoop baskets and clubs, bows and arrows, and their hands to 
catch salmon and other fish species.  These latter fishing methods obviously required 
water that was clear enough to allow the person fishing to see the fish.  Once mining 
began in earnest after 1850, the clarity of the Trinity became a central point of conflict 
between Indians and miners.  As for ownership of fishing sites among the Chimariko, 
information is scanty.  It appears, however, that unlike the majority of fishing sites in 
Hoopa Valley, Chimariko fishing sites were communally owned.61 
 The Trinity River Wintu had even fewer methods for catching fish in the 
headwaters of the Trinity River Basin than the Chimariko or Hupa which suggests that 
fish were less central to their diet than their down river neighbors.  The Wintu commonly 
undertook communal fish drives to push steelhead into nets where they harvested them 
with dip nets and baskets. The Wintu then distributed the catch to those who participated 
in the harvest.  Individual ownership of fishing sites was common among the Wintu, but 
social custom insured that fish were distributed to people not owning a fishing site or to 
those who needed food. The Wintu of the upper Sacramento Valley had much more 
elaborate fishing methods than the Trinity River Wintu.  The lack of a large percentage of 
edible salmon on the upper Trinity compared to the superabundance of edible salmon on 
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the upper Sacramento is the likely explanation for the Trinity Wintus’ limited methods 
for catching fish.62 
 Obviously the fish resources of the Trinity River Basin were a significant source 
of food for the native peoples living near its rivers and stream.  Yet, a discussion of 
fishing must also take into account the spiritual significance of the act of fishing.  
Looking at how the Hupa and their down river neighbors practiced World Renewal 
religion, allows us to understand the significance of the river in the daily lives of pre-
contact peoples of the region.  For the Hupa, Yurok and Karok, fishing was so 
intertwined with religious significance that the act of fishing cannot be separated from its 
religious meaning.  For the Chimariko, and to an even lesser extent the Wintu, fishing 
and religion apparently were not as intertwined as they were for those living in the lower 
Basin.63 
 The practice and meaning of the World Renewal religion is complex.  Generally, 
however, practitioners "renewed" the world every year.  Through ritual, ceremony and 
dance, the peoples practicing World Renewal balanced the world around them--restored 
balance to, or "doctored" the world (expressed by them as a large disk floating in the 
ocean) which had become unbalanced or “tipped” by actions of humans during the 
previous year.  The spiritual understanding and restrictions of World Renewal flowed 
through all facets of the daily lives and activities of its practitioners and regulated how 
they behaved toward the physical and supernatural world.  World Renewal as it applies to 
                                                
 62Frank R. Lapena, “Wintu,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 337-8. 
 63Shirley Silver, “Chimariko,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, 
 
50 
the management of the fish resources of the Trinity River Basin is only part of an 
interconnected whole, and the ceremonies and formulas (prayers recited in a prescribed 
fashion) of World Renewal have meanings and implications far beyond the harvesting of 
salmon and other resources.64 
 World Renewal in northwestern California was (and still is) practiced mainly 
within the Klamath and Trinity River Basins.65  The Hupa, and their Yurok and Karuk 
neighbors practiced World Renewal, while the Chimariko and Trinity River Wintu did 
not.  World Renewal bound the three tribes whose territory met at Weitchpec.  On the 
other hand evidence suggests that the Hupas’ upstream neighbors practiced distinctive 
religions much less centered on the river and its resources, and much more individualistic 
in character. The physical position of the Yurok downstream on the Klamath River from 
the Hoopa Valley meant that cooperation regarding management of the fish resources 
was necessary to insure a supply of salmon for all people concerned and to avoid conflict 
between them. Hupa leaders (wealthy individuals) from the Trinity River Basin met with 
leaders from important communities along the Klamath River to negotiate over resource 
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use. During major World Renewal ceremonies either on the Klamath or Trinity rivers, 
one could expect to find Hupas, Karoks and Yuroks attending the same ceremony, as well 
as, peoples from other tribes invited to attend.66 
 The origins of World Renewal are ancient and practitioners trace it to the time of 
before human beings lived on the earth.  In the beginning of all things, powerful religious 
figures populated the world that is an "earth-disk" floating upon the sea.  These figures 
lived harmoniously with the laws of the world and did not alter the balance of the world.  
When the people (mortals) came to this world, these religious figures taught them 
everything they needed to know to properly care for the earth.  After teaching humans 
how to behave properly, they departed across the ocean.  Mortal humans, because of their 
flaws such as greed, and because of their evil actions, disrupted the balance of the world.  
The world itself theoretically remained beautiful, reliable and perfect in an ideal sense, 
but humans acting without restraint threw the world out of balance.  If action were not 
taken, and bad behavior allowed to continue unchecked, human activity threatened to 
throw the earth-disk out of balance.  If left alone, the earth-disk would become so 
unstable that it would begin to tilt on the ocean.  As the earth-disk tipped more and more, 
floods, disease and death would spread across the world creating misery for humans and 
causing salmon runs to fail. The people were taught how to restore the balance of the 
earth-disk upon the sea, or to "renew" the world, and so humans had the power, 
knowledge and, most importantly, the obligation to restore harmony and balance to the 
                                                




 The knowledge the ancient religious figures gave to humans in the form of 
formulas (spoken prayers), rituals, personal conduct and dance is the basis of World 
Renewal Religion.  Acting out this knowledge through formula, song, ritual and dance is 
the key to restoring the balance of the earth-disk.  Although there were numerous rituals 
associated with World Renewal, the two major dances conducted by the Hupa and their 
down-river neighbors were (and are) the White Deerskin Dance and the Jump Dance.  
Also important for World Renewal, although not as elaborate as the Jump and White 
Deerskin dances, were the "first-fruit" ceremonies--among them the First Eel and First 
Salmon ceremonies.68 
 Individuals with specific knowledge of the language and instructions of the 
religious figures (formulas) led the major rituals.  Every year or two at sites within Hupa 
territory and throughout northwestern California, ceremonies were repeated regularly. All 
people from throughout the area could attend - rich and poor, free and slave.  Those 
attending the first ceremonies of the year had to prepare in ways prescribed by the pre-
mortals humans called K’ixnay in Hupa, and Wo’gey in Yurok. Thomas Buckley states:  
 
[A]ll litigation and debts had to be settled, grudges laid aside, the grief of 
mourners assuaged.  The wealthy individuals and families displayed their 
wealth in the form of regalia . . . the fundamental quality of the world as it 
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 68Thomas Buckley, “World Renewal”, 83; Alfred Kroeber and Edward Gifford, “World Renewal: 
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was in wo'gey [pre-mortal human] times and was, now, to be again. So, in 
the minds of the ritual leaders, in the social relations of the spectators, in 
the singing and costumes of the dancers, everything was once more as it 
should be, and the world was "doctored. . . .".69 
 
The leaders of these rituals, who anthropologists have called "formulists" or "priests," 
recited prescribed "formulas" or prayers.  As they did so, they were essentially 
transformed into pre-mortal humans and through recitation of the formulas renewed the 
world.  Through individual study formulists gained knowledge of the language of the 
K’ixnay or Wo’gey, and the power necessary to return all things to a state of balance.70  
 World renewal works through repetition of these formulas year after year.  The 
rains, floods, salmon and eel runs, were "seemingly reliable and automatic," but the 
cycles of the world "were reliable only when they were accompanied by other, human 
orders of repetition: the return, generation by generation . . . of a few individuals 
[formulists] . . . to the knowledge of how Creation actually is, when people do not 
interfere with it, and the cyclical repetitive enactment of this knowledge in ritual."71  The 
Hupa and their downstream neighbors insured the return of salmon and the cyclical 
abundance of the Trinity River Basin, by regularly renewing the world.  The Trinity 
River was central to Hupa culture and gave of itself to the Hupas the animals of its 
                                                                                                                                            
A Cult System”, 56. 
 69Thomas Buckley, “World Renewal,” 84-85. 
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waters, and to maintain their life ways, the Hupas reciprocated spiritually and physically 
thus maintaining the balance of the river and the world. 
 A lunar calendar determined exactly when the rituals were held.  The number ten 
is held sacred by the Hupa and their neighbors down river, and the number plays a 
significant role in the rituals and dances of World Renewal. Historically the Jump Dance 
was held twice a year, once in the spring and then again in the fall, and the White 
Deerskin Dance was held once a year, usually in August.72 The White Deerskin Dance, 
 
 
The Jump Dance.  Ca. 1906.  Only one person is observing in the photo (wearing non-traditional clothing) 
yet there would have been many other people watching this important event.  The dancers wear traditional 
Jump Dance costumes and regalia.  The cedar wall behind them is a significant part of the dance.  
Photograph in Authors’ personal collection. 
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Jump Dancer.  This young Hupa and Yurok boy is wearing part of the regalia required for the Jump Dance  
The Headdress is adorned with sacred redheaded woodpecker scalps and he carries the Jump Dance basket 
“purse.” He also wears canvas pants.  Photo postcard.  ca. 1910-1920.  Possibly Ericsson, Art Ray, 
Patterson or Eastman.  Authors’ personal collection. 
 
with its elaborate rituals, formulas and songs was conducted at ten sacred places for ten 
days throughout Hoopa Valley (this dance was also held down river on the Klamath).  
After a formulist performed important rituals and recited formulas in the language of the 
ancient ones, the dance began.  People and regalia arrived at the dance sites by canoes or 
trails.  Scholars have described the dances and regalia in detail, so it is unnecessary to 
repeat it here.73  However, one part of the ten-day ceremony is especially relevant to this 
                                                
 73Walter R. Goldschmidt and Harold E. Driver, "The Hupa White Deerskin Dance." University of 




study because of its relation to the Trinity River.  Pliny Earle Goddard described a 
segment of the White Deerskin Dance that he and others have called the Boat Dance that 
was conducted on the Trinity River itself: 
 
The boat dance, which takes place on the fourth day of the ceremony, is 
spectacular in the extreme.  Three large canoes are placed abreast [in the 
Trinity River].  A man dressed with the hook [deer antler] head-dress 
assumes a kneeling posture in the bow of each boat.  Paddles reaching 
from bow to bow are held by these men to keep the boats abreast each 
other.  Eight or ten men stand behind one another in each canoe.  One man 
sits in the stern to steer.  While the boats are floating down [the river] the 
men flex the knees and hips in unison imparting considerable motion on 
the boat. The leaders make peculiar motions with their heads while they 
lead the boat-dance song.  This song, either because of its inherent nature, 
or because of its associations, powerfully affects the old people.  At the 
landing-place opposite Miskut [a village sometimes spelled Misqit, 
Mesket or Meskat] the canoes approach and recede from the shore ten 
times before the final landing is made.74 
 
The Trinity River itself is central to this part of the White Deerskin Dance and thus the 
importance of the river within the world view of the Hupas is revealed.  Each part of the 
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dance must be carried out according to the instructions of the Immortals who watch the 
dancers and listen to the words of the formulists to insure that they behave properly and 
recite the formulas precisely.75 
 The Jump Dance, held twice yearly, was conducted first in the Spring during late 
May, and then again in September at the sacred dance grounds in the Hoopa Valley.  Like 
the White Deerskin Dance it is conducted according to prescribed rituals, formulas, songs 
and dance steps.  The regalia is different from that used in the White Deerskin Dance and 
the dance took place at only two sites--the towns of Te’k′imitding and Misqit.  The 
Immortals interrupt their own dances to closely watch the Hupas dancing the Jump 
Dance.76  The Jump Dances were held on sacred ground near the Trinity River and were 
important social and religious events where elaborate dance regalia was worn.  Salmon 
and acorn soup were served at the Jump Dance, and the stones used to heat the soup were 
                                                
 75Walter R. Goldschmidt and Harold E. Driver, "The Hupa White Deerskin Dance,” 128-131.  
These authors analyze the dance and downplay its religious significance ignoring the interconnectedness of 
all Hupa rituals. 





First day of the White Deerskin Dance. This snapshot was taken in October, 1906 at Campbell Field (site of 
part of the sacred ten day dance sequence).  Note that the dancers wear a mixture of traditional and non-
traditional clothing.  They carry white deerskins with tongues made from redheaded woodpecker scalps  
Photograph possibly Kroeber, Goddard, or Ericsson.  Authors’ personal collection. 
 
 
piled near the dance ground until large piles of stones accumulated.  The White Deerskin 
and the Jump dances are only part of the World Renewal, but are key to continuing the 
balance of the "earth-disk."  Goddard stated it best when he wrote: "These dances, while 
social and religious in character, were really "medicines" in the wide Indian use of the 
term."77   
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 The function of these dances is wide in the sense that they help balance all things.  
But the Hupa also directed their religion specifically to the Trinity River and the fish it 
yielded.  Before taking fish from the Trinity, the Hupa performed prescribed ceremonies 
and formulas to insure an abundant catch and the return of fish in the future.  These 
ceremonies and rituals, like the larger dances, maintained the balance of the earth-disk.  
The smaller ceremonies included "first-fruit" rituals, individually recited songs and 
"formulas," and prescribed behavior by those fishing.   
 The Hupa did not conduct first-fruit ceremonies before taking all species of fish, 
but certain rituals had to be conducted before taking salmon and eels, the most important 
food sources in the Trinity.  The Hupa held the First Eel ceremony in March when the 
lamprey run was at its height.  Before the ritual it was forbidden for anyone to catch 
lampreys.  At a time specified by the lunar calendar, the formulist began to act in strict 
ritual manner for ten days as prescribed by the Immortals.  After completing the 
physically demanding rituals, including sweating and reciting formulas or "praying," the 
formulist caught eels from the river.  Like other Hupa rituals, the formulist followed the 
instructions from the Immortals, and on the first night after the completion of the ritual, a 
feast was held. The formulists invited people to eat his catch, but the formulist could not 
eat these eels.  After this ceremony, the people of Hoopa Valley were free to catch eels at 
will. Before contact with Euroamericans, the Hupas held First Eel ceremonies for both 
the southern and northern districts.78  
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 The First Salmon Ceremony was similar to the First Eel Ceremony.  The ritual 
was held in Sugar Bowl south of Hoopa Valley during the run of salmon. The formulist, 
who was often from Me’dilding, the village that owned the ceremony, observed ten days 
of ritual behavior accompanied by an attendant.  Afterwards the formulist caught a 
salmon from the Trinity River. The salmon was then treated according to prescribed 
methods and then cooked.  Only the formulist ate of the first salmon.  If the salmon was 
not carefully handled at all times, the salmon would not allow Hupas to catch them in the 
future.  No Hupa could fish for salmon until ten days after the first fish caught by the 
formulist. After taking the first salmon, the formulist continued his ceremonial behavior 
for a specified time.  The formulists' assistant prepared the fish caught during this time, 
and on the tenth day after catching the first salmon, the Hupa feasted upon the salmon 
caught by the formulist. Like all Hupa ceremonies, "Immortals" observed the ceremony 
to be certain the formulist treated the salmon properly. If handled incorrectly, "the world 
would be ruined."79 
 Observing rituals of World Renewal allowed the Hupa to manage ritually the fish 
resources of the Trinity River Basin, but they did not act in a vacuum.  Ritual cooperation 
with neighboring tribes--particularly the Yurok who held territory north (down river) 
from Hoopa Valley was necessary to insure that the fish could actually get to Hoopa 
Valley.  Through agreements secured with neighboring tribes, ceremonial communal fish 
dams could remain in the rivers for a short time before being opened to allow salmon to 
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move upriver to the communal weirs of other peoples reliant upon salmon.80 The Kepel 
fish dam in Yurok territory on the Klamath River was the largest ceremonial weir in the 
region.  The Yurok built the weir near Kepel on lower reaches of the Klamath River 
halfway between Weitchpec and Johnsons.  The building of the Kepel weir involved not 
only the Yurok, but their neighbors as well.  The weir required the hands of at least sixty 
individuals working for ten days. After completion, an elaborate ceremony accompanied 
by dance and formula was held for several days, or even weeks before the salmon began 
to run.  Once the salmon began running in earnest, the weir was allowed to remain closed 
for only ten day before it was opened to allow salmon to move upstream to avoid conflict 
with up-river peoples.   
 Apparently the raising a weir was not always done in a way that satisfied all 
peoples upstream from the obstruction.  George Gibbs, traveling the region with the 
United States Treaty Expedition of 1851, noted that intertribal cooperation concerning 
fish weirs could lead to intertribal conflict. "They [weirs] form a frequent cause of quarrel 
among the bands [tribes] inhabiting different parts of the rivers.  Some understanding 
however, seems to exist as to opening portions of them at times, to allow the passage of 
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fish for the supply of those above."81 Once the fish passed the dam at Kepel, they 
ascended the Trinity River to Hoopa Valley where the Hupa waited at their own 
ceremonial weir to put in a supply of salmon. 
 Religiously, the Chimariko and the Trinity River Wintu were much more 
individualistic in their outlook.  The Chimariko had one major dance each summer which 
lasted for ten days, but evidence suggests that the dance was not religious in nature, but 
rather, was more of a social occasion.  Nor did the Chimariko conduct first fruit 
ceremonies such as first salmon or first eel ceremony.  The Trinity River Wintu, it 
appears, were even more individualistic in their religious behavior.  While evidence is 
mainly derived from ethnographic data gathered from the Wintu in the Sacramento 
Valley, it appears that the Wintu dances did not have the same significance for the health 
of the earth as did the World Renewal dances of the peoples on the lower Trinity and 
Klamath rivers, but had religious significance nevertheless.  Like the dances held by the 
Chimariko, the dance of the Wintu were more commonly social events.82    
 The people of the Trinity River Basin looked to rivers and streams for sustenance 
and incorporated the resources into their spiritual lives.  Rivers also served other 
purposes, such as transportation and communication routes.  For the Hupa, the position 
on the lower Trinity River  allowed them access to peoples above and below Hoopa 
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Valley.  This was crucial for trade purposes, and especially during times of important 
rituals when the Hupas needed to negotiate with their neighbors, participate in World 
Renewal ceremonies, or during times of warfare. Prior to contact, the Hupa Indians used 
dugout canoes for traveling on the waters of the Trinity River.  Made of redwood, the 
Hupa, who did not have significant stands of redwood within their territory, obtained 
these sturdy craft through trade with the Yurok who were especially skilled boat builders.  
Capable of carrying thousands of pounds of cargo and up to six adults, canoes allowed 
the Hupa to communicate and trade with their neighbors and among themselves, aided 
them in fishing, and were central to the White Deerskin dance.83  While we have several 
references to the Hupa using canoes on the Trinity, because of the nature of the streams 
and Rivers in the Trinity River Basin, river travel was not practical for most native 
peoples in the region.  Topography dictated that foot travel was the most efficient way to 
traverse the Trinity River Basin.  For example, sources do not indicate that the Chimariko 
or Wintu used redwood canoes for transportation.  They traded extensively with their 
neighbors using trails instead of water transport. 
 An extensive network of trails and paths linked Hoopa Valley with the Pacific 
coast and interior California.  The Hupa traded goods or purchased items from the coastal 
Yurok who had articles not available from the neighboring Karok and Yurok residing 
along the Klamath River.  Neighboring peoples brought seaweed, dentalium shells, and 
other objects to Hoopa Valley by means of the river and trails.  The Chimariko traded 
with the Wintu and the New River Shasta, and although they had conflict with the Hupa, 
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they traded with them as well.  However, because the Chimariko were devastated so 
quickly after the arrival of Euroamericans in the 1850s, too little information on them 
exists to allow a re-creation of their trading system.  The trading network of the Trinity 
River Wintu is not well understood for similar reasons.  The Trinity River Wintu traded 
with the Chimariko, New River Shasta and possibly the Hupa, but they had generally 
hostile relations with the peoples on the Klamath River and usually stayed away from 
their territory.84  The Trinity River, therefore, was only a viable avenue of 
communication for the Hupa, and was much less so for the Chimariko and Trinity River 
Wintu.  The Trail network in the region followed the non-navigable stretches of the 
Trinity River, but also deviated from the river when it was necessary to trade with 
peoples of other drainage basins.  For example, the Trinity Wintu were in closer contact 
with the Wintu of the Sacramento Valley than they were with their Trinity River 
neighbors, but had to reach them over rugged trails originating in the upper Trinity River 
Basin. 
 The Trinity River was central to the subsistence of the pre-contact Hupa and to a 
lesser extent, the Chimariko and Trinity Wintu.  The daily activities of the Hupa were 
dictated by religious belief.  In their relations with one another, their valley home, and the 
plants and animals they gathered for subsistence, the Hupa conducted themselves 
according to religious precepts within the context of World Renewal.  Seen within this 
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wide context the river held meaning beyond its ability to merely support aquatic life.  The 
Trinity River occupied a central place within the larger world view and cosmology of the 
Hupa people. While the Hupa harvested fish from the Trinity and conducted religious 
ceremonies on its waters and banks, it was a practical avenue for transportation and 
communication as well.  For the Chimariko and Trinity Wintu, the river was less essential 
to their subsistence, but was nonetheless important.   
 Indigenous uses of the pre-contact Trinity River Basin were ancient and intimate.  
The Indian people dictated how they interacted with their environment, and over 
centuries they developed  social, political and subsistence systems that allowed them to 
exploit the material abundance of their surroundings.  The practice of World Renewal 
ensured that the resources they depended upon would be available year after year, and 
their world would remain balanced and predictable.   
 The discovery of gold on Reading's Bar in the upper Basin in 1848 initiated 
changes that swept through northern California.  The Indian peoples of the Trinity River 
Basin immediately experienced a disruption in their intimate world.  As the following 
chapters show, the upheaval was drastic and extensive.  Change was not only rapid, but 
culturally and physically devastating for the Indian peoples of the Basin.  The period 
from 1848 until the mid 1860s was characterized by bloody Indian-White warfare, a rapid 
decline in the indigenous population, and severe environmental change.85  While all the 
Indians of the region felt the impact of the arrival of thousands of gold seekers, some 
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managed to maintain their traditional homelands, cultural identities, and strong sense of 
place.86  The gold rush to the Trinity River Basin signaled the end of total Indian control 
of the region as the new arrivals set about re-ordering the country in ways familiar to 
them.  As the Basin passed from Indian to non-Indian control, competing interests 
determined the fate of how the resources of the region to be were exploited.  
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 Chapter 2 
 The End of Indian Time: The Trinity River Basin to 1858 
 Prior to the California Gold Rush, there were only two documented visits made to 
the Trinity River Basin by non-indigenous peoples.  The fur trappers who passed through 
were looking for pelts, and were not interested in settlement.87   The first occurred in the 
spring of 1828 when Jedediah Strong Smith, a well-known explorer and trapper, led a 
group eighteen men and a herd of approximately three hundred horses through the Basin 
on his way to Oregon country.88  Smith’s route led him first through the Sacramento 
River Valley, and then west/northwest across the mountains towards the Trinity River 
Basin.  The group proceeded into the Basin via Hayfork Creek through Chimariko Indian 
territory and the Hyampom Valley. On April 22, the party passed several Indian 
dwellings.  Smith reported that Chimarikos began yelling at the party from the hills but 
remained a safe distance away.  At one point in the day Smith attempted to talk with 
them, but the Chimarikos attacked Smith and his men with bows and arrows.  Although 
the Indians did no harm, the trappers returned fire wounding several Indians who fled 
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into the hills. Smith did not meet any other Indians until two weeks later when he reached 
the territory of the South Fork Hupa along the South Fork of the Trinity River.  
 The party found that the canyon of the South Fork was difficult to traverse.  Two 
miles below the point where Grouse Creek enters the South Fork from the west, passage 
was impossible because the “mountain closed in to the river which ran in a channel of 
cleft rocks.”89  The party left the river and made its way along Hogback Ridge in three 
feet of snow.  It was several miles before they could return to the river because they 
“found the deep ravines impossible and the river yet washing the base of high hills.”90  
After several days walking along the ridge, the party returned to the canyon and camped 
for three days at the confluence of the South Fork and main stems of the Trinity rivers 
near the South Fork Hupa village of Tlelding. 
 The party then proceeded along the main stem of the Trinity River, and on May 6 
were near the mouth of Willow Creek, an important tributary that enters the river from 
the west.  Here the expedition encountered several Indian homes and decided to camp 
near one.  While encamped, Smith reported seeing a canoe piloted by Indians floating 
“down the river with a good many Deer skins on board.”91  Smith attempted to coax the 
Indians to shore, but they refused and continued north towards Hoopa Valley.  Two or 
three other Indians were spotted across the swollen Trinity River and when Smith asked 
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them to come across, they too, declined.  While camped near Willow Creek, Smith 
described the typical Indian house found in the lower Trinity River Basin:  “Their lodges 
were built differently from any I had before seen. They were 10 or 12 feet square, the 
sides 3 feet high and the roof shaped like a house.  They were [shaped] built of split pine 
plank with 2 or 3 small holes to creep in at.”92 
  Smith’s party continued north along the Trinity until reaching Hoopa Valley.  
They camped across the river from Me’dilding, an important Hupa community.  While 
encamped, several Hupas approached the trappers wanting to trade deer skins for axes 
and knives.  Smith noted that he had seen several places were Indians had used metal 
hatchets on trees along his route suggesting that European trade items had reached the 
Trinity River Basin well before Europeans.  Smith asked the Hupas to give him directions 
for the best route out of the valley.  Using sign, the Hupas informed him that if his party 
continued north along the Trinity River in the direction of the Klamath River to 
Weitchpec, travel would be difficult because it “was rocky along the bank of the river.”93  
Smith chose an easier route pointed out to him by the Hupas that followed a well-traveled 
path out of the valley by way of Bald Hills.  Smith then skirted north of Chilula territory 
near Redwood Creek, and thence went to Yurok territory and the Klamath River.  
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 Smith’s journey through the Trinity River Basin reveals the difficulty of the 
topography that would hinder future settlement. His account also shows he had mixed 
relations with the Indians he met, which was not untypical.  The Chimariko attacked 
Smith and his men and expressed fear of them, but the Hupas were friendly, wanted to 
trade for metal axes and  knives and gave him information.  Smith needed the information 
the Indians had and wanted friendly relations with them.  The Indians he encountered 
were in control of their world and Smith’s presence, while surely a novelty for the 
Indians, did not disrupt that world. From this account it is clear that the Indians used the 
Trinity River for trade, and not surprisingly were willing to interact with Smith for their 
own benefit, and they had an intimate knowledge of their country. When Smith left the 
Trinity River Basin on May 9, 1828, it was still Indian Country and remained so until the 
gold rush for another two decades.94   
 Seventeen years after Smith’s visit, more trappers entered the area.  In 1845 
Pierson B. Reading led a fur hunting expedition into the Trinity River Basin.  John Sutter, 
the founder of New Helvitia located at the confluence of the Sacramento and American 
Rivers in the Central Valley, sent Reading and some Indian trappers to the upper reaches 
of the Trinity watershed to look for beaver.  Reading did not comment in detail about the 
things he saw or the people he met in the Basin.  He and his men explored the area, but 
returned to the Central Valley with few furs.  Reading’s expedition was the last to 
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penetrate the Basin before the discovery of gold in California.95 
 In 1848, another Sutter employee, James Marshall, discovered gold at Coloma in 
the Sierra Nevada Mountains while building a sawmill race.  The find set off a rush that 
drew hundreds of thousands of people to California from all parts of the globe.96  As the 
rush began, Pierson Reading went to the initial gold discovery site at Coloma to have a 
look, and noticed that the gold-bearing gravels resembled gravel he remembered seeing 
on the Trinity River during his 1845 fur expedition.  He quickly retraced his route to the 
Central Valley and assembled a group of Indian laborers to help him look for gold.  They 
crossed the mountains from the Sacramento River Valley into the Trinity Basin and 
discovered gold at a place later named Reading's Bar near present-day Douglas City.97   
 Reading and his Indian laborers quickly set about mining on the Trinity River, but 
once word got out that there was gold in the Basin, more prospectors began arriving and 
competing for mining locations.  Reading commanded a large group of laborers which 
angered a group of white miners from Oregon who appeared on the scene.  These men 
did not want to compete with Indians for wealth.  The Oregonians, fresh from the bloody 
and brutal Indian wars in Oregon, threatened to kill Reading’s laborers if he continued to 
employ them.  Reading retreated from his claim back to the Central Valley and left the 
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mining on the Trinity to others.  The significance of Readings’ discovery is that it set off 
a rush to the Trinity River Basin that would wholly transform the region and the lives of 
the native peoples residing there.98 
 The discovery of gold marked the “End of Indian Time” in northwestern 
California.99 Miners poured into the Trinity River Basin hard on the heals of Reading, 
many following a route from the Central Valley to the Trinity Diggings.100  The arrival of 
miners opened a direct competition between Indians and non-Indians for control and use 
of local resources.  The Indians, who had well-ordered societies based on locally 
abundant resources, were overrun by people who held a wholly different approach to 
resource use.  This difference was at the core of the conflicts that began soon after the 
commencement of the gold rush.  
 The isolation of the Trinity River Basin and the rugged nature of the region 
caused problems for the miners moving into the area.  Also, northwestern California 
receives the highest amount of rainfall in the state, and the rainy season, which begins in 
October and lasts through March, hampered travel and made it difficult to obtain 
supplies.  For example, in 1849 Hector Dulany, an early arrival at the Trinity River 
mines, reported that it took a month for him to travel the difficult country from the 
headwaters of the Trinity Basin to the town of Sacramento during the rainy season, and 
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that he would not be able to return to the Trinity River mines until the following spring 
when the rains let up.101  Nevertheless, individuals braved the difficulties of travel to get 
to the Basin because of the lure of gold.  The presence of so many miners created a 
demand for supplies and an opportunity for enterprising individuals to make profits from 
carrying freight to them.  The influx of miners, and the search for ways to get supplies to 
them quickly, opened the isolated Trinity Basin to the outside. 
 Soon after the discovery of gold in the Basin, steamboats began plying the 
Sacramento River from San Francisco Bay north as far as modern-day Redding.  From 
there, miners could make the difficult jaunt over the mountains to the mines and supplies 
could be sent in.  Weaverville was established in the Basin early during the rush and 
became the central supply depot for these mines.  Eventually, the camp would grow to 
become the largest community in the region and the county seat of Trinity County.102  
Despite the difficulties of the journey from the Central Valley to the Trinity diggings, 
miners clogged the route.  J.P. Haynes, who mined on the Trinity River during the 
opening years of the rush, commented that the trail between the Sacramento Valley and 
the bustling town of Weaverville was so crowded that "you could scarcely go half a 
dozen rods but you would meet someone, or someone would overtake you."  "In fact," he 
continued, "you could see someone go over that trail all the time. . . ."103 
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 The difficulties of the overland route from the Sacramento valley and the 
possibility of making tremendous profits freighting goods to the mines spurred 
exploration of the Basin and the northern coast of California.  At the beginning of the 
Gold Rush, topographical knowledge of coastal California was limited.  But response to 
the news of gold on the Trinity River set off a rush by ocean to that part of California.  
After the news of gold reached San Francisco, several shiploads of explorers and 
speculators sailed from San Francisco Bay in a race to be the first to discover a port and 
possibly a lucrative water route to the mines.  They located the mouth of the Eel River, 
Trinidad Bay, Humboldt Bay, and the mouth of the Klamath River, but they found no 
practical water route to the Trinity mines. They did, however, establish coastal 
settlements that began competing with one another for the overland traffic to and from 
the mines.104 
 Miners who chose to approach the Trinity River Basin from the coast ran into the 
same obstacles as those approaching from the Sacramento River valley.  In June 1849, a 
Frenchman named Alexander Andre and a party of Europeans landed at Trinidad Bay 
where they disembarked and packed their supplies overland to the east and the Trinity 
River mines.  After a few days walking, they came upon Hoopa Valley in the lower 
Trinity Basin which Andre described: 
 
Straight in front of us, at the bottom of a valley we were to cross, 
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the Trinite' River meandered slowly, slightly larger than the Loire 
river at home.  On the right and on the left, huge prairies stretched, 
separated here and there by rows of trees, as well lined as if they 
had been planted by men, while in the intervals we could not see 
the smallest shrub. The grass in these prairies was tall enough to 
cover a horse.  This plateau was surrounded on all sides by very 
large mountains covered with huge trees.  At the bottom of the 
valley were a few Indian villages.  Some persons have estimated 
the number of Indians at 3,000, but from what I saw myself, I think 
this number exaggerated.  We were to camp in these prairies, and 
such an attractive sight gave us added strength.105  
 
 Andre’s description of Hoopa Valley is obviously exaggerated.  The "huge" 
prairies do not fit into the reality of topography of Hoopa Valley, although coming upon 
the valley after days of struggling through mountains must have been impressive.  What 
Andre described was a place yet to be transformed by the presence of non-Indian peoples.  
But that transformation was beginning.  When the party entered Hoopa Valley they found 
a group of American sailors already there recuperating from an exhausting boat trip up 
the Klamath and Trinity Rivers.  
 
While crossing the prairie, we met a party of Americans whose 
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camp was on the bank of the river; they told us they had been here 
for fifteen days, fishing and hunting.  They had a small boat with 
which they had reached this spot from the sea.  The stream being 
so fast, it took them no less than twenty days and the efforts of six 
courageous and trained sailors to arrive at the very same spot we 
had reached after a four and a half days' walk.106 
 
The Americans were taking resources upon which the Hupas relied for sustenance.  We 
have no record of the Hupas’ reaction to these interlopers, but considering their greater 
numbers, they could have prevented the Americans from hunting and fishing if they 
wished to do so.  One can assume that since this incident took place in June of 1849, very 
early in the rush to the Trinity River mines, the Indians had yet to realize the dangers the 
presence of these miners posed to their way of life.    
 Miners approached the Trinity Basin from the Central Valley and the coast, but in 
1849, the exact course of the Trinity River was not widely known to anyone but the 
native inhabitants.  The Indians understood the Basin’s topography and the courses of 
rivers and streams, and knew it was not easy to travel the area except on foot.  For non-
Indians, this knowledge came through much hardship.   In the winter of 1849, Josiah 
Gregg, the well-known author of the widely read and highly influential account of the 
Santa Fe Trail, Commerce of the Prairies, led a party of nine explorers through the 
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Trinity Basin hoping to find the mouth of the Trinity River and chart a path to the 
California coast.107  Gregg and his contemporaries erroneously believed that the Trinity 
emptied on the Pacific Coast at Trinidad Bay.   
 Traveling on foot during the rainy season, the group departed Rich Bar at the 
mines on the Trinity River on November 5, 1849, and followed the river to its junction 
with the South Fork of the Trinity where Jedediah Smith had camped decades earlier.  At 
that point in their journey, Gregg met several Indians and inquired about what lay farther 
downstream.  Since the party was in South Fork Hupa territory and near the important 
village of Tlelding, it is safe to assume these were South Fork Hupas.   The Indians told 
Gregg that the tribes downstream would not welcome them and they should move west 
and out of the Basin.  Why the Hupas down river would not welcome the Gregg 
expedition is unknown, but it is probable that the South Fork Hupas were referring to 
some other group that was hostile to whites, or the Hupas were not anxious to have more 
whites in Hoopa Valley.  Regardless of who the hostile Indians might be, the Gregg Party 
heeded the advice of the South Fork Hupas and abandoned the river.  They turned west 
and struggled overland out of the Basin hoping to make the coast.  The Gregg party failed 
to discover the mouth of the Trinity River and establish if a water route to the mines 
existed. However, the expedition did add to the general knowledge about the region, and 
also reaffirmed the difficulty of travel to and from the mines from the coast.108 
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 Because of the experiences of miners like Alexander Andre, and explorers like 
Josiah Gregg, people wanting to travel to the mines, or supply them realized that 
freighting goods overland would be the only practical way.  The newcomers at Trinidad 
and Humboldt Bay soon began to build trails and improve existing Indian trade trails to 
connect the coastal ports to inland camps to facilitate commerce and communication.109  
In the summer of 1850, residents of Humboldt Bay wrote the editor of the widely read 
San Francisco newspaper Alta California,  "A road [to the mines] is now nearly 
completed and packers are already coming down with mules to Humboldt for provisions 
and goods, and a good business will be done there this summer and fall.”110  The 
residents let it be known that three hundred mules were kept busy packing between the 
mines and the coast earning for their owners a handsome $1.50 per pound for freight.111 
A mule and horse packing industry quickly grew on Humboldt Bay and Trinidad to 
supply the increasing number of miners heading to the Trinity Basin and others making 
their way to the Klamath River in search of gold.   
 The influx of miners put enormous pressure on Indian resources throughout 
northern California and caused severe problems for the native inhabitants of the Trinity 
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River Basin.  The Indians now had to compete with people who had different views on 
how land and resources should be used.  The method and motivations of non-Indian 
resource extraction threatened the very existence of Indian people in the Trinity River 
Basin.  Soon after the rush began, the competition for space and resources resulted in 
sporadic hostilities between Indians and non-Indians in the northwest, but violence within 
the Trinity Basin was less common than elsewhere.  Murders of Indians and reprisal 
attacks on whites was the common scenario. 112   
 The United States government had limited influence and no presence in the Basin 
during the initial gold rush.  At the time of the gold discovery in the Sierras, the United 
States was struggling to deal with the recent doubling of its territory at the end of the 
Mexican War.  In 1849 Congress transferred the Indian Office from the War Department 
to the newly created Department of the Interior as part of an overhaul of Indian policy.  
The Indian Office had yet to create a specific policy to effectively deal with the 
thousands of additional Indians now included in territory governed by the United 
States.113 
 In 1850 Congress provided for three commissioners to investigate the Indian 
situation throughout California.  Congress authorized them only to gather information 
about the Indians and assess the situation.  Congress did not intend that the three should 
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or could make treaties with the California Indians.  However, contrary to the wishes of 
Congress, the Secretary of the Interior told the commissioners to “make such treaties and 
compacts with the Indians as may seem to be just and proper.”114   
 By 1850, relations between Indians and whites in the northwestern region of 
California began to deteriorate.  During the summer of that year, two whites were killed 
east of Union (modern Arcata), a packing center on the Humboldt Bay.  The two men 
were found 18 miles east of the town at a spot in the redwood forest west of the Trinity 
Basin that packers used as a camping spot on a pack trail leading to the mines.  As 
prospectors continued to spread across the area, clashes increased.  A conflict between 
Shasta Indians and miners at the forks of the Salmon River led miners to retaliate by 
burning three villages and killing several Indians. 115  In the spring of 1851 a group of 
prospectors from Trinidad Bay moved inland to prospect the middle reach of the Klamath 
River.  They followed a trail leading from Trinidad across the Bald Hills through Chilula 
territory to the Klamath River and Yurok territory at Weitchpec.  They split into small 
groups and began working up river into Karok territory.  Three men went missing and 
were found dead by their companions.  A volunteer force made up of prospectors set out 
to punish the Indians.  They found an Indian village, and, using a tactical approach that 
would be perfected in the region, waited until dawn when they fired on and killed the 
sleeping Indians.  These types of incidents became more frequent as more miners 
inundated the region, and fear of an all-out Indian war began to spread among the 
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newcomers.116    
 Upon news of trouble in the northwest, one of the three commissioners appointed 
by Congress to investigate the Indian situation in California, Redick McKee, hastily 
prepared to go to northern California to try and avert more bloodshed.  With an Army 
escort commissioner McKee made his way north to Trinidad.  From there he headed 
inland past Bloody Camp (a site where packers had been killed by Indians a year before) 
and crossed the Bald Hills to the confluence of the Trinity and Klamath Rivers at 
Weitchpec.  He learned that Weitchpec was an important and convenient place whereby 
Indians might be gathered for a parley.  McKee succeeded in meeting several Indians 
representing groups living on the Trinity River and the lower and middle Klamath River.  
The final document, signed on October 6, 1851, contained the signatures of 27 Indians, 
including five Hupa men representing the 12 villages in Hoopa Valley in the Trinity 
River Basin.  Among the several stipulations, the treaty outlined boundaries of a 20 
square mile reservation that would include Hoopa Valley on the Trinity River.  Indians 
outside the boundaries would be removed to the reservation where they would become 
farmers.  The treaty stipulated that 1000 acres of farm land in the reserve, presumably in 
Hoopa Valley, were to be set aside for white farmers and the remaining lands farmed by 
Indians.  This latter stipulation shows how little McKee understood about the limited 
agricultural land in the Trinity Basin. 
 McKee forwarded the document to Washington D.C. for consideration by the 
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Senate, but that body rejected the treaty along with 17 others negotiated by the three 
California commissioners.  Pressure from state and local interests prompted the Senate 
not to ratify the treaties and to sequester them.   The main opposition to the treaties came 
from interests who feared that Indian reservations would lock-away valuable land and 
resources.117  Non-Indian interests took precedence over Indians in gold rush California.  
The failure of the Senate to ratify the treaty left the Indians, their land and resources, 
unprotected.  Miners carried on their work without pause, and their activities broke the 
boundaries between the Indian and white worlds.118   
 When miners first entered the Trinity River Basin they established their camps at 
claims along the streams and rivers.  The rugged topography of the Basin, as well as, the 
need for water for mining meant that there was limited habitable space.  Favorable living 
surfaces were usually already occupied by Indians if there were resources nearby upon 
which they depended.  Once the rush began, many Indians abandoned their homes in face 
of the onslaught or were outright driven away or killed.  Competition for riparian space 
and the resources of the Basin were favorably tilted toward the miners because their 
mining activity and their overwhelming numbers rapidly disrupted the aquatic ecosystem 
and undermined the native peoples’ ability to subsist in their traditional way. 
 Even such places as Hoopa Valley that lay far downstream from the majority of 
mining activity was not immune to the impact of mining in the upper Basin.  Groups of 
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prospectors traversed the valley testing the river gravel for gold and killing game and 
taking fish.  Some low-grade placer deposits were found in Hoopa Valley early in the 
gold rush, but the quantities of auriferous gravel discovered there were small so that few 
miners attempted to mine the Valley during the early gold rush.  Instead, most bypassed 
Hoopa and headed for the rich diggings farther upriver and later to mines near the 
Klamath River at Orleans or on the Scott and Salmon rivers.   But Hoopa Valley lay 
between the coast and the mines, thus, pack trains continually moved back and forth from 
the coast to the mines passing near the Valley making for a continual presence of non-
Indians in the area.119 
 The physical presence of so many miners displaced Indians and crowded their 
world.  By 1851, the Basin had been thoroughly explored, and thousands of miners 
crowded along rivers and streams in an area of rich placer gravels along the middle and 
upper Trinity River and its tributaries.  The debris miners dumped into the streams and 
rivers degraded salmon habitat, and hampered the Indians’ ability to catch fish.  Debris 
contributed to the causes of the conflict between Indians and non-Indians because silt, 
sand, mud and rocks roiled area rivers and streams.   While the first miners who entered 
the area used simple tools, their method of mining did not respect people living down 
stream or relying upon a healthy stream for subsistence.  A brief description of early 
placer mining techniques gives some indication of the potential disruptive impacts of 
placer mining.    
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 When prospectors found pay dirt, they laid claim to the site and began mining 
with the simple tools they carried on their backs or packed into the Basin.  With picks, 
shovels, gold pans, long toms and rockers, miners first turned their attention to the 
auriferous (gold bearing) gravel bars along a river's meandering course.120  The bars 
contained free gold easily separated from gravel using the tools at their disposal.  They 
washed promising gravels on the banks of the Trinity River or tributary streams, 
depositing silt, rocks and gravel into the water, roiling the stream and creating myriad 
problems for aquatic life and the native peoples dependent upon the river for subsistence.  
If a prospect was not near water, miners dug ditches to divert water for washing gravel 
from an existing stream to a claim.  At most claims pay dirt was overlain by a thick layer 
of overburden consisting of gravel, clay and soil.  Miners tunneled down through the 
overburden to access promising gravels.  They then dug out the gold-bearing gravel and 
hoisted it to the surface where they washed the dirt and clay contributing to the pollution 
of nearby rivers and streams.   
 Using these simple methods, miners rapidly exhausted the exposed auriferous 
gravel bars on the Trinity River and its tributaries.  They then turned their attention to the 
actual beds of the rivers and streams.  Because of its specific gravity, placer gold 
migrates over time to the bottom of river gravel near bedrock.  Thus, miners devised 
ways to mine gravels to bedrock under a flowing streams.   One early solution was the 
                                                                                                                                            
reservation boundary disputes, the miners were allowed to continue working. 
 120This discussion is a synthesis of information taken from Mines and Mineral Resources of 
Trinity County, California: County Report 4 (San Francisco: California Division of Mines and Geology, 
1965); Gold Districts of California: Bulletin 193 (Sacramento: California Division of Mines and Geology, 
1970); Owen C. Coy, Humboldt Bay.; Isaac Cox, Annals of Trinity County.; and Overview of the Cultural 
Historic Resources of Euro-American and other Immigrant Groups in the Shasta-Trinity National Forest 
 
85 
wing dam.  Wing dams were constructed directly in a river to divert the current into a 
small, narrow channel on one side of the stream to expose the gravels behind the dam.  
Miners then could mine the stream to bedrock.  Miners built wing dams of logs, brush, 
dirt and stone, but could only do so when the rivers and streams were low because of 
limited technology and the need to avoid back flow around the dam.  This meant that 
mining was at its peak during the late spring, summer and early fall months during the 
same time as the runs of eels, salmon and steelhead.121 
 Wing dams were obviously of limited value so placer miners erected larger, more 
complicated dams.  These structures completely blocked and diverted a stream, were 
much more environmentally intrusive than wing dams. The most well-known of these 
early structures was the Arkansas Dam located four miles above present-day Junction 
City on the Trinity River.  In 1851, a group of miners agreed to pool their capital and 
labor resources to build a large stone and brush dam to completely divert the river around 
their adjacent claims thereby exposing the entire riverbed for mining.  The project was a 
major undertaking considering that the miners did not know how the river behaved.  
Unlike rivers such as the Sacramento or the Mississippi, the Trinity River acts more like a 
mountain stream.  If there is heavy precipitation in the upper Basin, the Trinity rises 
quickly in a freshet.  If not taken into consideration, this river behavior undermined 
human activity.  The Arkansas dam was near completion when it was destroyed by flood.  
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The miners were not deterred, and made two more attempts to rebuild the structure at the 
same site during subsequent mining seasons, but each time it failed because of rapidly 
rising water and they finally conceded defeat.  Each time the Arkansas dam fell, it 
deposited more and more debris into the main stem of the Trinity River and the 
anadromous fish habitat so vital to the survival region’s native peoples.122 
 The bars and beds of the Trinity and its tributaries were not the only places 
containing gold; the benches and terraces next to and above area streams also contained 
placers.  These areas were dry, therefore miners had to bring water to them from nearby 
rivers and creeks.  Miners dammed streams and rivers to divert water. They dug ditches 
where the terrain permitted, but for extremely rugged terrain, they erected wooden flumes 
that could be built upon trestles over rugged country permitting miners to wash gravel 
deposits far from a river's edge.  This expanded the amount of land that could be mined 
for gold, but also took water from its source diminishing the amount within the original 
stream.  One result of this activity is that they removed a large quantity of water from the 
Trinity River and its tributaries reducing the water available for salmon and other fishes 
while at the same time they polluted the water that remained in the stream.123   
  Another consequence of the discovery and exploitation of deposits distant from a 
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source of water is that water itself became a valuable commodity.  There was no mining 
without water.   
When miners first entered the Basin this was not a problem, but as more mines 
were opened away from rivers and streams, access to and ownership of water caused 
conflict between the miners themselves.  For example, an enterprising individual named 
William Ware built a dam and ditches on West Weaver Creek in the early 1850s and 
began selling water to miners owning dry claims.  Miners who relied upon water in West 
Weaver Creek did not oppose Ware’s operation until a drought limited the supply and 
Ware diverted almost the entire stream into his ditch.  In frustration the miners armed 
themselves and went to Ware’s dam and destroyed it letting water run once again.  The 
conflict turned on water rights.  Did the miners adjacent to the stream have a riparian 
right to the water regardless of when they arrived at the site? Or did Ware, who diverted 
the stream well before many of the miners who opposed him were in the area, have the 
right to turn the stream into his ditch because he appropriated the stream first?  Ware filed 
a complaint, and eventually, in one of the first water rights cases in California that 
addressed the issue of riparian rights versus prior appropriation, the Ninth Judicial 
District Court of Trinity County ruled in favor of Ware upholding the doctrine of prior 
appropriation.  More water rights litigation followed as more ditches were constructed, 
and periodic droughts exacerbated the problem.124 Miners competing for water, a limited 
resource, began turning to the court system as their own ability to compromise with one 
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another declined.   
 Early placer mining in river and stream channels took place during the time of 
year when the water was low enough to allow miners to use the limited resources and 
tools they possessed to access the beds of rivers and streams.  The mining season lasted 
generally from the late spring to the early fall, which coincided with the runs of eels, 
salmon and steelhead so important to the sustenance and spiritual lives of the regions 
Indian peoples.  The impact on the Indians must have been profound.  First eel and 
salmon ceremonies had to be observed to ensure a bounty and the return of fish.  A roiled 
stream hampered the ability of a shaman to catch fish and insure a future food supply.  
The construction of communal and private fish weirs had to go forward, but a severely 
polluted stream and the presence of miners digging for gold could hamper those life-
giving activities.  
 The failure of the Senate to ratify the 1851 Treaty and set aside a reserve for the 
Indians left them vulnerable to the effects of placer mining and the influx of non-Indians. 
In the lower Trinity Basin near Hoopa Valley there were few miners and a limited non-
Indian presence.  But because the Basin was so isolated, and because freighting goods 
overland from the coast or Central Valley, people began to look for places within the 
Trinity watershed whereby they might locally produce goods to sell to miners.  One of 
those places was the Hoopa Valley.  Because the valley was better suited to farming, and 
because it was closer to the mines, marketing valley products to hungry miners was 
potentially profitable.125   
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 David Snyder was the first non-Indian to settle in Hoopa Valley.  Captain Snyder, 
as he was commonly referred to in the local press, located in the valley in 1853.126  While 
the valley was not rich in gold, it contained considerable arable land, a rarity in 
mountainous inland northwestern California.  Snyder believed that if he could farm the 
Valley, he might use the Trinity River as a transportation artery to ship his produce up 
river to market.  Snyder set up a wheat farm, and in the virgin soils the wheat did well.  
Snyder also built a grist mill and began milling wheat for market.  Although the Trinity 
proved unsuitable for navigation, his agricultural endeavors were successful.  He had 
access to the trails to the mines that passed near Hoopa Valley.  He reportedly made 
handsome profits supplying miners with produce and flour. The Hupas tolerated his 
presence in the valley, but they now had to compete within their own home for the 
resources upon which they relied.127   
 Farther up river, miners crowded the canyons of the Trinity River and its 
tributaries.  The most productive gold claims were along a seventy-five mile stretch of 
the middle and upper Trinity River and its tributaries in Chimariko and Wintu territory.  
These people were rapidly overrun by miners.  In the upper Basin the Indians were in a 
more precarious position than the Hupas down-river because the presence of so many 
                                                                                                                                            
Square on the Trinity River.  This caused conflicts between Hupas and miners, but because of reservation 
boundary disputes, the miners were allowed to continue work. See also George Gibbs, George Gibb's 
Journal of Redick McKee's Expedition Through Northwestern California In 1851, Robert Heizer, ed. 
(Berkeley: Archaeological Research Facility, Department of Anthropology, University of California, 1972), 
40, 47;  George Esborne Anderson "The Hoopa Valley Reservation in Northwestern California: A Study of 
its Origins", 25, 52. 
 126George Esborne Anderson, “The Hoopa Valley Reservation.”, 48; Byron Nelson Jr., Our Home 
Forever., 67; Humboldt Times, March 3, 1855.  
 127Nelson, Our Home Forever, 61-62. 
 
90 
miners threw their world into chaos.  Nevertheless, during the first decade of the Gold 
Rush, violence directly in the Trinity Basin was sporadic.  Just outside of the Basin, 
however, gold strikes to the north and west on the Klamath, Scott and Salmon rivers drew 
in thousands of miners to those areas, and violence erupted there that affected the Indians 
in the Trinity River Basin.   
 In 1854, a conflict known locally as the Red Cap War erupted near Orleans up-
river from Weitchpec on the Klamath.  While this war did not openly involve the native 
peoples of the Trinity Basin, the Red Cap War prompted the United States government to 
enter the region and establish a presence there.  The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
George Manypenny, called for the creation of a reservation to isolate Indians and stem 
the tide of violence.  On November 16, 1855, at the urging of the Indian Office, President 
Pierce set aside 25,000 acres as a reservation.128  The reservation, known as the Klamath 
Reserve, began at the mouth of the Klamath River on the Pacific Ocean, and ran 20 miles 
inland from the coast encompassing one mile on each side of the river all within the 
territory of the Yuroks.  There were some areas along the lower Klamath where farming 
could be conducted, and the Indian Office hoped to prevent more violence by sending the 
regions native peoples to the isolated area where there were no mines or pack trails and 
very few non-Indians.  Only Yuroks, who already resided on the lower Klamath, and a 
few Indians from Smith River to the north, occupied the Reservation.  The Indians of the 
Trinity Basin, rather than remove to the Klamath Reserve, attempted as best they could to 
remain in their home territories.   
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 The Hupa refused to remove to the Klamath, even as more non-Indians began to 
arrive in their valley.   For example, a year after Captain Snyder moved to Hoopa, a local 
newspaper reporter commented: "We learn of one or two parties, who commenced 
mining in Hoopa Valley last week, have been very successful.  It is the first work 
[mining] ever done there. . . ."  According to the article, the auriferous gravel deposits in 
Hoopa Valley were large enough to support several hundred miners for many years.129  
The next year, in 1855, a reporter stated that in an effort to attract miners to Hoopa 
Valley, several ditch companies had been formed by non-Indian valley residents in an 
attempt to profit from the many streams feeding into the Trinity River.  To encourage 
mining these companies offered to provide free water to any miner who failed to make at 
least five dollars a day from his claim.130  But mining in the valley never amounted to 
much.  In 1856 , a local newspaper reported that, "[t]here are at present quite a number of 
Chinamen mining along the Trinity in the valley, and they seem to be doing well.”131  In 
typical fashion, Euro-Americans shunned the low-grade gravel of Hoopa Valley and left 
it for Chinese miners who were willing to work less-productive gravels.132 
 The Hupas responded to this new presence by taking advantage of the possibilities 
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that the new arrivals represented.  They did not sit idly by watching non-Indians take 
their water and land.  Although they were seeing their world altered, they also recognized 
opportunity to participate in this new world.  The Alta California reported that there were 
many agricultural and other opportunities in Hoopa Valley.  Moreover, there was no 
labor shortage because the Hupas there would hire themselves out as farm and mine 
laborers for one dollar a day.133  Willing participation in the money economy of the non-
Indian world is not surprising considering the Hupas already embraced money (dentalium 
shells) as a medium of exchange and wealth was a way to gain prestige among their own 
people.   
 While Indians willingly participated in the new economy brought to them by the 
gold rush, they remained at a disadvantage in the contest they did not voluntarily enter.  
During the 1850s the State of California stepped in to stack the deck against them.  For 
example, California authorized local residents to form militia companies in the event of 
war between Indians and newcomers.  These state-funded volunteer military units were 
essentially state-sanctioned vigilante squads with little discipline or regard for Indian 
lives.  The local volunteer units often exacerbated the violence because they wanted to rid 
themselves of the regions’ indigenous population.134  Their encounters with Indians often 
deteriorated into bloody massacres of innocent people.  If Indians wanted to turn to local 
civil authorities or courts to redress these wrongs, they could not.  The state of California 
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made it illegal for an Indian to testify against a white person in court.  If an Indian wanted 
to defend himself with an adequate weapon, he was legally forbidden from doing so 
because in 1854, the legislature passed a law making it illegal for Indians to own 
firearms.135  The state allowed whites to “indenture” Indians captured in war or found to 
be orphaned. This encouraged a vigorous illegal slave trade in Indians who were 
routinely kidnapped and sold under the guise of a legal indenture.136  Clearly, the State 
stood behind and supported non-Indians in their competition with Indians over the use of 
local resources, and non-Indian interests were to drive the transformation of the Basin 
with the aid of the state.   
 By the mid-1850s, non-Indian settlement was spread across many parts of the 
Basin.  Camps and towns dotted the landscape, many were located near the Trinity River 
or one of its tributary streams, and mining continued at a brisk pace.  Weaverville was the 
County seat located on Weaver Creek.  There was also Douglas City, Junction City and 
Trinity Centre on the Trinity River, as well as numerous camps such as Big Bar, Rich 
Bar, and many others on tributary streams such as Coffee Creek, Stuart’s Fork and others.  
Widespread mining activity produced debris that clogged rivers and streams causing 
problems not only for Indians, but whites as well.137  Debris destroyed property, disrupted 
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the regional transportation network serving local communities, and forced some residents 
to abandon their homes and businesses.  The debris issue received little attention from the 
contemporary press and other observers, but there is some fragmentary evidence that 
gives a limited picture of some of the consequences of debris deposition for non-Indians 
in the Trinity River Basin.   
  John Carr, an early arrival in Trinity County, recorded his observations of the 
Trinity Mines.  On an unnamed stream below Weaverville feeding into the Trinity River, 
Carr observed that during the early rush to the Basin, a man named Lathrop hit upon the 
idea of trapping fish and selling his catch to hungry miners.  Lathrop constructed a fish 
trap and apparently did a brisk business selling his catch to hungry miners at fifty cents a 
pound.  His fish business depended on a healthy river and a reliable run of salmon.  But 
Carr tells us that as mining expanded, the miners discharged so much debris into the 
stream that they forced Lathrop out of business:  
 
The fish operation was soon a failure, for when the mines came to be 
opened, the debris running into the Trinity stopped the salmon from 
running upstream.  From a clear mountain stream it became a red, muddy 
river to its mouth, which was death to salmon.138 
 
Mining took precedence over fishing, even if it was a non-Indian fisherman.  Here, 
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resource competition between non-Indians led to the failure of one resource-based 
business at the hands of another. 
 A few years after Lathrop’s business folded, the editor of the Trinity Journal 
described how the miners disposed of their debris as the mining season commenced on 
the Trinity River.  This technique undoubtedly contributed to the failure of Lathrop's fish 
business. The editor stated: 
 
We have been informed that the miners along the Trinity are beginning to 
work in earnest.  At Big Flat the large wheel at the head of the flat 
supplies the miners with an ample supply of water, and they are fast 
sending the "top dirt" down the river.  At other points along the river the 
mines are flourishing.139 
 
 Sending the "top dirt" down the river not only caused disruption of spawning 
runs, it impacted the regional transportation network.  After the mines had been in 
operation for several years, a man named Allen Butler wrote to the Trinity County Board 
of Supervisors at Weaverville and asked that Trinity County provide funds to raise the 
existing bridge across Canyon Creek on the road from Weaverville to the Salmon River 
mines-an important transportation artery.  Butler stated that the bridge was no longer 
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effective because Canyon Creek had filled with mining debris.140  Butler did not ask that 
somebody should step in and regulate mining, but he did turn to local authority for 
redress.  Mining fueled commerce in the region, but the debris caused by mining 
hampered that very same commerce.  The communities in the Basin were connected by a 
series of trails and roughly constructed roads that already made travel difficult, and 
mining debris could exacerbate the problem. 
 Debris from mining also destroyed property.  Near Weaverville, mining debris 
filled a creek known as Garden Gedde.  When the rains came, the creak flooded resulting 
in the loss of nearby property.  Franklin Buck, an early settler at Weaverville, wrote that 
every rainstorm brought flooding because "the bed of the stream has been filled up with 
tailings from the mines and it [the stream] runs anywhere and cuts a channel either close 
to the bank or a hundred feet off".141   
 Mining was not the only resource activity conducted by non-Indians that 
contributed to the clogging of streams and the flooding associated with it. Logging was a 
vital activity that began as soon as miners reached the Basin.  The need for wood in 
mining and construction spurred the development of a local logging industry closely tied 
to mining. Unlike along the coast and Humboldt Bay where logging and milling grew 
into a powerful industry by the mid-1850s, the difficulty of the terrain in the Trinity 
Basin made early logging and saw milling a local affair with the market for sawed lumber 
contained mostly within the Basin.  Miners and local residents required sawed lumber for 
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building flumes, water races, water wheels, diversion dams, fuel and, of course, 
commercial structures and private dwellings.    
 Lumbermen built the first sawmills as close to the site of demand as possible.  
Once logging began in earnest, lumberjacks cut most trees near at hand if they were of 
sufficient size to fulfill an intended need, leaving the rest for firewood.  Loggers cut 
stands of timber on public land, often without a permit or having paid any fees.  Settlers 
could claim 160 acres of government surveyed land for $1.25 per acre under the 
Preemption Act of 1841 if they could prove residence and cultivation.  Of course this 
requirement was almost impossible for the new settlers arriving in northwestern 
California because settlement in California moved well in advance of government 
surveyors.  Thus, timber tracts were technically claimed and cut illegally.  In 1853 the 
federal government responded by opening un-surveyed lands (excluding mineral lands) to 
preemption as well making it possible to pay $1.25 per acre for un-surveyed public lands.  
After that there was no real barrier to logging in the Basin except a lack of markets or 
water to power mills.142  
 Lumbermen proceeded to cut trees indiscriminately with little regard for property 
rights, and with even less regard for the rights of indigenous peoples or the potential harm 
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their activities had upon the environment.143 Once a mining claim played out, the claim 
was sold or abandoned and the mining company or individual mill owner shutdown or 
moved the mill to another location.  This practice, and the fact that placer claims played-
out rapidly, meant that most sawmills in the Trinity River Basin in the 1850s were short-
lived and their history remains obscure.144 
 Isaac Cox, the first person to write a description of the Trinity River mines, toured 
the Trinity River Canyon through the busiest mining areas in the late 1850s.  He noted 
that every mining camp along the Trinity River had its own sawmill.145  These mills were 
usually water-powered, and diverted water from nearby streams or the Trinity River to 
turn water wheels and power saws.  Loggers in the Basin cut a wide variety of trees 
including Douglas fir, yellow and sugar pine, white and red fir, and incense cedar.  
Redwood was not available in the Trinity Basin because it is outside of the “Redwood 
Belt”, that strip of Redwood habitat paralleling the coast of California from San 
Francisco Bay northward to Oregon.   
 Franklin Buck, who is mentioned earlier in connection with the flooding of 
Garden Gedde near Weaverville, was also a lumberman. His logging activities provide us 
with a good example of the operational history of early sawmills in the Trinity River 
Basin.  In 1856, Buck and a partner erected a sawmill along the North Fork of the Trinity 
River in the upper Basin. The men built a dam to back up water to create a mill pond for 
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manipulating saw logs, and diverted water to power the mill. They sawed logs into 
boards, and sold the wood miners.  Buck wrote that the lumber “was floated . . . down the 
North Fork into the Trinity and used, most of it, for building flumes in the [Trinity] 
canyon.”146 The flumes were essential for supplying water to placer mines.  By 1856 
mining was being conducted on the gravel benches above and away from the Trinity 
River and other streams using a new placer mining technique called hydraulic mining 
(discussed in the next chapter).  Hydraulic mining was developed at Nevada City in the 
Sierra Nevada, and was adopted in the Trinity Basin, because it allowed miners to wash 
enormous amounts of gravel quickly.  
 During the Summer of 1856, Buck estimated that he sold 100,000 board feet of 
lumber to the mines, but his business suffered severe fluctuations.  Orders varied 
considerably with the rapidly changing fortunes of the mines along the river.  Apparently 
the flush times were limited because Buck and his partner closed their operation by the 
end of the decade.  The record does not indicate if he resumed logging and milling in 
another location.147  In the late 1850s, the Trinity County Assessor reported that there 
were eighteen water-powered sawmills operating in Trinity County.148  One was the 
Warrener Mill operating on Little Weaver Creek, a tributary of the Trinity River near Big 
Flat. This operation cut an estimated 100,000 feet each season.  Isaac Cox also noted that 
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a sawmill at Manzanita Flat was “flourishing” during his tour of the Basin.149  
 While the evidence is not abundant, early logging operations in the Trinity River 
Basin contributed to erosion and the further degradation of the health of the Trinity River 
and its tributaries.  Although we do not have documentation clearly linking early logging 
practices in the Basin to erosion and increased flood damage, the observations by miners 
and others who noted the debris clogging the region’s streams provides anecdotal 
evidence supporting this conclusion.  It is safe to speculate that some of the early 
flooding occurring on the Trinity River soon after the arrival of miners and loggers was 
exacerbated by the fact that loggers often took every salable tree near at hand leaving 
soils vulnerable to erosion.  Since sawmill operators built the first mills near streams and 
rivers to harness their water to power saws and fill log ponds, it is highly likely that 
logging contributed to stream pollution.  While it is clear that mining was the main source 
of the debris making its way into the Trinity River during the nineteenth century, logging 
surely contributed to the problem.    
 The extensive impact of early, non-industrial placer mining in the Trinity River 
Basin rapidly and extensively disrupted the ecosystem of the region.  Native Americans 
responded to the incursion first through accommodation, and then resistance.150  Rampant 
warfare along Redwood Creek among the Chilula and Whilkut and on the Klamath River 
mines spilled into the Trinity Basin.  By 1858, Indian-white warfare was rampant 
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throughout the northern coastal region.  Within the Trinity watershed fighting was 
particularly heavy on the upper-Trinity River among the Wintu and Chimariko.  Down 
river, the Hupas were outside of the major mining areas, were not openly involved in 
these conflicts, and were less impacted by them at first than were the Chimariko and 
Wintu. The truth, however, is that the Hupas used diplomacy and secrecy to make their 
non-Indian neighbors think they had no hand in local hostilities while secretly aiding 
their neighbors in the war against white incursion.151 
 By 1858, the indigenous people of the area began to mount a stiff resistance 
against whites.  Indians managed on several occasions to completely shut down pack 
trails into the mines from the coast.  Miners received almost everything they consumed 
via pack trains, and the closure of the pack trails was a serious threat.  In response, the 
United States Army stepped in to provide escorts for the pack trains to protect them from 
attack and insure that miners would continue receiving supplies.  Forts were erected in 
strategic areas so that the Army could respond to conflicts and stem the violence.  
Nevertheless, attacks against settlers and miners were frequent.  Something had to be 
done to end the violence, but there were few options open.  Whites could not exterminate 
all the regions’ Indian peoples, although some settlers viewed this as a final solution to 
the problem.  Removing the Indians to reservations was an option, and supporters of this 
approach claimed it held the potential for providing care and education for the Indians.  
Many settlers opposed the reservation idea arguing that reservations would instead lock 
up resources valuable to whites.  With no consistent policy for addressing the Indian 
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problem, the native people struggled to cope with the disruption of their subsistence 
system and open warfare directed at them by whites. 
 The Hupas were initially spared from the onslaught of miners who overran 
Chimariko and Wintu territory farther up-river.  The Hupas tolerated the presence of 
whites within their valley because they understood that open resistance to white 
settlement might result in the total destruction of their homes and forced removal to the 
Klamath Reserve or possibly another reserve elsewhere in the state.  However, Captain 
Snyder and other valley settlers suspected that the Hupa were secretly aiding their 
neighbors in their war against the whites (they were), and so they took matters into their 
own hands. In October 1858 Snyder and a groups of settlers took Captain John, a 
prominent Hupa man from the village of Me’dilding and a signatory to the 1851 treaty 
negotiated by Redick McKee,  to Humboldt Bay and the town of Eureka. They boarded a 
steamer and sailed to San Francisco with two intentions.  First, the settlers wanted to 
intimidate Captain John. If, as they suspected, the Hupas were aiding other tribes at war 
in the region, Captain John would see a great American city and realize that resistance to 
white settlement was futile.  Second, Snyder carried in his pocket a petition from the 
settlers of Hoopa Valley addressed to Congress asking that the Army establish a military 
post in the valley to make sure the Hupas remained peaceful and, if possible, that the 
Hupas be removed to a distant reservation.   
 The delegation arrived at San Francisco Bay two days after leaving Eureka.  The 
impact of the city on Captain John and his companions can only be guessed at, but it must 
have been impressive to a man who had certainly never traveled far from his valley 
home.  Undoubtedly Captain John saw a forest of ships’ masts; San Francisco Bay was 
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the premiere port on the West Coast.  The city itself bustled with people from every 
corner of the globe.  The number of people, reported to be 50,000 at the time, the 
countless buildings and houses, the ships in the Bay must have been an amazing sight.  
The local press reported:   
 
. . . [Captain John] could not control his wonder when our city burst into 
view…as the steamer rounded the point, he very anxiously inquired, ‘How 
long it took to build it,’ expressing a strong doubt of the statement when 
told it had all been done in ten years.  He said that his people had never 
seen many whites, and they believed our numbers to be few…. 
 
The Humboldt Times reported that Captain John told his fellow travelers that “…he 
[would] tell all the tribes…of the mighty power and countless numbers of the whites.”  
After returning to Hoopa Valley, Captain John reportedly stood on the bank of the Trinity 
River and scooped-up a handful of sand.  He slowly allowed the sand to sift through his 
fingers while informing his people that the whites were as numerous as the grains of sand 
and resistance would be useless.  More importantly, on October 30, 1858, the Humboldt 
Times reported that the United States Army moved troops into Hoopa Valley and 
established Fort Gaston.152  Thus, a permanent military presence arrived in the valley and 
the Trinity River Basin.   
 
                                                





Captain John. Ca. Photo taken October 1906 as noted in pencil on reverse.  Photograph possibly by 
Kroeber, Goddard, or Ericsson.  Similar photos of Captain John are published elsewhere.  58 years before 
this photograph, David Snyder and several other white residents of Hoopa Valley took Captain John to San 
Francisco in an attempt to intimidate him hoping he would stop the Hupa people from joining in the Indian-
white warfare then raging in northwestern California.   Authors’ personal collection. 
 
 
 By the late 1850s, much of the gold-bearing river gravels in the Basin had been 
mined more than once and returns from river mining were diminishing.  For example, the 
auriferous gravel underlying Deadwood Creek near Lewiston had been mined three times 
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from the mouth of the creek where it meets the Trinity River upstream for three miles.  
By 1858, Chinese miners, who often re-worked claims abandoned by white miners, 
completely diverted the Trinity River into flumes where it flows in the canyon between 
Northfork and Big Flat, and mined the gravels in the river a total of six times.153  To 
continue making profits, miners had to turn their attention to pay dirt farther away from 
rivers and streams.  When Isaac Cox toured the Trinity River Canyon in 1858, he counted 
76 flumes and ditches taking water from the Trinity and its tributaries.  He also noted that 
there were 18 water wheels operating in the canyon, some as large as 40 feet in diameter, 
lifting water out of the river into races so the water could be used elsewhere.154  Thus, ten 
years after the initial rush to the region began, gold mining in the Basin was shifting from 
relatively simple channel mining to more sophisticated industrial hydraulic mining that 




                                                
153Overview of the Cultural Historic Resources of Euro-American and other Immigrant Groups in the 
Shasta-Trinity National Forest (Playa Del Rey: Geoscientific Systems and Consulting, March, 1981), 30-
32. 
154Cox, Annals of Trinity County., 61., Cox toured the Trinity from just above the Hoopa Valley to the 
upper reaches of the river.  This number is low.  Prior to the publication of Cox’s work, the Alta California 
reported that Trinity County had a total of 120 mining ditches.  This information is in Donald Pisani, 




Waterwheel.  Photo ca. 1910.  This waterwheel is of the typical design used in early placer mining on the 




 From 1858 onward, the Indian peoples of the Trinity Basin had to contend with 
people  backed by military force.  The federal government became a permanent presence 
in the area, and as far as native people were concerned, the United States would begin to 
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implement a policy to re-direct the way Indians used resources in the Trinity River Basin.  
Military presence in the Trinity Basin failed to end the Indian-white warfare immediately, 
but by 1858, the Trinity Basin was no longer wholly Indian Country and Indian time was 
at an end.  The combination of the miners intruding upon the territory of the Basin’s 
native peoples, and the discharge of mining debris into rivers coupled with the removal of 
water devastated the salmon runs and late in the decade sparked conflict with the local 
Indian population that would continue into the 1860s. 
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 Chapter 3 
 Confining Trinity River Indians to a Reservation: 1858-1864 
 By late-1858, Indian-White warfare in northwestern California was rampant. 
Violence erupted within the Trinity River Basin, and outside the Basin as well.  Warfare 
along the Klamath, Scott and Salmon rivers to the north and east impacted the Trinity 
Basin peoples, as did conflicts along Redwood Creek west of the Basin and on the Mad, 
Van Duzen and Eel rivers to the south and southwest.  Because the Indians of the 
northwest lived in such close proximity to one another, and there were so many small 
tribes with close relationships, the conflicts engulfed all Indian peoples of the region.  
Indians aided their Indian neighbors in the effort to repel the white advance, and to retain 
control of their territories and resources.  The newcomers, for their part, continued to 
move into the region adding to their own numbers and increasing pressure on Indian 
peoples and resources.  Because fighting was regional rather than confined to the Trinity 
River Basin, we must look at the course of Indian-white conflict generally so that when a 
relatively peaceful period returned to the Trinity River Basin in 1864, the new world of 
the Indians and the whites will make sense.  Finally, it is important to keep in mind that 
although the federal government eventually used federal military force to compel the 
Indian peoples to move to a remote reservation and embrace agriculture and ranching as a 
new way of sustaining themselves, the actions of local non-Indians, including 
townspeople, miners and merchants, and the reluctance among Indians themselves to 
cave into white pressure actually shaped the outcome of the course of events rather than a 
consistent, one-sided directed government policy.  
 The common scenario cited by whites as the cause of violence between Indians 
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and whites was the commission of depredations by Indians upon property owned by non-
Indians.  Indians stole cattle or some other property, and whites then tracked them down 
to recover the stolen goods.  In the process of recovering stolen property, Indian villages 
were often attacked, Indians were killed, and survivors faced the possibly of being 
“indentured.” This biased scenario, which dominated the newspaper reporting at the time 
and the memoirs of those who witnessed the events, ignored several important factors 
that led to violence.  The newcomers overran Indian homes, roiled streams with mining 
debris which killed fish, and introduced livestock that ate important plant foods, such as 
acorns, that were staple foods for Indians. When Indian resources failed, or when Indians 
were prevented access to them, they were faced with starvation and had few choices but 
to prey upon cattle and other white-owned resources for survival.  Resentment, too, drove 
the violence.  Because of the system of legal Indenture, Indian slave traders scoured the 
countryside in search of Indians.  Once a village was located, the slavers attacked, killing 
resistors and rounding up others, usually women and children, whom they then sold to 
farmers and others who used them as laborers or domestics.  Those who managed to 
escape the attack retaliated and killed whites if they could.  Retaliation was not merely 
driven by anger or hatred, but had a cultural component as well.  Many Indians tribes of 
the region believed that a life taken had to be paid for in kind.  If goods or money were 
not given to the family of a slain person, the relatives of the deceased had a duty to 
avenge his or her murder. Relatives, it should be remembered, were not only those people 
related to one another by blood or marriage, but also by clan and moiety thus 
relationships were complex.155  In response to Indians trying to even the score, whites 
                                                
155The system of payment to a family for loss of property or the death of a relative is common throughout 
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raised volunteer militias to punish the Indians.  The militias used the common tactic of 
surrounding a village at night and attacking sleeping Indians at dawn.  After the attack, 
whites burned Indian houses and food stuffs to discourage re-habitation of the site and to 
starve any people who managed to escape into submission.  Thus, a complicated cycle of 
violence perpetuated itself.  It would take a concerted effort by the United States Army 
and the Indian Office to put a stop to the killing, but it took several years before the 
violence ended.  Once the conflict was over, the federal government was firmly 
entrenched in the Trinity River Basin, and the indigenous people were no longer a 
deterrent to the free use of the resources of the Trinity River Basin. 
 Increased federal military presence in the Trinity River Basin began in 1858.  The 
United States Army began pushing into the area in response to increased violence arising 
from the efforts by local, non-Indian residents and state officials pushing to clear the 
region of all Indian peoples, regardless of who they where or what they had done.  By the 
late 1850s, Indian-white warfare was out of control.  When a clash occurred, no matter 
who was at fault or what led to the incident, the first response among whites was to form 
volunteer militias to chastise Indians.  Non-Indians also petitioned the state and federal 
governments for help in suppressing hostile Indians.  In fact, local non-Indian actions 
drove much of the state and federal policy directed at the Indians of the region.  By the 
                                                                                                                                            
the northwest culture area.  Taking a life for a life was also acceptable, but was less preferable to payment 
in goods or money because revenge killing could lead to continual violence and blood feuds could develop.  
In 1851, George Gibbs, the interpreter accompanying Redick McKee during the treaty negotiations at 
Wietchpec mentioned this system of payment and retaliation.  While speaking with an important leader 
from a Yurok village, Gibbs noted that the man claimed his people were still owed one life by the whites.  
Gibbs noted, “The Chief, with great formality, displayed a bone, marked on one edge with twenty-six 
notches, being the number of white men admitted to have been killed upon the Klamath; while the other 
side of it counted twenty-seven, as the number of Indians killed by the whites.”  In this instance the treaty 
negotiators resolved the conflict by giving the village blankets and axes to compensate them for the 
discrepancy in numbers.  Quoted in, George Gibbs’ Journal of Redick McKee’s Expedition through 
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late 1850s,  volunteer militias had been operating against Indians in the area for several 
years, but these groups were without legal standing, financial backing, and were usually 
formed for a specific attack and quickly disbanded.  As trouble between whites and 
Indians continued, white citizens, particularly in costal towns such as Trinidad and 
Eureka where supplying the mines was important to the local economy, clamored for the 




Women and a child of the Klamath and Trinity region wearing a mixture of traditional and non-tradition 
clothing.  Photo postcards ca. 1910-1920.  Possibly Art Ray, Patterson or Eastman.  Authors’ personal 
collection. 
 
 As early as 1853 the United States Army established Fort Humboldt at Eureka on 
                                                                                                                                            
Northwestern California in 1851, Robert F. Heizer, ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972, 47.   
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the coast in response to troubles along the Klamath.  Fort Humboldt was too far from the 
mining areas to be effective in quelling violence inland.  In 1855 the Army established 
Fort Terwar to prevent trouble between miners and Indians living on the newly 
established Klamath Reserve.  The Army also established posts in the Salmon and Scott 
river region, and in 1858 selected Hoopa Valley as the site for Fort Gaston in the Trinity 
Basin.  The number of federal troops, however, was simply too few to meet white 
demands to subdue the Indian populations and to completely clear the region of Indians.  
Public relations played an important role in forcing the Army to make a more concerted 
effort to pacify the region.  Local newspapers criticized the commanders of federal forces 
for not doing their jobs.  Officers followed the orders of their superiors rather than 
bowing to the demands of local residents who then derided the officers in the local press 
as incapable, corrupt and incompetent. 
 When locals deemed the federal government’s response inadequate (or, not severe 
enough), they raised their own volunteer troops to chastise the Indians.  For example, in 
1858 citizens of Union (Arcada) and Eureka raised subscriptions to fund a militia to 
attack Indians who were raiding along the pack trails leading to the Trinity and Klamath 
mines.  The citizens also turned to the state and requested assistance in the form of 
money and soldiers.  In response, Governor Weller asked the United States Army to send 
additional troops to the region.  The Army responded by dispatching only a single 
detachment to Fort Humboldt.  These soldiers turned out to be too inexperienced and 
poorly trained to be of much use beyond escorting pack trains.  Weller also ordered State 
Adjutant General William Kibbe to Weaverville in the Trinity River Basin to organize 
two companies of militia with the goal of punishing Indians and to clear the trails 
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between Weaverville and the coast.  Kibbe raised a company of 70 men at Weaverville, 
and he assigned Captain I.G. Messec to command a second company of 80 to 90 men 
raised at Big Bar on the Trinity River.156   
 These companies, known as the Kibbe Guards, set out to clear the entire region of 
indigenous peoples.  Kibbe claimed that his forces were too small to take the Indians 
head on, and so resorted to attacking villages late at night to achieve surprise.  Kibbe’s 
methods were effective.  The militias took to the field at the height of the rainy season, 
and their first campaign ended with the capture of at least 350 Indians, mostly in the 
Redwood Creek area to the west of Hoopa Valley.  The prisoners were sent to Humboldt 
Bay and imprisoned there until they were shipped south by steamer south to Mendocino, 
and then to Round Valley Reservation after the Indian Office agreed to house the 
prisoners there.  Over one hundred Indians were killed in this initial campaign, and the 
Kibbe Guards continued operations into the spring of 1859 with engagements on 
Redwood Creek, the Van Duzen and Eel rivers, as well as, within the Trinity Basin.157 
 Peace might have been achieved without such bloodshed but the native peoples 
could not stop whites from committing acts of violence.  The militias were made up of 
                                                
156Humboldt Times, 9/24/1858; Bledsoe, Indian Wars of the Northwest, 251.  There is some disagreement 
among sources as to the number of volunteers enlisted under Kibbe.  The information in this section is a 
general description of events.  The California Indian Wars were extensive and the correspondence between 
the governor’s office, Indian agents, local officials, militia officers, federal Army officers and officials, and 
concerned citizens can be found in the Indian War Papers, California State Archives, Sacramento. 
157Bledsoe, Indian Wars of the Northwest, 255; For a brief description of the violence against the Trinity 
River Wintu, the Chilula and Whilkut, see Edward D. Castillo, “The Impact of Euro-American Exploration 
and Settlement,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., 
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 99-126; William J. Wallace, “Hupa, Chilula and 
Whilkut, in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., 
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 177-179, and Frank R. LaPena, “Wintu,” in Handbook 
of North American Indians: Volume 8, California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1987., 324-325. 
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individuals who were mostly miners and packers with an interest in the removal of 
Indians.  They did not want a peace that left Indians in the region.  Rather, most whites 
were determined to capture and remove Indians to reservations far from the areas coveted 
by whites.  With local sentiment mostly in favor of this position, local militias became 
little more than Indian hunting parties.  There were few voices of protest against them.  
By 1859, the Redwood Creek area west and southwest of Hoopa Valley was almost 
completely cleared of Indians.  White settlers quickly overran the region expanding 
livestock operations that had helped provide spark for conflict in the first place.  But the 
optimism of new settlement was premature because the Indians that were sent to Round 
Valley Reserve and the Klamath Reserve escaped and returned to their homes where they 
again clashed with whites.158 
 On the night of February 26th, 1860, an incident occurred that shocked many 
Americans sympathetic to the plight of American Indians generally, and sympathetic 
whites in northern California in particular.  Early in the morning before the sun rose, a 
group of local men, probably merchants, traders, packers, and possibly the editor of a 
local newspaper, from the town of Eureka, and other men from smaller coastal 
communities, armed themselves with clubs, axes, knives, pistols and rifles and executed a 
plan that had obviously been well-thought out.  On that cold February morning, hundreds 
of Wiyot Indians who lived on islands in Humboldt Bay (having been displaced from the 
coastal shoreline by white settlement) had celebrated a religious event with dancing, 
                                                
158Much of the violence in the Redwood Creek area was a result of introduced livestock destroying 
resources upon which the Whilkut and Chilula relied upon for sustenance. Owen Coy, The Humboldt Bay 
Region, 146-147; Nelson, Our Home Forever., 69-70, 80.  Those individuals sent to the Mendocino 
Reservation soon escaped and returned home and continued fighting. 
 
115 
feasting on seafood and drinking liquor.  The exhausted celebrants had finished their 
festivities and were sleeping when the armed whites landed on the island (called Indian 
Island at that time, and Gunther Island today), and set about killing the sleeping Indians 
by bashing in their skulls, cutting throats, and shooting when necessary.  Simultaneous 
attacks took place at other Wiyot villages father from Eureka and when the massacre 
ended, hundreds of Indian men, women and children lay dead.  Although reports disagree 
on the number of Indians killed, the estimated number on Indian Island ranged from 188 
to 350.  As for other village sites, reports vary and are not reliable. All reports agreed that 
there was only one Wiyot survivor on Indian Island, a child that later came to be adopted 
by a local white family.  He took the white name Jerry James, and was the son of the 
prominent Wiyot headman, Captain Jim.  Nobody was punished for the murder of 
hundreds of innocent people, but the massacre drew the attention of sympathetic whites 
throughout the United States and lead to a concerted effort to stop the violence in 
northern California. 
 Although the Indian Island Massacre sent shock waves throughout the Indian 
communities of northwestern California, the pattern of Indian resistance to white 
encroachment continued into the early 1860s making northern California the scene of  
some of the bloodiest and most morally disturbing events in the history of Indian-white 
relations.  The Indians inland that survived being exiled to reservations outside of the 
region continually managed to escape and return to their homes where they rearmed and 
continued fighting.  In 1862 the federal government, although now embroiled in the 
American Civil War, increased its military presence in the region and tried to end 
hostilities by capturing all Indians resisting white presence and sending them to 
 
116 
reservations away from the mines and far south to such places as Catalina and the 
Channel Islands where they could not escape.  Colonel Francis G. Lippitt, the newly 
appointed commander of the District of the Humboldt, insisted that his men should not 
treat the native peoples as the volunteer militias had done (or the civilians of the towns of 
Eureka, Union and elsewhere had done). He cautioned his men that they should not 
conduct “Indian hunts,” but instead, that they should “bring them [Indians] in and place 
them permanently on some reservation where they can be protected against all outrages 
by hostile whites.”159 Lippitt, while perhaps well-intentioned, was unable to succeed.  
While he managed to capture and send hundreds of Indian prisoners to reservations, they 
continually escaped and returned to their homes. Indians and whites continued attacking 
one another and the bloodshed continued.160 
 The pattern of Indian-white warfare in northwestern California had an important 
demographic component that worked in favor of the newcomers.  The continual attack on 
Indian villages led to a drastic decline in the numbers of Indian people of reproductive 
capability.161  The culling of young men through violence, the devastation of resources 
and village sites, the removal of Indians to distant reservations, and the indenturing of 
young men and women meant that it was increasingly difficult for them to reproduce 
quickly enough to recover from the population lost to warfare, disease, and dislocation.  
                                                
159Quoted in Nelson, Our Home Forever,, 80. 
160Nelson, Our Home Forever, 80. 
161For a detailed analysis of the demographic changes experienced by California Indians during the Gold 




The longer that conflict dragged on, the fewer Indians there would be to resist.  Whites, 
on the other hand, continued to stream into the area at the same time that the Indian 
population was in decline.  The balance of whites to Indians tipped more in favor of 
whites as time passed.   
 Violence and warfare among Indians and whites in northern California was in part 
caused by the differing approaches to resource use.  The only options open to the native 
peoples hoping to remain in their homelands were to fight or accommodate.  Those 
people who chose (or were more often forced) to fight, such as the Chimariko and Trinity 
River Wintu were decimated.  They essentially vanished or were absorbed into 
neighboring tribes or ended up living on the margins of the white society that came to 
dominate the region.  The Hupa, on the other hand, chose a mixture of diplomacy, 
secrecy, resistance and accommodation, and managed to cling to their homes along the 
Trinity River. Their persistence paid off, but only after warfare reached the valley in 
1863.   
 In 1863, S.G. Whipple, the former agent at the Klamath Reserve, replaced Lippitt 
as commander of the Humboldt military district.  Whipple had extensive experience 
among the Indians of the northwestern California, and he believed he could subjugate the 
Indians.   Whipple thought that ending the continuing Indian-white warfare rested upon 
subduing the Hupas whom he suspected of committing depredations far from their 
villages casting suspicion on neighboring Indian peoples while maintaining a “friendly 
stance” towards whites living among them.  Whipple also worried that if the Hupas and 
neighboring tribes were not soon subdued, they might join forces and an extensive Indian 
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uprising might occur.162   Whipple, as the former agent on the Klamath Reserve, believed 
that the Yurok below the mouth of the Trinity River would prefer peace, but he feared the 
Karok Indians on the Klamath above the Trinity might join the Hupas in a general war.   
Whipple did not offer evidence that the Hupa were attacking whites or that a general 
uprising was about to erupt, but in early January 1864, Whipple moved into Hoopa 
Valley and established his headquarters at Camp Gaston where he could operate against 
hostiles and watch the Hupa. At just about the same time, a skirmish along a pack trail 
between Eureka and the Klamath mines led to the death of several packers and hostile 
Indian attackers.  Among the dead Indians lay a slain Hupa warrior of renown among his 
people and well-known to the whites of Hoopa Valley.  The gig was up and the cover was 
blown.  Hupas were now definitely linked to the ongoing conflict.  In response to 
Whipple’s movement of additional troops to Hoopa Valley and the revelation that Hupas 
actually were guilty of engaging whites in war, many Hupas fled the valley and into the 
surrounding mountains where they could protect their families and continue fighting.  
Whipple responded by secretly recruiting friendly Hupas as scouts and sent them out to 
convince those who fled the valley to return.163   
 A Hupa man named Charley Hostler, who was opposed to those Hupas who fled 
to the mountains for reasons that are not clear in the record, led about dozen Hupa scouts 
into the mountains to search for the hostile Hupas with the hope of contacting them and 
                                                
162Letter.  S.G Whipple to R.C. Drum, January 12, 1864, in Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, 
Vol 50, Part 2: 723-725. 
163Letter.  S.G Whipple to Lieut. Middleton, January 30, 1864, in Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion, Vol 50, Part 2: 727. 
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convincing them to return to the valley so that the military would not force the friendly 
Hupas to Round Valley along with any hostile Hupas captured in a campaign that was 
sure to come if they remained in hiding.164  After two months, the scouts made contact 
with the Hupas hiding in the mountains and Whipple’s assistant, J.T. Carey, began 
negotiation with them.  Whipple told Carey, “If they deliver themselves up they will be 
dealt with leniently by the Government,” and assured them that if they cooperated with 
Government most would receive a pardon.  Whipple also promised to suspended military 
actions until the results of the negotiation were known.165  The negotiation ended with the 
return of twenty young men to the valley, but several other groups remained in the 
mountains which angered Whipple.  Remarkably, he still held faith that a negotiation 
could prevent further violence and end the struggle.166  
 Whipple soon made contact with the leaders of two bands still hesitant to come in. 
One band was lead by a Hupa named Big Jim and second was led by Seranalthin John 
(also called Captain John, who was the same John taken by David Snyder to San 
Francisco in 1858 - obviously, San Francisco was not as impressive to him as the local 
press had claimed or hoped).  Through negotiation, Whipple managed to get them to 
return to the valley.  The Indians Big Jim and Seranalthin John returned stolen weapons 
and other articles taken on raids in the upper Trinity and Klamath River basins, and 
                                                
164Letter.  S.G Whipple to R.C. Drum, February 18, 1864, in Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, 
Vol 50, Part 2: 758-759. 
165Letter.  S.G Whipple to Carey, April 6, 1864, in Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Vol 50, 
Part 2: 807. 
166Letter.  S.G Whipple to James Ulio, April 21, 1864, in Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, 
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Whipple agreed to ration the two bands because they had no food.  Whipple wrote, “...it 
is absolutely necessary that rations be issued them, for the present time at least.”167  
Whipple also pointed out that many Hupa men had been wage laborers on local farms 
and ranches, or had worked as packers.   Since most whites abandoned the region in 
response to Indian-white warfare, the government must ration the Indians who could not 
gain fish from the dirty Trinity River because of up-river mining, and now could not earn 
cash except though criminal acts.  Rations were insurance that they would not again 
commit depredations and the violence could be stopped.168 
 During the Summer of 1864, more Hupas came in from the mountains, but an 
unknown number, perhaps 100 warriors, still remained hidden.  Whipple’ s patience ran 
thin and he wanted all Hupas remaining in the mountains to return at once.  Whipple 
issued orders to Captain A. Miller to move immediately with force into the mountains 
where he was to attack all the holdouts - men, women and children, until they were killed 
or surrendered.  “Kill the last one until they find it prudent to obey.”169 
 This ultimatum left the holdout Hupas with little choice, they could fight the 
whites or surrender to them.  Some Hupas in the valley and living in peace panicked and 
choose to leave the valley again, but instead of trying to wait out the war, they joined 
their neighbors on Redwood Creek and elsewhere and again took up arms.  Other Hupas 
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stayed in the valley and decided to throw in with the Americans and aid the Army against 
their hostile brethren.  This situation caused hostilities to break out amongst the Hupa 
remaining in the valley and inter-village warfare erupted for reasons that Whipple did not 
completely comprehend and we can only guess.  While white outsiders viewed the Hupa 
as a single “tribe”, in reality, the Hupas saw themselves differently.  Briefly, an 
explanation of power and obligation at this point in the narrative can help the reader 
understand the complex nature of Hupa and northwest coast Indian societies, and perhaps 
crack a window into what helped cause the Hupas to war among themselves, and how 
white resource use, while obviously destructive, actually was much more damaging in 
ways whites could not see and Whipple surely did not understand.   
 
 
Hupa Indian packers unloading supplies in Hoopa Valley ca. October 1906.  Packing mules required great 
skill.  After peace came to the region in 1864, Indians often worked as packers running supplies from the 
coast to the inland.  Photograph possibly Kroeber, Goddard or Ericsson. Authors’ personal collection. 





Hupa Indian packers coming into Hoopa Valley ca. October, 1906.  Hoopa did not see its first gas-powered 
freight truck until well into the second decade of the twentieth century.  Packing required special skill and a 
good grasp of how to distribute weight evenly on an animal so as to ensure that the mule would not give-
out before it was time to change animals.  Photograph possibly Kroeber, Goddard, or Ericsson.  Authors’ 
personal collection. 
 
Imagine the situation as a series of concentric circles of loyalty and obligation. A 
Hupa man was in a position of authority within his nuclear and extended family, but a 
shaman or doctor, who could be a woman, had power of a different source and she could 
be stronger within the family unit because of her natural and supernatural knowledge and 
possession of formulae.  But for the moment, sticking with the man and imagining him 
not to have supernatural knowledge, he had political, legal, and social obligations to his 
nuclear and extended family, but also clan and moiety obligations which could obligate 
him to people living in other villages and in some cases, other tribes, thus we see a larger 
circle of ties which could control what decisions he made and how he acted or was 
obligated to act.  Also, depending on which family the man was a member of, say he was 
Seranalthin John’s nephew, he had more legal and social power within his village and 
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among other villages because of his blood line.  In addition, Seranalthin John was a rich 
man.  The fact that Seranalthin was rich increased his nephew’s standing in Hupa society, 
and in Indian northwestern California generally.  
 Unlike other northwestern cultures, the Hupa, Yurok and Karok, the most 
southern of the Northwestern Culture Type Indian societies, did not practice potlatch - 
thus, certain individuals and families tended to become wealthier over time, and a type of 
aristocracy was grown that had reached impressive proportions by the 1850s.  For the 
purposes of this study, let’s say our imagined Hupa man was wealthy.  What was wealth 
to the Hupa Indians and their neighbors?  Three principle types of wealth were sought by 
the Hupas.  The most common and democratic was dentalium shell money.  Dentalium 
shells were only found on the Puget Sound in what is today western Washington state, 
and were traded widely.  The value was measured by lines tattooed on the forearm of a 
man - the longer the string of dentalium shells, the more valuable. A second, and more 
prestigious and important form of wealth was the ownership of places of resources 
extraction - in this case prime fishing eddies and holes on rivers and streams, acorn 
gathering sites, and sites for gathering berries for food and grasses and shoots for basket-
making.  These sites could not be trespassed upon or used without permission from the 
owners, or compensation of some form.  The sites were also religiously connected to the 
earth disk and religious prescription had to be observed whenever a person used them.  It 
is significant that over time many women came to own these type of sites, and through 
family relationships, aristocratic families owned sites in their own territory and also miles 
away in the territories of their neighbors.  This was a larger circle of obligation, but was 
an obligation that fell on others wishing to use sites owned by someone else.   
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 Finally, the most prestigious form of wealth and important obligation was the 
ownership of Dance Regalia.  Dance regalia was so valuable it was only loaned during a 
dances and was stored away the rest of the year in cedar boxes and passed down as 
inheritance.  A complete regalia list is not needed here, but certain pieces should be 
mentioned.  White deer skins were sacred and a central part of the ten day white deerskin 
dance. Albinism is rare among humans, and is certainly rare among other animals.  
Mature albino deer are even rarer considering the fact that albinos usually die young.  So 
when, during the White Deerskin Dance, a man lent the dancers 10 white deer skins, he 
was certainly wealthy and possessed great power and prestige.  For the White Deerskin, 
Boat, Jumping and Brush Dances, a wealthy man might lend redwood canoes (a more 
common wealth item and not sacred), headbands of red-headed woodpecker scalps (white 
deerskins were also adorned with a red-headed woodpecker scalp for a lounge), or sacred 
black or red obsidian blades of ceremonial proportions (often 15-18 inches long, 3 wide 
and an inch thick-shaped and sharpened volcanic glass of extreme value).  Finally, there 
were beads, dentalium shell necklaces, ceremonial weapons, and spectacularly decorated 
tube baskets worn by dancers during the Jump Dance.  It was a man, or sometimes a 
woman, who owned the dance regalia that had extreme wealth and power - but also 
commensurate tribal, extra-tribal and religious obligations among all practitioners and 
participants of World Renewal. 
 Owning resource sites and dance regalia made the wealthy person a respected 
individual.  They became arbitrators, settled disputes between individuals, married 
couples, and negotiated with other prominent men and women over blood feuds, murders, 
accidental death, resource use sites, and other conflicts.  They were not, however, 
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“chiefs” in the sense that whites understood the term from their own culturally biased 
standpoint.  Whites believed these powerful people could tell their neighbors what to do.  
They were commanders of the people of their villages, and could “make” others do as 
they were told.  This was a misconception - instead, they were wealthy, respected, aged 
(usually) wise in council and good speakers who were looked to as arbitrators.  It was this 
basic misunderstanding by white observers, and a misunderstanding of what motivated 
obligation, loyalty and therefore, action, that helped fuel the fighting, and finally led to 
fighting amongst the Hupas themselves.  Obligation caused some to support was while 
breaking down traditional cohesion and group solidarity. 
 Nevertheless, once Whipple issued his ultimatum of surrender or death, several 
groups of Hupas left the valley and allied with their neighbors the Whilkut and Chilula to 
fight against the whites.  After several months of hostilities, Whipple’s forces had 
captured over 500 Indians and held them at Fort Humboldt near Eureka.  What to do with 
the Indians was an important question.  Because those Indians who had been sent to 
Mendocino and Round Valley during the previous years managed to escape and return to 
their homes, there was some question as to the advisability of how to deal with the Indian 
prisoner held at Fort Humboldt. 
 Austin Wiley, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for California, advocated sending 
the prisoners to Catalina Island or San Pedro Bay in Southern California to prevent their 
returning to the northwest coast.  Wiley wrote to William Dole, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, suggesting such an approach to the Indian problem, but Dole rejected his 
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plan.170  Since Dole refused to support the plan, Wiley suggested that if the Indians could 
not be removed far to the south, the only workable alternative was to establish a 
reservation at Hoopa Valley.171     
 In Hoopa Valley, the Indians informed the commander at Camp Gaston that they 
would remain at peace if the government would reserve Hoopa Valley for them.  The 
commander agreed, but he did not have the authority to create a reserve.  On August 8, 
1864, against the protest of local whites who insisted that all Indians be killed or removed 
from northwest California, Austin Wiley traveled to Hoopa Valley to negotiate an 
acceptable agreement with the Hupas.  Wiley negotiated a Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
with the Hupas, and also with South Fork Hupas, and other Indians living on Grouse and 
Redwood Creeks outside of the Trinity Basin.  In the treaty, Wiley agreed to set aside the 
whole of Hoopa Valley and the surrounding hills as a reservation.  Among the 
stipulations agreed to by the Hupa were a promise to cease hostilities, obey the agent in 
charge at Hoopa Valley, remain within the defined limits of the reservation, and to 
deliver up all firearms in their possession.172  The federal government purchased the 
improvements that whites had made in Hoopa Valley, including twelve farms, fields and 
equipment, a derelict saw and grist mill, and ordered all whites out of the valley except 
                                                
170Letter, Austin Wiley to Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Dole. June 4, 1864.  National 
Archives.  Office of Indian Affairs.  Letters Received. Entry M234: Roll 39. 
171Letter, Austin Wiley to Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Dole. August 2, 1864.  National 
Archives.  Office of Indian Affairs.  Letters Received. Entry M234: Roll 39. 
172There were three treaties negotiated with the Hupa.  None of the treaties were ratified, but the 1864 
document was recognized as valid and the terms of the agreement were followed.  Vine Deloria, Jr., and 
Raymond J. DeMallie, Documents of American Indian Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements and Conventions, 
1775-1979 Vol. One (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 207-208, 231-232. 
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soldiers, BIA employees and licensed traders.  The military post remained and would be 
active in the valley until 1892.  The Indian agent sent to the valley decided that the 
Hupas’ best chance at living at peace was to make them become farmers.  Although 
Hupas had labored on farms within the valley for over ten years, had cut wood and milled 
wheat for market to the mines, worked as packers and sold fish to earn cash, teaching 
them to rely on farming as the most important part of their subsistence would be a 
challenge that was never to be completely realized for reasons beyond the control of 
Indian Agents, the BIA, or the Hupas themselves. 
 Nevertheless, the newly arrived agent set about teaching the Hupas to become 
farmers.  The agent set up an experimental farm near his quarters which were part of 
Camp Gaston.  He thought that the Hupas could easily be educated as farmers and re-
oriented away from a reliance upon Salmon fishing and the Trinity River.  As farmers, 
the Hupas would become self-sufficient, the possibility of future conflicts with their non-
Indian neighbors would diminish, and with the help of the government, they could 
become positive contributors to society.173   
 This optimism, as far a farming goes, did not materialize, but after 1864, major 
Indian-white violence in the Trinity River watershed essentially ended and the Hupas and 
others on the reservation began a new life. The establishment of the Hoopa Valley 
Reservation on the Trinity River assured the presence of the Hupa along the Trinity 
River. But the setting-aside of the reservation was too late for their upstream neighbors, 
the Chimariko who were decimated by the time the reservation was formed, or the Trinity 
                                                
173“Report to the Secretary of the Interior,” Executive Documents: The House of Representatives, Second 
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River Wintu who were either pushed out of the Trinity River watershed, or ended up 
living on the margins of the white communities that came to dominate the riparian areas 
once inhabited by native peoples.174  The only sizable Indian presence along the Trinity 
River after 1864 was in Hoopa Valley.175 
 The end of Indian-white warfare and the creation of the Hoopa Valley 
Reservation was a turning point in the history of the Trinity River watershed.  It had 
taken just over fifteen years from the discovery of gold on the upper Trinity River until 
the native peoples in the region had been eliminated as a significant hindrance to the 
advancement of white settlement and the contest over resource use.  After 1864, non-
Indian land use practices came to dominate the area.  Whites managed to succeed in their 
goal of eliminating Indians from a majority of the landscape, and they continued to 
transform the land and exploit its resources for a market economy.  The native peoples, 
particularly the Hupa, the Karok, and their down-river Yurok, did not disappear.  Rather, 
the reservation allowed them to retain their pre-contact territory and their cultural identity 
and to take anadromous fish from the Trinity River.  Yet the reservation was the tool that 
the federal government would attempt to use to try to decouple the Hupa from the Trinity 
River and their surrounding landscape, and to reorient their land use practices in a way 
that mirrored those of the larger white society.   
                                                                                                                                            
Session, Fifty-Fourth Congress, 1895-1896 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1896), 125. 
174The South Fork Hupa were absorbed into the Hupa proper after the creation of the reservation in 1864.  
See Wiliam J. Wallace, “Hupa, Chilula, and Whilkut,” in Handbook of North American Indians: Volume 8, 
California, Robert F. Heizer, ed., Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987., 177. 
175A flood destroyed the Klamath Reserve on the lower Klamath River in 1861-8162.  Because of the 
destruction of building and fields, the government physically abandoned the Reservation and the Indian 
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 During the period of Indian-white warfare in the Trinity River Basin, non-Indians 
continued to transform the region in numerous ways. This transformation was by no 
means immediate, nor was it always consciously directed with predictable results.  The 
Indian people who lived along rivers and streams were replaced or absorbed by non-
Indians who became riparian peoples themselves, and who, like the natives before them, 
gained their livelihoods from the river and nearby resources.  The small, intimate world 
of pre-contact northwestern California was shattered.  The Indians fought for control of 
their resources, but were far from successful.  Euro-Americans understood that if they 
were to control the resources they desired, they would have to exterminate the Native 
Americans, or at least remove them to reservations.  They chose a combination of the 
two.  Those Indians removed to the Hoopa Valley Reservation would be shown how to 
use local resources in ways compatible with, and acceptable to, the larger white society.   
 While violence between Indians and newcomers continued sporadically, mining 
and logging advanced in the region.  Logging is among the worst threats to a river’s 
health because improper or careless logging practices can overwhelm a river with 
sediment.  Since rivers are the lowest points in a regional topography, they form because 
of runoff, and collect sediment and debris and deposit it in a terminal basin such as a lake 
or the ocean.  Over thousands of years, rivers adjusts to the storm regimes (high and low 
precipitation) and sediment lodes (the amount of sediment and debris washing into the 
river) characteristic of their watersheds.  Wildlife, particularly anadromous fishes, evolve 
and adapt to the specific characteristics of a watershed ( its precipitation patterns, 
topography, geology, temperatures, sediment lode and chemistry).  Here they are born 
                                                                                                                                            
inhabitants returned to their former villages along the river. 
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and spend several years in-stream while growing.  It is also where they return to spawn 
and die. The impact of logging on a river is dependent in part upon the soil composition, 
topography, climate and precipitation of the watershed, coupled with the method of 
logging.  If conditions are right, removing trees from the landscape can cause a serious 
erosion problem and threaten the health of a watershed and the wildlife living within it. 
 The Trinity River Basin possesses characteristics that exacerbate the 
destructiveness of logging. The majority of the region’s soils are granitic and highly 
unstable.  This is particularly true of the Grass Valley area on the upper Trinity River, 
however, the topography of the entire Basin is rugged, and steep.  The climate of 
northwestern California is the wettest in all of the State, and the majority of precipitation 
arrives in the form of rain.  Loggers cut at will, usually taking the best trees, damaging 
others, and leaving behind piles of slash and brush, damaged stream banks, and a 
landscape vulnerable to erosion.  Deforesting steep mountains overlain by unstable 
granitic soils and exposing them to the heavy rains of northwestern California made 
erosion a serious issue on the Trinity River.176  Just as mining debris wreaked havoc 
within the Trinity Basin, the silt, sand and debris from logging operations washed into the 
river and its tributaries, altered water chemistry, temperature, and clarity, and further 
reduced anadromous fish habitat and salmonid populations. 
 The scant documentation addressing nineteenth-century logging and milling along 
                                                
176There are numerous studies of the erosion and sedimentation problems caused by logging in the Trinity 
River Basin.  Among the earliest are: Grass Valley Creek Siltation, California Department of Fish and 
Game. Region 1, Redding, California, 1963; M. Coots, The Effects of Erosion and Sedimentation on the 
Fishery of the Grass Valley Creek and the Trinity River, Trinity County, California. California Department 
of Fish and Game. Region 1., Redding, California, 1967. 
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the Trinity River does not give precise data on the location and number of sawmills in 
operation, the length of time they were in operation, nor the number of trees cut.  
Therefore, one can only guess at the environmental impact of these logging operations. 
What evidence we do have suggests that these short-lived operations were 
environmentally destructive.  For example, Franklin Buck, who previously operated a 
sawmill on the North Fork of the Trinity River, commented on the depletion of trees for 
fuel near Weaverville, the largest community serving the Trinity River mines and the 
county seat.  “[Wood] is getting quite scarce already near town.  We have to go two miles 
to find it and it is getting to be quite an object.  It brings eight dollars a cord and is 
growing scarcer and higher every year.”177  Bucks observation suggests the logging 
method referred was clearly having a negative impact on the area surrounding 
Weaverville.   
 The amount of precipitation falling on Weaverville every year is high, and so one 
can speculate that flooding and erosion, especially along Garden Gedde, the creek 
running through Weaverville, was exacerbated by the deforestation around the town.  
Buck complained that debris filled the creek and caused problems for town residents, and 
pointed out that mining debris filled the stream.  The deforestation caused by logging 
around Weaverville certainly contributed to the serious erosion problem along the 
stream.178  Bucks’ observations suggest that loggers took every piece of salable wood, 
whether for sawing or for fuel.  Lumberjacks felled trees without regard to the 
                                                
177Franklin A. Buck A Yankee Trader in the Gold Rush, 181. 
178Franklin A. Buck A Yankee Trader in the Gold Rush, 191. 
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environmental consequences, and in the Trinity River Basin where precipitation is high 
and soils are granitic and unstable, early logging practices surly negatively impacted area 
streams and fisheries.   
 Logging on an industrial scale also began on the coast of northwest California 
soon after the first Euroamericans began to settle in the Klamath-Trinity watershed. 
Logging companies developed transportation networks pushing inland along coastal 
rivers and streams.  Lumberjacks first worked the forests along the coast, cutting the 
timber easily accessed by the technology available to them.  They then moved inland 
along rivers feeding into the Pacific Ocean.  The method, scale and intensity of logging 
evolved rapidly as water-powered sawmills employing whipsaws, and oxen dragging saw 
logs overland, gave way to rotary-blade steam-driven sawmills, the employment of steam 
donkeys for yarding, and the adoption of logging railroads.  Logging companies exploited 
a variety of tree species for different uses, and the intensity of logging increased as the 
regional logging industry turned away from supplying local markets with building 
materials to exporting wood and wood-products to far-off destinations such as San 
Francisco, Hawaii, Australia and the Philippines.179   
 During the early 1860s, when Indian-white warfare was rampant, logging and 
milling had emerged as a significant industry on the Humboldt Bay and operators there 
began exploiting the rivers and streams leading to the Pacific Ocean.  While the logging 
operations along the coast had not yet moved into the Klamath River estuary in the early 
1860s, it had penetrated inland into the “Redwood Belt” east of Eureka and was poised to 
                                                
179Thomas R. Cox, Mills and Markets: A History of the Pacific Coast Lumber Industry to 1900 (Seattle: 
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move into the Klamath where floating logs for milling, and the pollution of the river with 
sediment and debris would impact the Salmon runs into the Trinity River Basin.  By 
1860s,  residents of  the Humboldt Bay region could claim that their mills were among 
the leading producers of lumber in all of California.180  The Alta California reported that 
in the Humboldt Bay region, “Lumbering is the main occupation and source of 
employment.”181 
 As lumbermen expanded their operations to meet increasing demand, there was a 
corresponding increase in the disturbance of land, streams and rivers as loggers cut and 
moved more and more trees to yarding areas and sawmills.  The destructiveness of early 
logging can be understood by briefly outlining the methods employed to move logs from 
the forest to the mill.  When the first mills began operating in the region, loggers cut trees 
near-at-hand and transported them relatively short distances to the mills.  Loggers felled 
trees and skidded the logs to staging areas and mills using oxen, steam donkeys, and 
crude logging railroads that could be easily dismantled and moved as areas were logged-
over.  Moving trees by dragging them across the forest floor disturbed soils and plants, 
created unstable soil conditions and erosion problems, and filled streams with sediment, 
logging debris and slash.   
                                                                                                                                            
University of Washington Press, 1974). 
180Coy, The Humboldt Bay Region, 118-120.  By 1857, the Humboldt and Klamath County Assessors 
reported a that nine sawmills in the area had produced a combined total of 25,000,000 board feet of lumber 
for that year.  See: Humboldt County Assessor’s Report, 1857 (n.p.);  Klamath County Assessor’s Report, 
1857 (n.p.). Another source reports that the Papoose Sawmill was the first erected on Humboldt Bay. See: 
Christine Savage, Six Rivers National Forest: A Contextual Cultural Resources Chronology of Events on or 
Near Forest Lands (Six Rivers National Forest, January, 1991), 8. 
181Alta California 6-6-1861, 2:2. 
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 Loggers also used rivers to move their logs wherever they could, but northwestern 
California did not have abundant navigable waterways than ran year-round.  Loggers 
felled trees, dragged them to a nearby river and dumped them directly in the river bed to 
await high water.  For example, in the early 1860s, at Freshwater Slough feeding into 
Humboldt Bay, lumbermen floated logs downstream to tidewater on freshets caused by 
early-winter rains.  Once at tidewater, lumberjacks easily moved the timber to nearby 
mills for sawing.  Waiting for high water or floods to move timber, however, was slow 
and time consuming.  To overcome the obvious problems with waiting for nature to act, 
loggers became creative.  Rather than wait for a flood to move timber in rivers not 
naturally navigable, lumber companies struck upon the idea of “booming” their logs.  
Booming, simply put, was creating a man-made freshet.  Loggers dumped saw logs in a 
river bed, built a temporary dam upstream from the waiting logs, and when enough water 
backed-up behind the dam to float the logs downstream, the dam was broken down using 
explosives.  The freshet caused by the collapse of the dam moved logs downstream to 
tidewater.  These methods of moving saw logs choked rivers with debris and sediment, 
and destroyed anadromous fish habitat and spawning beds.182   
 Transporting logs by water was cheap, quick and reliable, and where it was 
possible to move logs by river year-round, lumbermen attempted to do so.  The Eel River, 
navigable for the much of the year on its lower stretches, was a favored route for early 
lumber companies.  However, logging interests soon discovered they were not the only 
                                                
182Using seasonal floods and human-caused freshets to move logs down rivers usually too shallow to be 
used on a daily basis was a common practice in the western lumber industry, and large numbers of board-
feet could be moved this way.  In late 1860, logs containing an estimated one million feet of lumber were 
floated down Freshwater Slough to Humboldt Bay during heavy run-off.  See: Coy, The Humboldt Bay 
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commercial enterprise interested in utilizing the rivers of northern California.  Several 
times each year, salmon and steelhead ran the coastal rivers of northern California.  
Cannery operations made their living harvesting salmon, and by the 1860s they were 
harvesting fish from most major rivers in the region.  As a result, conflicts between 
fishing and lumber interests eventually erupted.183  Nevertheless, the majority of coastal 
rivers in northern California, excepting the lower forty miles of the Klamath River, were 
simply unsuitable for floating logs and so using water to move logs and sawed lumber 
from interior forests to coastal sawmills and ports was, for the most part, unrealistic.  
 While water was used where possible, logging railroads were commonly used to 
move  felled trees to staging areas on the Humboldt Bay or directly to lumber mills.  
Loggers preferred to build railroads on relatively level ground because of cost and the 
useful life of the railroad.184  Once loggers removed the valuable trees from a particular 
cutting area, they often moved their rail lines, thus investment in expensive bridges, 
trestles and tunnels was not realistic unless the railroad could be used for other purposes 
or if a large stand of valuable trees awaited the lumberjack’s saw.185  The reach of a 
logging railroad could be extended by using oxen and other methods of bringing logs to a 
yarding area near the road for shipment to the mills, but as distances to tree stands 
                                                                                                                                            
Region, 216, fn.5. 
183The major battles between fishing and logging interests erupted in the early twentieth century along the 
lower Klamath River between companies using the river to move logs, and sport fishermen competing for 
space on the river.  Once logging operations moved far into the interior after World War II, the issue of 
declining salmon and steelhead runs caused by logging and milling operations on the upper reaches of the 
Trinity and Klamath rivers prompted protests from fishing interests and resulted in state regulation (see 
below).  
184Coy, The Humboldt Bay Region, 286-292. 
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increased, this became more and more expensive. Nevertheless, logging railroads were 
used throughout coastal northern California.186 Thus, by the 1860s Humboldt Bay was a 
world producer of redwood and other types of lumber for global markets.  
 While logging on the coast expanded during the early 1860s, mining also 
continued during the period of Indian-white warfare.  By the early in the 1860s channel 
mining was beginning to the wane in the Trinity Basin as the easily accessible placer 
gravels played out.  While the extent of early mining activity was widespread, 
impressive, and as the warfare between newcomers and Indians suggests, socially and 
environmentally disruptive, miners began importing industrial mining techniques 
developed outside of the Basin that enabled them to rework the previously mined gravels 
of the Trinity River and to mine areas untouched by earlier activity.  Miners imported 
new methods of mining, particularly hydraulic mining (discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter) during the early 1860s at the same time that the Hupas and other 
native peoples were trying to resist white incursion.  They could not prevent industrial 
mining from reaching into the Trinity River Basin, and the impact of industrial mining 
was substantial.  
 The confinement of Indians to a reservation, the beginning of industrial logging 
on the coast, and the advancement of industrial hydraulic mining in the Basin resulted in 
                                                                                                                                            
185Hyman and Roberts, “History of the Lumber Industry in Humboldt County”, 8, 12-13, 15. 
186See, Lynwood Carranco and John T. Labb, Logging in the Redwoods (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton 
Printers, 1975); and Lynwood Carranco and Henry L. Sorensen, Steam in the Redwoods (Caldwell, Idaho: 
Caxton Printers, 1988). Although these texts are for popular consumption, they are valuable for their 




a wholly new world for the Indians of the region.  The new world, while recognizable, 
was the result of tensions at the local state and federal levels, and between cultures and 
land use practices.  Nature itself played a role by providing an abundance of anadromous 
fishes, free gold, trees, and water.  After 1864, these tensions played out in important 
ways.  By addressing change among the Hupas we can understand these tensions and 
changes in the Trinity River Basin. 
 
138 
 Chapter 4 
 Industrial Mining and the Decline of the Fishery: 1864-1898  
 The introduction of industrial hydraulic mining to the Trinity River watershed 
beginning in the 1860s had a tremendous environmental impact on the river and the 
region in general. Industrial mining is defined here as the application of large-scale, 
highly-developed gold-recovery techniques to massive, low-grade disseminated gold-
bearing placer gravels.  The most important and destructive industrial mining technique 
applied in the Trinity River Basin was hydraulic mining.187 It was at Nevada City in the 
Sierra Nevada foothills in 1852 where three miners hit upon the idea of directing water 
under pressure onto auriferous (gold-bearing) gravel.  Edward E. Matteson, Antoine 
Chabot and Eli Miller are generally acknowledged as combining their skills and 
imaginations to invent one of the most efficient, and environmentally destructive, 
methods of gold mining ever known.188  The three miners developed hydraulic mining at 
their Buckeye Hill claim in the Sierra Nevada foothills.  They experimented with 
different configurations until successfully hitting upon an acceptable design.  The 
apparatus consisted of a wooden intake located at their water ditch to regulate pressure, 
one hundred feet of canvas hose, and a tin nozzle tapered to a 1 ½ inch opening.  The 
initial results were encouraging.  Blasting away at the gravel claim, the partners began 
                                                
187Dredging in the Central Valley is not addressed in this report because dredges were not a factor 
in the debris controversy.  Dredges are mentioned when discussing the Trinity River because they 
contributed to the degradation of spawning habitat. 
188Philip Ross May, Origins of Hydraulic Mining in California., 40-46. 
 
139 
washing considerably more gravel than their fellow miners on nearby claims.189  Their 
invention attracted considerable attention, and soon miners throughout the southern 
mines (Mother Lode Country near the first strikes - not the northern mines on the 
Klamath and Trinity Rivers) were improving upon their original design.  With the new 
invention, the consumption of water and the amount of debris washing from mines into 
area streams skyrocketed. The Daily Alta California described the new hydraulic method: 
 
A new method of mining the hill diggings has lately been introduced in 
this place as novel as it is efficient.  The usual cut is made from the outer 
edge at the base into the centre of the hill.  From a reservoir on its summit 
(made from a barrel, to preserve a steady pressure), the water is conducted 
by a leading hose of strong canvas, terminating with a pipe, similar to that 
of a fire engine.  The column of water thus produced ranges from twenty 
to one hundred feet according to the height of the hill [depth equals 
hydraulic pressure - thus, the greater the height of the “head” - the point 
where water enters the hose above a mine - the greater the pressure 
emitting from the tip of the hose]. . . [A]nd such is the immense power of 
the water as it escapes from the pipe, that no alluvial deposit can resist the 
force for an instant. The toughest clay dissolves like wax, thus 
disintegrating much fine gold, a greater part of which has hitherto been 
lost [by the previous, inefficient rocker, long-tom and gold pan] . . . .  
                                                
189Philip Ross May, Origins of Hydraulic Mining in California., 40-46. 
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Witness the operation of the new appliance: the hydraulic apparatus is 
brought into contact with the debris [emphasis in original] . . ., which 
melts like ice under a midsummer sun, and lo! in much less time than it 
requires to describe the operation, the huge mass is released from its 
diluvian home and comes tumbling down into the space below.190  
 
 This article points to the potential environmental harm of hydraulic mining.  The 
hydraulic method reduced the amount of labor needed to mine gravels, substantially 
increased the amount of gravel that could be washed in a single day, eliminated the 
danger of collapsing undercuts that killed so many miners, and like all industrialized 
methods of production, required fewer and fewer miners as the method improved.  
Hydraulic mining, as it improved, became a truly industrial mining technique whereby a 
single man, operating an improved hydraulic monitor (nozzle) with a head of 500 feet 
could move mountains.  In a single day one man could move more gravel than a thousand 
men working a claim by hand.  The hydraulic method changed everything about gold 
mining.  Water was the paramount resource needed for hydraulic mining, and the amount 
of water consumed by mines near Nevada City, the site of the first hydraulic mines, 
jumped considerably with the new invention.  Early in the 1850s, a typical hydraulic 
operation using 40 Miners’ Inches of water was considered unprecedented.  By mid-
decade, some mines were buying as much as 76 inches a day, and by the close of the 
decade, many hydraulic mines consumed 300 Miners’ Inches.  Miners soon discovered 
                                                
190Daily Alta California, June 7, 1853., quoted in Philip Ross May, Origins of Hydraulic Mining in 
 
141 
that the debris from their mines became a problem for the mine itself.  Although earlier 
mining had created a tremendous debris problem for those living downstream from placer 
claims, particularly anadromous fish and the Indian people who relied on them which led 
to wars described previously, the new mining created new problems, and these problems 
impacted not only the miners, but whites living well away from the mines.  A new 
tension developed in gold country, but this tension emerged between whites which 
impacted the direction of mining, and had important legal ramifications for the mining 
industry, yet, for reasons we shall see, did not apply to the Trinity River Basin. 
 
Industrial hydraulic mining scene in the Trinity River Basin ca. 1940.  The location of this mine is 
unknown, but note the hydraulic “Giants” operated by a single individual with a counterweight. Note that 
the working face has been caved-down and the debris is being pushed towards the sluice.  Eastman photo 
postcard. Ca. 1940s.  Authors’ personal collection. 
 
 Debris produced by hydraulic mining accumulated so quickly in the rivers and 
streams near the mines themselves that the mine operators soon discovered that they 
needed to move the debris  away from their operations or the mines would have nowhere 




to send the detritus and would have to shut down.  Thus, mine operators hit upon the idea 
of using their “Giants” (hydraulic monitors) to push gravel though sluices with wooden 
riffles lined with liquid mercury to recover the gold and at the same time move the debris 
into nearby ravines and stream beds with the rivers of water they had purchased from 
canal and ditch companies and moved through their operations.  Once the debris was 
cleared from a mine, it was forgotten by the mine owners, but people living below the 
mines were aware of the debris perched high in the mountains awaiting rain and snow to 
wash down into the valleys.  Once the debris began moving with winter rains, it caused 
tremendous damage to navigable rivers and flooded farms and towns causing crop losses 
and millions of dollars in damage.  By the late 1860s, the stage was set for epic court 
struggles that would end hydraulic mining in the watersheds above the Central Valley by 
the 1880s, but the same battles fought to stop mining in the mother lode region would not 
apply to the Trinity and Klamath Rivers, and the result was disaster for the health of the 
Trinity and Klamath River fisheries.  Before relating the necessary details of this 
struggle, we must briefly understand the impact of industrial mining in the Trinity 
Basin.191   
 By the early 1860s miners began applying the hydraulic mining method in the 
Trinity and Klamath River watersheds.  Engineers continued improving upon hydraulic 
mining equipment until hydraulic mining became extremely efficient, industrialized, and 
destructive.  Canvas hoses gave way to riveted metal penstock pipes, pointed nozzles 
gave way to double-jointed monitors, and "Giants," and deflectors, or counterweights, 
                                                
191Philip Ross May, Origins of Hydraulic Mining in California., 47-49. 
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allowed a single worker to easily steer a Giant in any direction directing millions of 
gallons of water under pressure at a gravel bank.  Black powder, and eventually 
dynamite, helped miners loosen stubborn gravel.  Finally, water was gathered in 
company-owned reservoirs and sent to the mines through hundreds of miles of ditches 
and flumes.192 
   Foreign capital poured into California to fund the operations, and many hydraulic 
mines became international ventures.193  Large mining companies acquired thousands of 
acres of Tertiary gravel, controlled water rights over large areas, and people who 
formerly labored for themselves as independent, hardscrabble placer miners became 
employees of international mining companies making steady, but usually low, daily 
wages, and working a 10 to 12 hour shift under a mine foreman who supervised mines 
that often operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  Every year these industrial 
ventures dumped millions of cubic yards of debris into area streams and rivers and 
pushed the debris downstream using billions of gallons of water diverted from other 
rivers and streams and brought to the mine to be dirtied, dumped and forgotten.194   
 To understand the impact that hydraulic mining had upon rivers and streams in 
the Trinity Basin, we need to explore in a general way the rise of opposition to hydraulic 
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mining that began in California’s Central Valley and how it played out.195  Industrial 
hydraulic mining began in the Mother Lode region of the Sierra Nevada foothills where 
miners there, like those who later worked in the Trinity River , began mining free gold 
from the gravel bars of rivers and streams using shovels, picks, crowbars, gold pans, 
rockers, long toms and sluice boxes.  These simple tools, combined with gravity, water 
and a strong back, a miner could make a good daily wage and the technology, although 
simple, led to the rapid exhaustion of the easily accessible gold in the Sierra and the 
Trinity-Klamath region because of the large number of miners using this technology. 
 As happened on the Trinity River, once the placer bars played out in the Sierra, 
miners turned their attention to the stream beds and began "river mining" accessing 
bedrock under river gravels by de-watering rivers using water wheels, wing dams, coffer 
dams, flumes and ditches.  Obviously de-watering impacted stream bed morphology and 
aquatic life.  The miners literally dried-out and turned over the beds of rivers in search of 
gold.  As the "forty-niners" exhausted the most profitable gravels in the Sierra Nevada, 
they began chasing the actual source of placer gold in the surrounding hills.  
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Unexpectedly, they discovered ancient river beds that were fossil rivers from the Tertiary 
era that had deposited gravel containing placer gold.196 To mine these deposits, miners 
developed hydraulic mining through experimentation.  Miners approached these 
auriferous gravels just like any other placer deposit, but mining Tertiary gravels proved to 
be no easy task because Tertiary gravel deposits were hundreds of feet deep and gold was 
disseminated throughout.  Like any river placer, the highest gold accumulations in these 
deposits were found at bedrock, but these deposits were highly compacted and difficult to 
break apart. Three miners near Nevada City  improved their gold-saving appliances so as 
to profitably mine the millions of yards of low-paying auriferous gravel over lying 
bedrock and launched truly industrial scale hydraulic mining.197 
 The availability of water took on new importance when miners began exploiting 
Tertiary gravels because most deposits were far from a water supply.  Water, which was 
always important for mining placers, became a valuable commodity that could be sold to 
hydraulic mines far from a stream.  Enterprising individuals formed ditch and canal 
companies, built reservoirs, and sent their water to Tertiary gravel deposits through 
ditches, canals and flumes where they charged mines for the precious commodity by the 
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"Miner’s Inch."198   
 With a reliable supply of water at hand, tried recovery methods such as ground 
sluicing, and booming, were possible but these methods only worked on shallow 
deposits.199  Miners found that continued washing and caving down caused working faces 
to grow higher and higher creating hazardous conditions for the miners working below.  
Also, as the depth of a mine increased, more over-burden gravel had to be moved to get 
to pay dirt, and profits diminished.  Once miners realized that high-pressure streams of 
water could quickly and cheaply break down millions of tons of tightly compacted gravel, 
true hydraulic mining took off and spread throughout the mother lode and by the mid-
1860s, the Trinity River Basin.200 
 The Achilles heel of Industrial hydraulic mining was the increasing volume of 
debris entering streams and rivers above agricultural communities and mercantile centers 
of the Central Valley.   Estimates from the 1860s show that hydraulic mines were 
profitably working gravels containing 34 cents worth of gold per cubic yard.  By the 
1870s, the method and equipment had become so refined as to commonly allow profits to 
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be made from gravel yielding only 4.75 cents worth of gold per cubic yard.  The North 
Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company, one of the largest hydraulic mines ever operating in 
California, claimed a profit from working gravel containing only 2.9 cents worth of gold 
per cubic yard between 1870 and 1874.201  From 1875 to 1876, the North Bloomfield was 
washing gravels estimated to contain one part of gold for every twelve million parts of 
gravel and using a hundred million gallons of water a day.202  Efficiency was paramount 
and led to the accumulation and movement of mining debris that created problems 
downstream from the hydraulic mines and eventually led to litigation and regulation by 
the State of California and the federal government. 
 Hydraulic mines dumped so much debris into California streams and rivers that 
the industry eventually came under legal attack by farmers, merchants, steamship 
companies, the State of California and the federal government.  Billions of cubic yards of 
rock, gravel, sand, mud and silt originating in the Sierra Nevada began flowing with 
spring flooding during the early 1860s downstream to the Sacramento Valley where it 
filled the lower reaches of the Feather River, much of the Sacramento River to the Delta, 
the American River, and eventually affected Suisun Bay.203  The debris overflowed 
farmlands and towns along the rivers of the upper Central Valley destroying thousands of 
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acres of farmland, flooding towns and cities, and destroying commercially navigable 
stretches of the Sacramento, Feather, Yuba and American rivers.  Although the “Debris 
Problem” as it became known in the local press, began to seriously harm the regional 
agricultural, commercial and navigation interests in the 1860s, there was not a serious 
challenge the hegemony of gold mining over farming and commerce until the 1870s.  
These developments ultimately affected the mines of the Trinity River Basin.   
 In the Trinity River Basin debris harmed transportation networks, caused flooding 
in Weaverville, and ended early attempts to exploit the salmon runs near Weaverville for 
commercial purposes.204  The introduction of mining debris into a river system changes 
river bed morphology and flood behavior.  When a river channel fills with debris, the 
height of the banks remain the same, and the ability of the stream to carry flood waters 
diminishes.  The final result is that even a slight rise in water levels can send the river 
over its banks onto surrounding lands carrying with it debris.205 
 The winter flood of 1861-1862 was a memorable event in California history.  The 
flood scoured high mountain canyons and stream beds that had filled with mining debris, 
and moved it into the major rivers of the Sacramento Valley causing those rivers to 
overflow their banks and inundate farm lands and towns and kill several people.206  
Within the Trinity and Klamath Basin, flooding occurred as well, and was severe enough 
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on the lower Klamath that the Klamath Indian Reserve, created in 1855 for Yuroks on the 
lower Klamath below Weitchpec, was flooded and washed away.  Buildings washed 
away, crops and fields were destroyed, and several feet of debris covered much of the 
reserve causing the Yurok to abandon the reservation and move to their former homes 
along the Klamath.207  But the mines in the Basin continued dumping without restriction.  
Throughout the remainder of the 1860s, floods came and went, depositing more debris.208  
This continued in the Sacraments Basin as well, and because of mining debris, steam 
navigation companies lost the use of the Sacramento from the town of Sacramento to Red 
Bluff, a distance of 395 miles. They also lost 41 miles on the Feather River making it 
more costly to send freight to the Trinity and Klamath Mines.209  Eventually, valley 
agricultural interests began a long series of court battles with the hydraulic mining 
industry that eventually ended on the side of farming and navigation.210  The intricate 
legislative and legal battles surrounding the debris issue are beyond the scope of this 
study, but a general discussion is important to our understanding of hydraulic mining in 
the Trinity River Basin. 
 In 1878, after several devastating floods had caused millions of dollars in damage 
and loss of life in the Central Valley, an uproar from valley agriculture, urban, and 
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navigation interests prompted the State legislature to investigate the debris problem.  The 
legislature created the Office of State Engineer and charged it with producing a report 
investigating the capacity and condition of the State's rivers, irrigation possibilities, and 
the improvement of navigation.  Specifically, the State Engineer was to report on how 
much damage debris had caused to rivers and lowland property, and return a plan 
whereby future injury could be stopped without closing the hydraulic mines.211 
 The legislature appointed William Hammond Hall as State Engineer, and under 
his able, but under funded direction, there began a systematic survey of California's two 
most important navigable rivers; the Sacramento and San Joaquin.  Hall was a former 
officer in the Army Corps of Engineers and had been studying the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin River systems since the early 1870s.  The Army Corps, as a federal interest, was 
concerned primarily with navigation and conducted intensive mapping surveys of the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin-California's two main navigable rivers to aid navigation for 
commerce - the debris was secondary to them at first.212  Hall incorporated his experience 
with the Corps into his own work for the state and eventually issued his report in 1880. 
 Hall concluded that hydraulic mining had severely damaged the Sacramento, San 
Joaquin, and other rivers receiving debris, destroyed thousands of acres of farmland, and 
ruined navigation.  Flooding, Hall warned, was natural and inevitable, but was made 
worse by debris and these problems would continue to worsen unless addressed quickly.  
Hall recommended a system of debris dams and levees to control debris, control floods, 
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and scour rivers by increasing water velocity.  Halls’ plan included only general data on 
where dams might be built, and it did not include a detailed description of the volume of 
water that surged down the Sacramento Valley during flood periods.213 
 There are no precise statistics for the amount of debris dumped into the rivers of 
the Sierra Nevada, but federal statistics for the period 1853 to 1909 reveal a startling 
picture.  Estimates for this period show the following: Yuba River, 685 million cubic 
yards of debris dumped; Feather River, 100 million; Bear River, 255 million; American 
River, 255 million; Butte Creek and Cherokee Canal, 30 million.  Farther south in the 
area of the Tuolumne and Mokelumne Rivers, 230 million cubic yards of debris were 
dumped.  Thus, an estimated total of one billion, five hundred and fifty five million cubic 
yards of debris entered valley streams and rivers, and much of this debris arrived before 
Hall finalized his study in 1880.214 
 After Hall submitted his report, the California State legislature began 
consideration of an act that was a compromise among various interests, and embraced the 
main points of Hall's work.  The 1880 "Act to Promote Drainage" called for the creation 
of a three-person commission to approve plans submitted by the State Engineer with the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers acting as a consultant.  The act called for the erection of 
works to control mining debris, protect towns from flooding, improve navigability and 
                                                
213Robert L. Kelley, Gold vs. Grain, 132-135;  Robert F. Kelley, Battling the Inland Sea, 202-
207. 
214Joseph J. Hagwood, Jr., The California Debris Commission: A History, 21;  Robert F. Kelley, 
Battling the Inland Sea, 202-203;  Grove Karl Gilbert, Hydraulic Mining Debris in the Sierra Nevada, 43;  
Thomas L. Casey, Mining Debris, California, 51st Congress, House Executive Document 267 
(Washington, D.C., 1891), 9. 
 
152 
prevent further harm of navigable rivers.215  The costs would be covered by a 
complicated series of taxes.   
 While the legislators debated the Drainage Act, the Army Corps of Engineers, 
which initially studied and mapped for the interests of navigation issued its own 
preliminary report on its investigation of the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers and the 
worsening debris problem to the Secretary of War.  The conclusions of the reports’ main 
author, Lieutenant Colonel G.H. Mendell, not surprisingly supported Hall's report in 
almost every way.  Mendell painted a bleak picture of the condition of California's 
navigable waterways, and went farther than Hall by recommending nine large debris 
dams in the Sierras to halt debris from the mines.216  The contents of the report boosted 
support for the Drainage Act, which became law soon thereafter.  The Drainage Act 
marks one of the earliest instances when a state acted to create a governmental agency to 
protect and control rivers in the interest of the general welfare rather than for one interest 
over another.217  On the federal level, the Army Corps ordered Mendell to prepare an 
additional report on the feasibility of the suggestions put for in his preliminary report 
issued in 1880.218 
 Under the Drainage Act, brush debris dams and levees were quickly thrown-up, 
and the supporters of the act claimed, prematurely it turned out, that they had solved the 
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debris problem.  The mining industry continued hydraulicking and adding debris, and the 
rather half-hearted measures to halt the debris failed. Opponents of the Drainage Act 
argued that dams alone were not a realistic solution.  Rather, the problem, Hydraulic 
mining, they insisted, must be stopped.219  The 1880 Drainage Act was a compromise 
designed to allow hydraulic mining to continue while attempting to protect navigable 
waterways, valley communities, and farmland.  The act was an attempt to satisfy all sides 
in the controversy showing that the state was as yet unwilling to officially stand totally 
against an industry that even the experts said was a nuisance to the public welfare.  
However, for technical reasons, in September 1881 the Drainage Act was declared 
unconstitutional leaving California agricultural and commercial interests without any law 
or policy to address the debris problem. It was now time for litigation.220  
 The State of California and individuals brought numerous lawsuits against 
hydraulic mines to halt operations.  Many cases lasted for years and made their way to 
the State Supreme Court, and almost all of them went against the hydraulic mining 
industry.  Yet loopholes in each decision allowed mining to continue forcing the litigants 
to seek redress in federal court where, finally, hydraulic mining was dealt a severe 
blow.221  The single most important case decided against hydraulic mining, and which 
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really brought the industry to its knees, at least in the Sierra Nevada region, was the 
Sawyer Decision. 
 The case began in September 1882, when Edwards Woodruff filed suit in the 
Ninth United States Circuit Court of Appeals at San Francisco against the North 
Bloomfield Gravel Mining Company and all hydraulic mines working along the Yuba 
River asking for a perpetual injunction against them.222  Edwards Woodruff v. North 
Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., et al., dragged-on for eighteen months, and the decision, 
commonly known as the Sawyer Decision, was handed-down in two parts.  In April 1883, 
Judge Lorenzo Sawyer ruled that there was no misjoinder of defendants as asserted by the 
mining companies in the case (in other words, Sawyer said it was legal and right to join 
all defendants under one suit).  Sawyer stated that enjoining all defendants in one suit was 
valid because all the defendants were cooperating to produce debris, and the debris 
flowed as a combined mass before damaging farmlands and rivers.  The first half of the 
decision eliminated the prohibitively expensive method of having to sue each mine 
individually.223  
 The second part of the Sawyer Decision was handed down on January 5, 1884.  
The Judge ruled that the brush debris dams the State constructed under the Drainage Act 
(one on the Bear and one on the Yuba) had proven ineffective in halting debris, and the 
dams built by mining companies on their own in an effort to mitigate the problem failed 
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and thus did not stop the complaints of downstream residents.  Sawyer said these dams 
were essentially useless and half-hearted gestures.  Therefore, unless tailing debris into 
rivers was granted by law, which it was not, dumping debris constituted a major 
destructive nuisance to private and public interests under common and statutory law.  
Thus, the mining companies were perpetually enjoined from dumping any type of mining 
debris or refuse into the Yuba River or any of its tributaries.224  The decision would 
effectively end hydraulic mining in the Sierra Nevada, but not immediately, and it did not 
end hydraulic mining elsewhere.  By its language the Sawyer Decision did not actually 
forbid hydraulic mining, instead it forbade miners from dumping debris in a river if the 
dumping created a public nuisance by harming navigation and farmlands.  Thus, if a 
mining company could find a way to mine while keeping debris out of rivers and streams, 
it could legally operate.225  Once again, Sawyer gave the mining companies a loophole, 
but nature and technology were not so kind.  Debris dams could simply not be built high 
and strong enough, nor even large enough to restrain millions of cubic yards of sediment.  
Mining companies, therefore, could not afford to build big dams, nor did they yet possess 
such technology.  Thus, the Sawyer Decision put a stop to most hydraulic mining in the 
Sierra Nevada, but not in the northern mines of the Trinity River and Klamath River 
mines. 
 While the Sawyer Decision was hailed as a great victory for valley interests, the 
issue of debris remained important to valley residents and navigation interests because so 
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much debris was still sitting in the mountains waiting to be washed into the Sacramento 
and its tributaries.  To deal with this latter issue, in 1888, Congressman Marion Biggs of 
California secured passage of a bill in Congress providing for a definitive investigation of 
the debris problem and the possibility of river reclamation.  The bill created a three-
person commission composed of Army Corps officers, who were to study the debris 
problem, and submit a report on the possibility of reclaiming the rivers and reviving 
hydraulic mining.  The Biggs Commission, as it was known, conducted extensive 
interviews and surveys in an attempt to reconcile mining, farming and navigation 
interests.  In 1891 the commission issued the "Heuer Report,” named after Major W.H. 
Heuer of the Commission.226   
 The Heuer Report stated that hydraulic mining had to cease because of the 
damage it had done and was doing to rivers, and its method of debris disposal was in 
violation of recent court decisions.  Heuer stated that high stone debris dams were 
feasible and could effectively restrain much of the debris on major rivers if no more 
debris was added.  These findings were nothing new.  What is significant about the Heuer 
Report was the section addressing the funding of the construction of debris dams.  "The 
construction of dams being called for entirely in the interests of the miner, the cost 
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thereof should be borne by the individual interested. . . ."227  This brief passage suggested 
that debris dams used exclusively to restrain mining debris from mines wishing to operate 
had to be paid for by the mines themselves rather than from taxes or by the federal purse.  
Although he did not say so in the report, Heuer must have understood the implication - it 
would cost more for a mine to build a stone high dam than it could make from mining. 
 In 1892, just after the delivery of the Heuer Report, Congressman Anthony 
Caminetti of California introduced another bill in Congress that encompassed the major 
recommendations of the report.  Caminetti, in his own effort to save mining, also 
proposed the creation of a Debris Commission that would have the power to regulate and 
license hydraulic mines if they could prove that they were in compliance with rules and 
regulations implemented to protect farms and navigable rivers.  In March 1893, the bill, 
known as Caminetti Act, became law.  The bill created the California Debris Commission 
(CDC) and it members were drawn from the ranks of the Army Corps of Engineers and 
appointed by the President of the United States.  The jurisdiction of the California Debris 
Commission only extended to navigable rivers and their tributaries: 
 
That the jurisdiction of said commission, in so far as the same affects 
mining carried on by the hydraulic process shall extend to all such mining 
in the territory drained by the Sacramento and San Joaquin river systems 
in the State of California.  Hydraulic mining, as defined in section eight 
hereof, directly or indirectly injuring the navigability of said river systems, 
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carried on in said territory other than as permitted under the provisions of 
this act is hereby declared unlawful.228 
 
This section of the act had significant implications for the Trinity River Basin.  The 
duties of the California Debris Commission were extensive and required the commission 
members to possess extensive knowledge of river behavior and the works used to alter 
that behavior.  The CDC became the final authority on any subject or issue relating to 
hydraulic mining within the jurisdiction outlined by the act creating it.  Any miner or 
mining company wishing to operate within the CDC's area of jurisdiction had to apply for 
a license, submit plans and specifications for debris restraining structures, and wait for 
approval to commence construction.  Once finished, the structures were inspected and a 
license to mine granted.  If at anytime thereafter the mine caused any damage 
downstream, the CDC revoked its license and shut down the mine.229   
 The significance of the above discussion about the fight in the Central Valley over 
the harmful effects of hydraulic mining is that the Caminetti Act did not to apply regions 
lying outside the Sacramento-San Joaquin watershed.  The debris controversy was limited 
to the Central Valley and its tributary streams because of the navigable nature of many 
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inland rivers, and the presence of millions of acres of farmland.   
 The development of hydraulic mining on the Trinity River must be considered 
within the context of the debris controversy in the Central Valley and the protection of 
navigable streams in that part of California.  Unlike the Sierra Nevada, the Trinity 
watershed did not contain nearly the massive quantities of Tertiary gravels for washing 
by the hydraulic method.  Instead, numerous "bench" deposits suitable for mining with 
hydraulic technology ran parallel to regional rivers and streams.  As noted previously, 
miners began small-scale hydraulic mining along the Trinity River a few years after the 
development of that technology in the Sierra Nevada.  Large-scale mines soon opened 
employing the same methods and equipment.  As the mines located within the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin River watersheds began to shut down after the 1884 Sawyer 
Decision, hydraulic mining activity picked-up in the Trinity River Basin.  The hydraulic 
mines along the Trinity and its tributaries were never as numerous as those in the Mother 
Lode, but many were large ventures and their activity permanently impacted the river.  
The tailings from these mines washed into tributaries and the main stem of the Trinity 
River choking the river with debris and altering stream-bed morphology.230  High gravel 
benches deposited by the Trinity River for thousands of years were reduced to gaping pits 
and exposed bedrock.  Miners used their nozzles to push tailings into mercury-lined 
sluices where placer gold amalgamated with the mercury to assure higher recovery rates.  
The water, rocks, sand, mud, silt and unknown quantities of mercury flowed into nearby 
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drainages, streams and the Trinity River where it remained, lodged or eventually washed 
downstream.231   
 Regardless of the praise historians have heaped upon the Sawyer Decision and the 
Caminetti Act as early pro-environmental measures, they did not apply to the Trinity 
River Basin because there was little agriculture in the watershed (except for the Hoopa 
Valley Reservation) and the river was not navigable.  Because it was not navigable, the 
river was also outside of the jurisdiction of the California Debris Commission.  During 
the debris controversy, the hydraulic mines in northwest California were seldom 
mentioned.  In fact, as early as 1876, when the Army Corps was studying the debris 
problem, it did not even investigate the Trinity and Klamath rivers because it was 
assumed they were not navigable streams.  If they had been so, they would have been 
under the jurisdiction of the Corps.  In the Mendell Report, for example, the officer 
explained that because the Trinity and Klamath Rivers were not navigable, and the debris 
posed no problem to agricultural lands, they were excluded from investigation:   
 
It may be remarked that in addition [to the hydraulic mines operating in 
the Sierra Nevada] there are, on the Klamath and Trinity, one of its [the 
Klamath’s] branches, quite important places, which are now worked [by 
the hydraulic method].  The detritus is lodged in the rivers, which are 
neither navigable or tributaries of navigable rivers, so that this separate 
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mining district is not thought to come within the limits of this 
investigation.232 
 
 The contemporary press was not lost to the fact that the Sawyer Decision did not 
cover hydraulic mining in the north.  In January 1887, The Mining and Scientific Press, a 
San Francisco newspaper catering to the mining industry, pointed-out to its readers that 
while hydraulic mining was almost dead in the Sierra, the hydraulic mines in Trinity 
County were expanding and the trend was likely to continue: 
 
Since the closing by legal procedure of [hydraulic mines vs. the State] in 
the central mining counties . . . the gold obtained from this source [is] 
diminished to about one-fourth of what it once was.  This reduction would 
have been considerable [sic.] greater, but for some increment in the 
business in the more northerly counties, where it has not yet been 
interfered with by legal process, nor is it at all probable that it ever will be, 
as there is no agricultural or other interests there exposed to be injured by 
its continuance.233    
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 Local boosters in the northern counties encouraged hydraulic miners to come to 
the Trinity River region in hopes of stimulating the local economy.  Legal and 
environmental conditions were favorable to hydraulic mining, and the flurry of court 
decisions and injunctions did not reach the north.  Describing the Klamath River, the 
largest river in northern California, a local booster outlined the reasons why hydraulic 
mining went unregulated in northern counties:  
 
Placer mines [in the north] pay well, hydraulic better . . . .  This region 
should be the paradise of the hydraulic miner.  It is out of the injunction 
belt, as the Klamath is not navigable, its banks are not arable and its debris 
not possibly detrimental to any interest.234 
 
 The Heuer Report of 1891 gave more attention to the mines on the Trinity and 
Klamath Rivers and other northwestern rivers in what is termed the "northern district" of 
hydraulic mining, but the same conclusions were reached about the rivers and mining as 
put forth by Mendell. Heuer stated: 
 
The gravel deposits composing the hydraulic mining field in California 
may be considered as embraced in two districts.  The upper one, in the 
northwestern part of the State, embraces portions of the counties of 
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Trinity, Siskiyou, and Humboldt and is watered by the Klamath, Trinity, 
Salmon, and Scott rivers and their tributaries . . . .  In this upper district 
there are no farming lands liable to injury from the debris [discharged 
from the mines], nor are there any river channels which need improvement 
or rectification [for navigation].  By acts of the legislature of the State the 
main rivers have been declared navigable, but they are not so in fact.  
There are therefore not the same reasons for restriction [of hydraulic 
mining] as have been advanced against the operations in the Sierra 
district.235 
 
Heuer then went on to say:  
 
There is no conflict in this section between the miner and the farmer, and 
therefore there are no differences to be reconciled.  The main streams are 
not navigable, and thus dumping debris into their channels, or that which 
works down from the tributary streams, can be productive of no harm.236 
 
 However, debris did cause problems for people and wildlife living downstream 
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from the mines of the Trinity watershed.237  As we have seen, beginning in the 1850s, the 
amount of debris discharged by hydraulic and other types of placer mines into the Trinity 
River and its tributaries was certainly large, but the debris issue received little attention 
from the contemporary press and other observers, and did not command the attention of 
the state of California.238  With fragmentary evidence presented earlier in this chapter, we 
have already seen a glimpse of some of the consequences of debris deposition along the 
Trinity River.  The limited observations of the Trinity River region during the nineteenth-
century show that mining debris accumulated in the Trinity River and its tributaries, and 
the fact that the Sawyer Decision, Caminetti Act and CDC did not regulate the debris on 
these streams left them open to continual debris build-up. Finally, with the 
encouragement of the local press, hydraulic mining was actually encouraged in the 
region, and the main bait dangled in front of the eyes of potential hydraulic mining 
companies was the claim that debris could never cause problems in the Trinity and 
Klamath basins. 
 Yet we know that debris impacted the lives of those peoples living along the river 
in negative and positive ways.  On the positive side, mining created jobs and pumped 
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money into the local economy.  On the negative side, the rivers filled with sediment 
causing severe interruptions of salmon and steelhead runs, and undoubtedly destroyed 
spawning beds.  The alterations and pollution of the Trinity River seriously disrupted 
Native American subsistence practices and was a significant factor leading to a series of 
bloody regional conflicts between Native Americans and gold miners.239  Debris also 
destroyed property, and cost counties and municipalities money to repair bridges and 
roads, and hurt small businesses.240 
 By the 1870s, small scale placer mining was dying in the Trinity River Basin, and 
hydraulic mines were becoming the norm.  In the 1870s, Stephen Powers, a 
newspaperman with a keen interest in anthropology, toured California and published a 
series of articles on the condition of the Indians of California.  His collected observations 
were published first in Harper’s and later as a single publication, Tribes of California, 
which is still a classic work on a world that was undergoing rapid transformation. On 
Trinity River, his observations give us some idea of the impact mining had upon the 
fishery resource.  Powers, described the area at the confluence of the Trinity and Klamath 
rivers:  
As to the enormous numbers of salmon which ascended the streams of 
California before miners roiled them there can be no doubt.  Here [at 
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Weitchpec] one veteran pioneer says . . . he could have walked across the 
stream and stepped every step on a dead salmon; another that he has seen 
them so crowded in the deep and quiet reaches of the river that he could 
not thrust a spear without transfixing one or more.241 
 Powers continued his observations at Hoopa Valley noting that the Hupa Indians 
were less impacted directly by mining because there was little gold in Hoopa Valley. 
However, by the time Powers visited them, they, like other native peoples of the region, 
had been involved in a series of bloody conflicts arising directly out of the disruption of 
fish runs by placer mining and were now trying their hands as subsistence farmers under 
watchful eyes of the soldiers at Camp Gaston and the agents of the BIA.242   
 Farther up the Trinity River in the territory of the Chimariko Indians, Powers 
commented directly upon changes in the stream channel of the Trinity River and the 
changes in salmon runs.  "In the early days, before mining operations filled up the Trinity 
[with debris], there was a fall five or six feet high at Big Flat, above which the salmon 
could not pass."243  Salmon can easily pass an obstacle of "five or six feet," so the falls, if 
they impeded salmon runs, were probably higher than Powers' estimate.  Nevertheless, by 
the 1870s, the falls had obviously filled with debris and salmon were able to move easily 
up river.  If Powers’ observations are correct, the bed of the Trinity River was drastically 
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different than it had been in 1850 when the rush hit hardest, and the population of salmon 
had visibly declined within twenty years of the Gold Rush. 
 It was this drastic impact upon the Trinity River and tributary streams that helped 
contribute to the conflicts between whites and Indians discussed previously.  The 
Chimariokos, whose homeland stretched along the Trinity River from the confluence of 
the South Fork of the Trinity east to Big Bar, were the hardest hit and were completely 
routed from the Trinity River canyon.  Powers stated while he was in the former home 
territory of the Chimarikos, that "sternly were the Indians taught that they must not 
presume to discuss with American miners the question of the proper color for the water 
of the Trinity River."244 The quote clearly suggests that pollution of the Trinity River was 
a major source of conflict. Powers concluded that by the early 1870s just a few years 
before his visit, most independent miners were gone but had left behind devastation. 
"[A]mid the stupendous ripping-up and wreck of the earth. . . ." is a grim, rock-bound 
canyon strewn with grey boulders, abandoned mines, equipment and [abandoned and 
burned] Indian villages.245 
 In 1872, the year Powers began touring California, the California State Board of 
Fish Commissioners, a recently created regulatory body, declared mining to be the single 
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biggest cause for the depletion of anadromous fish in the state.246  They could have just as 
easily claimed that mining was also the biggest cause for the destruction of Native 
American societies.  Nevertheless, the declaration by the California Fish Commission 
was aimed at the Central Valley and had not impact or weight in the northern mines.  The 
extensive impact of mining in the Trinity River Basin was keenly felt by the native 
peoples living there, and the disruption of the ecosystem was rapid and extensive. 
Power’s observations are the best contemporary observations we have on how mining 
debris changed the Trinity River and the lives of the indigenous people who lived there.  
But we can look at other developments to see that this alteration was not over when 
Powers was writing.247 
 The most well-known and visible example of the impact of hydraulic mining 
debris upon the Trinity River and downstream residents was the LaGrange Mine.  The La 
Grange was located in Oregon Gulch three miles west of Weaverville.  Originally the 
mine was several different mines worked by various mining companies.  By the 1860s, 
miners applied the hydraulic method to several of the claims and large-scale mining 
began.  By the 1870s, these mines were producing thousands of yards of debris every day 
and continued to do so for decades.248  In the early 1890s, European investors purchased 
several of the claims and consolidated them into a single, large industrial hydraulic mine.  
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The La Grange Hydraulic Mining Company expanded the operation by bringing in 
additional water and the most modern hydraulic equipment.  The LaGrange became one 
of the largest hydraulic mines to ever operate in California and produced mountains of 
debris249  The company fed its Giants with millions of gallons of water brought in from 
the Stuart's Fork of the Trinity River northeast of the mine.  A series of  ditches, flumes, 
tunnels and siphons re-directed the water out of the Stuart’s Fork, over the mountains, 
and to the company’s reservoir.  The mine discharged it debris directly into Oregon 
Gulch where it flowed into the Trinity River.250 
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Looking over the pit of the La Grange Mine.  Note only two people can be seen as the face caves-down.  
Possibly Eastman photo postcard.  Ca. 1930-1940. Authors’ personal collection. 
  
The LaGrange Mine and the predecessors on the site continuously produced debris from 
the 1860s well into the twentieth century.251  The amount of debris produced by the 
LaGrange was so large that to avoid litigation with downstream residents, the mine 
owners purchased a debris "right-of-way" to the Trinity River consisting of Oregon 
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Gulch below the mine for a distance of four and a half miles from the mine to the Trinity 
River, and one quarter of a mile on either side of the gulch.252  This four and a half by 
one-half mile right-of-way encompassed the entire town of Oregon Gulch.  As the 
LaGrange continued operation, the town was eventually covered with debris to an 
estimated depth of four to five hundred feet.253  Official estimates show that the 
LaGrange discharged at least one hundred million cubic yards of debris into Oregon 
Gulch and the Trinity River.254 Residents of Oregon Gulch relocated elsewhere in the 
region, and the only building moved in tact was the Catholic Church which residents 
moved to Junction City where it still stands.255   
 As of 1898, the LaGrange was just one of three hundred and seven hydraulic 
mines working or claimed in Trinity County.  Of that number, one hundred and forty-five 
properties were operating as of October 1898, employing hundreds of miners and 
discharging thousands of tons of detritus into the Trinity River and its tributaries daily 
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without regulation.256  A California mining publication commented that by the late 
nineteenth century: 
 
Hydraulic mining is carried to its highest development in Trinity County, 
as the anti-debris law does not obtain there.  The famous LaGrange mine. . 
.is situated west of Weaverville. . .where the problem of what to do with 
the tailings does not worry the management, and the conditions for 
economical working are so favorable, that gravel carrying only five cents a 
cubic yard can be worked at a good profit. . .[and the mine] has immense 
reserves of auriferous gravel. . . .257 
 
Although the LaGrange was the largest hydraulic mine in Trinity County, there were 
others of considerable size including the Cie Fse, near Junction City, the McMurray and 
Hupp Mine near Weaverville, the Sykes Hydraulic Mine located near Trinity Center, and 
the Indian Creek Mine near Douglas City.258  
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Debris accumulating in Oregon Gulch below the La Grange Mine. Note that this view leads down to the 
Trinity River.  Also note the land slides on the right-center.  Somewhere in the debris lies the town of 
Oregon Gulch.  Unknown photographer.  Postcard ca. 1927.  The back of the card describes “the beautiful 
scene on the Trinity River in California.” Authors’ personal collection. 
 
 It is within the context of a continually expanding industrial mining industry and 
the growth of new extractive industries that we must understand the interconnectedness 
of human activity, environmental change, and the decline of the anadromous fishery of 
the Trinity River Basin upon which the Hupa, Karok and Yurok depended.  And through 
this context we may also understand the problems faced by indigenous people.  Finally, it 
is important to have a basic understanding of the habitat requirements of anadromous 
fishes if we are to understand how changes in river morphology can disrupt fish 
populations.  At contact, the Trinity River supported a wide variety of aquatic life.  The 
species that most concern us are four anadromous fishes: salmon, steelhead, Pacific 
lamprey and sturgeon.  Although these fishes can survive fluctuations in their habitat, 
 
174 
extreme changes adversely affect their populations.  Fishes reproduce and thrive in an 
ecosystem that is closest to that species' optimal habitat condition.  For any fish species, 
factors important to its ability to survive, thrive and reproduce are: temperature, stream 
flow and gradient, water chemistry, dissolved oxygen, water salinity, stream depth, cover 
in the river and along its banks, bottom type, barriers to water flow and fish movement, 
seasonally related flow and temperature variation, invertebrate population, competition 
from other fish and aquatic life, and the abundance of aquatic plants.259 
 When a particular fish species is doing well, biologists assume that the fish live in 
an ecosystem with optimal conditions for the survival of that species.  The anadromous 
fishes of the Trinity River at contact were well-adapted to that particular stream.  The 
river system was in "balance" and the fishes could survive seasonal changes in the river 
and the ocean.  This is not to say the Trinity remained static.  On the contrary, the river 
was continually fluctuating, but within limits to which the fish had adapted and could 
survive. Salmon, for example, are highly adaptable to changes in habitat conditions, and 
their habitat requirements change throughout their life stages.  They are born and live in 
freshwater rivers while young and spend their adult lives at sea. They return to the river 
only for spawning, and so ensure continuation of  their species.  If one of their essential 
habitat requirements is changed or destroyed (for instance, choking of spawning beds or 
elimination of gravel suitable for spawning), the chain that allows them to maintain their 
population is broken.  Therefore, a "balanced" ecosystem is extremely fragile even 
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though the fish species may seem hardy and adaptable.260   
 Biologists classify the Trinity River as a coastal stream based upon its physical 
characteristics and fish fauna.  When miners first entered the area, the Trinity had a 
variable flow regime ranging from a raging torrent during the rainy season, to a placid 
stream in the summer.  The Trinity River has a high gradient through much of the system, 
except where it meanders through Hoopa Valley, and so for much of its length, flows 
rapidly.261  Biologists divide coastal streams and rivers into "fish zones," areas that 
contain optimal habitat for a particular species. The anadromous "fish zone" of a coastal 
stream exists as far upstream as fish can migrate, and downstream to where tides 
influence the river's flow.  The water is generally cold, clear and fast flowing.  Pools are 
frequent, especially on the lower reaches of the river, and are separated by long stretches 
of shallow riffles flowing over rocks, gravel and sand.  Anadromous fishes use small 
rocks, sand and gravel for spawning. Young trout and salmon live in the anadromous fish 
zone for one or two years before moving out to sea.  Lamprey may spend from four to 
five years living along the river's edge and in silty backwaters.  Most of the main channel 
of the Trinity River and the lower reaches of many of its tributary streams were once 
prime examples of an anadromous fish zone.262  Habitat alterations are the greatest threat 
to the survival of any species.  Human activities that most threaten aquatic fauna habitat 
are: watershed changes, stream-channel alterations, de-watering (diversion), pollution, 
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dams and reservoirs.  In addition, the introduction of exotic fish species, and the rise of 
commercial fishing can all contribute to the decline in native anadromous fishes.263    
 Placer and later hydraulic mining created substantial change in the morphology of 
the Trinity River and contributed to a reduction in the anadromous fish population by 
filling pools with debris, covering spawning gravels with silt, diverting water, denuding 
river banks, etc... .  Not all of the downward pressure in fish numbers can be attributed to 
mining.   By the 1870s commercial salmon fishing operations arrived at the mouth of the 
Klamath River.  Anadromous fishes that spawn in the Trinity River Basin must pass up 
the Klamath River to make their way to the Trinity.  Industrial salmon fishing operations 
prevented many of the fish from entering the river system and further reduced the 
numbers of fish available to upstream residents.264  Commercial fishing took place 
contemporaneously with mining and so both of these activities combined to cause a rapid 
reduction of the aquatic life in the Trinity River.  
 For example, in 1876, Martin Van Buren Jones and George Richardson 
established the first commercial fishing operation at Requa on the lower Klamath River. 
The operation was strategically located to intercept fish at the point where they entered 
the river on their spawning runs to the upper reaches of the Klamath and Trinity rivers.265  
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The fishery was located on land that had been set aside for the Klamath Reserve in the 
1850s.  The reservation, it will be recalled, was destroyed by flood in 1862, and the land 
was physically abandoned in 1864.  According to the federal government, the area where 
Jones and Richardson set up operations was still considered part of the Klamath Reserve 
even though the site had been vacated. Nevertheless, Jones, Richardson, and other 
squatters attempted to settle the area when rumors circulated that the former reservation 
would be thrown-open to white settlement.  Soon, Jones and Richardson were joined by 
other commercial fishermen at Requa.  These new arrivals operated only temporarily.  In 
1879 the federal government forcibly evicted Jones and other squatters from the 
reservation on the grounds that whites were not allowed to fish on Indian land.  The 
government also pointed out that fishing operations were disrupting the inland migration 
of fish and harming the Indian fishery.266 
 Jones remained resolute however, and set-up a new enterprise, the Klamath 
Commercial Company, for canning fish, and also began logging the surrounding 
mountainsides.  The site for the new cannery was over a mile from the river, and 
therefore not on the Klamath Reserve.  Yurok and other Indians took advantage of the 
presence of Jones’ operation.  Jones hired local Native Americans to catch and deliver 
salmon to the cannery for a set price per head which allowed local Indians to participate 
in the market economy at a time when their traditional subsistence methods were being 
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severely disrupted.  Since the cannery was off-reservation and Indians fished for Jones, 
the federal government allowed it to operate, but the cannery was not a success, and 
closed shortly after its establishment.267 
 The continual presence of industrial placer mining in the upper Trinity watershed 
destroyed salmon habitat, and when industrial fishing reduced the numbers of fishes 
returning to the river to spawn, mining made it very difficult for those fish that managed 
to avoid the nets to find spawning beds once they were back in the river system.  Jones 
was not the last to attempt canning at the mouth of the Klamath River, and future canning 
operations adversely impacted the ability of indigenous peoples to gain subsistence from 
their traditional resource base. 
 In the 1880s, John Bomhoff, established a cannery on Hunter Creek near Jones' 
former operation, or possibly assumed control over Jones’ enterprise.268  Like Jones, 
Bomhoff made written agreements with local Indians to supply him with salmon if he 
supplied them with equipment and paid them ten cents for each fish.  This agreement 
benefitted Bomhoff who stipulated that the Indians working for him could not work for 
other whites, and that the Indians would also prevent other whites from fishing in the 
Klamath River estuary.  Native Americans, for their part, earned cash and continued 
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fishing for subsistence.269 
 Of all the commercial fishing operations on the lower Klamath River, the one 
established by R.D. Hume was the most controversial and successful.270  In 1883, Hume, 
a successful cannery operator on the Rogue River in Oregon, attempted to lease fishing 
privileges and obtain the right to establish a cannery on the banks of the Klamath River 
from the federal government, but was denied the right to do so.   Hume then attempted to 
pre-empt land on the Klamath Reservation, stating that it had been abandoned and was, 
therefore, open to settlement.  Again, he was rebuffed.  Undaunted, in May 1887, Hume 
directly challenged the government by establishing a floating cannery in the Klamath 
River.  He erected a two-story cannery and trading post on a barge in the river and began 
canning salmon.  By staying on the river, Hume insisted that he was not breaking any 
laws because the river itself was not Indian country. The federal government disagreed 
and eventually impounded his equipment by charging him with illegal trading of 
merchandise on reservation land.  The matter went to court and was settled in the case of 
United State v. Forty-eight Pounds of Rising Star Tea.  The federal government’s case 
against Hume was uncertain because the exact status of the former reservation was not 
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clear.  Hume received a favorable judgment, however, because the prosecution failed to 
show for the trial.  Hume immediately resumed fishing the estuary of the Klamath River 
using highly productive industrial fishing techniques.271 
 In 1889, Hume organized the Klamath Packing and Trading Company (KP&TC) 
and built a cannery on the bank of the Klamath River at Requa.  In 1890, a flood 
destroyed the KP&TC cannery, so Hume merged his company with Bomhoff's operation 
and continued to do business under the same name.  The new KP&TC operated through 
the 1890s and into the early 1900s.  Hume put up 17,447 cases of salmon during his 
operations on the Klamath in this period, but those numbers are low because another 
cannery, the Requa Fishery Company, operated nearby but left no packing statistics.  
Moreover, Indians continued subsistence and commercial fishing in the estuary and 
upriver, but left no record of their subsistence catch.  Finally, the KP&TC also took 
salmon for salt curing which were not tallied.272 
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Scene at the mouth of the Klamath River ca. 1920.  Note the bar of the river which impeded navigation.  
Also note the sport fishermen in skiffs lined across the mouth of the river creating what locals call “suicide 
alley,” or “murders’ row.”  Also not what appears to be a floating cannery at center-right, and the numerous 
curing racks on the shore at right.  Photo postcard.  Patterson. Authors’ personal collection. 
  
 Hume’s fishing methods were effective and destructive. Large drift nets were 
used, as were set nets placed in the Klamath River almost totally blocking the run of all 
salmon and steelhead except those fish small enough to pass through the mesh.  Indian 
and white fishermen worked together as drift net crews, and Indian fisherman also 
utilized traditional methods for catching salmon and steelhead such as dip nets, and seine 
nets.  Combined, these methods took a terrific toll on the anadromous fish population. 
Industrial fishing and canning considerably reduced the numbers of anadromous fishes 
that made the journey to the spawning beds of the Trinity and Klamath rivers, reducing 
the numbers of spawning fish and thus the number of fishes that would emerge from the 
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river the next season.273   
 Evidence from the Hoopa Valley demonstrates that commercial fishing at the 
mouth of the Klamath River lowered the population of anadromous fish, and the strength 
of runs in the Trinity River.  Because placing nets across the river to block passage of all 
fishes but those small enough to escape through the mesh, it is safe to assume that the 
cannery operations at Requa had a tremendous impact on salmon populations.  As a result 
of declining fish runs due in part to cannery operations and up-river hydraulic mining 
which physically destroyed fish habitat, in 1889 the United States Fish Commission 
established a fish hatchery at Camp Gaston in Hoopa Valley.  By looking at the history of 
the hatchery, we can understand the impacts upon the anadromous fishery because of the 
operation of canneries on the lower Klamath and mining upriver, and how the Indians 
were forced to respond and adapt. 
 On November 1, 1889, Marshall McDonald, Commissioner of the U.S. 
Commission of Fish and Fisheries, instructed Lieutenant Commander J. J. Brice of the 
United States Navy to establish an experimental fish hatchery in Hoopa Valley at the site 
of Fort Gaston to help re-stock the streams on the Pacific coast with salmon.  Eggs were 
to be stripped from fish caught in the Trinity River and also collected at sub-stations on 
nearby streams.274  The Commissioner selected Hoopa Valley because it was controlled 
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by the federal government, thought to have a good supply of salmon and steelhead, and 
the valley contained several tributary steams utilized by anadromous fishes. Moreover, 
the valley had a readily available supply of cheap labor that had great skill in fishing for 
anadromous fishes.  Moreover, while the Hupas had adopted subsistence farming and 
stock raising to an extent, the soils of Hoopa Valley were never very productive, and the 
rains fell from October to March which is just the opposite of the growing season.  
Markets in the mines for Hoopa agricultural products diminished as industrial mining 
ended the need for so many miners, and the valley was isolated with only horse trails 
leading to and from the valley.  The market for Hupa agricultural products was 
essentially Fort Gaston and BIA project personnel, but by1889 the military was planning 
on closing the post and would do so by 1892 and the Hupas themselves scrambled for 
work in and out of the valley.  A fish hatchery would at least provide some potential for a 
cash income to at least a few families and so the hatchery was welcomed by the Hupa 
people.  By December, 1889, the hatchery was in operation.275  It is significant that the 
eggs first used to stock the hatchery had to actually be packed into the valley by mules 
because so few salmon made it to Hoopa Valley that year.  The most magnificent salmon 
and steelhead fishery on the California coast was failing. When fish did manage to ascend 
the Trinity to Hoopa Valley, local Hupa Indians were paid to catch salmon and steelhead 
in weirs and traps along the Trinity River and strip them of eggs.276 
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 The salmon and steelhead running in the Trinity River were sufficient to supply 
the hatchery with the eggs needed for the propagation of those species from 1890 to 
1893.  The hatchery was also an experimental station and produced German brown trout, 
eastern (brook) trout, and hybrid varieties that were introduced into the Trinity River and 
surrounding streams. These latter fish were exotic species introduced to the river and may 
have negatively impacted the population of native anadromous fishes through habitat 
competition.  In 1893, hatchery officials noted that salmon and steelhead eggs would 
have to be brought to Hoopa Valley from the Redwood Creek sub-station west of the 
reservation because; "The canneries at the mouth of the Klamath River, 65 miles from 
here[,] are keeping down the supply [of fish] that comes, or used to come up the Trinity 
and our dependence on that source of supply has become very uncertain on that 
account."277  Thus, the impact of commercial fishing began to be felt within a few years 
after the decision handed down in the Rising Star Tea case. 
 In July, 1894, Captain William E. Dougherty, the official in charge of the 
hatchery at Hoopa, reported to his superiors on the continual decline of salmon in the 
Trinity River: 
 
I have the honor to report for your information that during the months of 
August, September, October, November, December, January, February, 
March, April and May of the last and present year, no salmon of any 
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account entered the Klamath River from the ocean, and that during the last 
month a plentiful supply entered the river for the first time since last year.  
When I first came to this valley, in 1886, salmon were abundant in the 
Klamath and Trinity nearly every month of the year.  Since then the 
supply has diminished steadily, and during the last four years the falling 
off in the Klamath has been very great.278 
 
 Dougherty was an astute observer and realized that the canneries were not wholly 
responsible for the declining salmon population.  He also blamed the continued 
sedimentation of the Trinity River from both natural causes such as landslides, and 
human causes such as mining. Dougherty stated: 
 
Since the establishment of cannery works at the mouth of the Klamath, the 
rapid diminution [of salmon] has been very apparent, yet I do not think 
that the catch at the cannery then will account fully for the extraordinary 
depletion of the supply.  There is one other cause, which occurs at 
irregular intervals . . . the destructive denudation of the precipitous 
mountain slopes along the water ways which occur at infrequent intervals . 
. . and which comes at times with such violence that the destruction of all 
forms of aquatic life in smaller streams and tributaries is inevitable.  
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[Melting snow and torrents of rain flow] . . . with a velocity, on the highest 
levels, that is incredible, carrying with it immeasurable quantities of 
boulders. . . destroy[ing] everything in its path that has life, until the force 
is expended at the lower levels of the larger streams.279  
 
 Dougherty was observing natural landslides and high water flows, but also the 
results of forty six years of placer mining.  The greatest slide directly related to mining 
activity occurred on the Trinity River several miles above Hoopa Valley in February, 
1890.  Known as the China Slide because Chinese miners died in the event, this man-
caused catastrophe was remembered by Dougherty who witnessed the result: 
 
In February, 1890, . . . sixty miles above this station on the Trinity the side 
of a mountain about 800 feet in height and nearly a mile and a half in 
length, slid into the river and stopped the place until the water was backed 
up for 14 miles.  The dam caused by this slide was 350 feet high.  In a few 
hours it broke and a bank of water about sixty feet in height rolled with a 
speed of more than twenty miles an hour down the Trinity and Klamath to 
the ocean.  It is very certain that all the fry and ova inside the water-shed . 
. . were destroyed in that flood, and probably great numbers of parent 
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The flood caused by this slide is possibly the same that destroyed the KP&TC cannery at 
Requa in 1890.  Thus, according to Dougherty, the canneries at Requa and the changes in 
river morphology caused by mining combined to bring about a decline in anadromous 
fish populations.  
 The hatchery at Hoopa increasingly relied on eggs procured from area sub-
stations at Redwood Creek, Korbel and elsewhere.  In his annual report for 1895, 
Dougherty complained that the sub-stations were necessary to procure salmon eggs.  
"Much of the greater number of the salmon and steel-head [sic] eggs were taken at the 
sub-station [Redwood Creek], there being no run of either kind in the Trinity River this 
year, all the fish having been taken at the cannery at the mouth of the Klamath River."281  
The very next year Dougherty again offered his opinion on the declining fish runs: "Since 
the establishment of the station [Hoopa hatchery] the supply of salmon in the Klamath 
and Trinity basins has diminished steadily and now it is impossible to procure brood fish 
from these waters.  This is due to the indiscriminate and incessant fishing for the cannery 
at the mouth of the Klamath."282  Dougherty then went on to suggest that the hatchery at 
Hoopa should only raise steelhead and non-anadromous trout.  Ironically, because the 
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canneries were preventing salmon from running, the Hoopa hatchery was in reality 
producing fish for the canneries and none for the Trinity River. 
 On June 3, 1898, W.C. Rovmel, an official for the U.S. Commission of Fish and 
Fisheries, recommended closing the hatchery at Hoopa and nearby sub-stations.  Rovmel 
stated that the operation should be closed because the hatcheries sub-stations were too 
expensive and isolated, they were now only providing steelhead eggs for shipment 
elsewhere, and the streams where they were located had no commercial value.  After 
another poor egg harvest at Hoopa, Dougherty agreed with Rovmel's recommendation, as 
did the Fish Commission. The hatchery at Hoopa closed later that year.283 
 Within a few years after the closure of hatchery operations in the region, 
observers noted that only one major run of salmon occurred in the Trinity River, and that 
was the fall run.284  The loss of a strong spring run adversely affected the Hupas and other 
native peoples of the region and further compelled them to alter their traditional economy 
and cultural practices.    In fact, Hupa Indians and their down river neighbors the Karok 
and Yurok, began traveling to the mouth of the Klamath River in order to procure salmon 
for subsistence.  Thus, native fishing practices were clearly disrupted, and significantly, 
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so were their ceremonies.285  Nevertheless, the continual decline of salmon and steelhead 
populations did not bring a halt to the cannery operations at the mouth of the Klamath 
River until well into the twentieth century.  The Hupas had to turn to non-traditional 
subsistence practices to continue to live in their valley home in a world of resource 
competition in which they were clearly at a disadvantage. 
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 Chapter 5 
 Logging, Mining and Irrigation in the Trinity River Basin: 1900-1940 
 Just after the turn of the twentieth century and until the late 1930s, the Trinity 
River Basin experienced tremendous change that set it on a path which would see it 
become much more connected to the outside world.  New interest groups emerged and 
began exerting pressure in the Basin as the region was opened by improved gravel and 
paved roads.  The rise of the automobile allowed sportsmen and women to venture to the 
mouth of the Klamath were they fished for salmon and steelhead, and they began 
recognizing the threat to their pastime and started pushing for regulation to curb the 
harmful affects mining and logging, and eventually they tried halting traditional Indian 
fishing practices.  While these developments occurred, the lives of the Hupa Indians and 
other native peoples on Hoopa Valley Reservation (now extending from the mouth of the 
Klamath to the Hupa “Square”), also began shifting to accommodate change - but the 
shift was not only a reaction to change, it also was directed by the Hupas and other native 
peoples who acted to take advantage of the opportunities they saw as the new century 
dawned.  By the late 1930s, the Trinity River Basin was no longer isolated from the rest 
of California and the world.  The lives of the people living there were touched more 
rapidly than ever by people from outside the Basin, and by events occurring beyond the 
region.  By looking at the Hupa Indians on their reservation and the changes they 
responded to and their own efforts to better their situation, we can gain an understanding 
of the larger changes impacting the Basin and the context within which the Hupa acted. 
By describing logging, mining and irrigation logging in Hoopa Valley undertaken by the 
Hupa themselves, we can see how the federal government attempted a top-down 
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imposition of policy upon the Hupa people (a controlled ideal that never became real 
because the “federal” government is a merely a collection of interests itself), the efforts 
by the State of California to meet the demands of a varied and evolving interest group 
landscape, and the proactive steps of the Hupa themselves as they tried to control their 
own destiny and influence policies directed at them. 
 The 1887 Dawes Act was an essential factor that must be considered when trying 
to understand the context within the Hoopa Valley.  By briefly describing the Hupa 
experience with the allotment of the Hoopa Valley Reservation within the “Square” we 
can better understand why events played out the way they did. In February 1887, 
Congress passed the Dawes Act providing for the allotment in severalty of Indian 
Reservation lands, and the public sale of the remaining land as "surplus".  The law called 
for the allotment of land in trust for a period of twenty-five years after which time the 
individual Indian allottee would be given fee simple title to his or her property and be 
allowed to manage his or her own affairs.  Often a competency test was taken in order to 
prove one could comprehend the white concepts of money, exchange, and even 
patriotism.  If deemed competent, the allottee could gain fee title to his or her allotment 
before the 25 year trust period ended.  Once a fee patent was issued that patentees could 
do whatever they wished with their property - even sell it on the open market just like a 
white person.  The original act called for allotting 160 acres to a head of household and 
each single person over age 18, and any orphan was to receive 80 acres, and any minor 
children would get 40 acres. Congress hoped the Dawes Act would break traditional 
tribal ties to the land by fostering the ownership of private property, and by encouraging 
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Native Americans to become yeoman farmers.286  Dawes Act supporters believed that a 
program of allotment in severalty would eventually end the federal governments' 
fiduciary responsibility over Native Americans and elevate them to equal status with 
white Americans.287  Significantly, many Hupas actually supported and pushed allotment 
because it fit into their pre-contact tradition of individual ownership of prime resource-
gathering areas and fishing rights.288  Moreover, many Hupas were already farming by 
the time of the Dawes Act and wanted to be sure their labor on a particular piece of land 
was not wasted. Thus, many Hupas officially requested allotments in writing even before 
the Congress passed the Dawes Act in 1887.289   
 Final allotment of Hoopa Valley under the Dawes Act, however, was delayed for 
several decades, and federal response to the needs of Hupa Indians was slow, confusing 
and inconsistent.  The first survey for allotments began in 1889, the same year the fish 
hatchery was established on the reservation, but it was not until 1923 that allotment was 
considered complete.  However, many Hupas remained landless after 1923 because of the 
limited arable land in the valley.  Many allottees who received land in the early allotment 
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attempts of 1889 and 1918 had died and their land had passed to their heirs.  Also, the 
population of the valley grew over time because Hupas were having families and their 
children were entitled to allotments under the act.  While the Dawes Act envisioned large, 
160 acre arable farms, that proved unrealistic in Hoopa Valley.  The valley had only 500-
700 acres of arable land, and perhaps as many as 1600 if irrigation water could be 
brought to the area.  But all the Hupas wanted allotments that bordered along the Trinity 
River to allow then access to fishing - their traditional subsistence, and for daily sweats 
and baths (religiously significant and for good health).  They wanted to ensure that the 
property they already owned, such fishing sites, acorn grounds, root and seed gathering 
areas, and basket grass gathering areas would remain in their rightful owner’s possession.  
All these issues, population increase and the passing of elderly allottees, a lack of arable 
land, and the desire to maintain traditional ownership patterns,  created a dilemma for the 
agents in charge, the numerous surveyors and allotment schedule compilers, and the 
Hupa themselves. There was not enough land to meet their needs and the Dawes Act just 
could not be made to fit the Hoopa Valley physical reality and the Hupa people’s 
demands for protection of property and access to the River.  The allotment problem was 
overcome by giving each allottee a strip of land that bordered the bank of the Trinity, but 
some for only a few hundred feet, and then moving away from the river in perpendicular 
strips of land so that most allottees were given four acre allotments.  The remainder was 
to be made up in “grazing” allotments - land in the mountains intended for raising 
livestock.  Later allottees did not get as much on the river, or more commonly, no river 
front, and often found themselves located away from the river but with arable lands.  
Many Hupas got nothing at all.  The final 1923 allotment schedule resulted in a 
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haphazard pattern of ownership that made the prospect of successfully dry-farming wheat 
or spring feeding truck gardens from seeps emerging from the mountains unlikely.   By 
1934, the federal government suspended any further allotments in Hoopa Valley and on 
all reservations under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.290  However, the incomplete 
and tardy allotment effort that began in 1889 and ended in 1923 hung over the heads of 
the Hupas and made it difficult for them and the agents in charge of the reservation to 
move forward with any viable economic plan for the Hupa people.  During the period 
addressed in this chapter, the Hupas participated in, or initiated on there own, three types 
of non-traditional economic activities to survive in their new world: logging, mining 
irrigation. 
 Prior to the advent of a federally-directed forestry programs in the early twentieth 
century, loggers pushed trails and roads into forested areas, crossing streams where 
convenient with no thought to engineering to avoid damaging rivers and streams, and 
causing erosion.291  The irony about logging and its potential to destroy the fisheries upon 
which native people relied is that in the early twentieth centuries, Hupas (to their credit) 
turned to logging the trees on their own reservation and of their own initiative as a way to 
earn cash which was not the preferred medium of exchange.  This endeavor allowed them 
to continue living in the valley rather than leaving to work far away in the mines, coastal 
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logging camps and salmon canaries on the lower Klamath River and elsewhere.  In 1892 
Camp Gaston was abandoned by the U.S. Army destroying the most important local 
market for Hupa-grown produce, and by 1898, their fish hatchery was abandoned because 
of a lack of salmon. The Hupa themselves controlled the first effort to log in Hoopa 
Valley, and the federal government later came in to direct the cutting of trees under the 
principal of sustained yield, but the federally-directed logging program in the valley 
(1930s-1980s) is mostly outside of the chronological boundaries of this study and will 
receive little attention here. 
 Ironically, for Native Americans, logging cut both ways.  It provided 
opportunities for participation in the market economy as wage laborers, and to some 
extent, sawmill operators, but it also injured the anadromous fishery making it 
increasingly difficult for Native peoples to continue their traditional relationship with the 
Trinity River.  The BIA encouraged Indians to drop their fishing nets and pick up the axe 
in its effort to reorient native peoples away from traditional subsistence practices, and to 
economic endeavors more in line with Euroamerican life ways.  
 The market for lumber produced in the Humboldt Bay region was first local, but 
within twenty years of its inception, lumber companies were shipping wood nationally 
and internationally. The location of mills on the Humboldt Bay and coastal rivers allowed 
producers to ship their products to world markets.292  By the 1880s the Humboldt 
Standard reported that “San Francisco was formerly the main stay of the lumber men of 
Humboldt; now they scarcely take it into account.”  By that date, the eastern United 
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States and Australia had become the main destination of Humboldt County redwood.  
“The mass of redwood must reach the markets of the world through the gates of 
Eureka.”293  Markets continued to expand for redwood, and by the turn of the twentieth 
century the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the mills at Arcata (formerly Union 
Town) alone were producing an average of 400,000 board feet daily and shipping their 
products as far away as Hawaii and the Philippines.294  
 Thus, even before the twentieth century the Humboldt Bay region was producing 
redwood and other types of lumber for global markets. The explosive growth in lumber 
production and a growing market helped push the expansion of the lumber industry 
inland from the Humboldt Bay.  As the lumber industry around Humboldt Bay expanded, 
lumber companies cut stands of redwood, Port Orford Cedar, Douglas Fir, Tanbark Oak 
(an important food source for Indian peoples), and numerous species of pine.  Moving 
inland only exacerbated the problem of transporting saw logs to mills for processing.  
Railroad logging allowed logging companies to move farther inland, but river 
transportation was cheaper and so where available, rivers were preferred to help increase 
profit margins in a highly competitive business.  The Klamath River, of which the Trinity 
River is a major tributary, was viewed by logging companies as an almost ideal water 
highway for moving saw logs.  The lower Klamath River was suited for moving logs 
because it is navigable for almost forty miles inland from its mouth, and it empties 
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directly into the Pacific Ocean providing relatively easy access to the Pacific Rim and 
international markets.  Because the Trinity River is a tributary to the Klamath River, the 
logging on the lower Klamath, if it harmed the fishery there, had an impact on the fishery 
of the Trinity River Basin.  The lower Klamath, in a sense, was the bottle neck for the 
entire Trinity Basin. 
 We have already looked at the logging operations of R.D. Hume in the 1880s who 
logged as a sideline to his salmon canning business at the mouth of the Klamath.  His 
schooners could be kept busy all year moving either canned or salted salmon, during the 
spring and fall runs, or towing rafts of sawed logs and lumber during other times of the 
years. 295  Other logging and milling operations on the lower Klamath River operated in 
the late nineteenth century, but the river was not the scene of large-scale industrial 
logging  until the first decades of the twentieth century.  Part of the reason that industrial 
logging arrived late on the lower Klamath River was the shifting shoals and sand bar at 
the mouth of the river.  Natural obstructions at the mouth of the Klamath made it difficult 
to enter and exit the river, causing frequent problems for loggers attempting to get their 
log rafts to sea.296  Of even greater significance in explaining the retarded development of 
                                                                                                                                            
economy well into the 1970s. 
295Records do not indicate why Hume failed in his attempt to operate a sawmill on the Klamath.  
Bearss, Edwin C., History Resource Study: Hoopa-Yurok Fisheries Suit, Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation, 
Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, California (National Park Service, Department of the Interior: Denver 
Service Center, n.d.), 273.  Hume’s canning operation was located near the Klamath estuary, and it is 
assumed that the sawmill was close-by.  The sand bar at the mouth of the Klamath probably necessitated 
the use of small schooners to ship sawed lumber across the bar and north to Crescent City for 
transshipment. 
296Bearss, Edwin C., History Resource Study: Hoopa-Yurok Fisheries Suit, Hoopa Valley Indian 
Reservation, Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, California (National Park Service, Department of the 
Interior: Denver Service Center, n.d.), 275-277. 
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logging on the lower Klamath, however, was the uncertain status of land ownership on 
the banks of the river.  In 1855, the federal government created a reservation for the 
Yurok Indians on the lower Klamath running from the mouth of the river twenty miles 
inland, and encompassing one mile on each side of the river.  The BIA ran the Klamath 
Reservation until 1862 when a flood destroyed the agency buildings, gardens, and 
storehouses.  The government never rebuilt the agency, but instead concentrated its 
efforts on the Hoopa Valley Reservation on the Trinity River and essentially abandoned 
the Yurok along the lower Klamath to fend for themselves.  Whites, like Hume, 
increasingly encroached upon the former Klamath Reservation.  The federal government, 
however, never formally abandoned the Klamath Reservation.  Under pressure by lumber 
companies and white settlers who wanted the federal government to determine the status 
of the 1855 Reservation, the federal government argued that the area was Indian 
Country.297 In order to settle all questions about title once and for all, on October 16, 
1891, President Benjamin Harrison signed an executive order extending the Hoopa 
Valley Reservation from the northern boundary of the Hoopa Valley Reservation at the 
confluence of the Trinity and Klamath Rivers at Weitchpec to the mouth of the Klamath 
River, and for one mile on each side of the Klamath.298 After that date, the original 
                                                
297The federal government was hampered in its assertion by the unfavorable ruling in the 1888 
Rising Star Tea case.  The best discussions of the events surrounding the land controversy on the lower 
Klamath River can be found in, Alfred E. Holland, Jr., “William E. Dougherty and Salmon Fishing on the 
Klamath River, 1886 - 1898.” MA Thesis: Sacramento State University, 1996., 152-161.   
298Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reservations: Volume 1, May 14, 1855 to July 1, 1912 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1975).  The Executive Order set aside the land that encompasses 
the present Hoopa Valley Reservation.  The order created what is now called the Extension (comprising the 
original Klamath Reservation) and a twenty mile “Connecting Strip” between the 12 mile square of the 
original Hoopa Valley Reservation and the extension. 
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reservation encompassing the Hoopa Valley was known as the “Square” while the 
original Klamath Reservation on the lower Klamath was thereafter referred to as the 




Logging scene on the upper-Klamath River.  Although not at the mouth of the river, the same techniques 
were used there to float logs to mills for process.  This method of moving saw logs could spoilt spawning 
habitat and cause erosion.  Patterson photo postcard. ca. 1920s.  Authors’ personal collection. 
 
 The rationale behind adding land to the Hoopa Valley Reservation was access to 
the resources on the land.  Since the 1887 passage of the General Allotment act, the 
federal government had been trying to allot land to individual Indians on many 
reservations throughout the United States.  On the lower Klamath, allotment was seen as 
a way to finalize the ownership status of the timberlands along the river’s banks.  If 
ownership could be determined, and there was little doubt it was Indian Country after 
Harrison’s Executive Order, the land could then be allotted to individual Yurok and the 
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remainder thrown open to settlement and the resources thereon released to the market.  
The California Congressional delegation had been pushing for the opening of the lower 
Klamath, and Harrison’s action was favorably received by them.  Eventually the BIA 
assigned allotments to the Yurok living along the river and allowed the surplus land to be 
sold.  As for trees on allotments themselves, from the 1890s until World War I, the Indian 
owners were only allowed to cut trees as a way to clear land for agricultural purposes.  
However, many leased their allotments to logging companies wanting to cut trees, but 
more often, logging companies just trespassed on Indian allotments in clear violation of 
regulations set forth by the BIA and cut trees without compensating the Indian owners.  
The Agent at Hoopa Valley could do little to stop illegal logging considering that his 
headquarters was forty river miles from the scene and had no support from law 
enforcement.299  After World War I, the BIA issued new rules and guidelines for leasing 
lands allotted to Indians and un-allotted Indian land still held in trust by the United States, 
and also new rules for selling “surplus” reservation lands to outside interests.  Once the 
guidelines were laid-out, logging on the lower Klamath commenced in earnest because 
there was no less confusion as to the method whereby an interested outside party might 
gain access to Indian timber on allotted and un-allotted lands.300 
 After World War I, logging on the lower Klamath accelerated. The Bull and Dunn 
                                                
299Trespasses on Yurok timber land was the most pressing problem faced by the Indians of the 
lower Klamath during this period.  See W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and Forest Resources: An Issue of 
Trust: A Forest History of Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation of Northwestern California (United States 
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Sacramento, California, 1983), 26. 
300Bearss, Edwin C., History Resource Study: Hoopa-Yurok Fisheries Suit, Hoopa Valley Indian 
Reservation, Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, California (National Park Service, Department of the 
Interior: Denver Service Center, n.d.), 175-216.  For a discussion of the allotment of the “Extension” and 
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Cedar Company began cutting along Klamath Bluffs and floating cedar logs down river 
to the Klamath estuary where they were formed into rafts and towed down the coast to 
Eureka for milling.301  Other logging companies also began cutting along the Klamath 
after the war, and logging continued to be strong until the late 1930s when the industry 
on the Klamath River virtually shutdown because of the Great Depression.302  
 It is within the context of the development of logging on the coast and along the 
Klamath River that we must understand the significance of logging in the Trinity River 
Basin and Hoopa Valley.  Logging and saw milling in the Basin was not conducted on an 
industrial scale until after World War II because the Trinity River Basin was isolated, the 
rivers non-navigable, and good timber was easily accessible nearer the coast.  Thus, we 
will look at less industrial logging, particularly on the Hoopa Valley Reservation 
“Square” to understand the development of logging during this era in the Basin.303   
 The Trinity River region is cut-off from the coast and the Central Valley by 
                                                                                                                                            
“Connecting Strip” see pp. 217-234. 
301Bearss, Edwin C., History Resource Study: Hoopa-Yurok Fisheries Suit, Hoopa Valley Indian 
Reservation, Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, California (National Park Service, Department of the 
Interior: Denver Service Center, n.d.), 274-275. 
302Bearss, Edwin C., History Resource Study: Hoopa-Yurok Fisheries Suit, Hoopa Valley Indian 
Reservation, Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, California (National Park Service, Department of the 
Interior: Denver Service Center, n.d.), 278-297.  In 1947, the harvest in Del Norte County was 23,000,000 
board feet; by 1953, the harvest jumped to almost 290,000,000.  The Klamath River lumber industry 
continued to grow throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  The industry began to slump in 1980.  The annual 
board-feet harvests from Del Norte County fluctuated little between 1953 and 1979, and then dropped to 
179,000,000 in 1980. See Bearss, Edwin C., History Resource Study: Hoopa-Yurok Fisheries Suit, Hoopa 
Valley Indian Reservation, Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, California (National Park Service, 
Department of the Interior: Denver Service Center, n.d.), 279, Appendix B.  See also, Lynn Huntsinger, et. 
al., A Yurok Forest History, United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
Sacramento, California, 1994. 
303Geoscientific Systems and Consulting, Overview of the Cultural Historic Resources ,106-109. 
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rugged mountains, and the river itself was almost useless for log-drives except for periods 
of extreme high water.  The Basin lacked good roads well into the twentieth century 
making transportation of logs prohibitively expensive.  All of these factors combined to 
retard the growth of industrial logging in the Trinity River Basin.  As a result, the lumber 
industry in the interior was different from the coastal lumber industry in that it produced 
lumber for local consumption.304  A good example of this phenomenon is seen by looking 
back at very early logging near Hoopa Valley.  On Willow Creek, south of Hoopa Valley, 
a sawmill was in operation during the 1860s and 1870s.  Willow Creek was located on a 
major trail leading from the coast to the Trinity River mines, and was up-river from 
Hoopa Valley.  When the army first set-up a post in Hoopa Valley in 1858, they built a 
sawmill to provide wood for the fort.  After the creation of the Hoopa Valley Reservation 
in 1864, the federal government needed sawed lumber to erect buildings for its agency in 
the Valley, and the Army, which still needed lumber for barracks and headquarters.  The 
government-owned sawmill in Hoopa Valley (purchased derelict from the valley’s white 
settlers) was poorly maintained and operated sporadically.  In fact, because the mill in 
Hoopa Valley was seldom in operation, the government had to look off-reservation for 
sawed lumber.305 
                                                
304The Trinity River Basin is surrounded by the rugged Klamath Mountains, the Trinity 
Mountains and the Coast Range making access difficult.  Where lumber was easily accessible, it was 
quickly exploited.  For example, a sizable lumber industry developed in northern California centered on the 
Shasta River Valley, the McCloud River Valley, the Fall River Valley, and on the Sacramento River near 
Mt. Shasta.  See: Geoscientific Systems and Consulting, Overview of the Cultural Historic Resources , 109.  
305The mill was continually in disrepair.  In 1870, the agent at Hoopa Valley reported that the 
sawmill was inoperative.  In 1880, the sawmill was reported in working condition, but in 1887, the agent at 
Hoopa Valley again reported that the sawmill was dilapidated and useless.  See: “Report to the Secretary of 
the Interior,” Executive Documents: The House of Representatives, Third Session, Forty-First Congress, 
1871-1872 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872), 547. See also, “Report to the Secretary 
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 In relation to the construction of a headquarters building for Fort Gaston the 
United States Army paid Hupa Indians to move lumber down the Trinity River to the 
Agency from a mill at Willow Creek.  During July, 1869, the commander at Fort Gaston, 
Major Henry Mizner, requested funding for the services of Hupa Indians to float sawed 
lumber eleven miles down the Trinity River from the sawmill at Willow Creek to Fort 
Gaston.  Mizner stated that Indians could move lumber down the river using redwood 
canoes, and that the Hupa were the only people familiar enough with the  river to do the 
job without getting killed by the rapid current and treacherous rocks. Mizner described 
the Trinity River as “a rapid, rocky, treacherous stream. . .” and that to move lumber 
would “require the services of Indian boatmen familiar with the river.”306 Mizner paid the 
Hupas as loggers and boatmen which is the first documented instance of Hupa being 
employed to exploit timber.  The effort to secure lumber for the construction of Fort 
Gaston not wholly a success, and the next year Mizner reported that the difficulty in 
obtaining lumber for the fort meant that construction had to wait until the next rainy 
season (possibly because the rains would raise the water level in the Trinity making it 
easier to float lumber).307  By spring 1871, Mizner was again buying sawed lumber from 
                                                                                                                                            
of the Interior,” Executive Documents: The House of Representatives, Second Session, Forty-Ninth 
Congress, 1886-87 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1887), 260. For information on the 
Hoopa Valley Sawmill in 1880 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of 
the Interior for the Year 1880 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1880), 7-8. By 1896, the 
government-owned mill in Hoopa Valley was operating, producing 245,000 feet of lumber annually.  See 
“Report to the Secretary of the Interior,” Executive Documents: The House of Representatives, Second 
Session, Fifty-Fourth Congress, 1895-1896 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1896), 125. 
306Major Henry Mizner to Bvt. Colonel I.P. Sherburne, Assistant Adjutant General., July 19, 
1869.  Record Group 393.  Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920.  Fort 
Gaston, California, Entry 137. Letters Sent.  Volume 3, Entry 137. 
307 Major Henry Mizner to Samuel Major, Assistant Adjutant General., October 1, 1870.  Record 
Group 393.  Records of the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920.  Fort Gaston, 
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the Willow Creek Mill, but he assigned soldiers to extra duty to retrieve the wood instead 
of Hupas, and they moved the sawed lumber overland to the post.308 
 Thus, the few references addressing logging operations in the Trinity River Basin 
in  the nineteenth-century which we have seen earlier in this study, are confirmed by the 
early experiences of the Hupas - cutting trees and milling lumber were undertaken 
primarily to supply local markets.  Well into the twentieth century the lumber industry 
was simply not a major economic factor in the region.  Unlike along the coast, 
lumbermen in the Trinity Basin erected sawmills wherever they were needed, cut trees 
intensely until either the trees became scarce, or demand for their product fell with the 
decline of mining or needs for building - they then moved on.309 
 By the late nineteenth century, many Americans became concerned that the 
forests of the nation were rapidly falling to the saw and that a resource once viewed as 
inexhaustible was being rapidly depleted.310  The concern over the possible demise of 
American forests prompted the federal government to move to protect forests from over-
                                                                                                                                            
California, Entry 2. Letters Sent.  Volume 4, Entry 212. 
308A.D. Nelson to Assistant Adjutant General., May 22, 1871.  Record Group 393.  Records of 
the United States Army Continental Commands, 1821-1920.  Fort Gaston, California, Entry 2. Letters Sent.  
Volume 4, Entry 79.  No other instance of using the Trinity River to float logs or lumber has been found in 
the records consulted. 
309Geoscientific Systems and Consulting, Overview of Cultural Historic Resources, 118. After 
the Trinity Forest Reserve was created by Presidential Proclamation in 1905, it was noted that mining and 
stock raising were the chief industries in the region, and that only a few sawmills were operating and those 
were on private land. 
310The Progressive Era of the late-nineteenth century was a period when many influential 
politicians, industrialists, social reformers, and many educated middle class Americans in the United States 
began to question the wisdom of laissez faire capitalism. In the area of resource exploitation, progressives 
feared that the unguided and unchecked cutting of America’s forests would destroy the resource forever, 
thus the federal government should step forward to protect the resource for the future.  For example, see: 
“Destruction of Forests of the United States.” S. Misc. Doc. 51, 1st Sess. 55th Cong.  
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exploitation, and to reserve them as a national resource.  In 1891, while Congress was 
passing the General Land Law Revision Act to repeal various land laws, including all 
preemption laws and the Timber Culture Act of 1873, Secretary of the Interior John 
Noble managed to have a rider inserted into the bill authorizing the President to withdraw 
forest lands from the public domain and set them aside as forest reserves.311  Also known 
as the Forest Reserve Act, it was a unique departure from the preceding public land laws 
because it was aimed at protecting public land from overuse, rather than promoting the 
cheap disposal of public lands.   After Congress passed the Forest Reserve Act, President 
Harrison withdrew millions of acres from the public domain and set them aside as forest 
reserves, but the provision of the act giving the President the power to create the reserves 
did not appropriate funds for managing the reserves, nor create an agency to do so.  The 
forest reserves initially created were placed under the authority of the Department of the 
Interior.  In 1897, Congress passed a law providing for the management of the reserves, 
the Forest Reserve Organic Administration Act, which included a provision allowing for 
harvesting timber from the forests.312   
 During the activist presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, vast tracts of forest lands 
were set aside.313  During Roosevelt’s second administration, he set aside the Trinity 
Forest Reserve on April 26, 1905, the same year that Congress passed the Transfer Act 
                                                
31126 Stat. 1095. 
31230 Stat. 11. 
313By 1893, President Benjamin Harrison reserved approximately 17.5 million acres of forest 
land.  Under McKinley the total amount withdrawn grew to over 35 million acres.  Roosevelt set aside 
approximately 95 million additional acres of forest land from 1901-1907.  E. Louise Peffer, The Closing of 
the Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-1950 (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 17. 
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moving the administrative responsibility of the reserves from the Department of the 
Interior to the Department of Agriculture.314   In 1907, the term “National Forest” was 
applied to all forest reserves to emphasize that forests were owned by the American 
people, and rather than being “preserved” were instead to be scientifically managed by 
the federal government for the good of the nation.  To manage the forest reserves, 
Roosevelt created the United States Forest Service as an agency within the Department of 
Agriculture to, among other things, promote and regulate logging within national forests.  
The Forest Service also was charged with regulating water use, grazing, agriculture, 
transportation, recreation and settlement within the boundaries of the forest reserves.  By 
1912, the Forest Service began to encourage logging companies to cut forests in 
previously undeveloped areas by offering them timber parcels on a twenty-year lease 
basis.  The goal of this policy was to encourage lumber companies to build roads and 
railways for the long-term systematic exploitation of timber resources.315   
 These developments did not result in the widespread exploitation of the forests in 
the Trinity River Basin simply because there were no major existing roads accessing the 
Basin and building them was prohibitively expensive while there were still valuable 
                                                
314Christine Savage, Six Rivers National Forest: A Contextual Cultural Resources Chronology of 
Events on or Near Forest Lands, 26.  The Trinity Forest Reserve did not include the Hoopa Valley 
Reservation.  However, on March 2, 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed that the Trinity 
National Forest included lands within the Hoopa Valley Reservation not allotted to Native Americans.  
This decision was not reversed until February 17, 1912 when President Taft restored the Hoopa 
Reservation to the status it held prior to the 1909 proclamation. See: Byron Nelson Jr., Our Home Forever, 
151. 
315Savage, Six Rivers National Forest, 30. 
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stands of timber outside of the Basin.316 By the mid 1920s, however, the federal 
government encouraged road building by distributing funds for road construction to the 
states through numerous highway acts.  Using federal monies, the State of California 
completed the first improved gravel road along the Trinity River.  The road ran from the 
town of Redding in the Central Valley, west over French Gulch and down into the Trinity 
River Basin.  The road then followed the Trinity River to Willow Creek, south of the 
Hoopa Valley Reservation.  At Willow Creek, the road left the Trinity River and cut 
overland to the west until it connected with existing roadway near the coast and 
Humboldt Bay.317  Thus, by the 1920 the Trinity River watershed was linked to the 
outside world and was accessible by trucks from the coast and the Central Valley.  Even 
though logging companies could now access the timber reserves in the Trinity River 
Basin, transporting wood products from that still remote region was cost prohibitive 
because there were still many forests closer to existing markets. There was no incentive 
to cut for distant markets.318   
 The Hupa Indians participated in the local lumber industry because of the large 
                                                
316Geoscientific Systems and Consulting, Overview of the Cultural Historic Resources, 120-123.  
In 1947, the Six Rivers National Forests was created out of portions of the Siskiyou, Trinity and Klamath 
National Forests, and in 1954 the administration of the Trinity and Shasta National Forests were combined 
for economy of administration, yet they remain two separate entities. 
317The road was not actually paved until the 1930s during the Great Depression when the state of 
California improved and re-routed the road through the county seat of Weaverville, and designated it 
California State Highway 299. It was during the re-routing and improvement of Highway 299 that the State 
of California ran Highway 299 through Weaverville and west through the Le Grange hydraulic mine using 
hydraulic mining methods and dumping thousands of yards of debris into the Trinity River. Also during the 
Depression, Indian laborers working on projects directed by the Indian Division of the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC-ID) built a road along the Trinity River in Hoopa Valley, and built roads 
throughout the forests of the reservation for fire suppression and to access timber for logging.  
318Savage, Six Rivers National Forest, 41. 
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stands of virgin timber available on their reservation.319 Ever since the creation of the 
reservation in 1864, the federal government searched for a way to break the Hupas’ 
traditional economy in order to make them into economically “viable” Americans.  The 
1887 Dawes Act was put into effect on the Hoopa “Square” in the hopes of creating 
farmers from Indians, and possibly lumberjacks if possible.  The final allotment of the 
Hoopa Square was delayed until the 1920s for reasons enumerated above.  The federal 
government clearly recognized the potential source of income held in the trees on the 
reservation in the early twentieth century, but also recognized that a lack of roads leading 
to outside markets, limited local demand, and limited funding from the BIA meant that 
even if they wanted to force a logging industry onto the Hupas, there was really no way 
to make money from the trees, or put the Hupas to work as lumberjacks and sawyers. 
Moreover, the Hupas, and neighboring Indian groups, were reluctant to cut one tree 
species in particular, the Tanbark Oak, a tree valuable for its bark used for tanning 
leather, because it provided acorns for food and ceremonial purposes, and feed for 
livestock.  For the time being, the trees on the Square remained where they were with 
limited cutting and sawing done at the government-owned mill for the use of the Hupas 
and the BIA.320 Agents on the reservation recognized that a commercially viable lumber 
                                                
319Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 115.  On February 16, 1889, Congress authorized the President 
to allow Indians to sell dead timber from Indian reservation.  See: Savage, Six Rivers National Forest, 23. 
320Nelson, Jr., Our Home Forever, 151-152. By the turn of the twentieth century the mill was 
back in operation and was producing 245,000 board feet annually. The lumber was used by the Hupas to 
construct reservation housing and a day and boarding school, and agency buildings. “Report to the 
Secretary of the Interior,” Executive Documents: The House of Representatives, Second Session, Fifty-
Fourth Congress, 1895-1896 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1896), 125.The government-
owned mill, however, was not a commercial operation, but rather, was operated to provide for the needs of 
the reservation.  The mill was powered by water from Supply Creek, and was in operation off and on un it 
was destroyed by fire in 1918, and it was never rebuilt.. W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and Forest 
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operation would allow the Hupa people to participate in the marketplace, earn money, 
and lift them out of poverty, yet there was no specific national policy outlined by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs regarding the sale of  timber from Indian reservations until late 
in the nineteenth century, and when it came, it did little to help the Hupa people who 
remained isolated from markets by rugged mountains, and a lack of roads. 
 
 
Workers for the State of California use the idle equipment of the La Grange Hydraulic Mine to blast the 
right-of-way for State Highway 299 from Weaverville west over Oregon Mountain towards the Trinity 
River canyon ca. 1934.  It took several years for California to complete the road through the La Grange 
mine, and in the process, the State added thousands of tons of debris to the Trinity River.  Today, this 
monitor sits by the side of the road in the former La Grange mine as an historic marker.  Unknown 
photographer.  Postcard.  Authors’ personal collection. 
 
 Federal policy for allowing the commercial sale of Indian timber developed in a 
                                                                                                                                            
Resources: An Issue of Trust: A Forest History of Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation of Northwestern 
California (United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Sacramento, California, 
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piecemeal fashion and in many ways was similar to the development of policy on public 
lands.  Timber on reservations was assumed to be part of the realty with ultimate title 
vested in the United States, although Indian tribes were permitted to use the timber 
because they held the right of occupancy.  During the late nineteenth century, contracts 
for cutting tribal timber were often made by agents on reservations with white-owned 
logging companies, but the legality of allowing tribally-owned timber lands to be cut was 
questionable.  In 1889, however, Congress passed an act allowing for the cutting of dead 
and fallen timber on Indian lands.321 
 Various court rulings muddied the efforts by Indian tribes to cut live timber on 
their lands, and abuses of fallen timber contracts led to the complete suspension of all 
timber harvesting on Indian reservations in 1899 and 1900.322  The abuses of Indian-
owned forests by unscrupulous logging companies pointed out that a major problem for 
tribes wishing to sell the timber on their reservations was who would oversee tribal 
timber operations.  Was the Bureau of Indian Affairs to oversee reservation timber and 
the Forest Service all timber outside of reservations?  In 1902, contracts for cutting 
Indian timber resumed, and from 1902 to 1909 the Bureau of Forestry (later the Forest 
Service) sought to assume the supervision of Indian timber sales believing it possessed 
the expertise lacking in the BIA, and that it was sensible that all forests, regardless if they 
                                                                                                                                            
1983), 144-145. 
32125 Stat. 673. 
322Jay P. Kinney, Indian Forest and Range: A History of the Administration and Conservation of 
the Redman’s Heritage (Washington, D.C.: Forestry Enterprises, 1950), 45-62, 116-117.  For discussion of 
the numerous cases and legislation addressing Indian Timber, consult Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal 
Indian Law with Reference Tables and Index (Washington D.C: Government Printing Office, 1942), 78, 
191, 220, 223, 314, 329, 337.   
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were Indian-owned or not, should be managed by one agency.323  In 1906 an agreement 
was struck between the BIA and the Forest Service whereby contracts for cutting on 
Indian lands would be administered by the Forest Service and the actual logging 
operations supervised by that agency as well.  In 1909 President Roosevelt issued an 
Executive Order placing all forests on Indian reservations under the administration of the 
Forest Service.  At the same time Congress passed an act providing funds for the creation 
of a forestry division in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and a year later passed another act 
authorizing the cutting of timber on allotted and un-allotted Indian land, both dead and 
live timber, and outlining the procedure for cutting Indian timber that would conserve 
that resource.324  In 1911, the BIA issued regulations for cutting timber on Indian lands, 
including standards for selecting which trees to cut, the sale of timber, and administering 
agency sawmills.325  The following year, in 1912, President William H. Taft issued an 
Executive Order returning Indian forest lands to the administration of the BIA by 
executive order in 1912.326    
 While the Secretary of the Interior worked out regulations and administrative 
authority for timber harvesting on Indian lands, the trees within Hoopa Valley remained 
standing.  The main obstacle to the development of commercial logging in Hoopa Valley 
was the same as that facing loggers throughout the Trinity River Basin; limited access to 
                                                
323Kinney, Indian Forest and Range, 51-56, 219. 
324See 35 Stat. 781, and 36 Stat. 857. 
325W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and Forest Resources, 26. 
326W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and Forest Resources, 25. 
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outside markets, and a small local market.  The agents on the reservation recognized the 
potential economic benefits that lay within the trees of the valley, but only if the Hupas 
had access to outside markets.327  Thus, while logging on Indian lands on the lower 
Klamath proceeded during the first half of the 20th century where access to markets was 
cheap, commercial harvesting did not take place in the square of the Hoopa Valley along 
the Trinity River.328   
 Between 1910 and the 1930s, most forestry activity within Hoopa Valley related 
to fire suppression.  Fires were common and agents continually complained that the 
Hupas intentionally set the fires to provide themselves with jobs and entertainment.  The 
reality was that many Hupas were chronically underemployed, and in many cases, 
destitute and so adapted their situation to a new reality - they were paid to put out fires - 
why not set a few, put them out, and get paid?  It was practical, it worked, and it 
infuriated the agents and the forestry manager in the valley.329  Setting fires had a cultural 
component as ancient as the Hupa culture itself - fire promoted the growth of grasses 
used for making baskets, clearing dangerous underbrush the could result in high-
                                                
327W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and Forest Resources, 143. 
328Because of the history of the formation of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, and the fact that two 
reservations for two tribes were combined to form a single reservation, records addressing timber sales are 
confused.  Agents in Hoopa Valley were responsible for managing forests on Yurok allotments on the 
lower Klamath River, as well as, timber reserves on Hupa lands.  This resulted in a lack of sufficient 
oversight on Yurok allotments; and numerous illegal trespasses.  The reservation encompasses the lands of 
two different tribes, and the administrative records of the location of forestry activity are often confused.  A 
reference showing timber sales on allotments on Hoopa Valley Reservation may actually be referring to 
allotments on the lower Klamath River in Yurok territory on the former Klamath Reservation.  Other 
references of the same date, however, might indicate that logging was not an important activity on the 
reservation.  In the latter case, the reference is to the Square of the original Hoopa Valley Reservation. For 
example, see W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and Forest Resources, 143-150. 
329W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and Forest Resources, 151. 
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temperature, and highly destructive crown fires, and also cleared trails to promote the 
movement of people and the game they hunted.  Simply put, the Hupas were doing what 
they always had done, and the whites came to them and tried to impose their view about 
what fire was, and what was valuable, upon the Hupa.  To whites, fire destroyed large, 
valuable trees.  To the Hupas, fire built good grass, encouraged game to browse and 
eased travel, aided the hunter, encouraged the spread of acorn (oak trees) and protected 
against damaging crown fires by clearing young trees and dried wood (trash and fuel).  
The Hupas were well advanced in their understanding of forest management before the 
whites first laid eyes upon Hoopa Valley, and this conflict over fire is another example of 
the struggle over how to use resources.  Moreover, the delay in allotment of the Hoopa 
Valley Square meant that the Hupas were reluctant to labor on a piece of ground they 
might never gain control of, and thus, there was simply not enough arable land to go 
around.  The agents recognized that lack of economic opportunities and the delays in 
allotment compelled Hupas to start fires for employment.  The federal response was to 
institute an active fire suppression program that called for the construction of lookout 
towers, the building of access roads into the forests to provide quick response to fight 
fires, and to apprehend and convict those Hupas who were responsible for setting fires.  
Funding for the fire suppression program was limited, however, and did not stop the 
Hupa from burning in Hoopa Valley.330  Nevertheless, between 1910 and 1930, several 
roads, telephone lines, and lookout posts were built on the reservation to aid in fire 
suppression to protect the Hupa’s timber reserves.  These activities helped pave the way 
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for future logging in the valley.  
 While the federal government haphazardly managed the forestry resources of the 
Hupa Indians, a Hupa Indian named David Risling, Sr., started the first commercial 
logging operation in Hoopa Valley.  Risling began running his water-driven sawmill on 
Hostler Creek in 1927.  The market for Risling’s lumber was in Hoopa Valley, and 
limited areas off-reservation.  Risling cut tribally-owned timber within the valley on a 
small scale.  The number of trees cut by Risling is not known, but the revenue collected 
by tribe from him during his first ten years of operation was apparently small: in 1938 the 
Hoopa Business Council requested that stumpage fees charged to Risling be waived and 
that Risling provide tribal members with lumber in lieu of cash payments.  Risling’s 
operation was the only commercial operation in Hoopa Valley prior to World War II.  
Risling employed Hupas as lumberjacks and sawyers, and also cut timber brought to his 
mill by other tribal members.  An Indian logger, therefore, was the first, albeit small-
scale, commercial logger in Hoopa Valley.331 
 The Great Depression dampened the national demand for lumber and slowed the 
development of a logging economy in Hoopa Valley.  During the Depression, Indian 
logging in Hoopa Valley continued.  In fact, David Risling, Sr., expanded his operation 
and applied for and received additional timber-cutting permits for the Hoopa Valley, and 
for cutting trees down-river on the Hoopa Extension in Yurok territory.  Using newly 
improved roads, Risling’s employees could bring timber from distant places to his mill in 
                                                
331There is some confusion on the location of the Risling Mill in the sources consulted.  It was 
possibly located on Supply Creek rather than Hostler Creek.  See W.T. Roberts, et. al., Indian Land and 
Forest Resources, 140, 169-172, 174. 
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Hoopa Valley where sawyers turned it into lumber.  Yet, the Depression witnessed a 
significant change in federal Indian policy after Franklin Roosevelt named John Collier 
as Commissioner of Indian Affairs.  Under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act the 
allotment of Indian lands stopped and tribes were encouraged to tribal governments and 
business councils, they could decided weather they wanted a tribal constitution, and they 
were encouraged to scientifically manage and exploit the timber resources on tribal lands 
using the theory of sustained yield: the practice of managing timber resources sustaining 
a balance between the number of trees harvested and the rate of forest growth with the 
goal of never running out of trees to cut in a specific region.   
 The lack of market access for Hupa timber was ended by the federal 
government’s policies during the 1930s, which initiated the opening of Hoopa Valley to 
world timber markets. Under the Indian Reorganization Act, the Hupa organized a 
business council, and began to actively participate in the decisions regarding the forests 
of Hoopa Valley.  The Hupa Business Council also began authorizing the sale of downed 
timber to off-reservation logging companies during the late-1930s, and expressed interest 
in buying a portable mill for the use of tribal members, although that never materialized. 
The Hupa benefitted from New Deal relief programs.  The programs of the Civilian 
Conservation Corps were extended to Indian tribes.  At Hoopa, this meant that for the 
first time in their lives many Hupa would have jobs and earn wages.  The forestry 
division ran the CCC-ID programs on Hoopa Valley.  Under the Indian Division of the 
CCC, hundreds of Hupas found employment.332  The projects undertaken included 
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building roads, extending truck trails, spanning the Klamath and Trinity rivers with 
bridges, improving access to forests for fire suppression, recreation and logging, and in 
1938, for the first time, BIA employees conducted cursory timber cruises in Hoopa 
Valley to enumerate the timber on the reservation.  Using CCC-ID funding, a preliminary 
timber cruise and limited scaling operation were undertaken to compile statistics for 
future cutting permits.   Finally, under the CCC-ID, tribal members received training in 
several fields, including forestry and forest fire suppression.  The CCC-ID at Hupa only 
partially relieved the Hupa’s desperate economic condition, but it is significant because it 
left behind the infrastructure that allowed the logging to penetrate not only Hoopa Valley, 
but the entire Trinity watershed after the end of World War II.333 
  It was also during the Depression that an effort to survey the Reservation’s soils 
to predict the impacts of logging was undertaken.  Under a cooperative agreement 
between the BIA and the Soil Conservation Service, the SCS conducted a survey of soil 
conditions in Hoopa Valley and issued a report in 1938 concluding that, “...hauling logs 
over steep slopes in connection to logging operations is resulting in the denudation of the 
soil and its exposure to erosive forces.”334  The SCS report recognized the potential 
harmful impacts upon the land in Hoopa Valley posed by extensive logging.  Erosion was 
the most obvious danger, and of course, every stream in Hoopa Valley leads to the 
Trinity River.  Therefore, while logging in Hoopa Valley had, up to the 1930s, been 
relatively limited in scope, the potential harmful impacts were already beginning to show.  
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The SCS went on to state that the reservation needed a comprehensive survey and land-
use plan in order to best manage and conserve the resources of Hoopa Valley. The next 
year, in 1939, the Agency forester issued a plan for harvesting trees in Hoopa Valley 
using the principles of sustained yield, and followed-up his report with another but the 
planning came to a halt when attention was turned to the looming war clouds on the 
horizon. The approach of the second world war led eventually to almost a complete halt 
of funding for the forestry program.335        
 The environmental impact of logging in the Klamath-Trinity watershed first made 
their appearance on the lower-Klamath River.  Logging operations along the lower 
Klamath River and on the Trinity contributed to the declining anadromous fish 
populations already hard hit by up-river mining.  The development of roads suitable for 
heavy equipment along the coast early in the twentieth century, and through the Trinity 
River Basin in the 1920s and 1930s, allowed for the rise of a recreational sport fishing 
industry.  Sportsmen fishing at the mouth of the Klamath River, and farther upstream on 
the Trinity River, began to complain in the early 1920s that logging harmed the 
anadromous fishery and made it difficult for sportsmen to fish the river during the fall 
run.  Several sportsmen’s organizations formed throughout the region and began calling 
for legislation to ban log rafting on the lower Klamath estuary from July 15 to October 
15, the peak of the fall salmon run.  This action was a compromise.  Sportsmen did not 
want an end to logging, only to suspend that activity during the period of peak fishing. 
The logging companies responded quickly by pushing the California legislature not to 
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pass any act that would hamper their operations.  Rather, the lumber interests asked for 
and received a one year grace period to develop a voluntary policing program of their 
own logging practices.336 
 Nevertheless, sediment from clear-cut logging combined with historic mining 
debris roiled the waters of the Trinity River during precipitation events and spring run-
off, inundating spawning beds and altering water chemistry.  The anadromous fishery 
continued to suffer, and by 1933, California responded not by ending logging or mining, 
but instead by banning commercial fishing on the lower-Klamath River.  The ban really 
had no effect because by 1933 ocean trolling technology was so advanced that the 
industry merely moved onto the ocean and scooped salmon from the ocean by the ton.  
Nevertheless, the anadromous fishery continued to decline.  Salmon lucky enough to 
survive the gauntlet of industrial ocean trollers had to pass the gauntlet of sports 
fishermen at the mouth of the Klamath River and return to the Trinity River basins were 
they were welcomed by rivers overburdened with logging and mining debris.  Ironically, 
the cutting of the timber by Hupa Indians in Hoopa Valley contributed to the 
sedimentation of the Trinity River.  The Hupa realistically viewed the trees on the 
reservation as a source of economic prosperity.  But by dropping the fishing net and 
picking up an axe (or chainsaw), Hupa lumberjacks and mill workers inadvertently 
contributed to the decline of the anadromous fishery and thus, the decline in the ability of 
the river to play its important role in the life way of the Hupa people.  Nevertheless, the 
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Hupa maintained their relationship with the Trinity River and the salmon that somehow 
managed to survive in the river regardless of its health.  But the Hupa also turned to 
mining in the Hoopa Valley during this same period, and thus, helped contribute to the 
decline in the fishery while searching for ways other than fishing and logging to make 
ends meet in their valley home.  Mining, which had caused such disruption to the lives 
and culture of the Hupas and their neighbors, also presented an opportunity for another 
avenue of participation in the new world confronted by the Hupa people. 
 After the federal government created and closed the Hoopa Valley Reservation to 
whites (except those authorized to trade or work there) in 1864, the Hupa were expected 
to become farmers and stock raisers.  This policy was consistent with Federal Indian 
policy throughout California and much of the United States.337  But gold mining, which 
was only a minor economic activity in the valley before the creation of the reservation, 
did not end with the departure of the miners.  The Hupas themselves tried their hands at 
placer mining which they had learned by themselves, or by working as mining laborers 
for whites previously in the valley and elsewhere.  As with logging, this allowed them to 
supplement their incomes earned from farming, logging and other labor.  Whites 
continued trespassing in Hoopa Valley in order to mine the auriferous gravels.  When 
caught they were ejected from the reservation, but the reservation agent was ineffective in 
                                                
337Hoopa Valley Reservation was created by treaty in August, 1864.  In 1876 the reservation was 
confirmed by executive order to protect the land-base of the Hupa Indians, and prevent them from being 
sent to Round Valley .  Improvements were appraised and eventually purchased by the Federal 
Government.  Placer claims are not shown as part of the "improvements" purchased by the government.  
See: George Esborne Anderson, “The Hoopa Valley Reservation in Northwestern California: A Study of Its 
Origins,” 206-211, 215-216, fn. 98;  Byron Nelson, Jr., Our Home Forever, 89-90, 96-98.   Valley 
agricultural products were marketed primarily to miners on the Klamath and Trinity rivers and the soldiers 
at Fort Gaston.  
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trying to stop this activity because the reservation was so large and he had little help 
patrolling the area from the U.S. Army.338  
 The allotment of Hoopa Valley influenced the development of placer mining 
along the Trinity River within the reservation.  The allotment process as implemented in 
the valley was so confused that the right of access to gold-bearing gravels became 
uncertain and clouded.  Nobody knew just who owned or had the right to mine the gold-
bearing gravels located on the edges of allotted reservation fields, on river bars, and in 
the bed of the Trinity River, nor who should receive money from the exploitation of 
gravel of uncertain ownership. What was certain is that the Hupas wanted to go after the 
gold, but the federal government held them back - not because government officials did 
not want the Indians to become miners, but because the federal bureaucracy had yet to 
rule on how these lands were to be exploited, and who owned, what, etc.  This confusing 
situation remained unsolved for years as agents at Hoopa Valley and officials at the BIA 
struggled with how to allot Hupa Valley in light of the shortage of arable land, Indian 
demands for land in certain places, and the stipulations of the Dawes Act.   
 By the early 20th century, after over a decade of delays in allotting the majority of 
Hupas, interest in mining the Trinity River in Hoopa Valley began increasing for two 
reasons.  First, the technology needed to successfully mine extensive, low grade 
auriferous river gravels arrived in the form of the gold dredge and the Doodlebug.  
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Industrial dredges and doodlebugs were returning handsome profits from low-grade 
deposits on other California Rivers and on the upper Trinity River, and this stimulated 
interest in the gravels at Hoopa Valley.  Second, observers believed that the allotment of 
Hoopa Valley would mean that remaining lands would be opened to outside mining 
interests, either through leasing or outright purchase.  As early as 1898, a local newspaper 
reported that allotments in Hoopa Valley had been made and were available for lease:   
 
Along the Trinity River [in Hoopa Valley] some rich placer claims can be 
found, which if properly developed would yield handsome returns.  When 
the allotments were made the government compelled the Indians to not 
sell their land for 25 years, but they may rent it if they choose.339 
 
 The newspaper report was wrong.  Although preliminary allotment surveys and 
schedules had been completed, allotments had not been approved and there was no 
provision for leasing un-allotted reservation land.  Ten years later, in 1908, a mining 
company attempted to prospect Hoopa Valley for minerals.  Frank Kyselka, the 
Superintendent in charge at Hoopa, asked the Office of Indian Affairs if mineral ground 
could be leased to outside interests, and if he or other BIA employees at Hoopa could 
lease mineral land or own stock in companies doing so.  Kyselka was informed that un-
allotted land could not be leased under the existing law, but allotted land could be leased.  
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The BIA also informed Kyselka that employees were not allowed to lease allotments.340  
Therefore, no leases could be granted to anyone at Hoopa Valley because the final 
allotment schedule still had not been accepted.   
 
 
Fairview Placers Dredge above ca. 1953, (now sitting at the bottom of Trinity Lake), and an aerial view of 
the dredge working in the gravel of the Trinity ca. 1940s. Eastman Postcards.  Authors’ personal collection. 
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 The slow, confusing process of allotting Hoopa Valley frustrated the Hupa people 
and confused reservation superintendents and BIA officials alike.341 In 1914, for 
example, Jessica Brecht, a qualified allottee at Hoopa Valley, selected a 160-acre 
allotment bisected by Mill Creek.  Brecht chose the land for agricultural purposes, but she 
discovered gold on Mill Creek and began small-scale placer mining as well.  Her right to 
mine her allotment was questioned, and so she sought the approval of the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs to conduct small-scale mining on her selected allotment to earn enough 
money to place her land into production.  Her chosen allotment, like all allotments in the 
ten-mile square, was not finalized, but after conferring with the Superintendent at Hoopa 
and with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, she was allowed to proceed after several 
months of waiting, although an official mining claim notice was not submitted to 
anyone.342 
 The delays in allotting Hoopa Valley slowed efforts by outsiders to access mineral 
lands, but the Bureau of Indian Affairs found itself pressured by outside interests to open 
not only Hoopa Valley, but all Indian reservations to mineral exploration.  Attempts to 
finalize allotments were still underway at Hoopa when, in June 1919, the United States 
Congress passed legislation allowing individuals or groups to lease un-allotted mineral 
                                                
341Byron Nelson Jr., Our Home Forever, 149-158, 195-197. 
 342  160 acres is a large allotment for Hoopa Valley, but the allotment was probably broken into 
pieces of agricultural and grazing land.  Research to date has not shown if this allotment was granted, but 
material in hand suggests that it was.  Jessica Brecht to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, July 27, 1914; 
Edward J. Holden to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 26, 1914; E.B. Meritt to Jessica Brecht, 
October 17, 1914, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 
1907-1939, Box No. 44, National Archives, Washington, D.C.  
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lands on those Indian Reservations created by Executive Order.343 Under the provisions 
of the act individuals could lease up to twenty acres of un-allotted mineral land, and a 
group of eight or more could lease a total of 160 acres.344  By throwing-open reservation 
lands, Congress liberalized the existing laws regulating leasing un-allotted lands, which 
up until that time had frustrated those interested in exploiting Native American 
resources.345 
 The passage of this act had immediate consequences for Hoopa Valley.  On 
November 1, 1919, Hoopa Valley was thrown-open to mineral exploration, and in 
December 1919, Jesse B. Mortsolf, the Superintendent at Hoopa Valley, noted a 
substantial number of people entering the reservation and posting claim notices in 
anticipation of leasing.346  But many of the claims were on lands that had been surveyed 
for allotment.  Three hundred and eighty allotments were tentatively selected and there 
still remained many surveyed allotments to be chosen, yet the allotment schedule was still 
not approved.  The situation posed a vexing problem for Mortsolf and the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs.  Could land surveyed for allotment, but which remained un-allotted, be 
                                                
343Hoopa Valley, although set aside by treaty in 1864, was officially designated a reservation by 
Executive Order in 1876, and was therefore subject to the new regulations. 
344Byron Nelson Jr., Our Home Forever, 157-158. 
345All un-allotted land in Hoopa Valley and selected land in the Extension were opened by this 
legislation.  See: "Description of Lands Subject to Lease for Mining Metalliferous Metals", RG 75, Bureau 
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Before and after the Fairview Placers Dredge on the upper-Trinity River.  It was this type of river-bed 
destruction that the Hoopa Tribe wanted to avoid.  Eastman postcards ca. 1935-1940.  Authors’ personal 
collection. 
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 E.B. Meritt, the Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs, informed Mortsolf that 
land surveyed for allotment could not be leased until after a fee or trust patent was issued 
to the allottee.  As for leasing the bed of the Trinity River, Meritt left the question 
unanswered when he stated that if the river was navigable, it was not open to leasing, but 
if non-navigable, the Superintendent should consult with the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs on a case-by-case basis.  But Meritt chose not to make a determination of 
navigability.348 Nevertheless, at this point, it seems that the river itself and its physical 
characteristics, were influencing federal Indian policy and mineral leases.  
 The federal government could not ignore the allotment issue nor the question of 
the navigability of the Trinity River because after Hoopa Valley was opened to mineral 
exploration, a rush to stake claims in the Valley took place.  Beginning in December 
1919, placer miners bombarded Superintendent Mortsolf with requests for claims along 
the Trinity River, and many miners trespassed on lands selected by Hupa Indians for 
allotment.349  White miners complained that they were forbidden to lease land already 
surveyed for allotment but still not assigned to individual Indians.350  The Hupas in turn 
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complained to the federal government about this new invasion of their land and the 
precarious position they found themselves in because they had not been officially granted 
allotments.351  Although Mortsolf accepted claim notices, mining was not allowed on any 
lands surveyed for allotment because the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and Mortsolf 
himself assumed that surveyed land would eventually be selected for allotments. 
 In 1922 and 1923, the federal government accepted and approved the allotment 
schedule that had been compiled in 1918 and 1919.352  Approving the allotment schedule, 
however, did not eliminate the barriers faced by white miners coveting auriferous gravels 
in Hoopa Valley.  The allotments along the Trinity River averaged four acres in size and 
the gravels suited for placering were located on land allotted to many different 
individuals, or on land being used by Tribal members but not officially allotted to them.  
A large amount of gravel was required to make a dredging operation profitable, and so 
miners were faced with the prospect of having to negotiate numerous leases with several 
owners, or settle for several small areas of gravel separated by areas where they could not 
mine.  Miners could lease un-allotted gravel deposits from the Tribe, but to make a mine 
profitable they still needed many additional acres of contiguous gravel.  The question of 
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who owned the bed of the Trinity River was still open, furthermore, and the approval of 
the allotment schedule created difficulties for those who had selected allotments along the 
Trinity River.  Many allottees wished to mine in the river adjacent to their allotments or 
lease the bed to interested parties, but were not officially allowed to do so until it was 
determined who actually owned the bed of the river.  Theoretically, no mining was 
allowed in the bed of the Trinity River until ownership was established, but throughout 
the 1920s, the river was mined on a small scale - mostly by the Hupas themselves.      
 The question of ownership turned on the question of navigability, and the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Superintendent at Hoopa failed to clearly address 
this question until 1931.353  In that year, the Superintendent at Hoopa Valley, O.M. 
Boggess, received numerous requests to mine the bed of the Trinity River and asked the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to settle the ownership issue once and for all.  The 
Commissioner responded that during the 1920s the State of California had enumerated all 
navigable rivers within its borders, and the Trinity was not included among them.  
Therefore, the Commissioner accepted the state's conclusion that the Trinity was not a 
navigable stream and informed Boggess that since the Trinity was not navigable, the 
allottees adjacent to the river owned to the centerline of the stream and could mine their 
allotments without paying any royalty to the Tribe.  Allottees were also permitted to lease 
their allotments to anyone they chose for mining purposes, but the Tribe owned the bed 
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of the Trinity where there was no allotted land.354  After determining ownership of the 
bed of the river, the Office of Indian Affairs approved pending leases between allottees 
and miners for working the bed of the Trinity River adjacent to allotments, and also 
permitted miners to conclude leasing agreements with the Tribe to mine un-allotted 
portions of the bed of the river.355 
 During the 1930s, the number of individuals, particularly Native Americans, 
undertaking small-scale placer mining in Hoopa Valley grew.356  Increased mining 
activity in the Trinity River Basin and was directly related to the Great Depression.  
Whereas logging suffered during the Depression, mining benefitted.357  During the 
Depression, Superintendent Boggess enforced the leasing regulations, and also allowed 
Native Americans living on the reservation to lease land suitable for mining through 
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National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
357Trinity Journal, June 2, 1932; July 23, 1932; February 2, 1933; September 16, 1933. 
(Weaverville Historical Society Museum, Weaverville California) Document File: Mining, Document #18a 
and 18b.  
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special one-year revocable leases devised by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs.358  
Under this system, Hupa and other Native Americans on the reservation could lease 
restricted allotments owned by other Indians, or lease Tribal land, but did not have to post 
bond, nor submit detailed development plans, because the agent assured the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that they were only mining on a small scale to 
supplement their meager incomes from other sources.  However, they were to pay the 
owners of allotments or the Hupa Tribe a royalty set by the superintendent.359  
 Not all of the Hupas supported the leasing program.  In December 1931, seventy-
five Hupas petitioned the federal government the right to mine, hunt and fish exclusively 
to Tribal members only.  Superintendent Boggess supported the Hupas in their complaint 
stating that there were legitimate miners in the valley, but "the sniper type of miner who 
comes in and claims to be prospecting but who in fact is trying to get a few dollars worth 
of gold and then drift along [without paying royalties, posting bond or filing a claim] is a 
source of much annoyance to us.”360  The Commissioner of Indian Affairs allowed 
                                                
358C.J. Rhoads to O.M. Boggess, August 4, 1931; "Placer Gold Mining Permit to Cover Hoopa 
Valley Tribal Land (For Indians Only)", RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified 
Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 44, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Rhoads to Boggess, 
enclosing copy of lease agreement form, October 20, 1931, R.G. 48, Records of the Department of the 
Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1907-1936, 5-1, Hoopa Valley-Hope, Box No. 
1221, File 5-1 (Part 1), April 13, 1912 to July 11, 1936, File: "Indian Office, Hoopa Valley, Leases", 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
359Lease Agreement, H.C. Chester, December 11, 1931, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 44, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C;  The royalties for each lease were determined by the Superintendent at Hoopa Valley.  The first leases 
concluded showed a disparity in the royalty charged for mining.  Eventually, a ten percent royalty became 
the standard amount paid by Indian lessees. See: C.J. Rhoads to O. M. Boggess, October 20, 1932, RG 75, 
Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 44, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C 
360O.M. Boggess to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, transmitting a petition against hunting, 
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Boggess to honor the wishes of the Hupa people regarding hunting and fishing, but he 
could not stop prospecting and mining that was in compliance with the federal laws then 
in place.361   
 Under the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, the Hupas created the Hoopa Valley 
Business Council.  The council allowed the Hupa people to assume a significant role in 
the exploitation of resources in the Hoopa Valley.362  The Business Council requested 
that superintendent Boggess stop leasing mineral ground to outside mining interests 
because it threatened to destroy agricultural land much more valuable to the people of the 
valley than low-paying placer claims.  The Council also requested that the federal 
government grant them power to regulate mining on Tribal land along the Trinity River 
and Mill Creek.  The BIA granted their request.  Under the new arrangement, individuals 
could still lease Tribal lands for mining, and Hupas could mine or lease their own 
allotments and the bed of the Trinity River adjacent to their property, but the Business 
Council assumed a stance of guardianship over all resources within the Valley and 
focused on ending placer mining on the valley floor where it threatened to destroy 
allotments.363  Requests to lease Tribal resources were discussed and voted upon at 
                                                                                                                                            
fishing and mining by whites, December 18, 1931, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central 
Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 4, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
361C.J. Rhoads to O.M. Boggess, January 19, 1932; Rhoads to Boggess, February 19, 1932, RG 
75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 4, 
National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
362Byron Nelson, Jr., Our Home Forever, 163-179. 
363"Minutes of Hoopa Valley Business Council", September 21, 1933; O.M. Boggess to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, February 19, 1934; Boggess to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, April 3, 
1934; John Collier to Secretary of the Interior, June 20, 1934, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 44, National Archives, Washington, 
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monthly Business Council meetings, and the council disallowed leases that were not 
beneficial to the Hupa Tribe, while encouraging the development of resources that it 
viewed as advantageous.364  Small scale placer mining continued throughout the 1930s, 
but the Hoopa Valley Business Council, with the cooperation of the Office of Indian 
Affairs, closely scrutinized lease requests, and studied the potential benefits and injury 
resulting from proposed projects before approving or disapproving a lease application.365  
 Unlike the debris issue in the Central Valley, the causes of opposition to mining 
in the Trinity River Basin was brought about for reasons other than flooding and damage 
to agricultural land.  The issue that finally brought the state of California into the Trinity 
River region to regulate mining was the concern over the depletion of anadromous fish in 
the Trinity and Klamath Rivers.  This was part of a larger movement that began in the 
1920s to conserve fish habitat and enhance a local economy that was increasingly 
dependent upon sportsmen.366  In 1933, the state of California consolidated its laws for 
                                                                                                                                            
D.C. 
364William Zimmermann, Jr. to Secretary of the Interior, recommendation to disallow placer 
mining lease requested by Mr. S.P. Coffer, January 28, 1935, RG 48, Records of the Department of the 
Interior, Office of the Secretary, Central Classified Files, 1907-1936, 5-1, Hoopa Valley - Hope, Box No. 
1221, File 5-1 (Part 1), April 13, 1912 to July 11, 1936, Indian Office, Hoopa Valley, Leases, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C.; "Minutes of the Hoopa Valley Business Council" August 8, 1935, approval of 
request to obtain a lease to mine coal in Hoopa Valley, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 4, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
365O.M. Boggess to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 6, 1939; Boggess to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, October 8, 1940; Report of B.W. Dyer, District Mining Supervisor, U.S. 
Geological Survey, on Certain Lands on Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation in Connection with Gold Placer 
Lease Application", November 28, 1939, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central 
Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1907-1939, Box No. 43, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
366In 1926 the Estabrook Gold Dredging Company near Trinity Center informed that Eureka 
Chamber of Commerce that it would voluntarily do whatever it could not to muddy the Trinity River with 
debris from July through September.  The company shut-down its hydraulic mine, but would only move the 
dredge out of the main channel of the Trinity but continue to operate.  See: Trinity Journal, July 3, 1926. 
(Weaverville Historical Society Museum, Weaverville California) Document File: Mining, Document #18a 
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fish and game into a comprehensive fish and game code.  Under its provisions, state fish 
and game districts were delineated for administrative and regulatory purposes.  The 
Trinity and Klamath river fish and game district encompassed the Trinity River from its 
confluence with the South Fork to the Klamath River.367  To protect fish, section 482 of 
the 1933 California Fish and Game Code forbid polluting the Trinity and Klamath River, 
and read in part: 
 
It is unlawful, between July fifteenth and October fifteenth, to pollute, 
muddy, or roil the waters of the Trinity and Klamath River district, or 
deposit, or permit the depositing of, any substance in said waters, so that 
the clarity thereof is affected.  The clarity of said waters shall be deemed 
affected when said waters. . .contain more than fifty parts per million, by 
weight, of suspended matter.  Any structure or contrivance which 
contributes to the condition, the causing of which is herein prohibited, is a 
public nuisance.368 
 
 Section 482 of the 1933 California Fish and Game Code was not specifically 
aimed at mining, but rather, was an attempt to stop pollution from any source whatsoever.  
                                                                                                                                            
and #18b. 
367California first divided the state into Fish and Game Districts in 1911.  Several changes in the 
number of districts and their boundaries have been made since then.  See: Edwin C. Bearss, History 
Resource Study, 322-324.  
368Edwin C. Bearss, History Resource Study, 331. 
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Mining, therefore fell under the limitations imposed by the code, yet the code had no 
stipulations for punishment.369  The dates of regulation, July to October 15, were in effect 
during the height the fall spawning run, but more importantly, the ban was in effect 
during the peak of the sport fishing season demonstrating the new importance of that 
industry within northwestern California.370 
 
Sport fisherman shoulder to shoulder at the mouth of the Klamath River.  The rise of the recreational 
fishing industry in northwestern California introduced another, powerful interest group in the area.  Sports 
fishing associations succeeded in pushing the State to regulate mining in the upper Basin.  Art Ray.  Photo 
postcard, ca. 1940s-1950s.  Authors’ personal collection. 
 
                                                
369The state and federal government did not have to abide by the 1933 Fish and Game Code.  
Section 484 stated: "The provisions of this article relating to the Trinity and Klamath River district do not 
apply to the construction, repair or maintenance of public works by the Federal or State government, or any 
political subdivision thereof."  Quoted in Edwin C. Bearss, History Resource Study, 331.  However, while 
operating the LaGrange Mine the state did refrain from dumping debris during the period stated in the code. 
See: Trinity Journal, July 28, 1934, Trinity County Historical Society Museum, Weaverville California. 
Document File: Mining, Documents #18a and 18b.  
370In an attempt to stall the depletion of the anadromous fish runs along the Klamath and Trinity 
River, California also banned commercial fishing of the Klamath River in 1933. For a concise summary of 




 The problem of silt from mining operations continued to affect the Trinity and 
Klamath rivers because forcing miners into compliance with fish and game regulations 
was difficult.  As debris continued to enter the waters of the rivers in northwestern 
California, sport fishing interests and conservationists pushed the state to specifically 
regulate the dumping of mining debris into the Trinity and Klamath rivers.  In the mid-
1930s, the California legislature was increasingly pressured to take action, and in 1937 
passed a law to stop mining pollution.  Known as the "Quinn Bill,” the law was a revision 
of earlier fish and game codes, and section 482 of the new legislation specifically forbid 
mines from tailing into the Trinity and Klamath River fish and game district, and 
extended the prohibition period when mines could not discharge detritus into the waters 
of the district.  Section 482b read in part:  
 
It is unlawful between July 1 and November 30, both dates inclusive, to 
pollute, muddy, contaminate, or roil the water of the Trinity and Klamath 
fish and game district.  It is unlawful between said dates to deposit in or 
cause, suffer or procure to be deposited in, permit to pass into or place 
where it can pass into said waters, any debris, substance or tailings from 
hydraulic, placer, milling or other mining operation affecting the clarity of 
said waters [said limit to be fifty parts per million of suspended matter].371 
 
 The law further addressed the hydraulic mining debris issue by stipulating in 
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Section 482c that hydraulic mines located along any waters flowing into the Trinity and 
Klamath River fish and game district were forbidden from dumping debris within the 
stated period.  Therefore, although the Trinity and Klamath River fish and game district 
encompassed the Trinity River from its confluence with the Klamath to the South Fork of 
the Trinity, the Quinn Bill effectively forbid dumping debris well outside of district 
boundaries.  Violation of the bill was punishable by a misdemeanor, and any mine or 
associated operation doing so was guilty of creating a public nuisance.  In an attempt to 
give the new code teeth, the law also provided that the district attorney of the county 
were any violations occurred was to take action to stop the nuisance.  Hydraulic mines, 
however, were specifically allowed to use and discharge water into said district between 
July 1 and July 15 for the purpose of "cleaning up.”372  The continued fight by the State 
and later, sport fishing interests falls outside the chronological scope of this chapter, but it 
was in the post world war II era that effective measures helped to regulate seriously 
mining and logging in the Trinity River Basin began.373  One area where the federal 
                                                                                                                                            
371Edwin C. Bearss, History Resource Study, 387. 
372Edwin C. Bearss, History Resource Study, 388. 
373By the 1940s, the Quinn Bill had proved ineffective at stopping all mines from dumping debris 
when they were forbidden to do so.  Studies showed that mining silt and logging wastes suffocated salmon 
and steelhead eggs and killed fry. Paul A. Shaw and John A. Maga, "The Effect of Mining Silt on Yield of 
Fry from Salmon Spawning Beds," in California Fish and Game, 9(1)1941:29-41. Silt was especially 
damaging during the late-spring and summer months when water velocity was slow allowing sediment to 
accumulate on spawning beds.  The Quinn Bill attempted to regulate mining during this critical period and 
it was somewhat effective at stopping most industrial-scale hydraulic mining because it allowed a seven 
month "hydraulic season," and industrial hydraulic mines had little problem operating at during that time of 
the year.  Under the law, dredges could operate in gravel well away from rivers and streams because they 
needed only a pond to float upon while dredging and often dug a settling Basin for their discharge water. 
See: Trinity Journal, July 4, 1946, Trinity County Historical Society Museum, Weaverville California, 
Document File: Mining, Document #18a and 18b, Small sluice operators and river miners were hampered 
by high water and so stopping all forms of mining from July to November was a hardship for them.  The 
Quinn Bill, like the Caminetti Act of so many years before, was an attempt to satisfy all economic interests.  
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government made a concerted effort to improve the lives of the Hupa people was in the 
area of agriculture.  The Hupas were directed to become farmers, but by the turn of the 
20th century, dry farming and spring-fed truck gardening could not support the Hupas.  
The federal government decided that irrigation could save the Hupa farming economy 
and benefit the entire tribe.   
 Prior to contact the Hupas relied on a complex set of subsistence strategies aimed 
at maximizing available plant and animal resources rather than intensive agriculture.374  
White farmers who appropriated much of the arable land in Hoopa had been growing 
non-native crops such as wheat, oats, barley, corn, potatoes, fruits, vegetables and feed 
crops that required irrigation.  After, the creation of the Hoopa Valley Reservation in 
1864, the Office of Indian Affairs expelled non-Indians, purchased their property and 
other improvements as a convenient ready-made farm setting that fit nicely into its 
                                                                                                                                            
But because it offered only token punishment, the bill had little effect and some miners continually refused 
to abide by the fish and game code. Western Mining News, March 1941, vol 15, no.3, p.3.,By 1941, 
sportsmen, resort owners, and other interest groups began clamoring for additional restrictions on mining.  
They asked for amendments to strengthen the Quinn Bill, and circulated petitions to force an initiative to 
amend the State constitution forbidding mines from polluting any California River. Edwin C. Bearss, 
History Resource Study, 390. 
374The Hupas and other Native people of the region actively cultivated tobacco for ceremonial 
purposes.  Kathy Heffner, "Following the Smoke: Contemporary Plant Procurement by the Indians of 
Northwest California".  Eureka, California: Six Rivers National Forest, April, 1984., 24-25, 77. For a recent 
interpretation of North coast Native impact on the land see: Thomas S. Keter, Environmental History and 
Cultural Ecology of the North Fork of the Eel River Basin, California (Eureka, California: Six Rivers 
National Forest, United States Department of Agriculture, September, 1995).,  In an attempt to classify pre-
contact Native agricultural practices, anthropologists have labeled subsistence activities as "Quasi-
Agriculture" and "Proto-Agriculture". See, Alan C. Zeigler, "Quasi-Agriculture in North Central California 
and its Effect on Aboriginal Social Structure," in Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers, 38(Spring 
1968), 52-76., and Lowell John Bean and Harry W. Lawton, "Some Explanations for the Rise of Cultural 
Complexity in Native California with Comments on Proto-Agriculture and Agriculture" in Henry T. Lewis, 
Patterns of Indian Burning in California: Ecology and Ethnohistory, Ballena Press Anthropological Papers, 
no. 1 (Ramona, Calif.: Ballena Press, 1973), 17-36.  The most accurate description and analysis of Hupa 
land-use and the relationship between the Hupa people and their environment is, Lee Davis, "On This 
Earth: Hupa Land Domains, Images and Ecology on 'Deddeh Ninnisan'" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
California, Berkeley, 1988). 
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standing policy of "civilizing" indigenous peoples.375  However, farming in Hoopa Valley 
was never able to wholly support the Hupas during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century for reasons beyond their control - the soils were rocky and were already 
becoming depleted when the reservation was established, irrigation was needed because 
rain fell from October to March, but during the growing season, the sky was more often 
clear and not, and finally, the office of Indian Affairs never committed enough resources 
or expertise and the Hupas were continually under the shadow of possible removal until 
1876 when their reservation was confirmed by Executive Order.  The Hupas were so 
isolated in the valley that only pack trains brought in and out supplies, communications, 
tools, etc.  As mining industrialized up river, the number of individual miners fell and 
they came to rely upon Camp Gaston for a point of sale.  The post closed in 1892 and the 
Hupa found themselves at the mercy of the BIA and hoped that they would finish 
allotting the reservation and assist in bringing irrigation to the arable lands of the 
valley.376  Although dry farming was the predominant method used by the Hupa farmers 
to farm in Hoopa Valley, if irrigation were needed, the numerous streams feeding into the 
Trinity River within Hoopa Valley were the most logical and easily accessible sources for 
                                                
375The 1887 Dawes Act spurred federal attempts to convert Indians into farmers and release 
Indian land for white settlement.  Hoopa Valley was surveyed, allotment schedules were drawn up, and the 
Hupas were encouraged to select allotments for farming.  Allotment was delayed for many reasons, and the 
program failed to divide the valley among its Native residents in a way that exactly mirrored white 
agricultural society.  The Hupas exerted influence upon the allotment process by continuing to define their 
world and living patterns based upon traditional village locations by selecting allotments in fields where 
their families had resided since time immemorial, or near traditionally recognized owned resources sites. 
376Hoopa Valley is naturally divided by the meandering Trinity River into eight defined "fields" 
suitable for crop agriculture.  The names of these fields today roughly reflect pre-contact and historic 
village occupation, federal government presence, and  the interaction of Hupas and non-Hupas.  The eight 
fields, from north to south are; Norton, Soctish, Meskat, Chenone, Hostler, Agency, Matilton and 
Campbell. David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 90. 
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irrigation water and other water needs.  Many of these streams are perennial, providing 
water all year long.  Some of the streams today bear names that reflect their historic use 
such as Mill Creek, and Supply Creek.  The latter was tapped to supply water to Fort 
Gaston, and later Hoopa Valley Agency and its associated structures with water.377  A 
completely self-sufficient Hupa farming community never materialized.  The Hupa 
people cooperated and embraced farming, but consistently on their own terms.  Office of 
Indian Affairs and military personnel expressed frustration, and seemingly could not 
understand why the Hupas continued to maintain many traditional, pre-contact 
subsistence strategies.378  The Dawes Act came into play when the attempt was made to 
create an agricultural economy, but because of its chaotic and confusing application, and 
the long struggle to finalize the allotment roll, the circumstances hindered Office of 
Indian Affairs and Hupa efforts to create a viable agricultural economy.379  Allotment 
confusion and delay, and the demands of the Hupa people ultimately led to the small size 
of allotments made to individual Hupas undermined efforts to farm.380 
 Attempts by the BIA to redefine the Hupas’ relationship to their valley were more 
difficult than anticipated.  Federal funding and programs were so inconsistent and 
inadequate that agents and military officers who sometimes acted as agents often found 
                                                
377David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 90. 
378David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 95-96. 
379Generally, the Hupas did not oppose allotment, but there was too little land for adequate 
allotment among the entire tribe based upon agriculture alone.  Byron Nelson, Jr., Our Home Forever, 136, 
195-197; David Rich Lewis, David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 98-105; John H. Bushnell, "From 
American Indian to Indian American: The Changing Identity of the Hupa," American Anthropologist, 70 
(December 1986), 1110. 
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themselves reacting to agricultural trends in Hoopa Valley rather than developing 
consistent and realistic programs.  Indian Office and military personnel often exacerbated 
problems associated with agricultural development by arbitrarily exercising their almost 
unchecked authority over the reservation.  The fertility of the soil also influenced policy.  
Valley land was productive though marginal when first cultivated, but over cropping 
eventually depleted the rocky, porous soil, and crop yields fluctuated year to year.381  
Reservation superintendents and farmers often cited irrigation as the key to the marginal 
soil of the Valley.  Finally, when the Hupas did occasionally produce enough surplus to 
sell, markets for the valley’s agricultural products were often inaccessible.   
 In 1887 construction began on a wagon road to connect Hoopa Valley with the 
coast and larger regional markets, but it was not finished until 1892.  When Valley 
products did reach outside markets, however, transportation costs usually made them too 
expensive and noncompetitive.382 A second road was started in 1908, but took eight years 
to complete.  As late as 1921, agent Jesse Mortsolf complained that the road leading to 
the coast was a "marginal road" eight months out of the year, and if passable at all during 
the winter, it took two days to reach Arcata.383 
 Nevertheless, Hupas worked hard at farming.  Some of them built private 
                                                                                                                                            
380David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 102. 
381David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 91. 
382The Hoopa Valley Wagon Road was not complete until 1892.  The road was poorly 
constructed and ran through rugged country.  David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog., 97,100. 
383Letter, Jesse B. Mortsolf, Supt., to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, May 16, 1921, RG 75, 
Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, letter #43427. David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog., 
 
241 
diversions in the valley to water garden plots and fields well after the creation of the 
Hoopa Valley Reservation.  The Hupas built these works without direct federal 
supervision or funding.384 Reservation personnel were never far removed from most 
Hupa land-use activities, however, and viewed the Hupas private irrigation efforts as a 
move toward achieving the federal goal of self-sufficient farming. The Hupa diversions 
were built to flood lands they hoped would be allotted to them, but they recognized that 
the federal government had not formally assigned the land.  Consequently, Hupa 
irrigators did not expand their private efforts beyond their immediate needs. In 1900, for 
example, several Hupa ranchers diverted water from Mill and Hostler creeks with ditches 
to flood their fields and grow alfalfa.  By 1910, only 40 acres were irrigated by private 
ditch.   
 Agency farmer Charles L. Davis realized that irrigation would increase field 
productivity, and encouraged the Hupas to build more ditches to grow alfalfa in hopes of 
restoring soil fertility and encouraging a valley livestock industry. Although the Hupas 
were willing to initiate limited diversions to help themselves, they were hesitant to move 
forward under the auspices of Davis and the Office of Indian Affairs.  The Hupas built 
ditches through their own initiative, but they recognized that their efforts were not wholly 
"private" because of federal presence within Hoopa Valley.  They had little control over 
the decisions of the Office of Indian Affairs.  The Hupas embraced allotment, but delay 
after delay made any investments in land in the form of labor, money or materials 
                                                                                                                                            
102. 
384The valley is well-watered and agents noted that there were "rivulets" seeping from 
mountainsides in Hoopa Valley that the Hupas diverted to irrigate their private gardens. David Rich Lewis, 
Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 102-103. 
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extremely risky.  Hupa individuals, therefore, took a cautious approach to expanding their 
irrigation systems because they recognized that delays in allotments placed them in a 
precarious situation. If they borrowed money and improved lands to which they held no 
title, they could lose everything.  It was safer, the Hupas may have reasoned, to wait until 
the allotment process was complete.385 
 The existence of private Hupa irrigation projects suggests several important points 
to consider concerning the development of reservation agriculture and water diversions.  
Agency personnel reacted to Hupa initiatives rather than conceiving of and directing 
irrigation projects themselves.  Moreover, the ideal of a self-sufficient Hoopa Valley 
farming community based upon individual land ownership and self-sufficient farms was 
not being realized.  Rather, after 45 years of effort, the Hupas were not self-sufficient 
farmers.  Davis, the agency farmer, and the Hupas recognized that raising livestock was a 
viable alternative to grain farming.  However, agency officials believed that ranching 
would augment, not replace crop agriculture, and so continued to cling tenaciously to the 
idea of self-sustaining individual farms which could only succeed if there was a 
dependable irrigation system.  The Office of Indian Affairs embraced irrigation in order 
to realize its goals of the Dawes Act.  But irrigation works were expensive, and federal 
funds were needed to finance any realistic project within Hoopa Valley.  Perhaps most 
important of all, the allotment issue had to be resolved if there was ever to be an adequate 
irrigation system in the Hoopa Valley.  Farming in Hoopa Valley continued to be a key 
component of the Valley economy during the 1920s.  Dry farming continued as the main 
                                                
385David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 102-103. 
 
243 
method of farming, but production and the number of acres farmed tended to fluctuate 
year to year and farmers continued to struggle.386   
 Until the early twentieth century, the developments of reservation irrigation 
systems nationally were the responsibility of reservation agents and superintendents.  
This system resulted in haphazard and inadequate attempts at irrigation on most 
reservations.387  Reservation agents and superintendents did not have the expertise and 
engineering skill, nor did they possess the funding to build and maintain irrigation 
systems that could adequately serve the needs of Indian people.388  Throughout the 
United States most reservation irrigation projects were funded on a project by project 
basis, usually built with Native American labor, and more often than not benefitted 
whites who purchased Indian lands rather than Native peoples.389  Yet, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, national interest in reclamation and irrigation in the arid west (where 
most reservations were located) manifested itself in the Department of the Interior and 
the Indian Office.  In 1899, two superintendents of irrigation were appointed within the 
                                                
386David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 106. 
387Daniel McCool, Command of the Waters: Iron Triangles, Federal Water Development, and 
Indian Water. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987, 161-75, an passim, examines some of the 
complications of Indian water development. 
388Porter J. Preston and Charles A. Engle, "Report of Advisors on Indian Irrigation on Indian 
Reservations," June 8, 1928, printed in "Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States, Hearings 
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 71st Congress, 2d 
Session (1930), part 6, pp. 2210-2661; Laurence F. Schmeckebier, The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, 
Activities and Organization (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), 237-242; Francis Paul Prucha. 
The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians. Vols. One and Two, 
unabridged (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984) (1995), 891. 
389Francis Paul Prucha. The Great Father, 894; Donald L. Parman Indians and the American West 
in the Twentieth Century. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 22. 
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Indian Office to oversee reservation reclamation projects.390  Thus, the "official" creation 
of the Indian Irrigation Service (later the Irrigation Division of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs) began with these first appointments.391  By 1911 the Office of Indian Affairs 
employed seven superintendents of irrigation to oversee project construction under the 
direction of a Chief Engineer.  The number of superintendents reflects the rise of a 
regulated and efficient approach to irrigation projects across Indian country.  The Chief 
Engineer was also an attorney charged with protecting Indian water rights for all 
Irrigation Service projects and advising on water rights.392 In 1912 the Irrigation Service 
was divided into five irrigation districts for administrative purposes, with each 
responsible for projects within a defined geographic area.393 
                                                
390In 1896, an appropriation was made to hire temporary irrigation engineers.  The trend of yearly 
appropriations for temporary employees continued until 1900.  The appropriation did not state specific 
qualifications until 1900.  Porter J. Preston and Charles A. Engle, "Report of Advisors on Indian Irrigation 
on Indian Reservations," 156-157. 
391The Indian Irrigation Service was shifted back and forth shifted between the land and field 
divisions within the Office of Indian Affairs until it was designated as a separate Irrigation Division in 
1934. Janet A. McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian: 1887-1934 (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1991), 75. 
392Porter J. Preston and Charles A. Engle, "Report of Advisors on Indian Irrigation on Indian 
Reservations," 131-132; Francis Paul Prucha. The Great Father, 892; Donald L. Parman Indians and the 
American West, 22. 
393Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report, 1907, 54-55; Porter J. Preston and Charles A. 
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 Water rights in the arid west were of particular concern to reclamation supporters, 
but within the Office of Indian Affairs, the concern for Indian water rights seemed 
peripheral to irrigation programs.  The 1887 Dawes Act briefly considered Indian water 
rights.  The Secretary of the Interior was charged with ensuring equal distribution of 
water among Indians where irrigation was necessary to the pursuit of agriculture.  But 
particular rights to water within the context of Indian-white relations were not considered 
in the act.  In 1908, the Supreme Court decided in Winters v. United States that there was 
a reserved right to sufficient water to irrigate reservation lands.394 But the Winters 
decision was not seen by the Office of Indian Affairs as an assurance that Indian water 
rights would be protected.  Therefore, the Office of Indian Affairs’ continued to file for 
water rights within states where reservations were located, much as any other user might 
apply for water, often to the detriment of Indian tribes.395  Moreover, the Office of Indian 
Affairs course of action reflects the fact that the Bureau never had a consistent approach 
to protecting Indian water rights, and often Indian water rights undermined by Office of 
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 On April 9, 1907, the Secretary of the Interior approved a plan whereby the Bureau of 
Reclamation would build and control major reclamation projects then within the jurisdiction of the Office 
of Indian Affairs.  The Office of Indian Affairs continued to influence reclamation policy by deciding 
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Indian Affairs inaction.396  
 Federal irrigation development in Hoopa Valley should be seen within the larger 
context of the reclamation movement in the United States.  During the nineteenth 
century, irrigation in Hoopa Valley was limited to small diversions of perennial streams.  
The passage of the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902, and subsequently the 1907 
cooperative project arrangement between the Bureau of Reclamation and Indian Affairs, 
brought the enthusiasm for reclamation to the Indian Office and Hoopa Valley. Now 
Indian Irrigation Service experts, with the assistance of Reclamation engineers, could 
design and build large-scale irrigation systems.  In Hoopa Valley, reservation personnel 
embraced the idea of large-scale irrigation as the best way to save agriculture in the 
valley, the key to realizing the goals of the Dawes Act.397   
 Reservation administrators understood by the turn of the century that food-crops 
alone could not sustain the Hupa people.  Animal husbandry emerged in the valley as an 
important component of Hupa subsistence without the encouragement from the Office of 
Indian Affairs.398  The later pursuit meant cultivating forage crops, particularly alfalfa, 
which required large amounts of water.  Reservation administrators and farmers also 
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encouraged cultivating alfalfa to restore soils exhausted by years of dry-farming grains, 
and claimed that surpluses could be sold outside of the reservation.  Essentially, the 
Office of Indian Affairs’ goal of creating self-sufficient Indian agriculturalists remained 
unchanged, but the Indian Office now embraced irrigation, forage crops and animal 
husbandry as potential allies to realize their agricultural ideal.   
 The cooperative irrigation arrangement between Reclamation and the Office of 
Indian Affairs did not immediately translate into an irrigation system in the Valley.  
Efforts to implement a government irrigation program were haphazard, insufficient and 
moved forward at a bureaucratic pace.  It was not until 1910 that the Department of the 
Interior first sent inspecting agent Joe H. Norris to Hoopa Valley to investigate conditions 
on the reservation and recommend needed changes.  Norris made a survey of the valley, 
and in a brief two-page report observed that Hoopa Valley had several naturally divided 
fields that could be cultivated by small-scale diversion, but a large-scale irrigation project 
was not feasible.  Norris recommended that the Hupas be encouraged to build small 
canals and divert water from valley streams, and noted that, "[s]ome effort has been made 
to do this, especially at Mill Creek," and officially recommended, "[t]he Superintendent 
should encourage more work of this kind."399  Soon thereafter, the Office of Indian 
Affairs ordered Superintendent Jesse Mortsolf to follow Norris' advice.  "In view of this 
report and recommendations made by Mr. Norris," wrote C.F. Hauke, "the Office 
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requests that you give some personal attention to encourage the Indians to construct these 
small irrigation systems for their own use."400 It was this time that agency farmer Davis 
began to encourage the Hupas to expand their irrigation efforts and plant alfalfa.  But the 
Hupas resisted expanding their systems, mostly because allotments were not yet finalized 
so why labor on land that may be taken away? 
 The next year, the Indian Irrigation Service, now headquartered in Los Angeles, 
sent the regional Superintendent of Irrigation John J. Granville to Hoopa Valley to 
conduct a more detailed irrigation inspection.  The investigation included surveying 
stream run-off and determining the best sites for power generation and water storage.  
The report noted that many valley streams could provide some irrigation, but most were 
too small for power development.  Supply Creek and possibly Mill Creek were suitable 
for power generation sites, and a dam could be built on Supply Creek for a reservoir. The 
inspector noted that many springs along the foothills could be used for small-scale 
irrigation.401 Yet this report, like that of Norris, was of limited use.  After reviewing the 
report, W.M. Reed, Chief Engineer of the Indian Irrigation Service, stated in March 1913, 
that an entirely new investigation to realistically assess the irrigation possibilities in 
Hoopa Valley would have to be conducted.402 
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 In early 1914, L.M. Holt, Superintendent of Irrigation, visited the valley to 
enumerate the number of irrigable acres, stream flow and investigate the possibilities for 
power generation.  Holt estimated that if an irrigation project were to include a 
hydroelectric facility to power irrigation pumps in the Trinity River, a total of 1768 acres 
could be irrigated at $34.18 per acre.  If this cost were prohibitive, Holt reported, the 
hydroelectric plant and pumping system could be dropped and a gravity system alone 
could irrigate 1480 acres at $23.78 per acre.  Holt's final estimate for completion of the 
project, including all equipment and materials, was $34,200 for a gravity system, and 
$61,430 if hydroelectricity and irrigation pumps were required. The report included 
maps, specific costs and material estimates for each individual field in the Valley, and 
described system design.  The Holt report became the basis for future discussion of 
irrigation in Hoopa Valley.403  
 In reply to Holt's report, Indian Irrigation Service Chief Engineer W.M. Reed 
stated that he favored including hydroelectric power and pumping.  However, Holt's cost 
estimate for the irrigation system if the pumping and power portion were included 
exceeded the $35,000 Congressional limit for this type of project.  Reed suggested that 
Holt make further inquiry to provide greater justification to convince Congress that the 
project was needed.  If the power generation portion of the project could be made to serve 
more than irrigation needs, stated Reed, Congress might be more inclined to grant the 
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appropriation.  The Chief Engineer concluded by informing Holt that the appropriate 
legislation would not be sent to Congress until 1915, and so Holt still had time to 
investigate alternatives.404   
 In response to the Holt report, Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs E.B. 
Meritt asked Hoopa Valley Superintendent Edward Holden to suggest ways that electric 
power might be used elsewhere on the reservation.  More importantly, Meritt asked if the 
proposed irrigation project would infringe upon any existing water rights.  Holden 
assured the Assistant Commissioner that numerous uses could be made of electric power 
in the valley.  Holden also stated: 
 
There are no conflicting claims to the water which will be used and there 
is no irrigation being done, or power developed anywhere on the Trinity 
River which uses water from the river and there probably never will be.  
There is very little land along the river that can be irrigated and in most 
every case there is plenty of creek water for the purpose.  The creeks 
which will be used for irrigating this Valley are located in the Reservation 
for almost their entire length, so that there is little possibility of the water 
being appropriated by any-one [sic] else... .  I can see nothing that can, or 
will interfer [sic] with the development of the proposed irrigation.405  
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 Superintendent Holden reported that the Indians of Hupa Valley supported the 
idea of irrigation and seemed to think the cost was reasonable.  The only problem was 
how the Hupas were to raise the money to pay for the project.  And of course, allotments 
still had not been formally issued and it was expected that a new schedule would be 
enumerated and most Hupas would be assigned irrigated land.406 
 Plans to irrigate Hoopa Valley according to the design and estimates of L.M. Holt 
were not acted upon immediately.  One reason was cost. In 1915, the new Agency 
Superintendent Jesse Mortsolf consulted the Hupas and assured the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs that they supported the plan and would reimburse the government if a 
reasonable repayment schedule were offered.  Mortsolf also explained that irrigation 
could rejuvenate exhausted soils, and provide the opportunity to cultivate a variety of 
crops while increasing the value of Indian allotments.407 Nevertheless, Holt's 1914 plan 
for irrigating Hoopa Valley continued to languish at the Bureau of Indian Affairs for 
years despite having the approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affair and Secretary of 
the Interior.  The central problem, according to the Indian Office, was that Holt's estimate 
of $61,430 exceeded the $35,000 Congressional cap placed on irrigation projects 
prohibiting the initiation of new projects above that amount.  For this reason, stated E.B. 
Meritt in a letter to Superintendent Jesse Mortsolf, "...it has been impracticable to include 
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the special appropriation necessary [for the Hoopa Valley Project] in either the Indian 
Bill for the fiscal year 1916 or 1917."  Yet, Holt's estimate of $34,200 ($800 under the 
Congressional limit) to construct a gravity system that would water most of the Valley 
was not even considered by the BIA.408 
 By 1915, the allotment of Hoopa Valley was tied to the issue of irrigation.  The 
Office of Indian Affairs surveyed Hoopa Valley for allotment in 1895, but these 
allotments were not approved by the Office of Indian Affairs.  A new survey and 
schedule based upon the 1895 survey was completed in 1915, and the Valley fields 
divided into four-acre arable tracts based upon a formula that divided the number of 
eligible Hupas (400), by the number of estimated arable acres (1,600).  Yet, these 
allotments were still not assigned for several years.409  One reason that allotting was 
delayed, at least after 1915 according to Superintendent Mortsolf, was that some Valley 
land was irrigable, and other land was not.  The number of Hupas to be allotted continued 
to increase, but perhaps not all the Indians wanted to pay the costs of irrigation and thus 
would need allotments outside of the irrigable areas.  Mortsolf believed that allotment 
should not go forward unless it was known for certain if the Irrigation Service was going 
to build the entire irrigation project or only part of it.  The future value of irrigated 
allotments and non-irrigated allotments concerned Mortsolf.  Obviously irrigated land 
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would be worth more on the open market, therefore non-irrigated allotments would have 
to be larger to assure equal value to the Hupas.410 Thus, allotment stalled as did irrigation 
development. 
 In 1917, frustration over the allotment process convinced 60 Hupas to sign and 
forward a petition to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs asking that allotments be 
finalized.  The Hupas expressed concern that future allotments should include, in addition 
to arable field lands, land suitable for grazing.  This concern reflects the fact that animal 
husbandry had emerged as an important part of the Valley economy.  But more 
importantly, the Hupas recognized that the proposed four-acre allotments were too small 
to provide them adequate support.  But the Hupas' petition, and Mortsolf's expressed 
concerns about irrigation and allotments, came to naught.  Instead, in April 1917, 
Commissioner E.B. Meritt wrote Mortsolf stating, "We [the Office of Indian Affairs] do 
not think it a good plan to make allotments on the reservation on the basis of future 
irrigation until money is appropriated for the [irrigation] project.  Just as soon as the 
funds required for the project are made available, the matter will receive appropriate 
consideration."411  
 Essentially, the Hupas wanted allotment. Mortsolf wanted the Office of Indian 
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Affairs to commit to irrigating Hoopa Valley and deciding on the final plan design so 
allotments could be assigned to individuals interested in paying for irrigation before the 
project was built.  The Office of Indian Affairs, however, wanted no movement toward 
allotment until funding was approved for the irrigation project.  Ironically, in light of the 
previous exchange, the request to Congress to appropriate funds for the Hoopa Valley 
irrigation project was dropped by the Office of Indian Affairs from the Indian 
Appropriation Act for 1918.  Thereafter, pressure upon the Office of Indian Affairs to 
allot Hoopa Valley, at least from Superintendent Mortsolf, increased.  The 
Superintendent strongly urged the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to move forward with 
allotment.  Mortsolf reminded the Commissioner that many Hupas had accepted the 
survey lines and were settled upon the lands accordingly.  The uncertainty of allotment 
made the Hupas hesitant to improve their lands.  The Superintendent blamed the 
dilapidated condition of agency fields and fences on Office of Indian Affairs allotment 
delays.  Thereafter, Mortsolf dropped his support for approval of the irrigation project 
before allotment, and pushed instead for allotment regardless or irrigation project 
funding.412 In 1918, the Hupas were allowed to submit their allotment selections to an 
allotting agents, but had to wait until 1923 before some allotments were approved.413   
 In February 1920, eighty-three Hupas sent a complaint to Congressman John 
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Barton Payne protesting the allotment process and land situation in Hoopa Valley.  The 
complaint, which Payne forwarded to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells, stated 
that allotments were too small and many people had no allotments at all.  The Hupas 
asked for completion of allotments for those without land, and that additional land 
suitable for grazing be assigned to allottees.  The Hupas stated that they understood that 
soon "the time is coming when the government will be made to throw this Reservation 
open and let each individual strive for themselves...".  The Hupas continued, "Our 
Reservation at present is open for mining location and water rights and some of us are 
surrounded by such claims by people of the outside."  Complaining of the 
mismanagement of Reservation resources and water rights by the Superintendent 
Mortsolf, the Hupas stated, "It seems since this is an Indian Reservation we should be 
given first rights [to placer gravels and water] and notified by our Superintendent that 
such rights and claims on this Reservation can be taken and worked upon."  The Hupas 
closed their complaint by reminding Payne, and through him, Commissioner Cato Sells, 
"that nearly every one of us have stock and we ask you to give each one [of us] land for 
grazing...before this reservation is thrown open to white settlers.”414 
 The people of Hoopa Valley understood that while they continued to live under 
the shadow of the Office of Indian Affairs, outside pressures were mounting to develop 
Valley resources and open the Reservation for settlement. The promise of irrigation had 
not been fulfilled, yet in 1919 Hoopa Valley reservation was opened to mineral leasing.  
Hoopa fears were justified.  Placer claims were filed and by 1921, a year after the Hupas 
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complained to Payne, the State Water Commission of California notified Superintendent 
Mortsolf that it had received an application for a water rights appropriation from Tish 
Tang-a-Tang Creek within the reservation.415  Superintendent Mortsolf responded that it 
was doubtful if the Commission had any jurisdiction within the reservation. "However," 
stated Mortsolf, "if the Commission can approve applications for Water Rights in a way 
that will not be prejudicial to the rights of the Indian residents of the reservation, I do not 
believe that objection would be made.  At this time no water from this creek is being 
used."416 
 The preceding incident exposes the precarious water rights situation that existed 
in Hoopa Valley and elsewhere on Indian reservations.  Although in 1908, the United 
States Supreme Court decided the landmark Winters decision reserving sufficient water 
for Indian reservations to develop irrigable lands, the Indian Office continued to apply for 
water rights under state laws believing that the rights claimed under Winters were 
unenforceable.417  Mortsolf acted along lines set out by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, but 
this policy allowed the potential erosion of Hupa water rights because the Hupas were not 
using the water.  The Hupas, of course, could not use the water until the Indian Office 
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built an irrigation system.418   
 The issue of Indian water rights again emerged in 1922 when a proposal emerged 
to divert a large amount of water from the Trinity River to the Sacramento River.419  The 
application to appropriate and divert such an enormous amount of water from the Trinity 
River sparked protest from Superintendent Mortsolf, the Eureka Chamber of Commerce, 
and others.  Mortsolf complained to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that a planned 
irrigation project in Hoopa Valley would be harmed by the diversion.  At the same time, 
Mortsolf called upon the Eureka Chamber of Commerce to protest the project based upon 
the threat to the fishing industry.  The Superintendent wrote to Supervising Irrigation 
Engineer L.M. Holt asking him to move forward with an irrigation project to bring water 
to the four-acre field allotments in Hoopa Valley.  The allotments, noted the 
Superintendent, were depleted from decades of grain farming, and were incapable of 
sustaining any crops unless irrigated.  Since many of the allotments were held in fee, 
Mortsolf rightly claimed, there was a danger that they might be sold to outside 
interests.420  It was necessary, Mortsolf reasoned, to irrigate these allotment before they 
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might be sold so as to gain for the allottee the true market value of the allotment.421 
 The Federal Power Commission (FPC), which was responsible for approving the 
diversion in question, assured Commissioner of Indian Affairs E. B. Meritt that the FPC 
would consider Indian water rights when deciding whether or not to issue a permit to 
divert the Trinity River.  "The Federal Power Commission would, of course, desire to 
preserve the Indian Rights, as they may be found by your office," wrote O.C. Merrill, 
Executive Secretary of the FPC.  "I shall be glad if you will send me such information as 
you desire concerning the rights and needs of the Indians, and the extent to which [the 
diversion] will interfere."  Commissioner Meritt left it up to Mortsolf to gather enough 
data to demonstrate if the proposed diversion would harm potential Hupa water rights.422  
Mortsolf's only response was that if too much water was diverted from the Trinity, it 
might threaten a planned irrigation project in Hoopa Valley, and adversely affect the 
salmon upon which the Hupa depended for much of their subsistence.423   
 In an effort to obtain information to bolster his protest against the diversion, 
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Mortsolf asked the Indian Irrigation Service to provide data to support him.  Herbert V. 
Clotts, Supervising Engineer of the Irrigation Service, who worked extensively on the 
notoriously disastrous and completely flawed San Carlos Project for the Pima Indians of 
Arizona, consulted his files and replied that he could only guess at the exact water use.  
Clotts, without possessing any accurate information, liberally estimated that there were 
perhaps two hundred acres irrigated in Hoopa Valley, but he did not know if the water 
was diverted from the Trinity River or Valley streams.  Clotts reasoned, however, that the 
proposed upstream diversion of the Trinity did not threaten the water available to Hoopa 
Valley because so little of the arable land in the Valley was under irrigation.  
Furthermore, Clotts asserted, the Trinity River contained sufficient run off to support 
diversion upstream and irrigation on the Reservation.424 
 While outside interests sought to appropriate Hupa resources and the waters of the 
Trinity River, the Indian Irrigation Service finally moved to develop an Irrigation system 
for Hoopa Valley.425  In 1922, L.M. Holt, the Supervising Engineer responsible for the 
original 1914 plan for irrigating Hoopa Valley, asked Irrigation Service Chief Engineer 
W.M. Reed to fund a reduced irrigation project for the valley with reimbursable funds 
                                                
424Letter, Herbert V. Clotts, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Los Angeles, March 14, 1922, 
RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs-California, HVA, Land Correspondence, 1894-1926. Box 158, Series 64. 
File 77-89. FARC-PSR, San Bruno, California; Letter, Mortsolf to Herbert V. Clotts, Supervising Engineer, 
Hoopa Valley, February 27, 1923. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box No. 81, NA, 
Washington, D.C. 
 In 1944 Agency Superintendent O.M. Boggess adhered to the same position regarding Indian 
water rights and the diversion of the Trinity River at Lewiston.  Letter, Boggess to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Eureka, California, Mat 23, 1944. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 50, 
File 341, Part D. NA, Washington, D.C. 
425The Office of Indian Affairs often moved forward with irrigation projects to put Indian water 
right to beneficial use to protect these rights in a manner acceptable to State law. See: Janet A. McDonnell, 
The Dispossession of the American Indian, 72. 
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held by the Indian Service.426  Holt suggested that one or more of the individual "fields" 
in Hoopa Valley, called irrigation units, could be easily irrigated for less money than 
attempting to irrigate all arable lands in the Valley.  The proposal called for the diversion 
of Mill Creek to irrigate Campbell, Norton and Mesket fields.  The plan embraced 850 
acres, and dropped the original hydroelectric power facility and the pumps that would 
have tapped the Trinity River in the 1914 plan.427 
 Holt's suggestion was answered with orders for yet another survey of the 
irrigation possibilities and detailed cost estimates of the proposal.  Reed called for a 
reduced "test" program until the Hupas could show they would efficiently use irrigation.  
"The Indians have not yet had an opportunity to show how efficiently they will use 
irrigation facilities on the Hoopa Reservation," stated Reed, "and, therefore, I believe we 
should make a test with a single project in the beginning.”428  Reed ordered Holt to 
investigate irrigation of Norton and Mesket Fields only.  Once completed, Holt estimated 
that the total cost for the diversion of Mill Creek into Meskat and Norton Fields would be 
                                                
426On January 2, 1925 the Federal Power Commission issued a preliminary permit to W.H. 
Simpson to appropriate water from the Trinity River for power and irrigation.  The project called for 
reservoirs, diversion systems and power generation facilities on the upper Trinity River.  Designated 
"Project No. 247",  the plans closely resembled the future Trinity Diversion of the Central Valley Project.  
"Memorandum for the Press". RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box No. 81, NA, 
Washington, D.C.; Letter, Meritt to Rastall, Washington, D.C., February 4, 1925. RG 75 Office of Indian 
Affairs-California, HVA, Land Correspondence, 1894-1926. Box No. 158, Series 64. File 77-89. FARC-
PSR, San Bruno, California. 
427Letter, L.M. Holt to W.M. Reed, Yakima Washington, May 30, 1922; Letter, Holt to Reed, 
Yakima, Washington, June 26, 1922. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs CCF, 1909-1929, HV, Box 10, NA 
Washington, D.C. 
428Letter, Reed to Holt, Los Angeles, July 10, 1922. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs CCF, 1909-




 After reviewing the 1922 survey, the Irrigation Service decided that construction 
of a canal from Mill Creek to water Meskat and Norton fields was the first order of 
business.  This irrigation system was less than that envisioned by Holt, but even before 
construction began, additional survey work was conducted in 1924 resulting in still 
another project of more complicated design than the original 1914 Holt Plan.430  Much of 
the additional work contemplated related to electric power and water supply for the future 
needs of the agency school, hospital and sawmill.  Irrigation, while still of central 
concern, was only part of a multiple use philosophy for the water of Hoopa Valley 
streams embraced in the 1924 plan.431 
 Chief Engineer Reed approved the 1924 Plan on September 19, 1924.  The plan 
called for irrigating 805 acres at a cost of $46.00 per acre.  $18,000 was appropriated to 
start the work in 1925, and soon thereafter construction crews comprised of Hupa 
laborers under white supervision began building the Mill Creek headgate, flume and 
canal.  Final work on field laterals and outlet boxes remained to be finished by allottees 
because of funding delays.  The Hupas provided the labor for the project in anticipation 
                                                
429Letter, Holt to Reed, Yakima Washington, September 12, 1922. RG 75 Office of Indian 
Affairs CCF, 1909-1929, HV, Box 10, NA Washington, D.C. 
430Reeds suggestion that only Meskat and Hostler fields be irrigated was more realistic than 
attempting to include Campbell Field in the plan. Campbell Field is far south and on the opposite side of 
the Trinity River from Mill Creek.  David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 90. 
431Report, Herbert Clotts to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Los Angeles, July 31, 1925. RG 75 
Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929. HV. Box 49. NA, Washington, D.C. 
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of receiving water for their fields.432   
 Funding for the project was uncertain, and hampered construction efforts.  During 
1925 construction on the Mill Creek Irrigation Unit moved forward, but funding 
uncertainty for fiscal year 1926, and shortages of materials, caused the project supervisor 
to predict that construction would be halted before any benefit could be realized.  An 
additional $20,000 was eventually appropriated, however, and work continued on the 
system in 1926.433 On June 22, 1926, P.B. Edson Skiff, the construction supervisor for 
the irrigation project, informed Superintendent Keeley that the project was complete.  
The Irrigation Service turned over system maintenance and operation to the 
Superintendent and those allottees who were project beneficiaries, and responsible for 
reimbursement for construction costs.  The Hupas, stated Skiff, would learn to efficiently 
use the system in time.434  
  The completed project was far less than envisioned in the 1914 Holt Report, and 
did not include the power generation facilities encompassed in the 1924 plan.  During 
actual construction in 1925-26, changes were made in project design to compensate for 
funding constraints and the topography of Hoopa Valley.  The number of acres that were 
originally to be irrigated  fell from 805 to approximately 625 irrigable acres on 175 
                                                
432Letter, W.M. Reed to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Los Angeles, August 11, 1926. RG 75 
Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 82. NA Washington, D.C. 
433Letter, Clotts to Rastall, Los Angeles, February 28, 1925; Letter, Clotts to Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, Los Angeles, May 7, 1925; Letter, Clotts to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Los Angeles, 
July 15, 1925. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 49. NA, Washington, D.C. 
434Letter, Skiff to Keeley, Hoopa, California, June 22, 1926. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, 
CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 82. NA Washington, D.C. 
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allotments.  The system diverted water from Mill Creek and delivered it to Norton, 
Mesket and Hostler fields on the east side of the Trinity River by pipeline, flume and 
ditch.  Supervising Engineer Herbert Clotts optimistically reported, "[t]he Indians have, 
in the past, utilized such facilities as they could develop themselves to quite good 
advantage, and with the proper start it is believed that they will make a great success of 
this new project."435  
 One year later, however, P.B. Skiff returned to Hoopa Valley to oversee extensive 
repairs on the system.  Flooding during the spring thaw had clogged or destroyed much of 
the system, and a month was required for repairs.  Skiff, in a report on the system 
condition to Herbert Clotts, bitterly complained that the system was not being properly 
used or maintained because the Hupas did not have adequate instruction.436  Furthermore, 
only a few Hupas were using the system to irrigate fields, and they did not want to spend 
more money to repair it.  Chief Engineer W. M. Reed forwarded the report to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and added that all efforts to irrigate the Valley would 
come to nothing if something were not done to bring the system to full use.  Reed stated 
that $45,000 had been spent on the system, but it was too small to justify hiring a full-
time irrigation service employee to maintain the system and it should be, "handled by the 
                                                
435Letter, Skiff to Keeley, Hoopa, California, June 22, 1926. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, 
CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 82. NA Washington, D.C.,Letter, Herbert Clotts to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Los Angeles, June 29, 1926. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 82. NA 
Washington, D.C. 
436Letter, Skiff to Herbert Clotts, Los Angeles, May 24, 1927. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, 
CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 49. NA Washington, D.C. 
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agency. . . .437 
 Problems with maintaining the system continued, however, prompting the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to chastise the Superintendent of Hoopa Valley Agency 
for not looking after the system.438  However, the Hupas use of and need for the irrigation 
system depended in part upon the amount of rain received during the spring.  The Mill 
Creek system was never used to its full potential, and often only watered fields when dry 
conditions arrived late in the growing season.  The Hupas, for good reason, were not 
satisfied with the Irrigation Service project.  While most fields in the Valley were 
irrigable to some degree, the system did not the reach majority of arable land, and 
irrigation farming was a technique in which the Hupas had little experience.439  It was 
easier and cheaper for the Hupas to continue dry farming, a pattern repeated on most 
reservation irrigation projects.440  In 1930, 1,854 acres were under cultivation in the 
                                                
437Letter, Clotts to Commission of Indian Affairs, Los Angeles, June 13, 1927.  Note hand-
written statement by W.M. Reed on bottom of letter.  RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, 
Box 49. NA Washington, D.C. 
438Letter, Commissioner of Indian Affairs to John D. Keeley, Washington, D.C., ?, 1929, RG 75 
Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 10, NA, Washington, D.C.; John Carpenter, a Hupa and 
holder of an irrigated allotment, was construction foreman on the irrigation system and continued to 
maintain the system on an unofficial basis for a short time. Letter, Carpenter to Skiff, Hoopa Valley, June 
9, 1927. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 49. NA Washington, D.C. 
439Commissioner of Indian Affair to John Keeley, 1929, Washington, D.C.? RG 75 Office of 
Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1939, HV, Box 10, NA Washington, D.C.; Minutes, Hoopa Business Council, 
October 5, 1933, and March 5, 1936, Hoopa Valley; Letter, G. Marshall, to William Zimmermann, October 
7, 1933, Hoopa Valley; Memorandum, Herbert Clotts, 1933?. Los Angeles. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs 
CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 4, NA, Washington, D.C; Letter, O.M. Boggess, to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Hoopa Valley, May 23, 1944. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1939, HV, Box 50, 341, 
Part D., NA, Washington, D.C. 




Valley, but only 41 acres were under irrigation.  The total number of acres farmed, and 
the number of acres under irrigation declined even further in 1931, and efforts by agency 
farmers to encourage the Hupas to use more irrigation and diversify crops failed.  By 
1934, only 304 acres were cultivated in all of Hoopa Valley.441 
 The limited use of the Irrigation Service system in Hoopa Valley can partly be 
linked with the general decline in Valley farming during the 1930s.  Markets were always 
marginal for Hupa farmers and the Depression hurt them even more.  Environmentally, 
farming in Hoopa Valley was always challenging, especially without irrigation.  The 
irrigation system built by the Indian Irrigation Service was limited in coverage, and its 
final construction costs - $60 per acre - was almost twice the original estimate.  
Therefore, when irrigation was available to an allotee, the reimbursement costs were 
often prohibitively expensive.442  Some allottees combined their fields to grow crops 
more efficiently, but combining allotments was not always realistic. Non-Indian land 
holding probably influenced farming in the Valley. Finally, the national economic crisis 
of the 1930s drew Hupas away from farming.  
 By 1935, every Hupa on the Reservation was working in some way for the federal 
government.  Some emergency work was directed to the improvement of Valley 
irrigation systems, but farmed acreage did not increase substantially.  The Hupa Business 
Council requested that relief money be spent on the improvement of irrigation in the 
                                                
441David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 109. 
442Janet A. McDonnell, The Dispossession of the American Indian, 80-81. The inability of many 




Valley, but the Irrigation Service did not respond favorably.  Herbert Clotts, Assistant 
Director of the Irrigation Service, stated that money should not be spent to repair or 
improve the existing system because it had been neglected and underutilized since its 
construction.  The Hupas should be able to maintain the system themselves, stated Clotts, 
and any new construction in the Valley should not be undertaken with Public Works 
funds because the remaining streams in the valley were not a reliable source of water, and 
thus could not support a substantial irrigation system.  Clotts concluded, "It would be 
possible but not practicable to pump from the Trinity River," and he did not believe 
"...that there is any irrigation project on this reservation which could be developed to 
advantage with an allotment of Public Work funds."443  Some emergency work on the 
Reservation was directed to irrigation in the during the 1930s, but with little effect.  In 
1938, 226 acres of the 520 under cultivation were irrigated - most farmers were 
producing forage crops.444  The system eventually was abandoned by the Hupas 
themselves.445 
                                                
443Memorandum, Herbet V. Clotts, Los Angeles ?, 1936. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 
1909-1929, HV, Box 4, NA, Washington, D.C. 
444Letter, Commissioner of Indian Affair to John Keeley, 1929, Washington, D.C.? RG 75 Office 
of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1939, HV, Box 10, NA Washington, D.C.; Minutes, Hoopa Business Council, 
October 5, 1933, and March 5, 1936, Hoopa Valley; Letter, G. Marshall, to William Zimmermann, October 
7, 1933, Hoopa Valley; Memorandum, Herbert Clotts, 1933?. Los Angeles. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs 
CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 4, NA, Washington, D.C; Letter, O.M. Boggess, to Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Hoopa Valley, May 23, 1944. RG 75 Office of Indian Affairs, CCF 1909-1939, HV, Box 50, 341, 
Part D., NA, Washington, D.C; David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog, 107-111. 
445During the 1940s, the Hupa Business Council encouraged farming to continue, and abolished 
the position of Agency Farmer in 1943.  The Council created the Hoopa Farm Enterprise to encourage 
farming by making farm loans available, and purchased farm equipment that it intended to rent-out to 
farmers in the Valley.  This program failed within two years, and the Hoopa Farm Enterprise folded in 
1954.  By 1960, the Business Council discontinued tribal expenditures to encourage farming in Hoopa 
Valley, and turned most of its attention elsewhere.  In Hoopa Valley as elsewhere, the irrigation program 
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 The water diversion system built by the federal government was underfunded, 
inadequately planned, poorly maintained, and did not achieve the desired results.  
Although agriculture became a central component of the reservation economy, (it was 
well-established in the Valley at the time the reservation was created) it never assumed 
the place within reservation society that the Office of Indian Affairs hoped it would.  
Instead, the cultivation of crops for human consumption essentially died out (except to 
small garden plots) and was replaced with feed crops.  The system of irrigation ditches, 
which were never adequate to accomplish the goals of the federal government, eventually 
fell into disuse, or were utilized in ways far more limited than envisioned by their early 
proponents. Hoopa Valley shows the Trinity River was not used for irrigation but others 
were looking to the Trinity River as a source of water for projects far outside of the 
Basin.   
 Logging, mining and irrigation – three possible avenues for surviving and 
controlling one’s own destiny, led the Hupas farther away from their pre-contact 
relationship with the Trinity River and the Hoopa Valley.  The sporadic attempts by the 
federal government to “modernize” the Hupa by imposing economic programs upon them 
failed; however, perhaps they were doomed from the beginning.  The federal government 
never funded its own programs adequately, rarely considered conditions on the ground in 
Hoopa Valley (physical, economic, geographic, topographic and cultural), ignored the 
fact that the Hupa could direct their own lives if adequately assisted and left to direct 
themselves.  All three activities discussed herein show that when the Hupa were 
                                                                                                                                            
implemented by the Office of Indian Affairs was a failure., David Rich Lewis, Neither Wolf Nor Dog., 
108-112. For a general discussion on the failure of Indian irrigation, see: Janet A. McDonnell, The 
Dispossession of the American Indian, 85-86.  
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successful, it was on their own initiative, and when they failed, it was usually because the 
federal government reacted to their success and tried to impose its own ideas on what the 
Hupas were doing. Finally, the long delay in allotting the Hupa people led them to act 
conservatively in expending their own labor and resources upon projects on land that 
might be taken away from them at the whim of a bureaucrat sitting in the offices of the 
BIA in Washington D.C.   
 Mining and logging degraded the Trinity River.  As the health of the river 
deteriorated, federal initiatives failed to protect Indian resources to provide an adequate 
alternative to traditional life ways.  By the 1930s, the Hupa were still struggling with the 
consequences of the disruption of their home, life way and culture, yet they were 
willingly stepping into the new world that was coming to them, and they took advantage 
of opportunities as they defined and saw them on their own terms.  They continued 
practicing as much of their traditional life way as possible, but were never reluctant to 
adopt modes of earning a living that would allow them to maintain themselves in their 
valley home.  Developments outside the Trinity River Basin and up-river in the former 
placer mining region would alter the lives of the Hupas in ways which they could not 
predict or control. 
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 Chapter 6 
 Over the Hills and Far Away: the CVP and the Trinity River Basin, 1920-1964 
 By the opening decade of the 20th century, development out the Basin began 
pulling at the resources within the Trinity River region.  Of particular interest was the 
water flowing down the  Trinity River into the Klamath and then to the sea.  California, 
which had been the worlds’ leading gold producing region had, by the 20th century, 
become an agricultural empire with wheat, citrus, nuts, fruits and vegetables growing in 
the rich soils of the Central Valley.  California as a whole does not receive rain in the 
quantities needed for successful dry-farming agriculture during the growing season and 
so farmers began developing irrigation agriculture to ensure successful crops.  By the 
early 20th century, irrigated agriculture had become the backbone of California’s 
agricultural empire, and as more farmlands were opened, more irrigation water was 
needed.  Large irrigation projects, funded by the State and the federal government, 
permitted the continual expansion and evolution of California’s agricultural economic 
sector until the family farm gave way to true agribusiness and the rise of powerful water 
districts who could, through political pressure, sway the debate over public funding of 
huge water diversion projects in their favor.  By the mid-1950s, although most of 
California’s rivers were already dammed and diverted, the Bureau of Reclamation, the 
Army Corps of Engineers, and the State of California began competing for the last viable 
water development projects remaining in the State regardless if those projects were 
needed, wanted, warranted, and economically viable.  Moreover, these huge bureaucratic 
water behemoths moved forward with projects regardless of the advice of their own 
staffers as to the potential for environmental harm.  In the Trinity River Basin best 
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exemplifies this bureaucratic water project feeding frenzy that peaked with the push for, 
and authorization of, construction of the Trinity River Division (TRD) of the Central 
Valley Project (CVP) in 1955.    
 Historically, within the Trinity River Basin, water diversion had been primarily an 
activity carried out by mining and logging companies who diverted water from the 
Trinity River for washing gravels and to fill log ponds.  These activities caused pollution 
and fouled the waters of the Trinity, but most of the water was returned to the Trinity 
River and eventually reached the Pacific Ocean.  There were no attempts to wholly divert 
the waters of the Trinity River and move it to another location.  Rather, the tributary 
streams of the Basin were usually tapped for hydraulic mines and logging operations.  
Water diversion for agricultural purposes was almost non-existent in the Trinity River 
Basin because of a lack of arable land.  Where water was diverted, such as in the Hoopa 
Valley, springs or streams tributary to the Trinity provided the limited amounts of water 
needed for agriculture.  Hoopa Valley contains the largest area of contiguous arable land 
along the Trinity River, but dry-farming was the preferred method of farming and, as we 
have seen, government efforts to build and run an irrigation system failed.446   
 The two factors that eventually lead to the diversion of the Trinity River were the 
development of hydro-electric power in the United States, and the agricultural 
development of the Central Valley.  During the early twentieth century, the proliferation 
of the use of electricity for domestic and industrial purposes created a rising demand for 
                                                
446The federal government, through the Irrigation Division of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, built 
an irrigation system for the Hoopa Valley Reservation in the 1920s.  The system, which was essentially a 
failure, did not draw water from the Trinity River.  Rather, it tapped nearby streams. 
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electricity.  In the Trinity River region, the first producers of hydroelectric power were 
the industrial hydraulic mining companies.  For example, the Cie Fse Hydraulic Mining 
company installed an electric generating system on its property near Junction City.  Using 
its extensive water-conveyance system to power a water-driven electric generator, the Cie 
Fse operated twenty-four hours a day.  As electrical appliances became more common for 
domestic applications in the United States, demand for electricity rose and enterprising 
individuals began to move into the new niche of hydro-electric power production and 
distribution.  Since many mines, such as the Cie Fse, had installed hydro-power systems, 
these properties were the first to be converted to providing electricity for sale.447 
 In 1904, a group of California businessmen purchased the property and all related 
support facilities of the Cie Fse hydraulic mine and opened the first commercial 
hydroelectric power generation facility in the Trinity River Basin.  Located near Junction 
City, the operation was named the North Mountain Power Company.448   The site 
included 1200 acres of land, extensive water rights, ditches, flumes, and siphons 
conveying water from Canyon Creek, and most significantly, an existing electric 
generation system originally used to light the mine for nighttime operation.  The 
company built a powerhouse down river from Junction City on the main stem of the 
Trinity River and began selling electricity to Eureka and other communities on the coast, 
as well as, other customers in the region.  The Hupas were not connected to this early 
                                                
447Jones, Alice Goewn, ed., Trinity County Historic Sites (Weaverville: Trinity County Historical 
Society, 1981), 184. 
448Jones, Alice Goewn, ed., Trinity County Historic Sites (Weaverville: Trinity County Historical 
Society, 1981), 184. 
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power grid.  Rather, they utilized a pelton electric generating wheel set up on Supply 
Creek and so had an unreliable electrical supply while power lines were built nearby.449  
The North Mountain Power Company supplied most of the electricity  in northwestern 
California until the Pacific Gas and Electric Company purchased the North Mountain 
Power Company in 1919.450   
 Soon after the North Mountain began transmitting electricity to Eureka, the 
federal government reacted to the rising demand for hydro-power by withdrawing 
potential water-power sites within the newly created Trinity Forest Reserve (later the 
Trinity National Forest) and other forests throughout California and the West.451  It 
should be noted that the rise in the development of hydro-power coincided with the 
Progressive Movement and a rising awareness of the potential threat to the public interest 
posed by unregulated development of the nations’ natural resources.  To prevent 
speculation and the inevitable inefficiency, inadequate funding and poor planning of most 
private hydroelectric projects, the federal government, through the General Land Office 
and under the guidance of the United States Geological Survey and the United States 
                                                
449For early development of hydroelectric power on the Trinity River and in Northern California, 
see Frederick Hall Fowler, Hydroelectric Power Systems of California and their Extensions Into Oregon 
and Nevada Water Supply Paper #493. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological Survey, 1923. 
450Trinity Journal, March 16, 1907; April 13, 1907; June 1, 1907, April 3, 1908.  See James C. 
Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California (Akron, Ohio: University of Akron Press, 1997), 
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California, see James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 168-267.  Transmitting 
power from remote sites to cities accelerated after the adoption of alternating current allowed electricity to 
be sent over long-distances. 
451The Federal Government regulates of public lands, and so controls the right to charge fees for 
using public resources to produce hydroelectric power.  It also issues permits for structures and 
transmission lines. This precedent was established only after bitter legislative battles.  See Jerome G. 
Kerwin, Federal Water-Power Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1926). 
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Forest Service, identified and withdrew from all entry sites that were potentially suitable 
for reservoirs and hydroelectric power generation along Trinity River and its tributaries.  
It is worth noting that sites designated for power generation on publicly-owned lands 
within the boundaries of the Forest Reserve were withdrawn from development well 
before they were surveyed. 
 The federal government initiated withdrawals not to prevent development of 
power sites, but to prevent a water-power site land rush and the inevitable speculation 
that would surely follow.452  In fact, in the early years of the twentieth century, a frenzy 
of activity that might be termed the "Second Gold Rush" occurred.  Individuals and 
corporations scrambled to claim potential water-power sites throughout California, many 
on public lands, and file for water rights on the rivers and streams flowing through them.  
The best sites, of course, were those where water could be impounded by dams to create a 
high head for producing hydroelectricity, or streams that could be diverted through 
flumes and pipes to a reservoir site where a power facility could be erected.453  
 The Arcata Union reported on January 6, 1912, that under an Executive Order 
dated November 25, 1911, a total of 8,643.65 acres of land along the Trinity River was 
withdrawn from public entry and reserved for water power sites.454  Oddly enough, the 
land withdrawn from public entry included the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation.  The 
                                                
452Before passage of the 1920 Water Power Act, hydropower interests claimed that the 
government retarded hydro-power growth.  Yet during this period, there was more hydropower produced 
than could be used.  This was especially true in California.  See Jerome G. Kerwin, Federal Water-Power 
Legislation, 39-41. 
453James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 168-267. 
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cursory survey which led to the withdrawal noted that a dam could be erected in the 
Trinity River canyon north of Hoopa Valley and then the Reservation could be flooded to 
create one of the largest reservoirs on the northwest coast.455  After the withdrawals were 
made, only then did the government attempt to accurately survey the region for potential 
water-power sites.456  After withdrawing the sites from entry, they were withheld from 
development until a system of fees for usage were devised and agreed upon.  Not until 
1920, after bitter debate over the legality of imposing use fees upon power companies 
operating on public lands ended in the favor of the government, did the federal 
government create the Federal Power Commission through the 1920 Water Power Act.  
This act codified a standardized method for licensing projects for power development on 
public lands in National Forests.457 
                                                                                                                                            
454Arcata Union, January 6, 1912. 
455The Agent at Hoopa Valley encouraged the U.S.G.S. to study possible power sites in Hoopa 
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miles of the Trinity River from its confluence with the Klamath, and the South Fork of the Trinity in 1921.  
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Agencies.  Water Supply Paper 558. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Geological Survey, 1926. 
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study.  Perhaps the best discussion is found in Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: 
The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).  For a 
specific discussion of the battle over leasing fees, see pages 252-256. See also Jerome G. Kerwin, Federal 
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 Although the North Mountain Power Company, and later the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company, provided power in the region, the development of additional hydro-
power sites on the Trinity River was slow.  However, after the 1920 Water Power Act, all 
that changed.458  The importance of the Water Power Act of 1920 to the development of 
rivers in California is demonstrated by the activity along the Trinity River soon after its 
passage.  While the Trinity River Basin was sparsely populated, it was rich in potential 
sites for hydroelectric power.  Once the Water Power Act codified a systematic method 
for permitting and leasing water-power sites on public lands, interest in damming the 
Trinity River for its hydroelectric power increased significantly.  
 In 1921, a year after Congress passed the Water Power Act, the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) began surveying and mapping potential hydroelectric dam 
and reservoir sites on rivers throughout the United States. On the Trinity River, the USGS 
surveyed a total of 31 river miles and identified one site within the survey area at Horse 
Linto Creek suitable for hydroelectric generation.  The next year, the State of California 
began its own investigation of the Trinity River.  The California Power Board surveyed a 
total of 110 river miles from the mouth of the Trinity at Wietchpec to 20 miles above the 
town of Lewiston.  State surveyors identified a total of eight sites on the main stem of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Water-Power Legislation, for the legislative history of the battle over water-power fees. 
458Trinity Journal, December 5, 1914.   In 1914, after building hydro-power projects in the 
northeastern part of the state, the California-Oregon Power Company (COPCO) applied to Trinity County 
for a franchise to produce hydro power on the Trinity River. Sources investigated do not indicate if the 
franchise was granted. For delays in applications caused by uncertainty over permits and fees, see Samuel 
P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920, 
252-256; and James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 245, 329, 418n 12. 
 
276 
river suitable for hydroelectric dams and reservoirs.459   
 While federal and State surveyors investigated the Trinity River, the first and 
most significant proposal for privately developing hydroelectric power on the main stem 
of the Trinity River was reported in the Trinity Journal on October 8, 1921.  W.H. 
Sampson460, a former Tehama County Supervisor, applied to the State Water 
Commission for water rights on the Trinity River and several tributaries for a project to 
produce hydroelectricity.  Soon after the news of the proposal broke, the Trinity Journal 
began a series of reports describing the details of the proposal, including costs, facilities, 
and locations.461  Over the next two years, Sampson continued to refine his plans and 
apply to the appropriate federal, State and county boards for permits needed to build his 
facility. The Trinity Journal reported that project, which would cost an estimated three 
million dollars, would consist of four power houses and numerous dams, and would also 
use existing flumes, reservoirs and ditches formerly owned by the now abandoned 
LaGrange hydraulic mine.  The editors of the Trinity Journal enthusiastically supported 
the project: 
                                                
459Benjamin E. Jones, and Randolph O. Helland, Preliminary Index to River Surveys Made by 
the U.S. Geological Survey and Other Agencies Water Supply Paper #558, Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Geological Survey, 1926. The eight sites identified were: Fairview Dam site: 6 Miles above Lewiston in 
Sec. 10., T. 34 N.,  R. 8 W; Lewiston Dam Site: in Sec 8., T. 33 N., R. 8 W; Steiners Flat Dam Site: in Sec 
34., T 33 N., R. 10 W; Helena Dam Site: in Sec. 32, T. 34 N., R. 11 W; Swede Dam Site: in Sec. 23, T. 5 
N., R. 7 E; Ironside Mountain Dam Site: in Sec. 35, T. 6 N., R. 6 E; Salyer Dam Site: in Sec. 19, T. 6 N., R. 
6 E; Beaver Dam Site: (Hoopa Valley Reservation) five miles above the mouth of the Trinity River in Sec. 
35, T. 9 N., R. 7 E. The California Department of Public Works, Division of Engineering and Irrigation, 
Sacramento, and the State Water Commission of California, Sacramento, compiled information on 
California rivers, water resources, and power sites. 
460The spelling of W. H. Sampson's name is inconsistent throughout the sources consulted. 
Sampson is the spelling adhered to in this essay. 




This project means much to Northern California, and especially to Trinity 
and Shasta counties.  It will, when completed, give an abundance of 
electric energy for lighting and heating and for power in all kinds of 
industries.  It should prove a big impetus to the development of mining 
propositions that cannot now be handled, as it will provide cheap power 
for the operation of machinery.  It should result in the rapid development 
of our timber resources, for with cheaper electric power mills could be 
operated in the forest instead of moving logs long distances, thereby 
eliminating the charges for transporting waste material.462 
 
This glowing assessment of the promising future to be found at the end of electric wires 
is indicative of the problems that plagued sparsely populated and remote Trinity County.  
The region was rich in natural resources, but poor in electricity and adequate roads for 
transportation. The dams and electricity promised by W.H. Sampson would move the 
county into the 20th century. 
   While many within Trinity County supported Sampson, the Humboldt County 
Chamber of Commerce and Jesse B. Mortsolf, Agent at the Hoopa Valley Indian 
Reservation, protested the possible damming and diversion of the Trinity River.  In 1922, 
Mortsolf wrote to the Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs claiming that the project 
proposed by Sampson would seriously injure the inhabitants of Hoopa Valley.  Mortsolf 
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asked for a hearing before the Federal Power Commission to submit his argument against 
Sampson's' project.  Mortsolf found allies within the Humboldt County Chamber of 
Commerce and Tax Payer's Association, but the Assistant Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, E.B. Merritt, instructed Mortsolf to provide specific facts as to why the Sampson 
project should be opposed before an official protest would be forwarded to the FPC.  
Mortsolf replied that the project would harm or prevent salmon spawning, an important 
food source for the Hupa Indians, and also claimed that a diversion of the Trinity River 
would ruin the ability of the Hupa Indians to irrigate their fields.463  Merritt responded 
that Mortsolf was to protest any such diversion on the part of Sampson, and asked the 
FPC to hear BIA concerns about the Sampson project.464 
 O.C. Merill, the executive secretary of the Federal Power Commission, reassured 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that if Sampson were granted rights to water in the 
Trinity River, he would not be allowed to infringe upon any water rights already held by 
the Indians of the Hoopa Valley Reservation.  Merrill also told Agent Mortsolf and the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs that the Federal Power Commission would defer to the 
                                                                                                                                            
462Trinity Journal, May 27, 1922. 
463Letter, Jesse B. Mortsolf, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hoopa Valley, California, 
December 4, 1922; Letter, Mortsolf to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, December 22, 1922. RG 75. 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1909-1939. Box no. 81, NA, Washington, 
D.C.; Letter, Jesse B. Mortsolf to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hoopa Valley, California, December 29, 
1922. RG 75. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Hoopa Valley California, Land Correspondence, 1894-1926, Box 
158. Series 64. File 77-89. San Bruno, NAPS Region.  It should be noted that the irrigation system 
designed for Hoopa Valley did not use water from the Trinity River. 
464Letter, E.B. Merritt, to Jesse B. Mortsolf, Washington, D.C., January 17, 1923; Letter, E.B. 
Merritt, to Jesse B. Mortsolf, Washington, D.C., January 17, 1923. RG 75. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1909-1939. Box no. 81, NA, Washington, D.C.; Letter, E.B. Meritt 
to, O.C. Merrill, Washington, D.C., January 17, 1923. RG 75. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Hoopa Valley 
California, Land Correspondence, 1894-1926, Box 158. Series 64. File 77-89. San Bruno, NASP Region. 
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BIA to inform the FPC of any water rights held by the Hupas.465  Mortsolf consulted the 
Indian Irrigation Service, which at the time was considering the irrigation project within 
Hoopa Valley, asking for information to support his protest.  The Indian Irrigation 
Service apparently could provide little information because its own files were so 
inaccurate and incomplete.  Nevertheless, Herbert V. Clotts, Supervising Engineer of the 
Service, informed Mortsolf that possibly two hundred acres of land within the Hoopa 
Valley were under irrigation, but did not know where the Hupas got the water - directly 
from the Trinity River or from streams in the valley.  Nevertheless, relying upon 
unreliable information, Clotts wrote from his office in Los Angeles that the Sampson 
project would not threaten the water supply needed by the Hupa Indians for their Indian 
Irrigation Service project. Clotts reasoned that because these was so little irrigable land in 
Hoopa Valley that Trinity River had more than enough water to meet the needs of the 
Indians and up-river diverters.466  In early 1923, Mortsolf forwarded this information to 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and at the direction of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, the BIA officially withdrew its objections to the Sampson project.467  
Nevertheless, the BIA and the agents at Hoopa Valley remained watchful over the 
                                                
465Letter, O.C. Merrill, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, January 23, 1917, Washington, D.C. 
RG 75. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1909-1939. Box no. 81, NA, 
Washington, D.C. 
466Letter, Herbert V. Clotts, to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Los Angeles, March 14, 1922, 
RG 75 BIA-California, HVA, Land Correspondence, 1894-1926. Box 158, Series 64. File 77-89. FARC-
PSR, San Bruno, California; Letter, Mortsolf to Herbert V. Clotts, Supervising Engineer, Hoopa Valley, 
February 27, 1923. RG 75 BIA CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box No. 81, NA, Washington, D.C.  In 1944 Agency 
Superintendent O.M. Boggess adhered to the same position regarding Indian water rights and the diversion 
of the Trinity River at Lewiston.  Letter, Boggess to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Eureka, California, 
Mat 23, 1944. RG 75 BIA, CCF 1909-1929, HV, Box 50, File 341, Part D. NA, Washington, D.C. 
467Letter, E.B. Meritt, to Herbert V. Clotts, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1923, RG 75. Bureau of 
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situation developing up-river from the reservation, and as it turned out, for good 
reason.468 
 The enthusiastic support for Sampson's proposal among the general population of 
Trinity County waned rapidly after the true nature and design of Sampson's project was 
released to the general public in February, 1923.  The Trinity Journal reported that 
Sampson's project did not consist of the four power plants and related structures as 
originally reported in the Journal.   Rather, Sampson proposed damming the Trinity 
River and building a power plant to generate electricity. More significantly, and to the 
great surprise of many, the plan also called for the construction of a diversion dam to 
divert 80% of the water of the Trinity River out of Trinity County through a tunnel into 
the Sacramento River drainage basin where it would pass through a powerhouse on Clear 
Creek in Shasta County.  After being used to generate electricity on Clear Creek, the 
water would then be used for irrigation in the Central Valley. Not surprisingly, much of 
the benefit from the arrival of irrigation water in the Sacramento River Basin would go to 
Tehama County, home of W.H. Sampson.469 
 Diverting water out of the Trinity River Basin for use elsewhere was not what 
most citizens of the region had in mind when the Sampson proposal first came to light.  
                                                                                                                                            
Indian Affairs, Central Classified Files, Hoopa Valley, 1909-1939. Box no. 81, NA, Washington, D.C. 
468The BIA continued to remain interested in the possible diversion of the Trinity River, and 
agents Mortsolf and Rastall continued to receive and send correspondence relative to Sampson's proposal 
until it was approved by the FPC in 1925. See, for example, Letter, Eureka Chamber of Commerce to 
Mortsolf, July 24, 1923, Eureka California. RG 75. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Hoopa Valley California, 
Land Correspondence, 1894-1926, Box 158. Series 64. File 77-89. San Bruno, NASP Region; Letter, 
Rastall to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hoopa Valley, January 13, 1925; Memorandum, Federal Power 
Commission, Washington, D.C., January 14, 1925, RG 75. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Central Classified 
Files, Hoopa Valley, 1909-1939. Box no. 81, NA, Washington, D.C. 
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Sampson himself may have known this, and so possibly to avoid opposition to his 
scheme, chose to keep the actual specifications out of the newspaper until he had no 
choice but to reveal them to the public.  The water of the Trinity River was not to be used 
to generate cheap hydroelectricity to benefit Basin residents.  Instead, and from this point 
forward, water interests outside of Trinity County targeted the river for its "surplus" 
water - flood waters and any water not needed within the drainage basin - in hopes of 
exporting it to the thirsty agricultural lands of the Central Valley.  Thus, the Trinity 
River, supporters of the diversion scheme hoped, would forever become tied a larger 
irrigation system outside the Trinity River Basin. 
 In March 1923, just after the Trinity Journal reported on the specifications of 
Sampson’s proposal, a public meeting to discuss the proposal was held in Redding, 
California.  After the meeting the Trinity Journal reported rising opposition to the project 
emerging from as far away as Del Norte County.470 The majority of opposition, however, 
came from within the Klamath and Trinity river basins where residents expressed fear 
that the project would divert most if not all the water of the Trinity River out of the Basin 
thereby depriving Basin residents of water needed for mining, hydroelectricity and 
agriculture.  Residents of Humboldt County opposed the project on the grounds that 
diversion of the Trinity might harm the potential for producing hydroelectricity in that 
county.  Navigation interests opposed the project on the grounds that the diversion might 
destroy navigation at the mouth of the Klamath River near Requa where the water of the 
                                                                                                                                            
469Trinity Journal, March 3, 1923; March 17, 1923. 
470Trinity Journal, March 31, 1923. 
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Trinity River, it was claimed, combined with the water of the Klamath creating enough 
volume to float schooners from Requa inland on the Klamath several miles to the mouth 
of the Klamath.  Moreover, the sandbar at the mouth of the Klamath could not be kept 
open if water flowing out of the river was reduced.    Humboldt County, in response to 
the proposal, appropriated $5000.00 to fight the project, and the Trinity County Board of 
Supervisors issued a formal protest.471 
 In light of Sampson’s application, the Federal Power Commission appointed a 
committee to study the Trinity River in order to determine the feasibility of Sampson’s 
project, and its potential impact. The committee also had broader duties.  It was to 
recommend a policy for the consideration of permit applications and the issuing of 
licenses for hydroelectric power development along the river, while simultaneously 
determining the possibility of diverting the Trinity River to the Sacramento River Basin 
and the Central Valley.472  The committee, which was made up of federal and State 
officials from land and water resource agencies, investigated the water uses of the Trinity 
River Basin, and compiled a basic inventory of the possible hydro-power sites along the 
river. The committee also explored the possibility of diverting the Trinity River into the 
Sacramento River Basin, and the consequences of that diversion for the Trinity River 
                                                
471Trinity Journal, March 31, 1923. Minor protest emerged within Tehama and other counties 
where the arrival of irrigation water from the Trinity River would mean the formation of new irrigation 
districts and additional taxes on property owners. 
472D.C. Henry, U.S. Grant, and W.F. McClure, Report to the Federal Power Commission on the 
Uses of the Trinity River, California. Board of Engineers, Federal Power Commission, San Francisco, 




 The committee physically surveyed the river, interviewed Basin residents, 
compiled flow data, river profiles and hydro-power statistics.  The final report, issued in 
1924, contained several important conclusions.  First, if full use was to be made of the 
Trinity River, large storage reservoirs were essential.  Second, within the Trinity River 
Basin, water demands for irrigation were so small that diversion of the Trinity to the 
Sacramento would not harm local irrigation.  Third, diversion of the Trinity would 
greatly aid in the agricultural development of the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys.  
Fourth, flooding on the Trinity River was not a major threat to Basin residents because 
"of the relative insignificance of agricultural or other interests which can be affected by 
floods."474  Flood control, therefore, was not a reason to build a dam, but a diversion dam 
would help ease the occurrence of floods by removing water from the Basin.  Finally, 
navigation was confined to the Klamath River below the mouth of the Trinity between 
Requa and the Pacific coast.  Diversion might impact the limited navigation on that river, 
but not enough to stop the diversion.  The committee recommended that no permits be 
granted for any use that might interfere with the ultimate diversion of the Trinity River to 
the Sacramento River, and concluded that "the advantages of diversion greatly outweigh 
                                                
473D.C. Henry, U.S. Grant, and W.F. McClure, Report to the Federal Power Commission on the 
Uses of the Trinity River, California. Board of Engineers, Federal Power Commission, San Francisco, 
February 18, 1924., 2-3. 
474D.C. Henry, U.S. Grant, and W.F. McClure, Report to the Federal Power Commission on the 
Uses of the Trinity River, California. Board of Engineers, Federal Power Commission, San Francisco, 
February 18, 1924., 3, 34-35. 
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its disadvantages".475  The report did not address the anadromous fishery of the Trinity 
River. 
 After considering the findings of the report, the FPC disregarded opposition to the 
Sampson proposal and issued preliminary permit #247 to W.H. Sampson and his 
financier, C.D. Hill, to proceed.  The permit included the right to divert Trinity River 
water to the Sacramento River watershed where it would ultimately be used for irrigation 
in Tehama, Glenn, Colusa and Yolo counties.  The final cost estimate for the project was 
$30,000,000.00.  Under the permit, Sampson and his backers were given one and a half 
years to complete all engineering investigations and secure financial arrangements or the 
permit would be revoked.476 
 The permit from the Federal Power Commission was only a first, but an essential, 
step in gaining the additional permits required for the project.  Final approval from the 
Federal Power Commission was contingent upon the project’s actual impact upon other 
possible beneficial uses of the waters of the Trinity River.  The FPC defined beneficial 
uses as navigation, water power, irrigation, flood control and reclamation.  Significantly, 
the FPC did not list anadromous fish habitat or propagation as a beneficial use of the 
water in the Trinity River.477 Opposition to the project within the region, however, did 
not end with the FPC decision.  Most notably, Humboldt County led continued 
                                                
475D.C. Henry, U.S. Grant, and W.F. McClure, Report to the Federal Power Commission on the 
Uses of the Trinity River, California. Board of Engineers, Federal Power Commission, San Francisco, 
February 18, 1924., 3, 35-38. 
476Trinity Journal, January 17, 1925. 
477Trinity Journal, February 25, 1925. While the federally-defined beneficial did not include fish 
 
285 
opposition to the project, and attorneys for the county assured project opponents that if 
necessary, an initiative would be put forth to kill the project by including the Trinity 
River within the Klamath River Fish District.  The Fish District had prohibited new 
construction of river obstructions on the Klamath River in response to the erection of the 
Copco Dam on the upper-Klamath River in 1917 which was already harming the 
anadromous fishery of that river basin.478  The State created the Fish District to mitigate 
the losses of anadromous fish habitat caused by damming, and the proposal for the 
Trinity, opponents claimed, would block salmon from essential spawning grounds.479    
 After the preliminary approval of the Sampson Project, a slew of applications for 
water rights and hydro-power sites arrived at the State Department of Public Works and 
the Federal Power Commission.  Although none of them were on the same ambitious 
scale as the Sampson proposal, the timing of their filing suggests that Sampson's initial 
success may have encouraged others to attempt to tap the waters of the Trinity River 
Basin.480  More likely, however, the numerous permit applications filed on the Trinity 
were related to the larger trend throughout California of a rush unclaimed power sites 
because, as noted earlier, the 1920 Water Power Act created a standardized permit 
process, and a consistent lease and fee policy ended the previous confusion and 
                                                                                                                                            
propagation, many local residents did see using water to ensure fish survival as an important beneficial use. 
478There are today seven dams on the Klamath River system that are considered to be seriously 
harming the anadromous fishery of the Klamath River Basin.  They are; Copco I, Copco II, J.C. Boyle 
Dam, Keno Dam and Link River Dam. 
479Trinity Journal, January 25, 1925. 
480For example, see: Trinity Journal, February 7, 1925; February 14, 1925; March 14, 1925; July 
25, 1925; August 7, 1926; October 2, 1926; November 13, 1926. 
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uncertainty surrounding applications for hydro-power sites on public lands.481 
 While applications for water rights and power sites continued to cross the desks of 
federal and State officials, the State of California, which was responsible for issuing 
water rights permits, cancelled seventeen water-rights applications submitted by Sampson 
because he failed to secure financial backing as per the stipulations in his application for 
diversion.  This failure to meet one of the conditions stipulated by the Federal Power 
Commission was a serious blow to Sampson’s project.482  Another blow to Sampson’s 
project came in 1926 when the State approved four applications for water rights 
submitted by a mining company within Humboldt County in direct conflict with 
Sampson's applications.   The approval of these water rights effectively killed Sampson's 
project.483 For the next year the State continued granting Trinity water rights for potential 
power generation facilities of much smaller scale than Sampson's proposal.484 
 The project first envisioned by W.H. Sampson, however, did not die.  Rather, it 
lingered within the confines of the California State Engineer's office, where, shortly after 
                                                
481Five months after the passage of the Water Power Act, eighty permit applications for power 
sites in California were filed with the Federal Power Commission.  See James C. Williams, Energy and the 
Making of Modern California, 418 note 12. 
482Trinity Journal, June 26, 1926. The state may have cancelled the permits because of its own 
plans for Trinity River water. In 1927 the State filed for water rights on the Trinity River. See Thomas B. 
Waddell, Assistant State Engineer, Division of Water Resources, "The Trinity River Division Project: A 
Statement Presented to the Assembly, California Legislature," April 28, 1955.  Typescript on file at 
California State Library, Government Documents, Sacramento, California. 
483Thomas B. Waddell, Assistant State Engineer, Division of Water Resources, "The Trinity 
River Division Project: A Statement Presented to the Assembly, California Legislature," April 28, 1955.  
Typescript on file at California State Library, Government Documents, Sacramento, California. 
484For example, see Trinity Journal, August 7, 1926; October 2, 1926; November 13, 1926; April 
9, 1927; August 20, 1927. 
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the State cancelled Sampson's applications, a new plan to divert the Trinity River re-
emerged in modified form.  This time the proposed diversion of the Trinity River was 
backed by the State of California as part of a preliminary report issued by State Engineer 
Paul V. Baily outlining a state-wide water conservation project that envisioned numerous 
dams, canals and power generation facilities that would tie several rivers together in a 
large irrigation and power generation network (several aspects of this plan would later be 
included in the Central Valley Project).  The report called for a dam near Fairview on the 
Trinity River where a diversion system could be erected to divert water to the Central 
Valley.  The major difference between the State’s plan and that submitted by Sampson 
was that the new plan called for diverting only the main stem of the Trinity River 
whereas Sampson proposed damming tributary streams as well.485 
 Those in opposition to diverting the Trinity River did not sit on their heels when 
the State announced its proposal. The groups originally opposed to the Sampson proposal 
continued to watch the developments at Fairview.  Nothing could be done, however, until 
the State decided if the project was feasible.  For the next several years the state 
conducted surveys at Fairview to determine if it was the best site for a dam, and also 
explored other potential sites along the Trinity River.  The editor of the Trinity Journal 
summarized nicely the general wait and see situation along the Trinity River during this 
period:  
 
As to diverting the waters of one stream into another, especially such a 
                                                
485Trinity Journal, August 20, 1927. 
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radical divergence as this project calls for, many people have their doubts.  
Trinity, Humboldt and Del Norte counties will always protest.  The project 
is a possibility - but as to whether or not it is a probability remains to be 
seen.  However, it is not dead.  The protesting counties should keep their 
ears open for the rustling of blue prints.486   
 
The project certainly was not dead, and State sent numerous teams of surveyors to the 
Trinity River and its tributaries near the proposed Fairview Dam site for the next several 
years.487   
 State surveys on the Trinity River began in 1925,  and continued for years.  The 
State was concerned with developing the water resources of the northwestern part of the 
state in conjunction with other proposals on the table for developing water resources for 
the Central Valley.  By the end of the 1920s, the California State Engineer’s office had 
compiled a general plan for developing California’s water resources, and the Trinity 
River was part of that plan.  Thomas Waddell, the assistant state engineer, studied several 
alternative plans for diverting the Trinity River.  When Waddell submitted the official 
California State Water Plan to the California State Legislature in 1931, the proposed 
diversion of the Trinity River was included as part of the plan.488  
                                                
486Trinity Journal, March 19, 1927. 
487Trinity Journal, October 2, 1927.  The details of the project outlined in the Journal were very 
similar to the project first proposed by Sampson, and later built by the Bureau of Reclamation. 
488Thomas B. Waddell, Assistant State Engineer, Division of Water Resources, "The Trinity 
River Division Project: A Statement Presented to the Assembly, California Legislature," April 28, 1955.  
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 Prior to the official submission of the California State Water Plan in 1931, a joint 
legislative committee composed of several northern county senators and assemblymen, 
guided by personnel from the Department of Public Works, the Division of Water Rights, 
and State Engineer Edward Hyatt, Jr., toured the Trinity River Basin and northern 
California in October 1927 to review potential dam sites outlined in a Department of 
Public Works water conservation report.  The committee stopped briefly in Weaverville, 
Trinity County Seat.  The Trinity Journal reported that the big question residents of the 
area wanted the committee to answer was the total amount of water that the State 
believed would be diverted from the Trinity River Basin if the project were approved.  
Attempting to answer this question, the editor of the Journal stated: 
 
George C. Mansfield, publicity man for the Department of Public Works 
[who accompanied the committee], is authority for the statement that the 
amount [of water diverted] would be whatever is available after all present 
and future needs of the Trinity valley has been taken care of, allowing the 
river its normal flow.  The flood waters would be stored during the winter 
season, to be released during the summer months for irrigation of lands in 
the Sacramento valley, power being generated as the waters flowed down 
the valley.489 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Typescript on file at California State Library, Government Documents, Sacramento, California. 
489Trinity Journal, October 22, 1927. 
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The editor continued that the cost of construction would be paid for by the sale of 
hydroelectricity produced at the point of diversion and sold by the State.   
 One week after the Journal report, State Senator Hans C. Nelson of Eureka, a 
member of the joint legislative committee, reassured area residents that there was plenty 
of water outside of the Trinity Basin to fulfill the needs of the state's proposed 
conservation project, and that a dam at Fairview was unnecessary and far too costly to 
justify.  Nelson made this reassuring statement, however, before the committee issued 
any formal report on the water situation in northern California.490  Little did Nelson and 
others in the area know that on July 30, 1927, the State of California, through the 
Department of Finance, filed applications for water rights on the Trinity River.  The State 
filed with the California Division of Water Resources to use Trinity River water for 
hydroelectric power, irrigation, domestic uses, navigation, and salinity control in the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys, outside of the Klamath-Trinity Basin.491 
 While the State was moving to secure water rights on the Trinity River, 
hydroelectric power interests continued to submit applications for power projects on the 
Trinity and its tributaries with the State and the Federal Power Commission.492  Although 
the number of applications were fewer than in the first years after Congress created the 
                                                
490Trinity Journal, November 5, 1927. 
491Thomas B. Waddell, "The Trinity River Division Project: A Statement Presented to the 
Assembly, California Legislature", 1. 
492Trinity Journal, January 7, 1928.  The State Engineer’s Office made it’s final survey of the 
Fairview site in May, 1930.  See the Trinity Journal, May 10, 1930.  Soon thereafter, the Assistant State 
Engineer submitted the California State Water Plan to the State Legislature.  See Thomas B. Waddell, “The 
Trinity River Diversion Project: A Statement Presented to the Assembly, California Legislature”. 
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FPC, the continual requests for water rights and project permits created a somewhat 
precarious situation.  Was the State going to build its own project or allow private 
enterprise to tap the river for power and mining purposes? 
 In 1933, the Army Corps of Engineers stepped into the game and issued its own 
survey report on the feasibility of a project to divert water from the Klamath-Trinity 
watershed, and the potential impact of such a scheme.  The Corps' survey was part of a 
larger program designed to inventory the nation’s rivers put forth under the provisions in 
the 1927 Rivers and Harbor’s Act.  The Corps surveyed the river's potential for 
hydroelectric power development, irrigation and other possible uses of the river.  Two 
important missions of the Army Corps of Engineers were to maintain and improve the 
nation's navigable waterways, and to provide flood control.  Thus, the Corps' survey of 
the Klamath-Trinity watershed addressed the possible impact that diversion of the Trinity 
River would have upon any navigable rivers in the Basin.  The Corps determined that 
only the lower forty miles of the Klamath River were navigable, and navigation there was 
limited to logging and light schooner traffic.  The Corps concluded that there was such 
limited commercial navigation on the lower Klamath, there was no need to improve 
navigation on the lower Klamath.  Flood control, moreover, was not needed on the 
Trinity or Klamath Rivers because there were no areas under cultivation or population 
centers susceptible to flood damage.  The most significant finding in the Corps’ study 
was its determination of the most beneficial uses for the waters of the Basin.  The report 
concluded that there were two beneficial uses for the waters of the Trinity and Klamath 
basins.  The first was the production of hydroelectricity.  Numerous sites existed in the 
Basin suitable for erecting dams to generate electricity.  The Corps specifically addressed 
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California's plan to divert the Trinity River as a beneficial use of the region's water 
resources. "Diversion of the upper Trinity River into the Sacramento Valley, as 
contemplated by the California State Water Plan, is considered advisable."493  The survey 
report, however, never mentioned the potential impact of hydroelectric dams and water 
diversion on the anadromous fishery. 
 With the endorsement of the federal government, it would seem that the State 
would only have to secure water rights, permits, and funding to move forward with 
diverting the Trinity River.  It was not until 1938, however, five years after the Corps’ 
acknowledged the feasibility of diverting the Trinity River, that the possibility that the 
Trinity might be diverted to the Central Valley was again brought before the public.  On 
December 22, the Trinity Journal reported that the United States Forest Service issued 
another report on the potential water-power sites along the Trinity River and South Fork 
of the Trinity River.  According to the report, there were at least ten suitable reservoir and 
hydroelectric power sites along the Trinity and its tributaries.494 The report referred to in 
the press was one of several reports emerging from the federal government in its’ on-
going effort to inventory the natural resources of the United States.  This national 
inventory included potential hydroelectric resources as well.495 As for the State of 
                                                
493House  Document No. 181, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, Report on the Klamath River, 
Oregon and California, October, 1933., 16. This is the "308 Report" for the Klamath-Trinity River Basin.  
Quoted in Views and Recommendations of State of California on Proposed Report of the Secretary of the 
Interior on Trinity River Division, Central Valley Project (Ultimate Plan), California, State of California, 
Department of Public Works, April, 1953., 13-14.  See H. Doc. 308. 1st Sess. 69th Cong. 
494Trinity Journal, December 22, 1938. 
495The best source on this issue is, Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: 
The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920. The most significant report affecting the 
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California during the 1930s, the Department of Public Works began quantifying the water 
resources of the State, including the amount of water available in the Klamath-Trinity 
Basin, as part of its effort to determine the amount of water available for development in 
conjunction with the State Water Plan.496 
 As the 1930s drew to a close, and the Second World War loomed on the horizon, 
interest in building a diversion on the Trinity River at Fairview increased.497  American 
entrance into the conflict in December 1941 brought a rising demand for electrical energy 
for war-related  industries.  Particularly power-hungry were the electrochemical, 
aluminum and refining industries.  For those interests hoping for a diversion project on 
the Trinity River at Fairview project, the war brought new optimism.  The main objection 
to the project up to the Second World War was that it would deprive Basin residents of 
“their” water.  Now, with war at their doorsteps, proponents stopped casting the project 
as one that would irrigate the Central valley with the side benefit of producing 
                                                                                                                                            
development of the Trinity and Klamath Rivers is, House Document #181, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
"Report on the Klamath River, Oregon and California", October, 1933.  This report is the "308" report for 
the Trinity and Klamath River which emerged from House Document 308, 69th Congress, 1st Session 
instructing the federal government to estimate the resources and future development potential for rivers in 
the U.S. 
496An outline of federal reports and investigations of the Klamath and Trinity Rivers to 1940 is 
found in L.L. Bryan, Summary of Investigations on Trinity River and Tributaries, California, United States 
Department of the Interior, USGS, March, 1940. RG 57, Records of the Geological Survey, Water and 
Power Branch, Conservation Division, Records Concerning Land and Stream Classification, 1900-1961. D-
100, 11-A-26 to 11-B-5, Entry 384, Box No. 57. NA, Washington, D.C.; For State and federal reports to 
1953, see Views and Recommendations of State of California on Proposed Report of the Secretary of the 
Interior on Trinity River Division, Central Valley Project (Ultimate Plan), California, State of California, 
Department of Public Works, April, 1953. 
497Trinity Journal, March 27, 1941; October 9, 1941; October 30, 1941; November 6, 1941; 
November 27, 1941. The State Water Plan, which included the Trinity River Division, was adopted by the 
California Legislature 1941, and became part of the Water Code of the State of California. See Thomas B. 




hydroelectric power. Rather, supporters of the project changed their approach and 
portrayed the diversion as an essential undertaking for national defense.498 
 The opposition to the project in Trinity County that lingered since Sampson’s 
proposed diverting the river in 1923, suddenly  evaporated in the post-Depression, 
wartime atmosphere of 1941.  On November 4, 1941 the Trinity County Board of 
Supervisors passed a resolution addressed to the United States Secretary of the Interior, 
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation, and the California Department of Public 
Works calling for the immediate authorization and construction of the project.  The 
Supervisors claimed that the project was an essential step to the industrial development of 
Trinity County and of Northern California.  Reviving earlier promises of an electrical 
panacea, the Supervisors claimed that the project would allow Trinity County to "take its 
place in the industrial areas of the west."499   
 A committee composed of prominent individuals from Shasta and Trinity counties 
calling themselves the Shasta-Trinity Committee, organized in Redding, California with 
the purpose of securing the construction of the Trinity River Division.  The group lobbied 
the State of California and the federal government to push through construction of the 
diversion.  State Engineer Edward Wyatt, heading-up California's water conservation 
efforts, urged the federal government to consider building parts of the water plan 
designed by the California Department of Public Works, including the Trinity River 
                                                
498Trinity Journal, March 27, 1941; December 18, 1941. 
499Trinity Journal, November 6, 1941. 
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Division.500 Soon after the United States entered the Second World War, the editor of the 
Journal stated: 
 
A strong possibility that the Trinity River Division project may be soon 
built as a national defense power project was seen recently in a report that 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation already has commenced a study of data on 
the project and will soon have a field survey in operation on the ground 
shortly after January 1.501 
 
 While interest in the project was expressed by the state, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, and many local officials, the development of the Trinity River Division did 
not take place in a vacuum. The history of the Trinity River Division of the Central 
Valley Project began as a project proposed by private interests, but it soon became 
intertwined with water development elsewhere in California.  Thus, if one is to 
understand the eventual success of those supporting the diversion of the Trinity River, it 
is important turn to a general discussion of the creation and implementation of the Central 
Valley Project in order to place the Trinity River Division in a broader context.502 
                                                
500Trinity Journal, November 27, 1941. The exact date of the formation of the Shasta-Trinity 
Committee is not known, but mention of the groups' activity first appears in the Journal on November 27, 
1941.  They are clearly identified on December 18, 1941. 
501Trinity Journal, December 18, 1941. 
502The information for this discussion of the Central Valley Project is drawn mainly from the 
California Water Atlas. 
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 The Central Valley Project (CVP) grew out of the water and flood control needs 
of agricultural interests in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys.  Beginning in the 
late-nineteenth century, the federal government and the State of California initiated flood 
control and reclamation projects throughout the Central Valley.503  With the growth of 
irrigation agriculture in the Central Valley, farmers increasingly over drafted existing 
ground water supplies, and surface waters were inadequate and too unreliable to meet the 
needs of a growing industry.  The rights to these surface waters, moreover, were 
uncertain, confused, and a source of expensive litigation.  In 1919-20, Robert B. 
Marshall, the chief of Hydrography for the United States Geological Survey, released in a 
private publication his idea for a comprehensive state-wide water plan that called for the 
State of California to construct a storage reservoir on the Sacramento River near Redding 
California.  The water stored would be fed into two parallel aqueducts running south, one 
on each side of the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys, to a point near the San Joaquin 
River on the east, and Dos Palos on the west.  The Marshall Plan, as it was called, also 
encompassed additional diversions to feed water from the Sierra Nevada to Los 
Angeles.504 
 Marshall’s proposal was not the first.  Many plans for State participation in 
                                                
503Small groups of private investors and local governments initiated various reclamation and 
flood control schemes with little success. It was up to the State and federal government to plan, fund and 
construct effective projects. For a good discussion of the early attempts at reclamation in the Central 
Valley, see Donald Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California and 
the West, 1850-1931 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Robert Kelley, Battling the Inland 
Sea: American Political Culture, Public Policy, and the Sacramento Valley, 1850-1986 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989). 




building water systems for irrigation, flood control and reclamation within the Central 
Valley emerged during the late nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.  For one reason 
or another, these plans usually remained paper dreams. Generally, failure of these early 
schemes can be attributed to a lack of political and financial support, technological know-
how, poor and unrealistic engineering, inexperience, and the fear of a land and water 
monopoly.505  
 As for the Marshall Plan, it was far too large, complex and expensive to gain 
immediate support from California's public officials.  While the California League of 
Municipalities heartily endorsed the plan, for example, the professional engineers in the 
State were at first slow to warm up to the idea.506  By the 1920s, however, many water-
related issues in California emerged that helped removed obstacles in the way of 
Marshall’s plan.  The need for flood control, hydroelectric power generation, inland 
navigation, irrigation and land reclamation raised public awareness of the importance of 
comprehensive water planning.  The success of the publicly-funded Los Angeles-Owens 
Valley aqueduct, furthermore, proved that extensive, complex water conveyance systems 
were feasible, and of great benefit to urban and agricultural interests.507 
 Therefore, in 1921, the California legislature inaugurated a comprehensive survey 
                                                
505The best study of the emergence of irrigation agriculture within California's Central Valley, 
see Donald Pisani, From the Family Farm to Agribusiness: The Irrigation Crusade in California and the 
West, 1850-1931. 
506California Water Atlas, 47; James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 
254. 
507For an informative discussion about the Los Angeles Aqueduct, see William L. Kahrl, Water 
and Power: The Conflict over Los Angeles’ Water Supply in the Owens Valley (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982).  Also consult, John Walton, Western Times and Water Wars: State, Culture and 
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of the state's water resources to compile exact data on the states' waters and study how 
best to utilize them.508  By initiating these surveys, the legislators tacitly accepted the idea 
of State government participation in water development.  It should be noted that 
Sampson’s request for rights to water in the Trinity River Basin coincided with the 
interest of the State in a comprehensive water development program. 
 It took nearly a decade for the California State Engineer to complete the surveys.  
In 1931 the California State Engineer issued Bulletin #25 encompassing many of the 
most important finding of the State's water inventory activities, and also outlining a series 
of dams, aqueducts, and hydroelectric facilities that, if constructed, would comprise a 
complex system of inter-basin water transfers called the Central Valley Project (the joint 
legislative committee that toured the Trinity River and northern California in 1927 
probably did so in response to early drafts of this report).509   In 1933, during the depths 
of the Great Depression, the California Legislature passed a bill authorizing the funding 
and construction of the Central Valley Project.510   
 The CVP would be the most ambitious, complex, multi-purpose water project in 
history to that time, but the State could not afford the enormous cost.  At first, the State 
turned to the federal government for partial funding of the project.511  Because the initial 
                                                                                                                                            
Rebellion in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
508California Water Atlas, 47. This initial survey expanded into a series of water resource surveys 
conducted over the next ten years. 
509James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 262-263. 
510James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 263. 
511California Water Atlas, 49. 
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Central Valley Project Act as written did not contain preferences for public power, an 
important part of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal agenda, the federal government was 
reluctant to provide funding to the project.  Under pressure for funding, however, 
supporters of the act amended the final version passed in 1933, adding preferences for 
public power to satisfy the Roosevelt Administration which held the purse strings.512  The 
California Legislature envisioned funding the project with bonds purchased by the federal 
government, but because of the Depression and obligations to other projects, the federal 
government did not step up to immediately buy the bonds and the State could not find 
sufficient buyers elsewhere.513    
 In 1935, after two years of bureaucratic wrangling, funding was appropriated by 
the federal government and the responsibility for building the project was handed to the 
Bureau of Reclamation.  Construction on the massive, federally-funded project did not 
begin until 1937, when the Bureau of Reclamation began construction of the first unit of 
the CVP, the Contra Costa Canal.514  Construction of other units of the CVP, including 
the ambitious Shasta Dam, were slowed or delayed because of unforseen re-design, 
engineering difficulties and the outbreak of World War II.  The first sale of hydroelectric 
power from Shasta Dam (the centerpiece of the CVP) did not take place until 1944,515 
                                                
512The Central Valley Project Act came under fire from private utility companies as soon as 
Governor James Rolph signed it.  The governor quickly called a special election to decide a voter 
referendum on the act.  Voters sustained it by a slim margin.  James C. Williams, Energy and the Making 
of Modern California, 263. 
513James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 264. 
514California Water Atlas, 49. 
515In 1942, the War Production Board ordered the Bureau of Reclamation to sell available power 
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and the first delivery of irrigation water from the system did not occur until 1951.516 
 As the CVP neared completion, a political struggle that underlay the entire history 
of the Central Valley project emerged between private agricultural and hydroelectric 
interests, and the federal government. The details of the struggle are complex.  Powerful 
private interest groups pressured the State of California to attempt to regain control of the 
CVP.  The controversy centered on water distribution and hydroelectric power.  Those 
advocating State control believed the federal government had moved too far towards 
public ownership and control of hydroelectric sales and distribution and so were 
competing directly with private enterprise.  Opponents of federal control also struggled 
with the 160 acre limitation provision placed upon those buying water from the Central 
Valley Project and sought exemption from the limitation.  Finally, they wanted the sale of 
electricity to subsidize their costs for irrigation water.517   
 The State could not afford to purchase the CVP from the Bureau of Reclamation, 
and eventually a compromise was reached over the most controversial features of the 
                                                                                                                                            
to Pacific Gas and Electric until project delays were worked out. Thus the first power sold was to a private 
utility, and was not the "official" first sale of power from the project. See California Water Atlas, 49; James 
C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 265-266. 
516California Water Atlas, 49.  The CVP was completed in a piecemeal fashion.  Projects 
deliveries of power and water were initiated at different areas as construction moved forward.  The dates 
cited for the commencement of project deliveries are approximate, and reflect the first water and power 
deliveries from Shasta Dam. 
517The Pacific Gas and Electric Company, The California Chamber of Commerce, the Farm 
Bureau Federation, the Central Valley Association and the Irrigation Districts Association were the most 
vocal in the struggle to wrestle control of the CVP from the federal Government. California Water Atlas, 
49.  The 160 acre limit was part of the initial Reclamation Act of 1902. See also, James C. Williams, 
Energy and the Making of Modern California, 266. 
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Central Valley Project.518  But the struggle of private versus public control of 
hydroelectric power and the distribution of project water remained in the background.  
Nevertheless, the Central Valley Project, although costly and long-delayed, was a 
success.  Irrigation districts took delivery of project water and electricity flowed to 
customers.519   
 The State accepted that the federal government was a necessary presence in 
California’s irrigation and hydroelectric network, but the State Engineer’s Office did not 
give up the idea of taming California’s remaining free-flowing rivers.  Just after World 
War II, the State proposed building a State, rather than federally-owned, water delivery 
and hydroelectric system called the California State Water Project.520 The Bureau of 
Reclamation, at the same time, moved forward with its own ambitious plans for the rivers 
of the State that the Bureau had been in contemplating for several years.  One reason the 
Bureau moved forward with its plans was the post-war era building boom in California 
and the growing demand for water.  The second reason was the presence of the  Army 
Corps of Engineers, which had plans to develop projects in the Central Valley where the 
                                                
518Contesting interests reached agreement over the controversial project features in the so-called 
Wheeling Agreement of 1951. Among other things this agreement gave PG&E a beneficial position in the 
purchase, distribution and sale of CVP power at rates favorable to PG&E.  The benefits envisioned by those 
New Dealers when conceiving the CVP were not to be realized. California Water Atlas, 51. 
519California Water Atlas, 50-52.  
520California Water Atlas, After 1945, Plans for the State Water Project (SWP) did not directly 
involve the Trinity River.  At certain points, however, the SWP and the CVP were merged.  The San Luis 
Unit is jointly owned and operated by the state and federal governments.  It is at this point that the waters 
of the  Trinity River mingle with SWP water and are fed mostly to the Westlands Water District in the San 
Joaquin Valley. In 1945 the California Legislature created the Water Resources Control Board to conduct a 
comprehensive state water resources survey and develop plans to meet future water needs.  Under the 
Division of Water Resources in the Department of Public Works, these activities led to the creation of the 
State Water Project.  In 1956 the Department of Water Resources was created to coordinate all the 
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Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers were navigable, and the State of California's 
announcement that it planned to develop much of the remaining untapped surface water 
in the state.521  Therefore, while the Bureau of Reclamation sought expansion of the 
Central Valley Project partly because there was a need for additional water, it also 
wanted to expand the CVP because the activities of the Army Corps and the State 
threatened Bureau plans for a comprehensive water and hydroelectric power system 
under Bureau supervision.522 
 In 1949, the Bureau of Reclamation released a study outlining its plans for 
constructing an additional thirty eight dams and related hydro-power delivery systems.  
The 1949 Bureau study is significant here because it included plans to dam and divert the 
Trinity River.  The report envisioned a complex and expensive trans-basin water transfer 
and hydroelectric generating system, and called for diverting as much as eighty-eight 
percent of the flow of the Trinity River at Fairview and sending the water to the 
Sacramento River system.  Once diverted to the Sacramento, the water, and by 
implication, most of the Trinity River itself, would be thoroughly integrated into the 
                                                                                                                                            
activities of development in the State Water Plan. 
521After the 1930s the Bureau envisioned a grand interconnected water conservation, transfer and 
distribution system crossing state boundaries in the western united States. Therefore, even before the end of 
World War II the Bureau was exploring new sources of water in California and the west.  The Army Corps 
and the State of California's water schemes threatened those plans. 
522The entry of the state and the Army Corps of Engineers into the development of California's 
water resources was in part a response to the conflict over the Bureau's 160 acre limitation and the state's 
failure to purchase the CVP. In 1944 the Federal Flood Control Act authorized the entry of the Army Corps 
of Engineers into California's Central Valley watershed under the umbrella of flood control. California 
Water Atlas, 50. 
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Central Valley Project.523  
 The history of State and federal activity within the Trinity River region leading to 
the construction of the Trinity River Division (TRD) reveals the ambiguity of the need 
for the project.  In a larger context, and perhaps of more import, the project is indicative 
of the wider trends of Bureau activity in the post-war West where large-scale multi-
purpose water projects were pushed forward on the backs of promises of enormous future 
benefits, while the downside of the projects were glossed-over or ignored.524   
 Plans to divert the Trinity River first came to light in 1923.  With some 
alterations, the basic configuration of the diversion system when it was finally authorized 
closely followed the initial design put forth in the California State Water Plan of 1931, 
which was the precursor of the Central Valley Project.525  During the 1930s, when the 
CVP was being handed-off to the federal government, the basic design of the Trinity 
River Division of the CVP was in place, but was not included as part of the Central 
Valley Project.  The State, as we have seen, possibly adapted the idea from W.H. 
Sampson's initial concept, and adapted it to the State Water Plan of 1931.  Instead of 
including the Trinity River Diversion in the CVP, the project remained part of the State 
                                                
523California Water Atlas, 53. 
524Development of the Trinity River Division in post-World War California was advocated 
primarily by Clair Engle who tied its authorization to a bill in Congress authorizing funding for the 
construction of the Sacramento Valleys (San Luis) Canals Unit.  California Water Atlas, 53; See also, 
Trinity River Flow Evaluation: Final Report U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., June 1999, 
1. 
525Trinity River Flow Evaluation: Final Report U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, 
D.C., June 1999, 5. The Federal Power Commission tacitly endorsed diversion of the Trinity River as early 
as 1924. See D.C. Henrey, U.S. Grant, and W.F. McClure, Report to the Federal Power Commission on the 
Uses of the Trinity River, California. 
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Water Plan.  There, the idea of diverting the Trinity languished until 1945, when a report 
to the California State Legislature stating that the idea would be bad for residents and 
businesses within the Klamath-Trinity watershed, the State removed the diversion from 
the State Water Plan.  There was enough opposition by Basin residents to trans-basin 
water transfers that the state declined to build the project.  Nevertheless, removal of the 
diversion from the State Plan did not stop the project, it only prevented the State from 
building it.  After 1945, the Bureau of Reclamation, which had been seriously studying 
the feasibility and features of the diversion as the next logical step in the expansion of the 
Central Valley Project, set about pushing for its construction.526    
 In 1942, during the initial involvement of the U.S. in World War II, engineers 
from the Bureau of Reclamation visited the Trinity River Basin and studied the river.  
The Trinity Journal reported that electrical power for the war effort was the main impetus 
behind the renewed interest in the project, but the possibility of diverting water to 
irrigation in the Central Valley was not left aside.  The editor of the Journal stated: 
 
The Trinity Project has been proposed as an emergency means of 
developing a large block of power for war production, in the event 
                                                
526The Trinity River Division was included in the 1931 State Water Plan adopted into the 
California State Water Code in 1941.  It was dropped in 1945 by the State Legislature after a study 
conducted by the State showed that diversion was not in the best interest of the Basin. See Thomas B. 
Waddell, "The Trinity River Division Project: A Statement Presented to the Assembly, California 
Legislature", 1-2; Joint Committee on  Rivers and Flood Control, Proposed Klamath and Trinity Diversions 
and Other Projects in the Central Valley, Report to the California Legislature, 56th Session, September, 
1945; See also "Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 
123, To Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Trinity River 
Development, Central Valley Project, California, Under Federal Reclamation Laws." April 16, 1954, 
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additional sources of hydro-electric energy are needed to supplant the 
power output to come from Shasta Dam and Keswick Dam of the Central 
Valley Project.  It is also contemplated that the additional water supply 
available in the Trinity River eventually will be needed in the Central 
Valley.527 
 R. S. Calland, District Engineer for the Bureau of Reclamation, reassured Basin 
residents who were nervous about the projects' potential for taking too much water from 
the Basin, that Bureau's plans for the Trinity River called for determining all the present 
and future in-Basin water needs.  After quantifying the needs of the Basin, the amount of 
water available for diversion would be known.  Only water available beyond the amount 
needed by the Basin would be diverted into the Central Valley.  The Journal editor 
reported, "Plans call for the use only of waste water and preliminary surveys have 
convinced engineers that this waste water is sufficient to mark the Trinity River as 
exceptional in the state as a source of new power".528  Waste water was essentially any 
water not needed by humans ignoring the needs of anadromous fishes and those peoples 
and businesses benefitting from a healthy fishery. 
 Publicly, therefore, 1942 was an important year for the Trinity River.  Although 
as yet the diversion was still part of the State Water Plan, the Bureau of Reclamation was 
                                                                                                                                            
Redding, California. Serial No. 20. United States Government Printing Office, 1954, 26-27. 
527Trinity Journal, March 19, 1942.  Among the engineers to visit in 1942 was C. W. 
Burningham, an important official that previously worked on the Grand Coulee Dam. 
528Trinity Journal, March 19, 1942. 
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committed to the project and began taking concrete steps to realize its construction.529  
The basic intent of the project, the production of hydro-electric power, and more 
importantly, irrigation water for the Central Valley, was clearly established.  Bureau of 
Reclamation engineers (and State engineers before them) favored a design that consisted 
of two dams and a hydro-electric plants in-Basin on the Trinity River, and a diversion 
tunnel beginning at the proposed diversion dam at Fairview to convey water through the 
mountains dividing the Trinity from the Sacramento River basins with plants for 
producing hydroelectricity at the convenient points along the diversion system.  This 
basic design scheme became the basis for all future study and discussion of the project. 
 The technological know-how for building the TRD was well in hand by 1942.  
The Bureau had built or was building other, more ambitious impoundment structures, 
such as Boulder (Hoover) Dam, Grand Coulee Dam and Bonneville Dam.  The major 
challenge for Bureau engineers was to define the amount of water that could be diverted 
to the Central Valley while maintaining enough water to satisfy in-Basin needs.  The key 
was the definition of the terms "waste" and "surplus" water.  These were interchangeable 
concepts bandied about by project proponents to convince their opponents that the water 
diverted was essentially useless if left in place.  The Bureau viewed water as a 
commodity, and defined water as "surplus" or "waste" when it was not used in the Basin, 
but instead simply flowed to the Pacific Ocean where is was wasted.  The Bureau had 
two important tasks.  First, it had to determine the amount of present and future water 
                                                
529The Bureau of Reclamation began studying the strata at the proposed dam site in 1942 even 
though the project was still part of the State Water Plan. See:  Trinity Journal, January 8, 1942; March 19, 
1942; July  23, 1942; August 19, 1943; July 6, 1944; March 1, 1945. 
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needs in the Basin.  Second, it had to quantify the precise amount of water available in 
the Basin, and subtract present and future in-Basin needs to come up with the number of 
acre-feet that could safely be diverted to the Central Valley.  Knowing these numbers 
would allow the Bureau to predict the amount of surplus water Central Valley 
agricultural interests could expect to get from the project, and the amount of electrical 
power the project could produce.  Knowing these numbers would also allow engineers to 
come up with the precise design and costs of the project.  The Bureau of Reclamation had 
experience building many structures on other rivers throughout the nation, but on the 
Trinity River, the previous experience of Bureau engineers and hydrologists was less 
valuable because of the basic physical and behavioral characteristics of the Trinity River. 
 The Bureau had to determine the average amount of run-off in the Trinity River, 
including flood waters, over time.  But in the Trinity Basin, targeting flood water as a 
source for diversion water was problematic because of the physical nature of the river.  
The Trinity River acts more like a mountain stream than a low-land slow-flowing river.  
Freshets, occur soon after precipitation events and can occur any time of the year.  The 
region usually receives heavy rainfall from October to February - the rainy season - when 
up to eighty inches of rain can fall in some areas.  This rain falls upon high, steep 
mountains that can, depending on the season, have significant snow pack that will melt 
with the rain, causing a quick run-off and rapid flooding and a tremendous rise in river 
levels.  Floods on the Trinity are, therefore, unpredictable, and the amount of water 
running out of the Basin varies tremendously year to year.  While an "average" might be 
calculated, there was no way to compile completely reliable flow-data statistics because 
of the extremes in run-off levels.  Moreover, flow data records for the Trinity based upon 
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stream gauges dated only to 1910, and those responsibly for reading the gauges gathered 
the inconsistently and not in the same areas year after year.  The Bureau came to the 
Trinity River with experience on projects where floods and the amount of water they 
brought were somewhat more predictable.  Usually floods on the Sacramento, Colorado 
and Columbia come gradually in spring and early summer with thawing in the mountains. 
The Trinity River was so isolated that available data was spotty, and an understanding of 
the river’s behavior incomplete.   Therefore, predicting an "average" flow on the Trinity 
was problematic, if not sheer guess-work.530  Because of the unpredictability of run-off 
levels, and the variation in total yearly precipitation amounts, large storage reservoirs 
were essential and became a necessary centerpiece of the proposed diversion. 
  A second task for Bureau engineers was to calculate in-Basin present and future 
water needs.  Once the Bureau of Reclamation had these statistics in hand, they could 
calculate the amount of surplus or waste water available to the project for diversion by 
subtracting from the overall Basin supply the known amount needed for real human uses 
and theoretical amount for future human uses, and subtracting the latter numbers from the 
former.  The Bureau of Reclamation found that there were few large water users in the 
region.  The Trinity River Basin had very little irrigated agriculture (the Hoopa Valley 
had the most arable land in the region, but agriculture there was not dependent upon the 
Trinity River for water) and few diversions of water from the Trinity or its tributaries 
except for diversions for mining and lumber milling.  It is significant that the latter two 
                                                
530In 1924 the Federal Power Commission recognized the wide variation in Trinity River flow 
levels, and used this extreme to justify the need for large storage reservoirs. See D.C. Henry, U.S. Grant, 
and W.F. McClure, Report to the Federal Power Commission on the Uses of the Trinity River, California. 
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industries returned water to the river after use - thus the bureau did not considered them 
water "consumers," but rather, only water users.  Navigation, another use considered, was 
of little concern because it was confined to the lower Klamath River (of which the Trinity 
is the main tributary) where limited commercial navigation took place.  The most 
significant difference between the study undertaken by the Bureau of Reclamation and 
other agencies that studied the river was that the Bureau was forced to address the water 
needs of anadromous fishes on the Trinity.  By the 1940s, when the Bureau began 
compiling data on the river, sport fishing had become a major regional industry with 
resorts throughout the Basin catering to salmon and steelhead fishermen.  Resort owners, 
chambers of commerce, and sportsmen’s organizations pressured the Bureau to determine 
the amount of water needed to protect the fishery before building the project.  The Bureau 
turned to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to study the question the amount of water 
needed to sustain anadromous fishes, primarily salmon and steelhead, was unknown.531 
 Meanwhile, Trinity County established a County Planning Commission to study 
the potential impacts of the project on the county, and to gather more technical 
information.  Throughout the early 1940s, after the Bureau of Reclamation expressed 
interest in the project, there was little general local support for a diversion, but the Trinity 
County Planning Commission reserved its decision on the project until it could compile 
                                                
531Calculating the amount of water needed to protect the Trinity River fishery was advocated by 
resort owners and sport fisherman.  Native Americans were not well represented in the debate surrounding 
the project. For the results of the USFWS study of the fishery, see James W. Moffett and Stanford H. 
Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery Resources of the Trinity River, California: Special 
Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12. United States Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Washington, D.C., February, 1950. 
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all available data.532  By 1945, the year the State of California removed the Trinity 
diversion from its State Plan, The Bureau of Reclamation and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service were busy studying different aspects of the diversion to determine project 
impacts and, by implication, the amount of water available for diversion.  Those agencies 
shared information to avoid duplication of effort and create a more thorough study.   
 On August 20 1948, C. William Burningham, Bureau of Reclamation Engineer in 
charge of the initial investigation of the TRD, appeared before a meeting of anxious 
Trinity County residents and assured them that the project was feasible, but that its 
construction, which he estimated would take four years, depended upon defense needs 
and the wishes of Basin residents.  The project benefits, according to Burningham, would 
be power generation (with plenty of power available to Trinity County), enough irrigation 
water to service 750,000 acres in the Central Valley, potential local recreational 
opportunities, and most importantly, jobs.  Burningham also assured residents that the 
project leave enough water in the river to maintain salmon and steelhead runs, and other 
wildlife.533 
 Despite this positive endorsement by Burningham, the project remained 
unapproved and was temporarily deactivated in 1948 by the Bureau of Reclamation for a 
                                                
532On February 23, 1945 a meeting was held by the Army Corps of Engineers in Eureka, 
California to discuss diverting the Trinity River.  The Trinity Journal reported that there was general 
opposition to the project from commercial and sport fishing interests, lumber interests, and "Indian 
reservations."   Trinity Journal, March 1, 1945. Transcriptions of this meeting have not been located and 
opponents of the project have not been clearly identified.  
533Trinity Journal, March 22, 1945; June 28, 1945; August 28, 1948.  By June, 1945, all agencies 
except the Fish and Wildlife Service had submitted preliminary reports to the Bureau of Reclamation.  The 
USFWS submitted its report in 1950, and so one must question the information upon which Burningham 
based his statements in 1948. 
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lack of funding.  One year later, in 1949, state Senator E. J. Regan of Trinity County 
introduced a bill in the California State Legislature to have the Trinity River project 
restored to the State Water plan where the state could construct the diversion on its own.  
Regan's actions caused fighting among representatives and senators from Humboldt, 
Siskiyou and Shasta counties who succeeded in tabling the proposed legislation.  
Opposition emerged over appropriating water from the Trinity to the Sacramento 
drainage basin, because Shasta and Siskiyou counties wanted Trinity River water for 
irrigation and domestic purposes.  State Senator Irving T. Quinn of Humboldt County, 
who had remained consistently against diversion, continued to oppose the project 
insisting that the water remain where it was.534 
 Matters remained there until early 1950 when the Bureau of Reclamation claimed 
that increasing demand for water and electricity in the Central Valley made the project a 
necessity and it was reactivated.  Noting a recent visit to the Trinity River by Richard L. 
Boke, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, the editor of the Trinity 
Journal stated that "In view of the very rapidly increasing demands for water and power 
in the Central Valley...the Bureau of Reclamation has recently reactivated its studies of 
the Trinity River Division".  Citing the usual benefits associated with the project such as 
in-Basin hydroelectricity and recreation, the Journal reported for the first time that the 
project would also help control flooding: 
Preliminary studies by the Bureau of Reclamation engineers indicated that 
with adequate reservoir storage at the Trinity dam site near the old 
                                                
534Trinity Journal, April 28, 1949. 
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Fairview mine, the high winter flood flows of the Trinity River can be re-
regulated to provide adequate flows for all future uses of the basin as well 
as making it possible to divert substantial quantities of water to the 
Sacramento valley.535 
 
 The editor also revealed for the first time another argument that would be 
embraced by project proponents for the remainder of the effort to build the diversion - 
that the Trinity River Division would actually help the anadromous fishes of the Trinity 
River: 
 
It would be possible to increase the extremely low [summer] flows of the 
Trinity River [with an impoundment] to the advantage of fish life as well 
as controlling the high water flows which cause flood damages along the 
Trinity River.  Flood flows which are destructive to property and 
structures along the river are also said to be highly detrimental to the 
anadromous and sport fish.536   
 
 In a final statement, possibly calculated to defuse the sport and commercial 
fishing interests opposed to the project, the editor included in his comments on the 
                                                
535Trinity Journal, June 29, 1950. 
536Trinity Journal, June 29, 1950. 
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project that with the assistance of the Fish and wildlife Service, "the Bureau of 
Reclamation has developed a method of operating the proposed Trinity River reservoir to 
provide water for the protection and propagation of fish life in the Trinity River."537  In 
reality, the Fish and Wildlife Service had no single method for preserving the 
anadromous fishery because there was only a limited understanding of the impact of 
water diversions and high dams upon anadromous fishes.538 
 Throughout 1950, the numerous public meetings held concerning the possible 
diversion of the Trinity River revealed that the concerns of residents were less important 
to the Bureau of Reclamation and other proponents of the project than residents had been 
led to believe.  At a meeting in Lewiston, Marshall Jones, planning engineer for the 
Bureau of Reclamation, ominously informed residents that there was no block of power 
reserved for Trinity County and no guarantees that power from the project would go to 
Trinity County unless transmission lines were built privately.  Jones told the fifty or so 
attendees that the water remaining for the Trinity River after diversion would be 100 to 
300 fps, enough, he said, for recreation and to maintain fish and wildlife.  In fact, Jones 
stated that the cooler in-river water summer water temperatures created by releases of 
reservoir water would actually be beneficial to fish reflecting a flawed understanding of 
                                                
537Trinity Journal, June 29, 1950.  The editor was basing his statements upon the report released 
by the Fish and Wildlife in February 1950. The report did not contain any single proposed method for 
protecting the Trinity River fishery, rather, it offered several scenarios that might be used by the Bureau of 
Reclamation to maintain fish life.  But these scenarios were only suggestive and were based upon 
incomplete data. See James W. Moffett and Stanford H. Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery 
Resources of the Trinity River, California: Special Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12. United States 
Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., February, 1950. 
538James W. Moffett and Stanford H. Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery Resources 
of the Trinity River, California: Special Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12. United States Department of 
the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., February, 1950. 
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the complex needs of anadromous fishes.539   
 After the meeting at Lewiston, the general tone in the Trinity River region 
regarding the project was one of concern.  Adding to the anxiousness of residents, at a 
meeting in October 1950, Congressman Clair Engle, a strong supporter of the project, 
informed residents that they had better express their views on the project forcefully and 
soon, because he believed the project's construction to be a done deal.  Engle, obviously 
catering to his constituency, stated that he believed the views of Trinitarians should 
determine if the project were built or not, but he predicted the diversion would be built 
regardless of what the residents of Trinity County thought about it.  Therefore, Engle 
urged residents to form a committee to gather information concerning what residents of 
the region would like to see in the final legislation before Congress authorized the 
project.540  
 Engle's warning and encouragement reveals that public opinion in Trinity County 
was not well-organized.  A lack of organization concerning the project might be 
explained in several ways.  First, the region itself was isolated and remote.  Population 
concentration was in small communities clustered along the banks of the Trinity River 
and its tributaries, in isolated valleys, and along important transportation routes.  Second, 
residents may have been complacent, considering the diversion project had been 
discussed for almost thirty years with little evidence that it would ever be built.  Finally, 
                                                
539Trinity Journal, September 14, 1950. Again, Jones is referring to statistics presented in the 
1950 USFWS report.  Jones' statement of 150 to 300 fps reveals the fact that the quantity needed for fish 
was not clearly known. 
540Trinity Journal, October 19, 1950. 
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those holding elective office and other county officials in Trinity County generally 
supported the project hoping for economic development.  Trinity County did not share in 
the prosperity of post-war economic boom and a major water project offered economic 
benefits.  Nevertheless, there was no consensus of opinion, and many residents opposed 
it.541  
 Northern Californians listened to Engle's warning. Throughout the remainder of 
1950 and into 1951, meetings of representatives from all northern counties affected by 
the proposed diversion met to form the Trinity Research Committee.542  Throughout the 
region, citizens and public officials expressed opinions, pro and con.  Arguments that the 
diversion was as good as done prompted the opinion that residents should act to ensure a 
block of power for Trinity County.  Others, particularly former state senator Irwin J. 
Quinn of Humboldt County, argued that proof be shown that there was an actual need in 
the Central Valley for the waters of the Trinity River before the project was authorized.  
Meanwhile, Edwin J. Regan, representative from Trinity County, urged an investigation 
of the legal status of water rights.  His concern centered upon whether the county where 
                                                
541The residents of Trinity Center were split on the diversion because the reservoir created by the 
project would inundate their homes requiring them to move their entire community.  Humboldt County 
representatives were consistently skeptical about the project. Trinity Journal, January 31, 1952. 
542This was one of several short-lived committees formed during the years preceding the project.  
For a brief review of the groups formed, their membership, and their lack of unity, see "Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 123, To Authorize the Secretary of the 
Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Trinity River Development, Central Valley Project, 
California, Under Federal Reclamation Laws." April 16, 1954, Redding, California. Serial No. 20. United 
States Government Printing Office, 1954., 21-24. 
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the source of water was located had any legal right to it or not.543  
 Perhaps indicative of the current climate of opinion in Trinity County as of 1951, 
thirty four residents of Trinity Center, a town up-river from the project that would be 
inundated by the reservoir created behind the Trinity Dam, informally voted on the 
project.  The majority, twenty eight, voted to support the project because of its potential 
economic benefits.  The main benefit they saw was the potential for increased business 
related to recreation and rising property values.  Of main concern was that the Bureau of 
Reclamation, when it built a new Trinity Center, would guarantee adequate homes, roads, 
and infrastructure to replace that lost to the project.544  
 The most vocal opposition at this time came mostly from Humboldt County.  
Former State Senator Irving T. Quinn, remained steadfast in his opposition to the project, 
and was supported by Trinitarians that also opposed the project.  For example, Elmer K. 
McDonald, also of Trinity Center, and a former Trinity County Supervisor, staunchly 
opposed the project on several points, and threw his support behind Quinn's camp. In a 
letter to Representative Clair Engle, McDonald pointed out that the project's supposed 
benefits were false.  He claimed that the diversion would destroy fish and wildlife habitat 
above the dam and ruin anadromous fish runs. Furthermore, the diversion, because of its 
placement high in the Trinity watershed, would not reduce flooding as promised. 
McDonald also claimed that the Bureau of Reclamation had failed to outline specific 
                                                
543Trinity Journal, November 2, 1950; November 23, 1950; January 18, 1951; May 24, 1952; 
July 19, 1951.  The Committee consisted of representatives from Humboldt, Del Norte, Trinity and Shasta 
counties. 
544Trinity Journal, December 6, 1951; December 13, 1951. 
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plans for residents of Trinity Center, and those resident's concerns were not given 
adequate consideration.  Finally, the former County Supervisor warned that if the water 
was diverted to the Central Valley, Trinity County would someday find itself in need of 
the water taken by the project, but with no way of getting the water back.545  
 Early in 1952, Congressman Engle presented draft legislation for the Trinity River 
Division to the public for comment.546 Engle warned that the legislation was going 
forward and time for public comment was at hand.  Within Trinity County, strong 
organized opposition to the plan never materialized.  Rather than outright opposition, 
groups such as the Northern Trinity Sportsman Association, the Trinity County Planning 
Commission, the Trinity County Board of Supervisors, the Weaverville Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Trinity River Research Committee wanted to ensure that their 
interests would be protected within the legislation sponsored by Engle, including a block 
of hydroelectric power reserved for the county.547  These groups did not argue that the 
project should not be built, but rather they were concerned about the spoils of the project 
and its impact on the river.  
 It was organizations outside of Trinity County that made the most important, 
albeit ineffective, stand against the project.  Responding to Engle's draft legislation, 
                                                
545Trinity Journal, January 31, 1952.  Other opinions against the project can be found in the 
Trinity Journal, February 14, 1952. 
546Trinity Journal, December 13, 1951; January 3, 1952; January 10, 1952. 
547Trinity Journal, February 7, 1952. The Trinity River Research Committee, made up of 
members of four counties, could not agree on the project. Only the Shasta and Trinity counties members 
met, said Armon Heffington, the committee member from Trinity County, and they only met in Trinity 
County. See Trinity Journal, February 14, 1952. 
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several opponents spoke during a public meeting at Weaverville in February, 1952. 
Indicative of such opposition were groups such as the Klamath River Development 
Association, which feared that a diversion would stymie industrial development in the 
region, or the Siskiyou Farm Bureau, who wanted the water for local interests.  These 
groups were most concerned about the lack of a comprehensive regional study of in-
Basin water needs.  With inadequate information, how could the effects of the project 
clearly be understood?  The Outdoor Writer's Association of America and the Associated 
Sportsmen of California, meanwhile, feared that the diversion would destroy one of 
California's best trout and salmon fishing streams.548 
 The general opinion reported by the local press during this period was that the 
majority of Trinitarians supported the diversion, but were concerned over specifics.  
Representative Engle, for his part, assured residents that they would have significant 
input regarding the contents of any legislation that he introduced to Congress.549  In fact, 
Engle reassured Trinitarians at a February 1952 meeting in Weaverville that he would 
withdraw his bill to Congress during "any stage of its enactment, if the people of Trinity 
County were not satisfied with its provisions."  It is significant to note that Engle 
informed the audience that he regarded the Trinity County Board of Supervisors to be 
"the legislative spokesman for this county."  This meant that the views of the Board of 
Supervisors was the view Engle would accept as representative of the entire county, 
which would have important consequences at a later date.  Answering residents’ concerns 
                                                
548Trinity Journal, February 14, 1952. 
549Trinity Journal, February 14, 1952; February 28, 1952. 
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that too much water would leave the Basin if the project went forward, Engle stated that 
he did not believe that "one bucketful of water necessary to this [Trinity River] 
watershed" would be diverted, and as for destruction of salmon runs, "The argument that 
[the diversion] will ruin fishing is absolute nonsense".550 Engle made his statement well 
before the completion of any comprehensive study addressing in-Basin water needs and 
local impacts of the diversion had been completed.551 
 In April, 1952, Engle introduced a bill to Congress asking for authorization of the 
Trinity River Division of the Central Valley Project.  In response, the California State 
Assembly passed a resolution asking Congress not to authorize the project until further 
studies were made on the project impact and deliveries.552  Regardless of local opposition 
or arguments over water deliveries, there was a real possibility that the project would be 
approved and constructed without Trinity County support and over any objections.  Clair 
Engle reminded his constituency of this fact when he stated in May, 1952 that the 
American River Dam, another large component of the Central Valley Project, was being 
built without any final authorizations for water deliveries.  Too much wrangling over 
where the water for that project would go created the situation on the American River, 
claimed the congressman, and he hoped that "we don't lose the Trinity project that 
                                                
550Trinity Journal, February 28, 1952. 
551For a brief discussion of the call for river surveys see Trinity Journal, April 23, 1952; May 22, 
1952. 
552Trinity Journal, April 3, 1952. 
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way."553 In fact, on May 6, 1952, the Bureau of Reclamation presented to the State of 
California a preliminary report on its proposal to build the Trinity River Project.  The 
Bureau sought comments and recommendations.  The report contained all the features 
that the Bureau would later build, therefore those supporting and opposing the diversion 
clearly knew the major physical specifications of the project by May, 1952.554  
 During the first half of 1952, potential water users in the Central Valley expressed 
growing interest in the Trinity River Diversion project.  At meetings in Trinity County, 
representatives of the Central Valley began to appear with increasing regularity.555  
Agricultural interests in the San Joaquin Valley would benefit most from water deliveries 
and so it was natural that they would push for the project.556  Trinitarians who expressed 
opinions about local water going to the Central Valley generally resented San Joaquin 
farmers, and questioned the logic of sending Trinity River water, at essentially subsidized 
government prices, to Central Valley farms.  Clair Engle stated that there was "no logical 
reason" for the water to be "going to the San Joaquin valley," but also claimed that just 
because farmers in the Central Valley would receive subsidized water taken from the 
Trinity River was "no reason to block a good project" for Trinity County.  When offering 
                                                
553Trinity Journal, May 22, 1952. 
554Thomas B. Waddell, "The Trinity River Division Project: A Statement Presented to the 
Assembly, California Legislature", 2. What was not known was the exact amount of water to be diverted 
and the impact of the project on the Trinity River fishery. Furthermore, in 1955, the Bureau revised its 
plans, increasing the reservoir behind Trinity Dam from 1,800,00 acre feet to 2,500,000 acre feet. 
555Trinity Journal, May 22, 1952; June 12, 1952. 
556Trinity Journal, May 22, 1952; June 12, 1952. In June of 1952, the Sacramento Valley 
Irrigation Committee sponsored a meeting in Trinity County to organize county and regional supporters in 
their effort to gain state and federal approval for the project. 
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his assessment of project deliverables, Engle stated that water for the Sacramento valley 
was in short supply.  In fact, the congressman asserted that because of over-commitment 
and over-subscription, the valley was short by an incredible 800,000 acre feet.557 
 From 1952, when Engle (the bill’s main sponsor) began gathering public opinion 
on his legislation, until 1955, the proposed diversion of the Trinity River moved forward 
on paper within government circles.  At the request and urging of Humboldt County, in 
1952 the Bureau of Reclamation belatedly began a river survey of the specific water 
needs in the Klamath-Trinity Basin.  Division of Water Resources of the State of 
California also began a belated study of water needs in the region.  Potential water users 
in the Central Valley resisted these new surveys, stating that additional surveys would 
delay construction of the diversion.  The Bureau apparently had enough information to 
move forward with basic project planning before these reports were ready for review 
because it carried-out planning for the project well before these reports were ready for 
review.558 
 A growing concern among people interested in the project within and outside of 
the Trinity River Basin was the question of the impact the proposed diversion would have 
on the fish and wildlife of the region.559  In 1950, the United States Fish and Wildlife 
                                                
557Trinity Journal, May 22, 1952. 
558Trinity Journal, July 24, 1952. The Trinity River Division Project was approved before these 
reports were available for review. See Natural Resources of Northwestern California: Preliminary Report, 
United States Department of the Interior, Pacific Southwest Field Committee, 1956; see also, Klamath 
River Basin Investigation, Bulletin No. 83, State of California Department of Water Resources, Division of 
Resources Planning, Sacramento, May, 1960. 
559In 1944, O.M. Boggess, agent at Hoopa Valley Reservation, wrote the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to express his belief that the Indians of Hoopa Valley Reservation "would be seriously injured by 
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Service issued a study on the Trinity River fishery as part of the overall effort to gather 
data on the river.  The report, while far from comprehensive, provided basic information 
for discussion among interested parties.560  The Wildlife Service stated that the study 
results were not conclusive because continuous data collection had occurred for only two 
years because of wartime interruptions. The authors, moreover, issued a disclaimer 
stating that the study was "an interim report with most findings and conclusions subject 
to possible revision pending further investigational findings."561 The Wildlife Service was 
faced with the reality that the science of anadromous fisheries was still in its infancy. 
 The authors of the report concluded that the proposed diversion at Fairview would 
cut-off 50% of the spawning grounds for King Salmon and an unknown, but larger 
percentage, for steelhead.  The authors did not claim that the diversion would destroy the 
fishery, but concluded that it would be necessary to initiate measures to mitigate the loss 
of spawning habitat.  The authors offered three possible solutions.  First, additional 
spawning grounds could be created by increasing the proposed flow of the Trinity River 
below the dam while fish were spawning. Second, additional spawning grounds could be 
built within existing streams below the proposed dam site.  Finally, the construction of a 
                                                                                                                                            
any reduction in available fish."  However, because the diversion was a federal project, Boggess refused to 
oppose it publicly unless the Indian Service was convinced the diversion would damage Indian holdings.  
Letter, Boggess to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Eureka, California, May 23, 1944. RG 75 BIA, CCF 
1909-1929, HV, Box 50, File 341, Part D. NA, Washington, D.C. 
560James W. Moffett and Stanford H. Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery Resources 
of the Trinity River, California: Special Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12. United States Department of 
the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., February, 1950.  This study is the result of 
investigations that began in 1942, however, the study was interrupted for a number of years making its 
conclusions suspect. 
561James W. Moffett and Stanford H. Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery Resources 
of the Trinity River, California: Special Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12. United States Department of 
the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., February, 1950, 1. 
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fish hatchery to artificially propagate anadromous fishes and maintain populations within 
the Trinity River was another possibility.  One or a combination of these approaches, 
suggested the authors, might satisfactorily maintain the anadromous fish population 
within the Trinity River.562  
 The most significant aspect of the report is the conclusion that the amount of 
water needed below the proposed diversion to maintain an acceptable number of natural 
nesting sites for anadromous fishes was only 150 fps.  It is important to note that this 
conclusion was based upon the author's assumption that the median flow of the Trinity 
River was 150 fps, and that the salmon population was at its maximum density during the 
period when the biologists made their survey.  Perhaps of even greater significance, as 
will be seen, is that project legislation embraced that quantity of water as an acceptable 
level of release for the project, although it was clearly based upon incomplete data.563   
 While the Bureau of Reclamation and the State undertook their belated surveys of 
the water needs of the region and the impacts of the diversion, political maneuvering 
                                                
562James W. Moffett and Stanford H. Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery Resources 
of the Trinity River, California: Special Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12. United States Department of 
the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., February, 1950., 57. 
563James W. Moffett and Stanford H. Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery Resources 
of the Trinity River, California: Special Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12. United States Department of 
the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., February, 1950., 51-65.  This number is 
significant because it is derived from limited and incomplete information.  Flow data for the Trinity River 
was gathered sporadically and reported in USGS Water Supply Papers, and federal and state reports.  The 
data was limited temporally and geographically.  The oldest flow data dated from 1910, but consistent 
yearly recording was not initiated until the 1930s. The activities of the USGS were part of a larger effort to 
quantify and classify the rivers of the United States.  See Steponas Kolupaila, "Early History of 
Hydrometry in the United States," American Society of Civil Engineers: Journal of the Hydraulics 
Division, 86(January 1960), 1-52. Fish counts were also limited because they were based upon limited 
physical observations by air, and commercial catch statistics from 1916 to 1943.  See L.L. Bryan, Summary 
of Investigations on Trinity River and Tributaries, California, 4-5. 
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surrounding the project continued.564  In 1953, just before leaving office, Secretary of the 
Interior Oscar Chapman presented the Trinity River Project to Congress and President 
Harry Truman with a finding of feasibility, thereby circumventing the need for 
congressional authorization of the project.  This action made the diversion, officially 
called the Trinity River Division, a part of the Central Valley Project.565 Chapman's act 
did not authorize funding, which still depended upon congressional action, but the 
secretary's action caused consternation among project opponents, particularly in 
community of Eureka where Chapman's move was officially condemned by the 
Humboldt County Board of Supervisors as "premature".566 Chapman's action was not 
unusual, considering that he had authorized two other components of the CVP in the 
same way, which was within his power to do, yet the California Department of Public 
Works had yet to submit its comments, views and recommendations regarding the 
proposal.567 
 As the project neared reality, local political lines hardened.  At a meeting in the 
                                                
564Views and Recommendations of State of California on Proposed Report of the Secretary of the 
Interior on Trinity River Division, Central Valley Project (Ultimate Plan), California, State of California, 
Department of Public Works, April, 1953; The reports that emerged from this activity are Natural 
Resources of Northwestern California: Preliminary Report, United States Department of the Interior, 
Pacific Southwest Field Committee, 1956; Klamath River Basin Investigation, Bulletin No. 83, State of 
California Department of Water Resources, Division of Resources Planning, Sacramento, May, 1960. 
565See Trinity River Division, Central Valley Project (Ultimate Plan) California. House 
Document 53, 83d Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C., 1953, III-IX. 
566Trinity Journal, January 8, 1953. 
567Trinity Journal, January 15, 1953.  The State's comments are found in Views and 
Recommendations of State of California on Proposed Report of the Secretary of the Interior on Trinity 
River Division, Central Valley Project (Ultimate Plan), California, State of California, Department of 
Public Works, April, 1953. 
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Trinity County courthouse in January 1953, residents and interest groups offered opinions 
both pro and con in response to Chapman's feasibility determination and the handling of 
the project in general, reflecting a split among residents over the project.  Prior to the 
January meeting, the Trinity County Board of Supervisors had unanimously endorsed the 
project in 1952, even when many residents objected.  For example, in District #4, along 
the lower Trinity River, a petition to the Board of Supervisors demonstrated that of 133 
residents who signed the petition, only four supported the project.  Nevertheless, their 
supervisor endorsed the project.568 
 The January 1953 meeting at the Trinity County Courthouse brought 52 residents 
to Weaverville.  The meeting is important because of the voiced opposition, and the final 
show of hands.  Among the arguments put forth by residents opposed to the project were 
that those benefitting hoped that the project would bring jobs, increased profits for 
business and increased property values.  One angry resident opposing the dam 
proclaimed that Trinity County was being "exploited for the benefit of everybody but 
Trinity County".  Another resident called for a county-wide vote to determine public 
opinion, and was told by Armon Heffington, Chairman of the Trinity River Development 
Committee, that "there was no time to do it now," because Trinity County "committed 
itself some time ago to go along with the diversion".  Heffington then added, that by the 
county, he was referring to the Trinity County Board of Supervisors.  In response, an 
angry resident asked Heffington, "Then why ask for protests [referring to the solicitation 
                                                
568Trinity Journal, October 23, 1952; January 8, 1953; January 15, 1953. The unanimous 
endorsement was taken by Clair Engle to mean that Trinity County residents supported the project, thus 
Engle did not withdraw his bill as he said he would if the county was not behind it. For Engle's statement, 
see Trinity Journal, February 28, 1952. There was no county-wide vote on the project. 
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of opinions pro and con] if the project is already approved?".  Heffington stated that the 
meeting was held merely to gauge sentiment on the project and Engle's proposed 
legislation. When asked to show hands for and against the project, favorable response 
dominated by 46 to 6.569 There is no record of where these people resided within Trinity 
County, but the overall favorable vote suggests they were up-river residents where the 
project would generate income.  Nevertheless, while many residents remained divided 
over the project, Trinity County officials supported the diversion, and Congressman 
Engle looked to them as representing the opinion of Trinity County.   
 In April 1953, after hearing arguments for and against the project, California 
Governor Earl Warren endorsed the Trinity River Division of the Central Valley Project, 
and sent word of his support to the Secretary of the Interior.  The project now had to pass 
through the Department of the Interior (under a new Secretary) and Congress before 
construction could begin.570  Warren's endorsement removed a substantial roadblock by 
transferring state-held water rights to the federal government.571 
 Governor Warren’s endorsement went to Washington in 1953 at the same time 
that the California Department of Public Works issued its views and recommendations 
concerning the project to the Department of the Interior.  Public Works found the project 
                                                
569Trinity Journal, January 15, 1953. The strongest opposition to the diversion emerged down 
river from the project along the lower Trinity and in Humboldt County where residents were more 
dependent upon water remaining in the river. 
570Trinity Journal, April 16, 1953. 
571The State of California granted the water rights it held on the Trinity River to the Bureau of 
Reclamation for the Trinity River Division.  The Bureau also had to apply for additional water rights.  
Trinity Journal, March 20, 1958.  
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to be feasible from an engineering standpoint and recommended that the project be 
constructed at the earliest possible date.  The Department of Public Works did, however, 
question the construction cost estimates, stating that they were possibly too low.  Also, 
the report called for changes in the scheduled release of water from the proposed dam to 
sustain fish in the Trinity River.  While the State concluded that the amount of water 
scheduled for release was adequate, the timing for releases was not appropriate and 
should be adjusted.572   
 Significantly, the Public Works report also contained comments from other State 
agencies on the feasibility and potential impact of the Trinity Division.  The report 
contained a glaring condemnation of the project from Seth Gordon, Director of the 
California Department of Fish and Game. Written in 1952, Gordon's report expressed 
serious reservations about the potential harm of the project.  Also, project proponents' 
claims that fish life would actually increase in the Trinity River because flood control 
provided by the Trinity Diversion, was over optimistic if not false.  Gordon claimed that 
38% of king salmon spawning grounds, and 75% of steelhead spawning grounds would 
be eliminated by construction of the TRD.  Bureau of Reclamation claims that the loss of 
habitat would be made-up for by flood control was based upon the assumption that floods 
washed away spawning gravels and this would no longer be a problem with the after the 
TRD went on line.  Gordon countered this assertion by stating that flushing gravels was a 
                                                
572House Document No. 147, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, "Views and Recommendations 
of State of California on Proposed Report of the Secretary of the Interior on Trinity River Division, Central 
Valley Project (Ultimate Plan), California" United States Government Printing Office, 1953,  29, 32. This 
report contains a summary review of previous reports on the Trinity River, and is critical of the conclusions 




beneficial function of floods, and that controlled flows might cause spawning beds to 
become compacted, creating additional loss of spawning sites.  Gordon concluded his 
report by recommending that if the project were built, there should be larger water 
releases from the TRD into the Trinity River, new pollution ordinances aimed at stopping 
dredge and hydraulic mining in the region, and the construction of counting fences and 
spawning facilities to aid in artificial propagation of salmon and steelhead.573 Despite 
Gordon's reservations, the Director of Public Works endorsed the project and it moved 
forward.574 
    In January 1954, the Eisenhower Administration allotted $100,000 in its budget to 
begin preliminary construction planning for the Trinity River Division, initiating the 
process that would eventually lead to funding and approval.575  Battle lines over the 
project hardened, and two camps emerged.  Among those supporting the Trinity River 
Division included officials of Trinity and now Shasta counties, and farmers from the 
Westlands Water District of the San Joaquin Valley.  Opposition forces included officials 
of Humboldt and Del Norte counties located downstream from Trinity County who had 
important interests in recreational and commercial fishing.  There are no sources showing 
the number of voters supporting or opposing the project, but evidence indicates the 
                                                
573House Document No. 147, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, "Views and Recommendations 
of State of California on Proposed Report of the Secretary of the Interior on Trinity River Division, Central 
Valley Project (Ultimate Plan), California" United States Government Printing Office, 1953, 74-81. 
574House Document No. 147, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 1953, "Views and Recommendations 
of State of California on Proposed Report of the Secretary of the Interior on Trinity River Division, Central 
Valley Project (Ultimate Plan), California" United States Government Printing Office, 1953, 1-2. 
575Trinity Journal, January 28, 1954.  The $100,000 appropriation was deleted from the 1954 
budget, then restored in April, 1954.  See Trinity Journal, April 8, 1954. 
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people remained divided with downstream residents generally opposed upstream 
residents.  In March 1954, at a meeting of the Trinity River Committee of the Redding 
Chamber of Commerce in Shasta County, local project proponents headed by Armon 
Heffington of Trinity County, invited representatives of the San Joaquin valley to join 
them in pushing to secure the Trinity River Division.  The Westlands Water District had 
emerged as the main subscriber to the water to be made available by the Trinity River 
Division, and the San Luis Project, a component of the Central Valley Project designed to 
divert water to Westlands, was to purchase Trinity River water thereby making the 
Trinity River Division financially feasible.576 
 Jack W. Rodner, the Manager of the Westlands Water District in the San Joaquin 
Valley, and Executive Secretary of the California Committee for the Trinity River 
Development, assured those concerned about Westlands taking too much Trinity River 
water, that "As desperate as our needs are in the west San Joaquin Valley, we do not want 
to take a drop of water from the Trinity River until all the water that can be beneficially 
used in the Trinity and Sacramento areas is definitely reserved for them".  Rodner 
continued by stating that the project could provide everyone with the water they needed: 
 
Studies show that the Trinity River will produce enough water when it is 
regulated and partially diverted into the Sacramento River, to provide a 
steady and sufficient supply to Trinity, Shasta and Tehema counties, firm 
                                                
576Trinity Journal, March 25, 1954. As with other Bureau of Reclamation Projects, ideally, 
project beneficiaries were to pay for the cost of construction through water and power purchases. 
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up the water supply to the Sacramento River area, and take care of initial 
development of the San Luis Project in the San Joaquin Valley, with 
surplus still running into the ocean.577 
 
 Soon after this meeting, a new group formed in Fresno, California to begin a 
concerted lobbying effort for the project.  The lobbying group called itself "Californians 
for Trinity-Sacramento-San Luis", and as its name suggests, was composed of individuals 
supporting the Trinity River Division, the Sacramento Canals Unit and San Luis Canal of 
the Central Valley Project.  Armon Heffington of Weaverville, a strong supporter of the 
project and in constant contact with Congressman Clair Engle, was appointed to act as 
president of the new committee.  The group’s goal was to argue its case before a 
Congressional subcommittee during a hearing scheduled to be held in Redding in April, 
1954.  Those who opposed the project, including the Humboldt County Chamber of 
Commerce and officials from Del Norte County, also planned to attend the meeting to 
argue their case.578 
 By 1954, however, the Trinity River Division had been wedded to the 
simultaneous approval and construction of the Sacramento Canals Unit and San Luis 
Project in the Central Valley making it a project of much wider significance.  The 
Sacramento Canals Unit and the San Luis Project were the proposed irrigation water 
delivery systems for the west Sacramento Valley and for the Westlands Water District of 
                                                
577Trinity Journal, March 25, 1954. 
578Trinity Journal, April 8, 1954; April 15, 1954. 
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the San Joaquin valley.  Trinity River water would have to make its way to the fields via 
these canal and pumping systems, and so interested parties combined forces to argue for 
their authorization and funding directly to congressmen at Redding and later in 
Washington, D.C.579  Armon Heffington of Trinity County stated that the goal of his 
group was to stress to the congressmen that they, the Trinity group, were willing "to have 
surplus Trinity water used where it was so badly needed in the Sacramento and San 
Joaquin areas," and to call for a revision of the proposed legislation.  Heffington wanted 
to insure an adequate supply of water for Trinity County's present and future needs, and 
thus clearly "determine the amount of water available elsewhere."580 
 The meeting of the Congressional subcommittee in Redding was well attended by 
parties on both sides of the issue.  Numerous opinions were put forth supporting the 
project.  Many individuals from Trinity County offered their support on the condition that 
the Bureau of Reclamation guarantee an adequate supply of water for the county.  The 
owner of the Trinity Alps Resort, Bob Delaney, urged support for purely economic 
reasons.  Stating that the project would be good for business, Delaney argued that the 
project would benefit tourism and protect fish life because the dam would be a "benefit to 
fishing by the stabilization of the river flow at the mean level thereby protecting fish 
life."  The manager of the Westlands Water District, Jack Rodner, urged authorization, 
explaining that the combined projects were needed to protect 400,000 acres of farm land 
                                                
579Members of the congressional subcommittee at Redding included Clair Engle, William H. 
Harrison of Wyoming, Oakly Hunter of California, A.L. Miller of Nebraska, Earnest Wharton of New 
York, Ken Regan of Texas and Wayne Aspinall of Colorado. Miller was Chairman of the House 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.  Trinity Journal, April 15, 1954. 
580Trinity Journal, April 15, 1954. 
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in need of water.  Rodner also reminded the subcommittee that ground water in the San 
Joaquin valley was being over drafted at a rate nearly four times faster than it could be 
replaced.581 
 Opposition to the project came, predictably enough, from Del Norte and 
Humboldt counties where, it was feared, economic development would be limited 
because of water being taken by the Central Valley.  As it had proposed at earlier 
meetings, Del Norte County again asked that "a complete and thorough survey of the 
water needs of the coast counties" be undertaken before the project was approved.  State 
Senator A. W. Way urged the subcommittee to exhaust all the water supply that remained 
available within the Central Valley before reaching over the mountains and taking the 
Trinity River.  The Chairman of the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors, Milton 
Huber, offered to end his county's opposition by stating, "if our needs are met, we will 
not have any opposition".582 
 For the first time during the process of debating the advisability of the project, 
representatives of the Hupa and Yurok tribes attended the meeting in Redding and 
offered their opinion on the project.  Like Del Norte and Humboldt Counties,  tribal 
representatives called for additional survey of regional resources before the project went 
forward.  The Yurok representative, Princess Lowana Brantner, expressed concern over 
                                                
581Trinity Journal, April 22, 1954. 
582Trinity Journal, April 22, 1954.. Transcripts of testimony are available in "Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 123, To Authorize the Secretary of the 
Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Trinity River Development, Central Valley Project, 
California, Under Federal Reclamation Laws." April 16, 1954, Redding, California. Serial No. 20. United 
States Government Printing Office, 1954. 
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the impact of the project on spawning salmon, and the ability to float logs on the of lower 
Klamath River if too much water was diverted.  The Yuroks were heavily involved in the 
forest industry, and also relied spiritually, physically and economically upon the 
predictable return Salmon each season.  Brantner feared that if the logging companies 
shut-down, many Yuroks would be out of work.  Robert Lake, representing the Hupa 
Tribe, asked for completion of additional surveys because he had not seen any of the 
surveys completed to that time and wanted additional information.  Lake, however, 
offered no opinion on the possible impact of the project on tribal resources.583  
 The Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation, Clyde Spence, countered 
the opposition by offering his opinion that only a small amount of the water in the Trinity 
River above the Lewiston Dam site was needed within the Basin. Also, said Spence, the 
Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys were short of "developed" water supplies, and 
remaining resources in the Central Valley were economically impractical to develop.584 
The Bureau of Reclamation was firmly behind the project, and considered it a necessity if 
all the water demands in California were to be met.585   
 After the congressional subcommittee meeting, the project continued to move 
                                                
583"Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 
123, To Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Trinity River 
Development, Central Valley Project, California, Under Federal Reclamation Laws." April 16, 1954, 
Redding, California. Serial No. 20. United States Government Printing Office, 1954. 
584Trinity Journal, April 22, 1954. 
585Trinity Journal, June 17, 1954; See also "Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and 
Reclamation of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Third 
Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 123, To Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Construct, Operate, 
and Maintain the Trinity River Development, Central Valley Project, California, Under Federal 
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forward.  In October, 1954, a timber survey was conducted on the proposed reservoir 
sites on the Trinity River to expedite timber clearance once the project was approved.586  
In December 1954, the Trinity Journal reported that Clair Engle would introduce his final 
legislation for project authorization to Congress early in 1955.587  Nevertheless, political 
wrangling and battles continued because until Congress authorized the project and the 
Bureau finalized the design, many questions remained as to just how the project would 
operate.  The question of distribution of the hydroelectric power produced by the TRD 
was of central concern to the Pacific Gas and Electric Company which offered to build 
and operate distribution systems thereby creating a public-private partnership.588  Another 
important issue was the state's own water project to develop the Feather River.  
Proponents of the Feather River Project (FRP) wanted to wed it to the Trinity River 
Division making the entire system a state project.589 
 In January 1955, Engle introduced his bill to Congress asking for authorization of 
the Trinity River Division. Prior to its introduction, Armon Heffington asked the Trinity 
                                                                                                                                            
Reclamation Laws." 
586Trinity Journal, October 28, 1954. 
587Trinity Journal, December 30, 1954. 
588Trinity Journal., December 30, 1954; March 3, 1955; March 17, 1955; April 7, 1955; April 14, 
1955; April 28, 1955; May 5, 1955; May 19, 1955.  The issue was not settled before the legislation was 
approved.  Within the authorization there was a stipulation to continue negotiations with PG&E over 
project power facilities and deliveries. Congress rejected having PG&E build the generation and 
transmission facilities in partnership with the Bureau of Reclamation. Trinity Journal, May 2, 1957; August 
22, 1957; July 23, 1959; August 13, 1959. 
589Trinity Journal, February 17, 1955; March 3, 1955; April 14, 1955; May 5, 1955. The proposal 
caused a controversy over building the San Luis Unit and the Feather River Project.  Fear of overlapping 
facilities and controversy over water deliveries, power deliveries, and state-federal ownership were also 
part of the problem arising from this proposal. 
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County Board of Supervisors to give their endorsement to the bill. Heffington explained 
that the bill to be introduced to Congress was similar to earlier drafts, but it did not 
specify the rate of flow, in other words, the amount of water discharged, to be left in the 
Trinity River below the diversion dam. Instead, the amount of water released from the 
dam would be left to the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior.590  The rate of 
discharge was a main concern of Trinity County residents.  Upon hearing that the Engle 
Bill did not contain specific numbers for the rate of flow, the board asked that the bill 
include a stipulation that guaranteed a minimum of at least 150 feet per second release be 
maintained below the dam to maintain fish life.  Engle agreed to incorporate this 
stipulation into his bill, and the Trinity County Board of Supervisors then gave their 
qualified endorsement to the legislation.591 
 The minimum flow guarantee set-off a controversy over just how much water was 
needed to sustain fish life in the Trinity River.  Because the design of the diversion could 
not accommodate a fish ladder for salmon and steelhead, and the construction of the dam 
would cut-off access to a major portion of the spawning beds for salmon, the amount of 
water needed in the river below the dam was crucial and hotly debated.  Soon after the 
Board of Supervisors gave their approval, Weaverville residents circulated a petition 
asking for a minimum of 221 fps based upon the available data gathered by the United 
                                                
590Trinity Journal, January 6, 1955. 
591Trinity Journal, January 6, 1955. Concerned citizens circulated a petition asking for 221 fps to 
be the minimum flow below the dam.  The Trinity Journal reported that 221 fps represented the mean flow 
of the Trinity River. See also, Trinity Journal, January 13, 1955. 
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States Fish and Wildlife Service.592 The petition stated that available flow survey data 
was extremely limited, and the data that did exist suggested a greater flow than 150 fps 
was needed to maintain fish life.593  Nevertheless, the final bill sent to Congress asked 
only for the minimum 120 fps, or the amount needed to maintain fish life below the dam 
as determined by the Secretary of the Interior.  
 Throughout 1955, Congressional committee hearings on the proposed legislation 
introduced by Clair Engle continued in Congress.594  Within California, controversy over 
the construction and operation of the Trinity River Division, the San Luis and 
Sacramento Canal projects and the state's own Feather River Project had erupted within 
the State Legislature.  The conflict threatened to undermine the authorization of the 
Trinity River Division and related projects.  But the controversy ended when the 
California Legislature called for immediate construction of the Trinity Division and San 
Luis projects, setting aside its decision on the future integration of those projects with the 
state's own Feather River Project.595   
                                                
592Trinity Journal, January 6, 1955; January 13, 1955. 
593The figure of 220 fps may be inferred from the 1950 report by the USFWS.  Yet the authors 
specifically claim that, under certain conditions, a minimum of 150 fps could provide enough water to 
maintain a viable salmon fishery in the spawning area left below the TRD, while satisfying water users in 
the Central Valley.  See James W. Moffett and Stanford H. Smith, Biological Investigations of the Fishery 
Resources of the Trinity River, California: Special Scientific Report - Fisheries, No 12., 51-65. 
594See "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation of the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Fourth Congress, First Session, on H.R. 
4663, To Authorize the Secretary of the Interior to Construct, Operate, and Maintain the Trinity River 
Division, Central Valley Project, California, Under Federal Reclamation Laws." April 13, 14, 15, 1955; 
July 14, 1955.  United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1955. 
595Trinity Journal, May 5, 1955; May 26, 1955; June 16, 1955.  California ended its opposition to 
federal construction and ownership of the San Luis Canal Unit.  The California Senate then unanimously 
approved the federal construction of the TRD and San Luis project, calling for later consideration of 
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 The state's endorsement cleared the last roadblock for the Trinity River 
Division.596  In June 1955, Congress passed Public Law 84-386 authorizing the Trinity 
River Division (TRD) of the Central Valley Project, and President Dwight Eisenhower 
signed the bill shortly thereafter.  Under stipulations in the act, a minimum of 120 fps, or 
that amount needed to preserve fish life, was to be released from the dam to the Trinity 
River.  The bill provided $1,000,000 to begin surveys and preliminary construction 
activities at the dam site, which began almost immediately.  Additional funding was 
authorized as the project progressed.  The Bureau of Reclamation refined the design of, 
and built the TRD between 1955 and 1964. The project as eventually built closely 
resembled the preliminary specifications released by the Bureau in 1952.597 
 
                                                                                                                                            
integrating the FRP into the San Luis and Trinity River projects. In September, 1957, the State Department 
of Water Resources assigned water and storage rights it held on the Trinity to the Bureau of Reclamation. 
See Trinity Journal, September 19, 1957. 
596The State of California continued surveys for its State Water Plan after the approval of the 
Trinity River Division.  In 1956, the state began exploration drilling on potential dam sites at Burnt Ranch 
and Helena on the Trinity River, and at Hyampom on the South Fork of the Trinity River. Trinity Journal, 
December 6, 1956. 




The site of the Trinity Dam ca. 1956.  The site is under preparation for the start of construction.  Trees are 
being stripped from the reservoir site, and gravel is being removed to expose the bedrock of the Trinity 
River to secure the foundation of the earthen-fill dam.  This dam cut-off 50-75% of salmon spawning 
habitat in the Trinity.  Eastman photo postcard.  ca.  1956.  Authors’ personal collection. 
 
 Ironically, on November 10, 1955, several months after the project was approved, 
the Trinity Journal reported that the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the 
California Department of Fish and Game announced that in 1956 they would begin 
detailed studies of the salmon and steelhead of the Trinity River to determine the possible 
effects of the Trinity Dam on their runs.598  In the meantime, legislation authorizing the 
project stipulated that the Bureau of Reclamation construct fish rearing facilities below 
Lewiston Diversion Dam for the propagation of fish life.599  
 It was not until 1960, five years after the authorization of the Trinity Division, the 
California Department of Water Resources, issued a study on the present and future 
potential development of the Klamath River Basin.  Opponents of the Trinity Division 
had called for such a study throughout the 1950s, but the study was completed far too late 
to affect the decision to build the project.  The report was essentially a survey of regional 
natural resources, 20th century land use, and the potential future commercial and 
                                                                                                                                            
Final Report U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., June 1999, 1. 
598Trinity Journal, August 4, 1955; September 1, 1955; November 10, 1955. The report produced 
was published in 1956.  See A Plan for the Protection of Fish and Wildlife Resources Affected by the 
Trinity River Division, Central Valley Project. California Department of Fish and Game, and the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service, Sacramento California, 1956. 
599During construction of the Trinity Dam a fish weir (trap) and a hatchery were built below the 
Lewiston Diversion Dam site.  This facility was temporary and was used during the construction of both 
the Trinity and Lewiston Dams.  A permanent facility was later built below the Lewiston Dam.  See Trinity 
Journal, August 15, 1957; January 21, 1960; July 14, 1960. 
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industrial development in the Basin.  The Klamath Basin River Survey did not address 
the Trinity River project, or its potential impact upon fish and wildlife.  Ironically, 
however, the report unintentionally demonstrated the potential destruction of anadromous 
fish habitat posed by dams and other river obstructions.  The report states: 
 
Many dams were built in the Klamath River drainage in Trinity and 
Siskiyou Counties during the past 80 or 90 years for the purpose of 
diverting water for domestic and mining uses.  All of these dams formed 
partial or complete obstructions to migrating fishes on their spawning 
runs.  Some of them blocked salmon and steelhead from miles of 
spawning gravels upstream...thus confining the fish to the stream sections 
below the dams.  Over a period of years, sizes of fish runs in these streams 
where dams formed complete blocks were reduced to numbers consistent 
with the available spawning area.  The California Department of Fish and 
Game began removing known abandoned dams about 30 years ago.  This 
program has recently been stepped up, and in the past few years 22 dams 
have been removed in the Klamath River system in Trinity and Siskiyou 
Counties.  These removals, plus two dams in Siskiyou County which 
recently washed out, have made at least 210 miles of additional spawning 
gravel available to steelhead and salmon.600  
                                                
600Klamath River Basin Investigation, Bulletin #83, California Department of Water Resources, 
Division of Resources Planning, Sacramento, California, 1960, 155. 
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As the gates of the spillways of the Trinity Dam were being closed, cutting-off an 
unknown but certainly large percentage of spawning habitat on the main stem of the 
Trinity River, the State of California was tearing-down low dams hoping to restore 
spawning habitat in the region.  Ironically, while the State was removing antiquated low 
dams, the federal government was building two permanent high dams.  
 The Trinity River Division as completed consists of two earthen dams on the 
Trinity River above Lewiston to impound and divert the river and the upstream tributaries 
feeding into it.  The first, the Trinity Dam, impounds the Trinity River to create Trinity 
Lake for water storage. The second dam, six miles below the first, is the Lewiston Dam, 
and is for the purpose of diverting the Trinity to the Sacramento Basin and also regulate 
the remaining flow allowed to spill into the Trinity River.  At the Lewiston Dam water is 
diverted to a tunnel running easterly under the Trinity Mountains to Clear Creek.  From 
Clear Creek, water flows into another tunnel that drops to the Sacramento Valley where 
the water is co-mingled with the Sacramento River at the Keswick Dam.  The fall in 
elevation between the Trinity Dam and the Sacramento Valley is used to generate 
electricity.  Power facilities are located at the Trinity Dam and Lewiston Diversion dams, 
and electricity is also generated at Clear Creek (Tower House Tunnel and Power Plant) 
and at Keswick Reservoir (Matheson Tunnel and Power Plant).   
 The Bureau of Reclamation took nine years to build the Trinity River Division of 
the Central Valley Project, from the start of construction planning in 1955 to official 
completion in 1964.  In October 1961, Secretary of the Interior Stuart Udall dedicated the 
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Trinity Dam, the world’s largest earthen fill structure up to that time.601  Construction 
continued on the Lewiston Diversion Dam and the remaining components of the 
project.602  Once the system was complete and integrated into the CVP, the water of the 
Trinity River became indispensable to the Bureau of Reclamation's mission of created a 
multi-purpose Central Valley Project to meet all current and potential future water needs 
in California.603   
 The Trinity River Division of the Central Valley Project was radically different 
from previous structures built to manipulate the flow of the Trinity River. The Bureau of 
Reclamation built it to divert water out of the Trinity River Basin. Because the diversion 
removed more than eighty percent of the flow of the river at the point of diversion, the 
project had a negative impact on the anadromous fishery of the Trinity River and its 
ability to function as a dynamic alluvial stream. Soon after the closure of the diversion 
gates, the anadromous fishery began a rapid decline from which it has not, and may never 
recover.604  The primary justification for damming and diverting the Trinity River was the 
perceived need for water in California's Central Valley.  Supporters of the Trinity River 
Division assured opponents of the project that the farms and communities of the Central 
Valley of California would someday face a critical shortage of water for farming and 
                                                
601Trinity Journal, October 5, 1961; October 19, 1961. 
602The gates on the Trinity Dam were closed in November, 1960.  Almost three years were 
required to fill Trinity Lake, the reservoir created by the dam. Trinity Journal, December 1, 1960; April 4, 
1963. 
603Trinity Journal, August 4, 1955; August 18, 1955. 
604In 1999, a long-term study of the effects of the TRD, and the necessary measures needed to 
mitigate the dam's impact on the Trinity River was released by the Department of the Interior. See Trinity 
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domestic purposes unless the "surplus" or "waste" water of the Trinity River was 
captured and diverted-apparently anything more than 120fps was surplus.  120fps was 
deemed sufficient to support fish and wildlife within the Basin, and to meet future 
domestic, agricultural, and industrial needs.  Yet, when the project was under constructed 
in the late 1950s, there was no shortage of water in the Central Valley.  Rather, the 
Bureau of Reclamation built the project on the assumption of a perceived future demand 
and "market" for water - a demand created by the Bureau and Central Valley farmers who 
clamored for the construction of San Luis and Sacramento Canals Units to water the 
Westlands Water District in the San Joaquin Valley and agricultural lands in the western 
Sacramento Valley.   
 The proponents of the Trinity Division urged residents of the counties affected to 
support the diversion by portraying the project as beneficial to the local economy .  The 
reservoirs created by the projects’ two dams, they claimed, would spur the local 
economy. Project supports claimed confidently that fishing on the Trinity River, 
considered by anglers to be among the best salmon and steelhead fishing streams in 
America, would actually improve because of the cooler temperatures in the Trinity River 
as a result of releases originating deep in Trinity Lake.  Moreover, the increased average 
summer flows maintained in the river would provide better summer habitat for fish and 
wildlife.  Furthermore, along the entire Trinity River and on the lower Klamath, flood 
damage would decrease because the ferocious Trinity River, with its rapidly rising waters 
and unexpected floods, could be controlled by impounding and diverting a large part of 
the rivers' flow out of the Basin.  Commercial navigation, non-existent on the Trinity, and 
                                                                                                                                            
River Flow Evaluation: Final Report, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Washington, D.C., June 1999. 
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of only slight importance on the lower Klamath River, would not be harmed by the 
diversion.  Industry would benefit because a large supply of the hydroelectric power 
could be available for use within the Basin.  Finally, water left to the Basin below the 
diversion would be more than adequate to assure future growth. 
 The promised benefits of the TRD for the Trinity River Basin were not realized.  
Damming the river severely disrupted the system that kept the Trinity River a healthy, 
functioning alluvial stream. A river that possibly could have recovered from human 
activities that negatively impacted it no longer had enough flow to flush away hydraulic 
and dredge mining debris, nor the sediments produced by clear-cut logging.  Prior to 
damming, the Trinity River prior to damming swept the river banks of dense vegetation, 
flushed spawning gravels, and maintained the riffle-pool riverbed configuration needed 
for salmon propagation was gone. Within fifteen years after the construction of the 
project the fishery was in danger of complete collapse, and is now artificially sustained. 
Spawning beds that once existed below the Lewiston Dam became compacted because 
the water released from the dam is free of sediment and thus is  “hungry” water, meaning 
it has the ability to entrain high loads of sediment.  The water picks up the smaller, 
salmon-friendly gravels and leaves behind large boulders and rocks which are useless for 
spawning salmon.  Low flows result in an increase in water temperature and prompt the 
growth of algae that sucks oxygen from the water and leads to chemical changes.  
Because of changes in temperature, oxygen and chemistry, salmon have a difficult time 
surviving their first few years in the river before running to sea.  
  Flooding on the Trinity River did not stop, although the severity of floods was 
reduced.  Ironically, the disastrous 1964 floods on the Trinity River struck the same year 
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the project was completed - the dam was too full to prevent flooding, and too high in the 
watershed even if it had the capacity to absorb the storm surge.  Large-scale industrial 
growth did not appear with the availability of electrical power.  Recreation on the newly 
created lakes was certainly of some benefit, but it did not become the centerpiece of a 
strong regional economy.  Opponents of the TRD and the Westlands Water District failed 
to stop water from flowing to the Central Valley.605 
 The needs of the people of the Hoopa Valley Reservation did not play an 
important role in the planning process for the TRD.  After registering concerns in the 
1920s, neither Agents at Hoopa Valley, nor their superiors at the BIA and the Department 
of the Interior expressed serious doubts about the TRD.  Tribal opposition was limited 
and when expressed during the 1950s, came at a time when the Federal Government was 
contemplating termination of its trust responsibility for Native Americans. The rights of 
native peoples were seriously threatened during the 1950s, but one can only speculate 
that the atmosphere in Washington D.C. led Congress to give little weight to the concerns 
of indigenous peoples.  The diversion of the river severely affected the environmental 
health of the river, and the precipitous drop in the number of salmon had serious religious 
implications for the Hupa and other indigenous peoples within the region.  Salmon runs 
diminished dramatically, reducing the availability of this ancient food resource.  
 The diversion of the Trinity River was the result of the intersection of interest 
groups and the tension between those who supported and opposed the project.  The TRD 
                                                
605The most visible opponent of the TRD today is the organization Friends of the Trinity River.  
This group maintains an internet site with information and links to data on the TRD and advocates restoring 
the Trinity River to its pre-TRD condition.  See www.fotr.org. 
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was as successful as its proponents hoped, and as disastrous as its opponents predicted.  
The native peoples were essentially ignored throughout the process, and the opinions of 
non-Indian Basin residents who opposed the project, although they were allowed to 
express their reservations, were also ignored when the final decision came down.  The 
officials at the California Department of Wildlife who predicted, only after the project 
had been authorized, that it would harm the anadromous fishery were also ignored, yet 
they were correct in their assessment.  Thus, the competing interest groups, among them 
the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army Corps, the State of California and water users such 
as the Westlands Irrigation District, dictated the future health and well-being of a River 
Basin and its residents within the context of their own bureaucratic and economic self-




 The changes wrought upon the Trinity River Basin, together with the Indian 
response and participation in the processes involved reveals that change was a result of 
the dynamic interactions among various interest groups. The competition over the 
exploitation and use of natural resources changed the Trinity River Basin over time.  The 
impact of these changes on the Basin’s inhabitants began when miners entered the Trinity 
River watershed in the 1840s.  The region’s indigenous inhabitants previously harvested 
anadromous fishes from the Basin’s rivers and streams for sustenance, and also centered 
their spiritual world upon the Trinity River and the salmon it provided.  The first miners 
entering the watershed disrupted the flow of the Trinity River and roiled the water with 
mining debris, causing rapid decline in the number of anadromous fishes available to the 
Indian peoples dependent upon them for life.  The disruption of the salmon runs led to 
bloody conflict between miners and Indians, and some tribes, particularly the Trinity 
River Wintu and Chimariko, were decimated and mostly driven away from the Basin.  
For those Indian peoples who managed to weather the onslaught, the federal government 
imposed reservations upon them.  Local merchants and the State attempted to kill or 
remove the Indians, and when they failed, demanded that the federal government send the 
Army to do so.  In 1855 U.S. Army and the Office of Indian Affairs established the 
Klamath Reserve on the lower Klamath River much to the dismay of local non-Indians 
who insisted that the Indians be removed.  On the Trinity River, in 1864, after bloody 
regional conflict in which the Hupas gave as good as they got, the government 
acquiesced to the wishes of the Hupa people, and instead of removing them to Round 
Valley or confining them on Catalina Island, they were allowed to remain in their 
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homeland, Hoopa Valley.  The federal government drew a boundary around the valley 
and set it aside as a reservation for them.  Whites who lived in the valley were paid cash 
for their improvements and expelled from the new reservation.   This was a compromise 
on the part of the government and Hupa Indians.   In return for being allowed to remain 
in their homes, the Hupas agreed to give up their freedom of movement away from the 
valley, and take up the plow and become yeoman farmers - a complete shift from their 
traditional life way.  And so began the long process of the federal attempt to impose a 
top-down program of redirecting the Hupa away from their traditional subsistence 
practices and away from the Trinity River in order to re-focus them towards to a market-
oriented economy based primarily upon agriculture.    
 In the long run, the efforts of the government to alter the Hupa’s relationship with 
the Trinity River (and by implication, their spiritual relationship with the salmon) were 
only marginally successful.  The Hupa did take up wage-labor and attempted to survive 
by farming, mining, and logging to supplement their loss of reliable salmon runs, but they 
did not discontinue their relationship with the Trinity River or abandon all of their 
religious ceremonies.  Instead, they took what they could use from the outsiders and tried 
to adapt what they already knew to the new reality of life in the Trinity River Basin.  
 Once the Indian peoples of the Trinity River watershed were confined to 
reservations, the development of the resources of the Trinity Basin went ahead relatively 
unimpeded.  After the first miners exhausted the easily mined placer gold, their 
operations gave way to highly-efficient, industrialized hydraulic and dredge mining, 
which, unlike those mines located in the mountains above the Central Valley, were free 
from the restrictions imposed by the Sawyer Decision, and were not under the regulations 
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imposed by the California Debris Commission.  Industrial mining further deteriorated the 
health of the rivers and streams of the Trinity River by dumping millions of cubic yards 
of mining debris causing deposition of sediment, suffocation and destruction of 
anadromous fish habitat, creating further downward pressure upon the anadromous fish 
population in the region as a whole.  Simultaneously with the rise of industrial mining, 
commercial salmon canning operations began operating at the mouth of the Klamath 
River and, using Yurok Indians as laborers (thus providing them with cash), they 
diminished the runs of salmon up the Klamath and Trinity Rivers so greatly that they 
caused the failure of the fish hatchery in Hoopa Valley built to employ Hupas who were 
paid cash to catch fish and strip them of roe and milk.   
 After the turn of the 20th century, sports fisherman began traveling to northwest 
coastal California by automobile to fish for salmon at the mouth of the Klamath River.  
Newly constructed federally and state-funded highways and gravel roads, combined with 
improved automobile technology, gave rise to a burgeoning tourist industry in 
northwestern California based upon fishing for salmon and steelhead.  The sport fishing 
industry was centered on the Klamath River and within the Trinity River Basin.  The rise 
of sport fishing spawned the growth of sport fishing organizations and local chambers of 
commerce who combined forces to fight threats to their recreation and local economies.  
The organization began putting pressure on the State of California to regulate industrial 
mining and logging to preserve what was then recognized as one of the most productive 
and important anadromous fisheries in all of California.  The State responded by creating 
a hydraulic mining “season” to accommodate mining interests, but banned mining during 
the fall runs of salmon and steelhead.  These sportsman organization also turned on the 
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commercial canneries at the mouth of the Klamath River, and managed to get the State to 
ban commercial fishing in the 1930s to provide further protection for the anadromous 
fishery. The Hupa were also criticized for their traditional fishing practices, but they did 
not cave to the pressure to stop building weirs and using dip nets, but did pledge to ensure 
that fish made their way upriver past the their valley.  Nonetheless, competing resource 
uses meant that efforts to stem the decline of the anadromous fishery would be an uphill 
battle.    
 The Hupas themselves attempted to diversify their economic activity in the valley 
by pursuing gold mining, logging, and irrigation-based farming by tapping seeps 
emanating from the mountains surrounding them.  Because the allotment process dragged 
on so long, haphazardly and poorly executed, the Hupas resisted investing too much of 
their own labor and resources onto lands that might be taken away at any moment by a 
bureaucrat wielding a fountain pen behind a desk in Washington D.C.  Thus, their efforts 
to farm and mine were only half-hearted.  The BIA stepped up in the early 20th century to 
construct an irrigation system for the Hupa that would divert water from the streams 
leading into the valley rather than the Trinity River.  Delays, poor design, and under 
funding plagued the system, and once complete, it was far from adequate to irrigate all of 
the valley’s arable land, and the repayment on the system was far too expensive for most 
Hupas to use it.  Thus the system languished and eventually fell into dis-use, becoming 
yet another example of a top-down federal policy failure caused not only by bureaucratic 
mistake, but by local resistance to take on a debt burden that was too onerous to pay 
back. 
 Logging was not a major industry in the Trinity River watershed prior to World 
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War II and so is not a main focus of this study.  Yet the isolation of the Trinity River 
Basin was broken when the State commenced building roads through the Basin in the 
1920s, and continued to improve roads in the watershed using federal highway funds 
throughout the 1930s and thereafter.   Without proper planning for erosion control on the 
highly unstable granitic soils and steep terrain of the Trinity Basin, logging can cause 
severe erosion and dramatically raise the sediment load of the streams feeding into the 
Trinity River and thus further impact the anadromous fish habitat.  There was only 
limited logging in the Basin prior to World War II, and most of that was for local 
consumption. The Hupas, led by David Risling, began commercial logging on their own 
initiative in Hoopa Valley, but that operation was mostly for local consumption and only 
to a limited extent for outside markets. By the 1930s the BIA began to interest themselves 
in the forests of Hoopa Valley and began to suppress fires (often blamed on unemployed 
Hupas, yet the fires had a cultural context as well), and to calculate the board-feet 
available in the valley by timber cruising, scaling, and the compilation of a forestry plan.  
World War II put the forestry activity in the Valley on hold for the duration of the 
conflict and only later would timber harvesting on an industrial scale be conducted in 
Hoopa Valley. 
 The most important change witnessed within the Trinity River Basin was caused 
not by in-Basin interests, but rather, by outside interests who desired a resource abundant 
within that Basin that had assumed tremendous importance outside of the region.  With 
the rise of hydroelectric power generation in the early-1900s, water-power sites on public 
lands were coveted by private power interests.  The federal government, acting through 
the United States Forest Service, withdrew thousands of acres of potential power sites 
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from public entry in the Trinity River Basin and elsewhere to prevent a “run” on these 
potentially valuable sites.  Once the Federal Power Commission created a system 
whereby private companies and individuals could obtain licenses for hydro-power sites, 
and could file for water rights with state water boards, the Trinity River Basin and other 
parts of the West were opened to people and companies wishing to develop hydroelectric 
power sites.   
 
Hoopa Valley within the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation on the Trinity River ca. early-1960s.  Note the 
lumber milling operations, the meandering Trinity River, farm fields and a landslide far in the background.   
Industrial lumber operations did not reach the valley until after World War II.  After that time, the lumber 
industry became a major employer of Hupas and other Indian residents of the region.  Eastman photo 
postcard.  Authors’ personal collection.  
 
 During the 1920s, while the Hupa were struggling with the delays and set-backs 
on the Indian Irrigation Service project,  W.H. Sampson filed for water rights on the 
Trinity River to dam the river for hydroelectric power generation.  The application had 
the support of many Basin residents until the Trinity Journal revealed that Sampson 
proposal actually called for diverting most of the Trinity River out of the Basin through a 
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tunnel to the Central Valley for use in irrigation agriculture.  Sampson failed to meet the 
conditions imposed upon him by the FPC and lost his right to build the project.  While 
Sampson worked on his project, the USGS, the State of California and the Bureau of 
Reclamation conducted physical surveys of the Trinity River Basin, its total water 
budget, and the best water-power sites, and eventually determined that Sampson’s 
proposal, with some modifications, was the most feasible.  By the 1930s, the State had 
given over to the federal government the responsibility for designing, building (and 
paying for) the Central Valley Project.  Once that project was underway, the Bureau 
began looking at other areas to augment the supply of water for agribusinesses fin the 
Central and San Joaquin valleys.  After the end of WWII, the Bureau of Reclamation, 
supported by Congressman Clair Engle, began pushing for the construction of the Trinity 
River Division (TRD) of the Central Valley Project.  By the mid-1950s, after much 
debate, inadequate study on the environmental impacts of the diversion, and politics 
trumping science, Congress approved and funded the project.  The gates were closed on 
the TRD in the early 1960s, and the Trinity River Basin was now inextricably linked to 
the outside world.  
 Competing interests determined the path of change within the Trinity River Basin.  
The region’s Indian people experienced tremendous social and cultural disruptions, but 
adapted old ways to new circumstances.   In many ways, the Hupas succeeded (at least to 
a certain extent) in influencing the outcomes of the changes they faced.  Non-Indian 
peoples also experienced the changes in the Basin.  Their lives, too, were transformed by 
events they helped set in motion.  By the 1950 and early 1960s, the Basin was a place 
where all peoples had settled into their niches, both Indian and non-Indian, and faced the 
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fact that they were all, in some way, dependent upon the Basin’s natural resources for 
making a living.  Finally, most of the flow of the Trinity River itself, the bind that ties the 
upper and lower Basin residents to one another, had been appropriated by outsiders.  The 
TRD changed the world within the Basin by linking it to the larger California and 
Western water and electric power network. 
 The destruction of the Trinity River came about as a result of many events, large 
and small, obscure and obvious, directed and accidental.  The conversion of a once free-
flowing river teaming with anadromous fishes to a resource appropriated by various 
competing interests did not happen overnight, nor did any single interest determine the 
course of events or their outcome.  Over time the interests groups competing within the 
Basin changed as the resources they coveted either gave out, lost value, gained valued, or 
were placed off limits by the State or federal government. The Trinity River still flows.  
Although now it is a much diminished stream, it is still a hotly contested resource.  The 
resources of the Trinity River Basin are still subject to the forces of competing interests.  
The competition today includes a reinvigorated Indian tribe - now another interest group 
(albeit with deeper historical ties to the resource than any other) wanting acquire enough 
water from the TRD to ensure the yearly return of the salmon that are central to their 
culture.  Opposed to them are various interests outside the Basin who have come to rely 
upon Trinity River water provided them by the CVP.  As competition continues, a 
broader lesson can be learned.  The current condition of the Trinity River speaks to the 
clashing ideologies of how to use natural resources, but perhaps more important, the 
condition we find the Trinity River in today, regardless of planning, or lack thereof, was 
not wholly predictable.  Instead, the Trinity River should stand as an example of best 
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intentions gone awry.   As government and private planners consider additional 
management schemes for the Trinity Basin, they should be aware that the work of their 
predecessors was fraught with lone term hidden impacts that chart some of the limits of 
the human capacity to superintend nature.                   
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